1 files changed, 550 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fd689921a1db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * shstk.c - Intel shadow stack support
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Intel Corporation.
+ * Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
+#include <asm/shstk.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/prctl.h>
+
+#define SS_FRAME_SIZE 8
+
+static bool features_enabled(unsigned long features)
+{
+	return current->thread.features & features;
+}
+
+static void features_set(unsigned long features)
+{
+	current->thread.features |= features;
+}
+
+static void features_clr(unsigned long features)
+{
+	current->thread.features &= ~features;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.  A token is always 8-byte
+ * and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
+{
+	unsigned long addr;
+
+	/* Token must be aligned */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	addr = ssp - SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * SSP is aligned, so reserved bits and mode bit are a zero, just mark
+	 * the token 64-bit.
+	 */
+	ssp |= BIT(0);
+
+	if (write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)addr, (u64)ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (token_addr)
+		*token_addr = addr;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * VM_SHADOW_STACK will have a guard page. This helps userspace protect
+ * itself from attacks. The reasoning is as follows:
+ *
+ * The shadow stack pointer(SSP) is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSPQ. The
+ * INCSSP instruction can increment the shadow stack pointer. It is the
+ * shadow stack analog of an instruction like:
+ *
+ *   addq $0x80, %rsp
+ *
+ * However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp
+ * and INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the
+ * memory of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be
+ * thought of as acting like this:
+ *
+ * READ_ONCE(ssp);       // read+discard top element on stack
+ * ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stack
+ * READ_ONCE(ssp-8);     // read+discard last popped stack element
+ *
+ * The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before
+ * it would read the memory. Therefore a single page gap will be enough
+ * to prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack,
+ * since it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a
+ * fault.
+ */
+static unsigned long alloc_shstk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
+				 unsigned long token_offset, bool set_res_tok)
+{
+	int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ABOVE4G;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+	unsigned long mapped_addr, unused;
+
+	if (addr)
+		flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
+
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
+	mapped_addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags,
+			      VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &unused, NULL);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
+
+	if (!set_res_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(mapped_addr))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (create_rstor_token(mapped_addr + token_offset, NULL)) {
+		vm_munmap(mapped_addr, size);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	return mapped_addr;
+}
+
+static unsigned long adjust_shstk_size(unsigned long size)
+{
+	if (size)
+		return PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+
+	return PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
+}
+
+static void unmap_shadow_stack(u64 base, u64 size)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = vm_munmap(base, size);
+
+	/*
+	 * mmap_write_lock_killable() failed with -EINTR. This means
+	 * the process is about to die and have it's MM cleaned up.
+	 * This task shouldn't ever make it back to userspace. In this
+	 * case it is ok to leak a shadow stack, so just exit out.
+	 */
+	if (r == -EINTR)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * For all other types of vm_munmap() failure, either the
+	 * system is out of memory or there is bug.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(r);
+}
+
+static int shstk_setup(void)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &current->thread.shstk;
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+
+	/* Already enabled */
+	if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Also not supported for 32 bit and x32 */
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) || in_32bit_syscall())
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	size = adjust_shstk_size(0);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return PTR_ERR((void *)addr);
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, addr + size);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_SHSTK_EN);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	shstk->base = addr;
+	shstk->size = size;
+	features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void reset_thread_features(void)
+{
+	memset(&current->thread.shstk, 0, sizeof(struct thread_shstk));
+	current->thread.features = 0;
+	current->thread.features_locked = 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long clone_flags,
+				       unsigned long stack_size)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+
+	/*
+	 * If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
+	 * switch to a new shadow stack.
+	 */
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * For CLONE_VM, except vfork, the child needs a separate shadow
+	 * stack.
+	 */
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) != CLONE_VM)
+		return 0;
+
+	size = adjust_shstk_size(stack_size);
+	addr = alloc_shstk(0, size, 0, false);
+	if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+		return addr;
+
+	shstk->base = addr;
+	shstk->size = size;
+
+	return addr + size;
+}
+
+static unsigned long get_user_shstk_addr(void)
+{
+	unsigned long long ssp;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return ssp;
+}
+
+#define SHSTK_DATA_BIT BIT(63)
+
+static int put_shstk_data(u64 __user *addr, u64 data)
+{
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(data & SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark the high bit so that the sigframe can't be processed as a
+	 * return address.
+	 */
+	if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, data | SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int get_shstk_data(unsigned long *data, unsigned long __user *addr)
+{
+	unsigned long ldata;
+
+	if (unlikely(get_user(ldata, addr)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (!(ldata & SHSTK_DATA_BIT))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*data = ldata & ~SHSTK_DATA_BIT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int shstk_push_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
+{
+	unsigned long target_ssp = *ssp;
+
+	/* Token must be aligned */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(target_ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+	if (put_shstk_data((void __user *)*ssp, target_ssp))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int shstk_pop_sigframe(unsigned long *ssp)
+{
+	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+	unsigned long token_addr;
+	bool need_to_check_vma;
+	int err = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * It is possible for the SSP to be off the end of a shadow stack by 4
+	 * or 8 bytes. If the shadow stack is at the start of a page or 4 bytes
+	 * before it, it might be this case, so check that the address being
+	 * read is actually shadow stack.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(*ssp, 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	need_to_check_vma = PAGE_ALIGN(*ssp) == *ssp;
+
+	if (need_to_check_vma)
+		mmap_read_lock_killable(current->mm);
+
+	err = get_shstk_data(&token_addr, (unsigned long __user *)*ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		goto out_err;
+
+	if (need_to_check_vma) {
+		vma = find_vma(current->mm, *ssp);
+		if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
+			err = -EFAULT;
+			goto out_err;
+		}
+
+		mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+	}
+
+	/* Restore SSP aligned? */
+	if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED(token_addr, 8)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* SSP in userspace? */
+	if (unlikely(token_addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*ssp = token_addr;
+
+	return 0;
+out_err:
+	if (need_to_check_vma)
+		mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+int setup_signal_shadow_stack(struct ksignal *ksig)
+{
+	void __user *restorer = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+	    !features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!restorer)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	if (unlikely(!ssp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = shstk_push_sigframe(&ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+
+	/* Push restorer address */
+	ssp -= SS_FRAME_SIZE;
+	err = write_user_shstk_64((u64 __user *)ssp, (u64)restorer);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int restore_signal_shadow_stack(void)
+{
+	unsigned long ssp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+	    !features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	ssp = get_user_shstk_addr();
+	if (unlikely(!ssp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = shstk_pop_sigframe(&ssp);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void shstk_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct thread_shstk *shstk = &tsk->thread.shstk;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+	    !features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
+	 * shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
+	 * free it.  In this case the parent (current) and the child share
+	 * the same mm struct.
+	 */
+	if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
+		return;
+
+	unmap_shadow_stack(shstk->base, shstk->size);
+}
+
+static int wrss_control(bool enable)
+{
+	u64 msrval;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/*
+	 * Only enable WRSS if shadow stack is enabled. If shadow stack is not
+	 * enabled, WRSS will already be disabled, so don't bother clearing it
+	 * when disabling.
+	 */
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Already enabled/disabled? */
+	if (features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS) == enable)
+		return 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
+	if (enable) {
+		features_set(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		msrval |= CET_WRSS_EN;
+	} else {
+		features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+		if (!(msrval & CET_WRSS_EN))
+			goto unlock;
+
+		msrval &= ~CET_WRSS_EN;
+	}
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, msrval);
+
+unlock:
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int shstk_disable(void)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	/* Already disabled? */
+	if (!features_enabled(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK))
+		return 0;
+
+	fpregs_lock_and_load();
+	/* Disable WRSS too when disabling shadow stack */
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, 0);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, 0);
+	fpregs_unlock();
+
+	shstk_free(current);
+	features_clr(ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK | ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
+{
+	bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
+	unsigned long aligned_size;
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* If there isn't space for a token */
+	if (set_tok && size < 8)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	if (addr && addr < SZ_4G)
+		return -ERANGE;
+
+	/*
+	 * An overflow would result in attempting to write the restore token
+	 * to the wrong location. Not catastrophic, but just return the right
+	 * error code and block it.
+	 */
+	aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
+	if (aligned_size < size)
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	return alloc_shstk(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
+}
+
+long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)
+{
+	unsigned long features = arg2;
+
+	if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS) {
+		return put_user(task->thread.features, (unsigned long __user *)arg2);
+	}
+
+	if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK) {
+		task->thread.features_locked |= features;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Only allow via ptrace */
+	if (task != current) {
+		if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)) {
+			task->thread.features_locked &= ~features;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Do not allow to change locked features */
+	if (features & task->thread.features_locked)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/* Only support enabling/disabling one feature at a time. */
+	if (hweight_long(features) > 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (option == ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE) {
+		if (features & ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS)
+			return wrss_control(false);
+		if (features & ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)
+			return shstk_disable();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE */
+	if (features & ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK)
+		return shstk_setup();
+	if (features & ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS)
+		return wrss_control(true);
+	return -EINVAL;
+}