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authorDave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>2016-05-12 15:04:00 -0700
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2016-05-20 09:07:40 +0200
commit0f6ff2bce0d4c3e4ff34f5d2ffb7329025b30844 (patch)
tree64e24c115ddc6541a60a577425febdc22166d7a5
parentd4bf7078c43e11097e0d6f04d3fb999bf92c4fb0 (diff)
x86/mm/mpx: Work around MPX erratum SKD046
This erratum essentially causes the CPU to forget which privilege level it is operating on (kernel vs. user) for the purposes of MPX. This erratum can only be triggered when a system is not using Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP). Our workaround for the erratum is to ensure that MPX can only be used in cases where SMEP is present in the processor and is enabled. This erratum only affects Core processors. Atom is unaffected. But, there is no architectural way to determine Atom vs. Core. So, we just apply this workaround to all processors. It's possible that it will mistakenly disable MPX on some Atom processsors or future unaffected Core processors. There are currently no processors that have MPX and not SMEP. It would take something akin to a hypervisor masking SMEP out on an Atom processor for this to present itself on current hardware. More details can be found at: http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/specification-updates/desktop-6th-gen-core-family-spec-update.pdf " SKD046 Branch Instructions May Initialize MPX Bound Registers Incorrectly Problem: Depending on the current Intel MPX (Memory Protection Extensions) configuration, execution of certain branch instructions (near CALL, near RET, near JMP, and Jcc instructions) without a BND prefix (F2H) initialize the MPX bound registers. Due to this erratum, such a branch instruction that is executed both with CPL = 3 and with CPL < 3 may not use the correct MPX configuration register (BNDCFGU or BNDCFGS, respectively) for determining whether to initialize the bound registers; it may thus initialize the bound registers when it should not, or fail to initialize them when it should. Implication: A branch instruction that has executed both in user mode and in supervisor mode (from the same linear address) may cause a #BR (bound range fault) when it should not have or may not cause a #BR when it should have. Workaround An operating system can avoid this erratum by setting CR4.SMEP[bit 20] to enable supervisor-mode execution prevention (SMEP). When SMEP is enabled, no code can be executed both with CPL = 3 and with CPL < 3. " Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160512220400.3B35F1BC@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c37
3 files changed, 48 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
index 08abf639075f..5490bbaf71d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/bugs.h
@@ -1,8 +1,16 @@
#ifndef _ASM_X86_BUGS_H
#define _ASM_X86_BUGS_H
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
extern void check_bugs(void);
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL)
+void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+#else
+static inline void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
+#endif
+
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL) && defined(CONFIG_X86_32)
int ppro_with_ram_bug(void);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index f45a4b9d28c8..62ff5255ae16 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/mtrr.h>
#include <linux/numa.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/mce.h>
#include <asm/msr.h>
@@ -270,6 +271,8 @@ static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg)
{
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
+ /* Check for things that depend on SMEP being enabled: */
+ check_mpx_erratum(&boot_cpu_data);
return 1;
}
__setup("nosmep", setup_disable_smep);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
index e4393bfc7f0d..b47df99dc5d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -25,6 +25,41 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#endif
+/*
+ * Just in case our CPU detection goes bad, or you have a weird system,
+ * allow a way to override the automatic disabling of MPX.
+ */
+static int forcempx;
+
+static int __init forcempx_setup(char *__unused)
+{
+ forcempx = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("intel-skd-046-workaround=disable", forcempx_setup);
+
+void check_mpx_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (forcempx)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Turn off the MPX feature on CPUs where SMEP is not
+ * available or disabled.
+ *
+ * Works around Intel Erratum SKD046: "Branch Instructions
+ * May Initialize MPX Bound Registers Incorrectly".
+ *
+ * This might falsely disable MPX on systems without
+ * SMEP, like Atom processors without SMEP. But there
+ * is no such hardware known at the moment.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MPX) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) {
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MPX);
+ pr_warn("x86/mpx: Disabling MPX since SMEP not present\n");
+ }
+}
+
static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u64 misc_enable;
@@ -173,6 +208,8 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (edx & (1U << 28))
c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order((ebx >> 16) & 0xff);
}
+
+ check_mpx_erratum(c);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32