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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-21 10:48:35 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-01-21 10:48:35 -0800
commit5515114211c5096987b8e622c2ca57929cebabaa (patch)
tree73924d90c4a9435b9eb0b29093b7b8a121c78864 /arch
parent319f1e04c7e7016233f998a1a48cd3d17da2108f (diff)
parent3f7d875566d8e79c5e0b2c9a413e91b2c29e0854 (diff)
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A small set of fixes for the meltdown/spectre mitigations: - Make kprobes aware of retpolines to prevent probes in the retpoline thunks. - Make the machine check exception speculation protected. MCE used to issue an indirect call directly from the ASM entry code. Convert that to a direct call into a C-function and issue the indirect call from there so the compiler can add the retpoline protection, - Make the vmexit_fill_RSB() assembly less stupid - Fix a typo in the PTI documentation" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/retpoline: Optimize inline assembler for vmexit_fill_RSB x86/pti: Document fix wrong index kprobes/x86: Disable optimizing on the function jumps to indirect thunk kprobes/x86: Blacklist indirect thunk functions for kprobes retpoline: Introduce start/end markers of indirect thunk x86/mce: Make machine check speculation protected
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S5
7 files changed, 45 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index aa15b4c0e3d1..ff6f8022612c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1264,7 +1264,7 @@ idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault has_error_code=1
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
-idtentry machine_check has_error_code=0 paranoid=1 do_sym=*machine_check_vector(%rip)
+idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 7b45d8424150..4ad41087ce0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
+extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
+extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
+
/*
* On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
* can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
@@ -203,16 +206,17 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+ unsigned long loops;
asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
"910:"
- : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
- : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+ : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+ : : "memory" );
#endif
}
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
index 31051f35cbb7..3de69330e6c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ dotraplinkage void do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
dotraplinkage void do_iret_error(struct pt_regs *, long);
#endif
+dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *, long);
static inline int get_si_code(unsigned long condition)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index b1d616d08eee..868e412b4f0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -1785,6 +1785,11 @@ static void unexpected_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
void (*machine_check_vector)(struct pt_regs *, long error_code) =
unexpected_machine_check;
+dotraplinkage void do_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ machine_check_vector(regs, error_code);
+}
+
/*
* Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
* Must be called with preempt off:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index e941136e24d8..203d398802a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ static int copy_optimized_instructions(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real)
}
/* Check whether insn is indirect jump */
-static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
+static int __insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
{
return ((insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0xff &&
(X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.value) & 6) == 4) || /* Jump */
@@ -237,6 +238,26 @@ static int insn_jump_into_range(struct insn *insn, unsigned long start, int len)
return (start <= target && target <= start + len);
}
+static int insn_is_indirect_jump(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ int ret = __insn_is_indirect_jump(insn);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * Jump to x86_indirect_thunk_* is treated as an indirect jump.
+ * Note that even with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y, the kernel compiled with
+ * older gcc may use indirect jump. So we add this check instead of
+ * replace indirect-jump check.
+ */
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = insn_jump_into_range(insn,
+ (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start,
+ (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_end -
+ (unsigned long)__indirect_thunk_start);
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Decode whole function to ensure any instructions don't jump into target */
static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 1e413a9326aa..9b138a06c1a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ SECTIONS
ASSERT(. - _entry_trampoline == PAGE_SIZE, "entry trampoline is too big");
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ __indirect_thunk_start = .;
+ *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
+ __indirect_thunk_end = .;
+#endif
+
/* End of text section */
_etext = .;
} :text = 0x9090
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index cb45c6cb465f..dfb2ba91b670 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.macro THUNK reg
- .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg
+ .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
CFI_STARTPROC
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
* than one per register with the correct names. So we do it
* the simple and nasty way...
*/
-#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
+#define __EXPORT_THUNK(sym) _ASM_NOKPROBE(sym); EXPORT_SYMBOL(sym)
+#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) __EXPORT_THUNK(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX)