diff options
author | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2023-04-20 13:33:56 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> | 2023-04-20 16:57:53 +0100 |
commit | 87727ba2bb05cc3cb4233231faa7ab4c7eeb6c73 (patch) | |
tree | 85f71f9300e38eb3a2e6d8a47f34172fc2c1ad94 /arch | |
parent | 257aedb72e731082ab514058e57b132f0b29d707 (diff) |
KVM: arm64: Ensure CPU PMU probes before pKVM host de-privilege
Although pKVM supports CPU PMU emulation for non-protected guests since
722625c6f4c5 ("KVM: arm64: Reenable pmu in Protected Mode"), this relies
on the PMU driver probing before the host has de-privileged so that the
'kvm_arm_pmu_available' static key can still be enabled by patching the
hypervisor text.
As it happens, both of these events hang off device_initcall() but the
PMU consistently won the race until 7755cec63ade ("arm64: perf: Move
PMUv3 driver to drivers/perf"). Since then, the host will fail to boot
when pKVM is enabled:
| hw perfevents: enabled with armv8_pmuv3_0 PMU driver, 7 counters available
| kvm [1]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff8000090366e0>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x284!
| kvm [1]: Cannot dump pKVM nVHE stacktrace: !CONFIG_PROTECTED_NVHE_STACKTRACE
| kvm [1]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffea41fbdf70000
| Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic:
| PS:a00003c9 PC:0000dbe04b0c66e0 ESR:00000000f2000800
| FAR:fffffbfffddfcf00 HPFAR:00000000010b0bf0 PAR:0000000000000000
| VCPU:0000000000000000
| CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7-00083-g0bce6746d154 #1
| Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
| Call trace:
| dump_backtrace+0xec/0x108
| show_stack+0x18/0x2c
| dump_stack_lvl+0x50/0x68
| dump_stack+0x18/0x24
| panic+0x13c/0x33c
| nvhe_hyp_panic_handler+0x10c/0x190
| aarch64_insn_patch_text_nosync+0x64/0xc8
| arch_jump_label_transform+0x4c/0x5c
| __jump_label_update+0x84/0xfc
| jump_label_update+0x100/0x134
| static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0x68/0xac
| static_key_enable+0x20/0x34
| kvm_host_pmu_init+0x88/0xa4
| armpmu_register+0xf0/0xf4
| arm_pmu_acpi_probe+0x2ec/0x368
| armv8_pmu_driver_init+0x38/0x44
| do_one_initcall+0xcc/0x240
Fix the race properly by deferring the de-privilege step to
device_initcall_sync(). This will also be needed in future when probing
IOMMU devices and allows us to separate the pKVM de-privilege logic from
the core hypervisor initialisation path.
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Fixes: 7755cec63ade ("arm64: perf: Move PMUv3 driver to drivers/perf")
Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230420123356.2708-1-will@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c | 47 |
2 files changed, 47 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index 3bd732eaf087..890f730bc3ab 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/mman.h> #include <linux/sched.h> -#include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <linux/kvm.h> #include <linux/kvm_irqfd.h> #include <linux/irqbypass.h> @@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ #include <kvm/arm_psci.h> static enum kvm_mode kvm_mode = KVM_MODE_DEFAULT; -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kvm_protected_mode_initialized); DECLARE_KVM_HYP_PER_CPU(unsigned long, kvm_hyp_vector); @@ -2105,41 +2103,6 @@ out_err: return err; } -static void __init _kvm_host_prot_finalize(void *arg) -{ - int *err = arg; - - if (WARN_ON(kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_prot_finalize))) - WRITE_ONCE(*err, -EINVAL); -} - -static int __init pkvm_drop_host_privileges(void) -{ - int ret = 0; - - /* - * Flip the static key upfront as that may no longer be possible - * once the host stage 2 is installed. - */ - static_branch_enable(&kvm_protected_mode_initialized); - on_each_cpu(_kvm_host_prot_finalize, &ret, 1); - return ret; -} - -static int __init finalize_hyp_mode(void) -{ - if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) - return 0; - - /* - * Exclude HYP sections from kmemleak so that they don't get peeked - * at, which would end badly once inaccessible. - */ - kmemleak_free_part(__hyp_bss_start, __hyp_bss_end - __hyp_bss_start); - kmemleak_free_part_phys(hyp_mem_base, hyp_mem_size); - return pkvm_drop_host_privileges(); -} - struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_mpidr_to_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long mpidr) { struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu; @@ -2257,14 +2220,6 @@ static __init int kvm_arm_init(void) if (err) goto out_hyp; - if (!in_hyp_mode) { - err = finalize_hyp_mode(); - if (err) { - kvm_err("Failed to finalize Hyp protection\n"); - goto out_subs; - } - } - if (is_protected_kvm_enabled()) { kvm_info("Protected nVHE mode initialized successfully\n"); } else if (in_hyp_mode) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c index cf56958b1492..6e9ece1ebbe7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ * Author: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com> */ +#include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/kmemleak.h> #include <linux/kvm_host.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> @@ -13,6 +15,8 @@ #include "hyp_constants.h" +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kvm_protected_mode_initialized); + static struct memblock_region *hyp_memory = kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_memory); static unsigned int *hyp_memblock_nr_ptr = &kvm_nvhe_sym(hyp_memblock_nr); @@ -213,3 +217,46 @@ int pkvm_init_host_vm(struct kvm *host_kvm) mutex_init(&host_kvm->lock); return 0; } + +static void __init _kvm_host_prot_finalize(void *arg) +{ + int *err = arg; + + if (WARN_ON(kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_prot_finalize))) + WRITE_ONCE(*err, -EINVAL); +} + +static int __init pkvm_drop_host_privileges(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + + /* + * Flip the static key upfront as that may no longer be possible + * once the host stage 2 is installed. + */ + static_branch_enable(&kvm_protected_mode_initialized); + on_each_cpu(_kvm_host_prot_finalize, &ret, 1); + return ret; +} + +static int __init finalize_pkvm(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled()) + return 0; + + /* + * Exclude HYP sections from kmemleak so that they don't get peeked + * at, which would end badly once inaccessible. + */ + kmemleak_free_part(__hyp_bss_start, __hyp_bss_end - __hyp_bss_start); + kmemleak_free_part_phys(hyp_mem_base, hyp_mem_size); + + ret = pkvm_drop_host_privileges(); + if (ret) + pr_err("Failed to finalize Hyp protection: %d\n", ret); + + return ret; +} +device_initcall_sync(finalize_pkvm); |