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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/Kconfig9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c24
2 files changed, 23 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
index 85246dd9faa1..9b1ec5d8c99c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/Kconfig
@@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ config XEN_DOM0
select X86_X2APIC if XEN_PVH && X86_64
help
Support running as a Xen Dom0 guest.
+
+config XEN_PV_MSR_SAFE
+ bool "Always use safe MSR accesses in PV guests"
+ default y
+ depends on XEN_PV
+ help
+ Use safe (not faulting) MSR access functions even if the MSR access
+ should not fault anyway.
+ The default can be changed by using the "xen_msr_safe" boot parameter.
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 8c2acccebfe1..0ad3d4bf52b3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -108,6 +108,16 @@ struct tls_descs {
*/
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
+static __read_mostly bool xen_msr_safe = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_PV_MSR_SAFE);
+
+static int __init parse_xen_msr_safe(char *str)
+{
+ if (str)
+ return strtobool(str, &xen_msr_safe);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+early_param("xen_msr_safe", parse_xen_msr_safe);
+
static void __init xen_pv_init_platform(void)
{
/* PV guests can't operate virtio devices without grants. */
@@ -1010,22 +1020,16 @@ static int xen_write_msr_safe(unsigned int msr, unsigned int low,
static u64 xen_read_msr(unsigned int msr)
{
- /*
- * This will silently swallow a #GP from RDMSR. It may be worth
- * changing that.
- */
int err;
- return xen_read_msr_safe(msr, &err);
+ return xen_do_read_msr(msr, xen_msr_safe ? &err : NULL);
}
static void xen_write_msr(unsigned int msr, unsigned low, unsigned high)
{
- /*
- * This will silently swallow a #GP from WRMSR. It may be worth
- * changing that.
- */
- xen_write_msr_safe(msr, low, high);
+ int err;
+
+ xen_do_write_msr(msr, low, high, xen_msr_safe ? &err : NULL);
}
/* This is called once we have the cpu_possible_mask */