diff options
author | Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com> | 2017-07-12 14:33:21 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-12 16:26:00 -0700 |
commit | 1229384f5b856d83698c38f9dedfd836e26711cb (patch) | |
tree | fb797eeab18938f30aa26aab8fd5c270cf0719e7 /kernel/kexec_core.c | |
parent | 5203f4995d9a87952a83c2ce7866adbbe8f97bb5 (diff) |
kdump: protect vmcoreinfo data under the crash memory
Currently vmcoreinfo data is updated at boot time subsys_initcall(), it
has the risk of being modified by some wrong code during system is
running.
As a result, vmcore dumped may contain the wrong vmcoreinfo. Later on,
when using "crash", "makedumpfile", etc utility to parse this vmcore, we
probably will get "Segmentation fault" or other unexpected errors.
E.g. 1) wrong code overwrites vmcoreinfo_data; 2) further crashes the
system; 3) trigger kdump, then we obviously will fail to recognize the
crash context correctly due to the corrupted vmcoreinfo.
Now except for vmcoreinfo, all the crash data is well
protected(including the cpu note which is fully updated in the crash
path, thus its correctness is guaranteed). Given that vmcoreinfo data
is a large chunk prepared for kdump, we better protect it as well.
To solve this, we relocate and copy vmcoreinfo_data to the crash memory
when kdump is loading via kexec syscalls. Because the whole crash
memory will be protected by existing arch_kexec_protect_crashkres()
mechanism, we naturally protect vmcoreinfo_data from write(even read)
access under kernel direct mapping after kdump is loaded.
Since kdump is usually loaded at the very early stage after boot, we can
trust the correctness of the vmcoreinfo data copied.
On the other hand, we still need to operate the vmcoreinfo safe copy
when crash happens to generate vmcoreinfo_note again, we rely on vmap()
to map out a new kernel virtual address and update to use this new one
instead in the following crash_save_vmcoreinfo().
BTW, we do not touch vmcoreinfo_note, because it will be fully updated
using the protected vmcoreinfo_data after crash which is surely correct
just like the cpu crash note.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493281021-20737-3-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/kexec_core.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kexec_core.c | 39 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index 154ffb489b93..1ae7c41c33c1 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -482,6 +482,40 @@ struct page *kimage_alloc_control_pages(struct kimage *image, return pages; } +int kimage_crash_copy_vmcoreinfo(struct kimage *image) +{ + struct page *vmcoreinfo_page; + void *safecopy; + + if (image->type != KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH) + return 0; + + /* + * For kdump, allocate one vmcoreinfo safe copy from the + * crash memory. as we have arch_kexec_protect_crashkres() + * after kexec syscall, we naturally protect it from write + * (even read) access under kernel direct mapping. But on + * the other hand, we still need to operate it when crash + * happens to generate vmcoreinfo note, hereby we rely on + * vmap for this purpose. + */ + vmcoreinfo_page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0); + if (!vmcoreinfo_page) { + pr_warn("Could not allocate vmcoreinfo buffer\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + safecopy = vmap(&vmcoreinfo_page, 1, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL); + if (!safecopy) { + pr_warn("Could not vmap vmcoreinfo buffer\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + image->vmcoreinfo_data_copy = safecopy; + crash_update_vmcoreinfo_safecopy(safecopy); + + return 0; +} + static int kimage_add_entry(struct kimage *image, kimage_entry_t entry) { if (*image->entry != 0) @@ -569,6 +603,11 @@ void kimage_free(struct kimage *image) if (!image) return; + if (image->vmcoreinfo_data_copy) { + crash_update_vmcoreinfo_safecopy(NULL); + vunmap(image->vmcoreinfo_data_copy); + } + kimage_free_extra_pages(image); for_each_kimage_entry(image, ptr, entry) { if (entry & IND_INDIRECTION) { |