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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
- Add byte/half-word compare-and-exchange, emulated via LR/SC loops
- Support for Rust
- Support for Zihintpause in hwprobe
- Add PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX prctl()
- Support lockless lockrefs
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-6.10-mw1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/riscv/linux: (42 commits)
riscv: defconfig: Enable CONFIG_CLK_SOPHGO_CV1800
riscv: select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
riscv: mm: still create swiotlb buffer for kmalloc() bouncing if required
riscv: Annotate pgtable_l{4,5}_enabled with __ro_after_init
riscv: Remove redundant CONFIG_64BIT from pgtable_l{4,5}_enabled
riscv: mm: Always use an ASID to flush mm contexts
riscv: mm: Preserve global TLB entries when switching contexts
riscv: mm: Make asid_bits a local variable
riscv: mm: Use a fixed layout for the MM context ID
riscv: mm: Introduce cntx2asid/cntx2version helper macros
riscv: Avoid TLB flush loops when affected by SiFive CIP-1200
riscv: Apply SiFive CIP-1200 workaround to single-ASID sfence.vma
riscv: mm: Combine the SMP and UP TLB flush code
riscv: Only send remote fences when some other CPU is online
riscv: mm: Broadcast kernel TLB flushes only when needed
riscv: Use IPIs for remote cache/TLB flushes by default
riscv: Factor out page table TLB synchronization
riscv: Flush the instruction cache during SMP bringup
riscv: hwprobe: export Zihintpause ISA extension
riscv: misaligned: remove CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE specific code
...
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Now that we track a DEXCR on a per-task basis, individual tasks are free
to configure it as they like.
The interface is a pair of getter/setter prctl's that work on a single
aspect at a time (multiple aspects at once is more difficult if there
are different rules applied for each aspect, now or in future). The
getter shows the current state of the process config, and the setter
allows setting/clearing the aspect.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Gray <bgray@linux.ibm.com>
[mpe: Account for PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX, shrink some longs lines]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240417112325.728010-5-bgray@linux.ibm.com
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prctl"
Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com> says:
Improve the performance of icache flushing by creating a new prctl flag
PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX. The interface is left generic to allow
for future expansions such as with the proposed J extension [1].
Documentation is also provided to explain the use case.
Patch sent to add PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX to man-pages [2].
[1] https://github.com/riscv/riscv-j-extension
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-man/20240124-fencei_prctl-v1-1-0bddafcef331@rivosinc.com
* b4-shazam-merge:
cpumask: Add assign cpu
documentation: Document PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX prctl
riscv: Include riscv_set_icache_flush_ctx prctl
riscv: Remove unnecessary irqflags processor.h include
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312-fencei-v13-0-4b6bdc2bbf32@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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Support new prctl with key PR_RISCV_SET_ICACHE_FLUSH_CTX to enable
optimization of cross modifying code. This prctl enables userspace code
to use icache flushing instructions such as fence.i with the guarantee
that the icache will continue to be clean after thread migration.
Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240312-fencei-v13-2-4b6bdc2bbf32@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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Patch series "ARM: prctl: Reject PR_SET_MDWE where not supported".
I noticed after a recent kernel update that my ARM926 system started
segfaulting on any execve() after calling prctl(PR_SET_MDWE). After some
investigation it appears that ARMv5 is incapable of providing the
appropriate protections for MDWE, since any readable memory is also
implicitly executable.
The prctl_set_mdwe() function already had some special-case logic added
disabling it on PARISC (commit 793838138c15, "prctl: Disable
prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) on parisc"); this patch series (1) generalizes that
check to use an arch_*() function, and (2) adds a corresponding override
for ARM to disable MDWE on pre-ARMv6 CPUs.
With the series applied, prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) is rejected on ARMv5 and
subsequent execve() calls (as well as mmap(PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE)) can
succeed instead of unconditionally failing; on ARMv6 the prctl works as it
did previously.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2023112456-linked-nape-bf19@gregkh/
This patch (of 2):
There exist systems other than PARISC where MDWE may not be feasible to
support; rather than cluttering up the generic code with additional
arch-specific logic let's add a generic function for checking MDWE support
and allow each arch to override it as needed.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227013546.15769-4-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240227013546.15769-5-zev@bewilderbeest.net
Signed-off-by: Zev Weiss <zev@bewilderbeest.net>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> [parisc]
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Russell King (Oracle) <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Cc: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Cc: Yin Fengwei <fengwei.yin@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [6.3+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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lock_task_sighand() can trigger a hard lockup. If NR_CPUS threads call
getrusage() at the same time and the process has NR_THREADS, spin_lock_irq
will spin with irqs disabled O(NR_CPUS * NR_THREADS) time.
Change getrusage() to use sig->stats_lock, it was specifically designed
for this type of use. This way it runs lockless in the likely case.
TODO:
- Change do_task_stat() to use sig->stats_lock too, then we can
remove spin_lock_irq(siglock) in wait_task_zombie().
- Turn sig->stats_lock into seqcount_rwlock_t, this way the
readers in the slow mode won't exclude each other. See
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230913154907.GA26210@redhat.com/
- stats_lock has to disable irqs because ->siglock can be taken
in irq context, it would be very nice to change __exit_signal()
to avoid the siglock->stats_lock dependency.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155053.GA26214@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "getrusage: use sig->stats_lock", v2.
This patch (of 2):
thread_group_cputime() does its own locking, we can safely shift
thread_group_cputime_adjusted() which does another for_each_thread loop
outside of ->siglock protected section.
This is also preparation for the next patch which changes getrusage() to
use stats_lock instead of siglock, thread_group_cputime() takes the same
lock. With the current implementation recursive read_seqbegin_or_lock()
is fine, thread_group_cputime() can't enter the slow mode if the caller
holds stats_lock, yet this looks more safe and better performance-wise.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155023.GA26169@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240122155050.GA26205@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Tested-by: Dylan Hatch <dylanbhatch@google.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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systemd-254 tries to use prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) for it's MemoryDenyWriteExecute
functionality, but fails on parisc which still needs executable stacks in
certain combinations of gcc/glibc/kernel.
Disable prctl(PR_SET_MDWE) by returning -EINVAL for now on parisc, until
userspace has catched up.
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Closes: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/29775
Tested-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/875y2jro9a.fsf@gentoo.org/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.3+
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree
and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.
The lengthier patch series are
- 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation
in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and
consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling
- After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in
min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and
the use of min_t() and max_t()
- A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly
fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
task_struct.thread_group"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits)
scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU
scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n
.mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso
mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea
tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions
.mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address
scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv
ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment
proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test
proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall
fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon
do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock
do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread()
ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error()
ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code
treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
fs: ocfs2: check status values
proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm
compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h
...
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This extends the current PR_SET_MDWE prctl arg with a bit to indicate that
the process doesn't want MDWE protection to propagate to children.
To implement this no-inherit mode, the tag in current->mm->flags must be
absent from MMF_INIT_MASK. This means that the encoding for "MDWE but
without inherit" is different in the prctl than in the mm flags. This
leads to a bit of bit-mangling in the prctl implementation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230828150858.393570-6-revest@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexey Izbyshev <izbyshev@ispras.ru>
Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Ayush Jain <ayush.jain3@amd.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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do/while_each_thread should be avoided when possible.
Plus this change allows to avoid lock_task_sighand(), we can use rcu
and/or sig->stats_lock instead.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172629.GA20454@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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No functional changes, cleanup/preparation.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230909172554.GA20441@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Somehow PR_GET_AUXV got added into PR_MCE_KILL's switch when the patch was
applied [1].
Thus move it out of the switch, to the place the patch added it.
In the recently released v6.4 kernel some user could, in principle, be
already using this feature by mapping the right page and passing the
PR_GET_AUXV constant as a pointer:
prctl(PR_MCE_KILL, PR_GET_AUXV, ...)
So this does change the behavior for users. We could keep the bug since
the other subcases in PR_MCE_KILL (PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR and PR_MCE_KILL_SET)
do not overlap.
However, v6.4 may be recent enough (2 weeks old) that moving the lines
(rather than just adding a new case) does not break anybody? Moreover,
the documentation in man-pages was just committed today [2].
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230708233344.361854-1-ojeda@kernel.org
Fixes: ddc65971bb67 ("prctl: add PR_GET_AUXV to copy auxv to userspace")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/d81864a7f7f43bca6afa2a09fc2e850e4050ab42.1680611394.git.josh@joshtriplett.org/ [1]
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/man-pages/man-pages.git/commit/?id=8cf0c06bfd3c2b219b044d4151c96f0da50af9ad [2]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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This patch add two riscv-specific prctls, to allow usespace control the
use of vector unit:
* PR_RISCV_V_SET_CONTROL: control the permission to use Vector at next,
or all following execve for a thread. Turning off a thread's Vector
live is not possible since libraries may have registered ifunc that
may execute Vector instructions.
* PR_RISCV_V_GET_CONTROL: get the same permission setting for the
current thread, and the setting for following execve(s).
Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu <andy.chiu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Greentime Hu <greentime.hu@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Chen <vincent.chen@sifive.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230605110724.21391-22-andy.chiu@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
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Patch series "mm/ksm: improve PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0 handling and cleanup
disabling KSM", v2.
(1) Make PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0 unmerge pages like setting MADV_UNMERGEABLE
does, (2) add a selftest for it and (3) factor out disabling of KSM from
s390/gmap code.
This patch (of 3):
Let's unmerge any KSM pages when setting PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=0, and clear
the VM_MERGEABLE flag from all VMAs -- just like KSM would. Of course,
only do that if we previously set PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE=1.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230422205420.30372-1-david@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230422205420.30372-2-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Patch series "mm: process/cgroup ksm support", v9.
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
Use case 1:
The madvise call is not available in the programming language. An
example for this are programs with forked workloads using a garbage
collected language without pointers. In such a language madvise cannot
be made available.
In addition the addresses of objects get moved around as they are
garbage collected. KSM sharing needs to be enabled "from the outside"
for these type of workloads.
Use case 2:
The same interpreter can also be used for workloads where KSM brings
no benefit or even has overhead. We'd like to be able to enable KSM on
a workload by workload basis.
Use case 3:
With the madvise call sharing opportunities are only enabled for the
current process: it is a workload-local decision. A considerable number
of sharing opportunities may exist across multiple workloads or jobs (if
they are part of the same security domain). Only a higler level entity
like a job scheduler or container can know for certain if its running
one or more instances of a job. That job scheduler however doesn't have
the necessary internal workload knowledge to make targeted madvise
calls.
Security concerns:
In previous discussions security concerns have been brought up. The
problem is that an individual workload does not have the knowledge about
what else is running on a machine. Therefore it has to be very
conservative in what memory areas can be shared or not. However, if the
system is dedicated to running multiple jobs within the same security
domain, its the job scheduler that has the knowledge that sharing can be
safely enabled and is even desirable.
Performance:
Experiments with using UKSM have shown a capacity increase of around 20%.
Here are the metrics from an instagram workload (taken from a machine
with 64GB main memory):
full_scans: 445
general_profit: 20158298048
max_page_sharing: 256
merge_across_nodes: 1
pages_shared: 129547
pages_sharing: 5119146
pages_to_scan: 4000
pages_unshared: 1760924
pages_volatile: 10761341
run: 1
sleep_millisecs: 20
stable_node_chains: 167
stable_node_chains_prune_millisecs: 2000
stable_node_dups: 2751
use_zero_pages: 0
zero_pages_sharing: 0
After the service is running for 30 minutes to an hour, 4 to 5 million
shared pages are common for this workload when using KSM.
Detailed changes:
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a cgroup
and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
3. Add general_profit metric
The general_profit metric of KSM is specified in the documentation,
but not calculated. This adds the general profit metric to
/sys/kernel/debug/mm/ksm.
4. Add more metrics to ksm_stat
This adds the process profit metric to /proc/<pid>/ksm_stat.
5. Add more tests to ksm_tests and ksm_functional_tests
This adds an option to specify the merge type to the ksm_tests.
This allows to test madvise and prctl KSM.
It also adds a two new tests to ksm_functional_tests: one to test
the new prctl options and the other one is a fork test to verify that
the KSM process setting is inherited by client processes.
This patch (of 3):
So far KSM can only be enabled by calling madvise for memory regions. To
be able to use KSM for more workloads, KSM needs to have the ability to be
enabled / disabled at the process / cgroup level.
1. New options for prctl system command
This patch series adds two new options to the prctl system call.
The first one allows to enable KSM at the process level and the second
one to query the setting.
The setting will be inherited by child processes.
With the above setting, KSM can be enabled for the seed process of a
cgroup and all processes in the cgroup will inherit the setting.
2. Changes to KSM processing
When KSM is enabled at the process level, the KSM code will iterate
over all the VMA's and enable KSM for the eligible VMA's.
When forking a process that has KSM enabled, the setting will be
inherited by the new child process.
1) Introduce new MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag
This introduces the new flag MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag. When this flag
is set, kernel samepage merging (ksm) gets enabled for all vma's of a
process.
2) Setting VM_MERGEABLE on VMA creation
When a VMA is created, if the MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY flag is set, the
VM_MERGEABLE flag will be set for this VMA.
3) support disabling of ksm for a process
This adds the ability to disable ksm for a process if ksm has been
enabled for the process with prctl.
4) add new prctl option to get and set ksm for a process
This adds two new options to the prctl system call
- enable ksm for all vmas of a process (if the vmas support it).
- query if ksm has been enabled for a process.
3. Disabling MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY for storage keys in s390
In the s390 architecture when storage keys are used, the
MMF_VM_MERGE_ANY will be disabled.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-1-shr@devkernel.io
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230418051342.1919757-2-shr@devkernel.io
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@devkernel.io>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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If a library wants to get information from auxv (for instance,
AT_HWCAP/AT_HWCAP2), it has a few options, none of them perfectly reliable
or ideal:
- Be main or the pre-main startup code, and grub through the stack above
main. Doesn't work for a library.
- Call libc getauxval. Not ideal for libraries that are trying to be
libc-independent and/or don't otherwise require anything from other
libraries.
- Open and read /proc/self/auxv. Doesn't work for libraries that may run
in arbitrarily constrained environments that may not have /proc
mounted (e.g. libraries that might be used by an init program or a
container setup tool).
- Assume you're on the main thread and still on the original stack, and
try to walk the stack upwards, hoping to find auxv. Extremely bad
idea.
- Ask the caller to pass auxv in for you. Not ideal for a user-friendly
library, and then your caller may have the same problem.
Add a prctl that copies current->mm->saved_auxv to a userspace buffer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d81864a7f7f43bca6afa2a09fc2e850e4050ab42.1680611394.git.josh@joshtriplett.org
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Linux Security Modules (LSMs) that implement the "capable" hook will
usually emit an access denial message to the audit log whenever they
"block" the current task from using the given capability based on their
security policy.
The occurrence of a denial is used as an indication that the given task
has attempted an operation that requires the given access permission, so
the callers of functions that perform LSM permission checks must take care
to avoid calling them too early (before it is decided if the permission is
actually needed to perform the requested operation).
The __sys_setres[ug]id() functions violate this convention by first
calling ns_capable_setid() and only then checking if the operation
requires the capability or not. It means that any caller that has the
capability granted by DAC (task's capability set) but not by MAC (LSMs)
will generate a "denied" audit record, even if is doing an operation for
which the capability is not required.
Fix this by reordering the checks such that ns_capable_setid() is checked
last and -EPERM is returned immediately if it returns false.
While there, also do two small optimizations:
* move the capability check before prepare_creds() and
* bail out early in case of a no-op.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217162154.837549-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Daniel Verkamp has contributed a memfd series ("mm/memfd: add
F_SEAL_EXEC") which permits the setting of the memfd execute bit at
memfd creation time, with the option of sealing the state of the X
bit.
- Peter Xu adds a patch series ("mm/hugetlb: Make huge_pte_offset()
thread-safe for pmd unshare") which addresses a rare race condition
related to PMD unsharing.
- Several folioification patch serieses from Matthew Wilcox, Vishal
Moola, Sidhartha Kumar and Lorenzo Stoakes
- Johannes Weiner has a series ("mm: push down lock_page_memcg()")
which does perform some memcg maintenance and cleanup work.
- SeongJae Park has added DAMOS filtering to DAMON, with the series
"mm/damon/core: implement damos filter".
These filters provide users with finer-grained control over DAMOS's
actions. SeongJae has also done some DAMON cleanup work.
- Kairui Song adds a series ("Clean up and fixes for swap").
- Vernon Yang contributed the series "Clean up and refinement for maple
tree".
- Yu Zhao has contributed the "mm: multi-gen LRU: memcg LRU" series. It
adds to MGLRU an LRU of memcgs, to improve the scalability of global
reclaim.
- David Hildenbrand has added some userfaultfd cleanup work in the
series "mm: uffd-wp + change_protection() cleanups".
- Christoph Hellwig has removed the generic_writepages() library
function in the series "remove generic_writepages".
- Baolin Wang has performed some maintenance on the compaction code in
his series "Some small improvements for compaction".
- Sidhartha Kumar is doing some maintenance work on struct page in his
series "Get rid of tail page fields".
- David Hildenbrand contributed some cleanup, bugfixing and
generalization of pte management and of pte debugging in his series
"mm: support __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SWP_EXCLUSIVE on all architectures with
swap PTEs".
- Mel Gorman and Neil Brown have removed the __GFP_ATOMIC allocation
flag in the series "Discard __GFP_ATOMIC".
- Sergey Senozhatsky has improved zsmalloc's memory utilization with
his series "zsmalloc: make zspage chain size configurable".
- Joey Gouly has added prctl() support for prohibiting the creation of
writeable+executable mappings.
The previous BPF-based approach had shortcomings. See "mm: In-kernel
support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)".
- Waiman Long did some kmemleak cleanup and bugfixing in the series
"mm/kmemleak: Simplify kmemleak_cond_resched() & fix UAF".
- T.J. Alumbaugh has contributed some MGLRU cleanup work in his series
"mm: multi-gen LRU: improve".
- Jiaqi Yan has provided some enhancements to our memory error
statistics reporting, mainly by presenting the statistics on a
per-node basis. See the series "Introduce per NUMA node memory error
statistics".
- Mel Gorman has a second and hopefully final shot at fixing a CPU-hog
regression in compaction via his series "Fix excessive CPU usage
during compaction".
- Christoph Hellwig does some vmalloc maintenance work in the series
"cleanup vfree and vunmap".
- Christoph Hellwig has removed block_device_operations.rw_page() in
ths series "remove ->rw_page".
- We get some maple_tree improvements and cleanups in Liam Howlett's
series "VMA tree type safety and remove __vma_adjust()".
- Suren Baghdasaryan has done some work on the maintainability of our
vm_flags handling in the series "introduce vm_flags modifier
functions".
- Some pagemap cleanup and generalization work in Mike Rapoport's
series "mm, arch: add generic implementation of pfn_valid() for
FLATMEM" and "fixups for generic implementation of pfn_valid()"
- Baoquan He has done some work to make /proc/vmallocinfo and
/proc/kcore better represent the real state of things in his series
"mm/vmalloc.c: allow vread() to read out vm_map_ram areas".
- Jason Gunthorpe rationalized the GUP system's interface to the rest
of the kernel in the series "Simplify the external interface for
GUP".
- SeongJae Park wishes to migrate people from DAMON's debugfs interface
over to its sysfs interface. To support this, we'll temporarily be
printing warnings when people use the debugfs interface. See the
series "mm/damon: deprecate DAMON debugfs interface".
- Andrey Konovalov provided the accurately named "lib/stackdepot: fixes
and clean-ups" series.
- Huang Ying has provided a dramatic reduction in migration's TLB flush
IPI rates with the series "migrate_pages(): batch TLB flushing".
- Arnd Bergmann has some objtool fixups in "objtool warning fixes".
* tag 'mm-stable-2023-02-20-13-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (505 commits)
include/linux/migrate.h: remove unneeded externs
mm/memory_hotplug: cleanup return value handing in do_migrate_range()
mm/uffd: fix comment in handling pte markers
mm: change to return bool for isolate_movable_page()
mm: hugetlb: change to return bool for isolate_hugetlb()
mm: change to return bool for isolate_lru_page()
mm: change to return bool for folio_isolate_lru()
objtool: add UACCESS exceptions for __tsan_volatile_read/write
kmsan: disable ftrace in kmsan core code
kasan: mark addr_has_metadata __always_inline
mm: memcontrol: rename memcg_kmem_enabled()
sh: initialize max_mapnr
m68k/nommu: add missing definition of ARCH_PFN_OFFSET
mm: percpu: fix incorrect size in pcpu_obj_full_size()
maple_tree: reduce stack usage with gcc-9 and earlier
mm: page_alloc: call panic() when memoryless node allocation fails
mm: multi-gen LRU: avoid futile retries
migrate_pages: move THP/hugetlb migration support check to simplify code
migrate_pages: batch flushing TLB
migrate_pages: share more code between _unmap and _move
...
|
|
Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
do_prlimit() adds the user-controlled resource value to a pointer that
will subsequently be dereferenced. In order to help prevent this
codepath from being used as a spectre "gadget" a barrier needs to be
added after checking the range.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Tested-by: Jordy Zomer <jordyzomer@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
- Huawei reported that when they updated their kernel from 4.4 to
something much newer, some userspace code they had broke, the culprit
being the accidental removal of O_NONBLOCK from /dev/random way back
in 5.6. It's been gone for over 2 years now and this is the first
we've heard of it, but userspace breakage is userspace breakage, so
O_NONBLOCK is now back.
- Use randomness from hardware RNGs much more often during early boot,
at the same interval that crng reseeds are done, from Dominik.
- A semantic change in hardware RNG throttling, so that the hwrng
framework can properly feed random.c with randomness from hardware
RNGs that aren't specifically marked as creditable.
A related patch coming to you via Herbert's hwrng tree depends on
this one, not to compile, but just to function properly, so you may
want to merge this PULL before that one.
- A fix to clamp credited bits from the interrupts pool to the size of
the pool sample. This is mainly just a theoretical fix, as it'd be
pretty hard to exceed it in practice.
- Oracle reported that InfiniBand TCP latency regressed by around
10-15% after a change a few cycles ago made at the request of the RT
folks, in which we hoisted a somewhat rare operation (1 in 1024
times) out of the hard IRQ handler and into a workqueue, a pretty
common and boring pattern.
It turns out, though, that scheduling a worker from there has
overhead of its own, whereas scheduling a timer on that same CPU for
the next jiffy amortizes better and doesn't incur the same overhead.
I also eliminated a cache miss by moving the work_struct (and
subsequently, the timer_list) to below a critical cache line, so that
the more critical members that are accessed on every hard IRQ aren't
split between two cache lines.
- The boot-time initialization of the RNG has been split into two
approximate phases: what we can accomplish before timekeeping is
possible and what we can accomplish after.
This winds up being useful so that we can use RDRAND to seed the RNG
before CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y systems initialize slabs, in
addition to other early uses of randomness. The effect is that
systems with RDRAND (or a bootloader seed) will never see any
warnings at all when setting CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM=y. And
kfence benefits from getting a better seed of its own.
- Small systems without much entropy sometimes wind up putting some
truncated serial number read from flash into hostname, so contribute
utsname changes to the RNG, without crediting.
- Add smaller batches to serve requests for smaller integers, and make
use of them when people ask for random numbers bounded by a given
compile-time constant. This has positive effects all over the tree,
most notably in networking and kfence.
- The original jitter algorithm intended (I believe) to schedule the
timer for the next jiffy, not the next-next jiffy, yet it used
mod_timer(jiffies + 1), which will fire on the next-next jiffy,
instead of what I believe was intended, mod_timer(jiffies), which
will fire on the next jiffy. So fix that.
- Fix a comment typo, from William.
* tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: clear new batches when bringing new CPUs online
random: fix typos in get_random_bytes() comment
random: schedule jitter credit for next jiffy, not in two jiffies
prandom: make use of smaller types in prandom_u32_max
random: add 8-bit and 16-bit batches
utsname: contribute changes to RNG
random: use init_utsname() instead of utsname()
kfence: use better stack hash seed
random: split initialization into early step and later step
random: use expired timer rather than wq for mixing fast pool
random: avoid reading two cache lines on irq randomness
random: clamp credited irq bits to maximum mixed
random: throttle hwrng writes if no entropy is credited
random: use hwgenerator randomness more frequently at early boot
random: restore O_NONBLOCK support
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull ucounts update from Eric Biederman:
"Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
siginificant bugs were found and fixed. At the time it was realized
that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
prone if there was less sharing.
This is the long awaited cleanup that should hopefully keep things
more comprehensible and less error prone for whoever needs to touch
that code next"
* tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
|
|
On some small machines with little entropy, a quasi-unique hostname is
sometimes a relevant factor. I've seen, for example, 8 character
alpha-numeric serial numbers. In addition, the time at which the hostname
is set is usually a decent measurement of how long early boot took. So,
call add_device_randomness() on new hostnames, which feeds its arguments
to the RNG in addition to a fresh cycle counter.
Low cost hooks like this never hurt and can only ever help, and since
this costs basically nothing for an operation that is never a fast path,
this is an overall easy win.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
|
Since the semantics of maximum rlimit values are different, it would be
better not to mix ucount and rlimit values. This will prevent the error
of using inc_count/dec_ucount for rlimit parameters.
This patch also renames the functions to emphasize the lack of
connection between rlimit and ucount.
v3:
- Fix BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_ucount.
v2:
- Fix the array-index-out-of-bounds that was found by the lkp project.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518171730.l65lmnnjtnxnftpq@example.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
As for SVE provide a prctl() interface which allows processes to
configure their SME vector length.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220419112247.711548-12-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
|
|
Unnecessarily grabbing the tasklist_lock can be a scalability bottleneck
for workloads that also must grab the tasklist_lock for waiting,
killing, and cloning.
The tasklist_lock was grabbed to protect tsk->sighand from disappearing
(becoming NULL). tsk->signal was already protected by holding a
reference to tsk.
update_rlimit_cpu() assumed tsk->sighand != NULL. With this commit, it
attempts to lock_task_sighand(). However, this means that
update_rlimit_cpu() can fail. This only happens when a task is exiting.
Note that during exec, sighand may *change*, but it will not be NULL.
Prior to this commit, the do_prlimit() ensured that update_rlimit_cpu()
would not fail by read locking the tasklist_lock and checking tsk->sighand
!= NULL.
If update_rlimit_cpu() fails, there may be other tasks that are not
exiting that share tsk->signal. However, the group_leader is the last
task to be released, so if we cannot update_rlimit_cpu(group_leader),
then the entire process is exiting.
The only other caller of update_rlimit_cpu() is
selinux_bprm_committing_creds(). It has tsk == current, so
update_rlimit_cpu() cannot fail (current->sighand cannot disappear
until current exits).
This change resulted in a 14% speedup on a microbenchmark where parents
kill and wait on their children, and children getpriority, setpriority,
and getrlimit.
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-4-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
There are no other callers in the kernel.
Fixed up a comment format and whitespace issue when moving do_prlimit()
higher in sys.c.
Signed-off-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220106172041.522167-3-brho@google.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Avoid mixing strings and their anon_vma_name referenced pointers by
using struct anon_vma_name whenever possible. This simplifies the code
and allows easier sharing of anon_vma_name structures when they
represent the same name.
[surenb@google.com: fix comment]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-1-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220224231834.1481408-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
During set*id() which cred->ucounts to charge the the current process
to is not known until after set_cred_ucounts. So move the
RLIMIT_NPROC checking into a new helper flag_nproc_exceeded and call
flag_nproc_exceeded after set_cred_ucounts.
This is very much an arbitrary subset of the places where we currently
change the RLIMIT_NPROC accounting, designed to preserve the existing
logic.
Fixing the existing logic will be the subject of another series of
changes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
set_user
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote:
> I'm not aware of anyone actually running into this issue and reporting
> it. The systems that I personally know use suexec along with rlimits
> still run older/distro kernels, so would not yet be affected.
>
> So my mention was based on my understanding of how suexec works, and
> code review. Specifically, Apache httpd has the setting RLimitNPROC,
> which makes it set RLIMIT_NPROC:
>
> https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#rlimitnproc
>
> The above documentation for it includes:
>
> "This applies to processes forked from Apache httpd children servicing
> requests, not the Apache httpd children themselves. This includes CGI
> scripts and SSI exec commands, but not any processes forked from the
> Apache httpd parent, such as piped logs."
>
> In code, there are:
>
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgid.c: ( (cgid_req.limits.limit_nproc_set) && ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgi.c: ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/filters/mod_ext_filter.c: rv = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, conf->limit_nproc);
>
> For example, in mod_cgi.c this is in run_cgi_child().
>
> I think this means an httpd child sets RLIMIT_NPROC shortly before it
> execs suexec, which is a SUID root program. suexec then switches to the
> target user and execs the CGI script.
>
> Before 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec would set the flag, and the
> target user's process count would be checked against RLIMIT_NPROC on
> execve(). After 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec wouldn't set the
> flag because setuid() is (naturally) called when the process is still
> running as root (thus, has those limits bypass capabilities), and
> accordingly execve() would not check the target user's process count
> against RLIMIT_NPROC.
In commit 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") capable calls were added to set_user to
make it more consistent with fork. Unfortunately because of call site
differences those capable calls were checking the credentials of the
user before set*id() instead of after set*id().
This breaks enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC for applications that set the
rlimit and then call set*id() while holding a full set of
capabilities. The capabilities are only changed in the new credential
in security_task_fix_setuid().
The code in apache suexec appears to follow this pattern.
Commit 909cc4ae86f3 ("[PATCH] Fix two bugs with process limits
(RLIMIT_NPROC)") where this check was added describes the targes of this
capability check as:
2/ When a root-owned process (e.g. cgiwrap) sets up process limits and then
calls setuid, the setuid should fail if the user would then be running
more than rlim_cur[RLIMIT_NPROC] processes, but it doesn't. This patch
adds an appropriate test. With this patch, and per-user process limit
imposed in cgiwrap really works.
So the original use case of this check also appears to match the broken
pattern.
Restore the enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC by removing the bad capable
checks added in set_user. This unfortunately restores the
inconsistent state the code has been in for the last 11 years, but
dealing with the inconsistencies looks like a larger problem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210907213042.GA22626@openwall.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212221412.GA29214@openwall.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds")
History-Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reviewed-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"55 patches.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: percpu, procfs, sysctl,
misc, core-kernel, get_maintainer, lib, checkpatch, binfmt, nilfs2,
hfs, fat, adfs, panic, delayacct, kconfig, kcov, and ubsan"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (55 commits)
lib: remove redundant assignment to variable ret
ubsan: remove CONFIG_UBSAN_OBJECT_SIZE
kcov: fix generic Kconfig dependencies if ARCH_WANTS_NO_INSTR
lib/Kconfig.debug: make TEST_KMOD depend on PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB
btrfs: use generic Kconfig option for 256kB page size limit
arch/Kconfig: split PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_256KB from PAGE_SIZE_LESS_THAN_64KB
configs: introduce debug.config for CI-like setup
delayacct: track delays from memory compact
Documentation/accounting/delay-accounting.rst: add thrashing page cache and direct compact
delayacct: cleanup flags in struct task_delay_info and functions use it
delayacct: fix incomplete disable operation when switch enable to disable
delayacct: support swapin delay accounting for swapping without blkio
panic: remove oops_id
panic: use error_report_end tracepoint on warnings
fs/adfs: remove unneeded variable make code cleaner
FAT: use io_schedule_timeout() instead of congestion_wait()
hfsplus: use struct_group_attr() for memcpy() region
nilfs2: remove redundant pointer sbufs
fs/binfmt_elf: use PT_LOAD p_align values for static PIE
const_structs.checkpatch: add frequently used ops structs
...
|
|
PRIO_PGRP needs the tasklist_lock mainly to serialize vs setpgid(2), to
protect against any concurrent change_pid(PIDTYPE_PGID) that can move
the task from one hlist to another while iterating.
However, the remaining can only rely only on RCU:
PRIO_PROCESS only does the task lookup and never iterates over tasklist
and we already have an rcu-aware stable pointer.
PRIO_USER is already racy vs setuid(2) so with creds being rcu
protected, we can end up seeing stale data. When removing the
tasklist_lock there can be a race with (i) fork but this is benign as
the child's nice is inherited and the new task is not observable by the
user yet either, hence the return semantics do not differ. And (ii) a
race with exit, which is a small window and can cause us to miss a task
which was removed from the list and it had the highest nice.
Similarly change the buggy do_each_thread/while_each_thread combo in
PRIO_USER for the rcu-safe for_each_process_thread flavor, which doesn't
make use of next_thread/p->thread_group.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211210182250.43734-1-dave@stgolabs.net
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use. At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.). Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.
On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc. This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages. It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).
If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.
Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes. It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace. Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace. It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.
This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas. The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].
Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling
prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)
Setting the name to NULL clears it. The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps. Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.
The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string. Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name. The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.
CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature. It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.
The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names. In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas. However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.
One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names. Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4]. I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.
This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name. Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/
Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):
PR_SET_VMA
Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
size specified in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.
Currently, arg2 must be one of:
PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
can contain only printable ascii characters (including
space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.
This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.
[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
him as the author]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
"147 patches, based on 7d2a07b769330c34b4deabeed939325c77a7ec2f.
Subsystems affected by this patch series: mm (memory-hotplug, rmap,
ioremap, highmem, cleanups, secretmem, kfence, damon, and vmscan),
alpha, percpu, procfs, misc, core-kernel, MAINTAINERS, lib,
checkpatch, epoll, init, nilfs2, coredump, fork, pids, criu, kconfig,
selftests, ipc, and scripts"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (94 commits)
scripts: check_extable: fix typo in user error message
mm/workingset: correct kernel-doc notations
ipc: replace costly bailout check in sysvipc_find_ipc()
selftests/memfd: remove unused variable
Kconfig.debug: drop selecting non-existing HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
configs: remove the obsolete CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV
prctl: allow to setup brk for et_dyn executables
pid: cleanup the stale comment mentioning pidmap_init().
kernel/fork.c: unexport get_{mm,task}_exe_file
coredump: fix memleak in dump_vma_snapshot()
fs/coredump.c: log if a core dump is aborted due to changed file permissions
nilfs2: use refcount_dec_and_lock() to fix potential UAF
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_snapshot_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_snapshot_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_delete_##name##_group
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_##name##_group
nilfs2: fix NULL pointer in nilfs_##name##_attr_release
nilfs2: fix memory leak in nilfs_sysfs_create_device_group
trap: cleanup trap_init()
init: move usermodehelper_enable() to populate_rootfs()
...
|
|
Keno Fischer reported that when a binray loaded via ld-linux-x the
prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP) doesn't allow to setup brk value because it lays
before mm:end_data.
For example a test program shows
| # ~/t
|
| start_code 401000
| end_code 401a15
| start_stack 7ffce4577dd0
| start_data 403e10
| end_data 40408c
| start_brk b5b000
| sbrk(0) b5b000
and when executed via ld-linux
| # /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 ~/t
|
| start_code 7fc25b0a4000
| end_code 7fc25b0c4524
| start_stack 7fffcc6b2400
| start_data 7fc25b0ce4c0
| end_data 7fc25b0cff98
| start_brk 55555710c000
| sbrk(0) 55555710c000
This of course prevent criu from restoring such programs. Looking into
how kernel operates with brk/start_brk inside brk() syscall I don't see
any problem if we allow to setup brk/start_brk without checking for
end_data. Even if someone pass some weird address here on a purpose then
the worst possible result will be an unexpected unmapping of existing vma
(own vma, since prctl works with the callers memory) but test for
RLIMIT_DATA is still valid and a user won't be able to gain more memory in
case of expanding VMAs via new values shipped with prctl call.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121221207.GB2174@grain
Fixes: bbdc6076d2e5 ("binfmt_elf: move brk out of mmap when doing direct loader exec")
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keno Fischer <keno@juliacomputing.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander.mikhalitsyn@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Pull MAP_DENYWRITE removal from David Hildenbrand:
"Remove all in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE from the kernel and remove
VM_DENYWRITE.
There are some (minor) user-visible changes:
- We no longer deny write access to shared libaries loaded via legacy
uselib(); this behavior matches modern user space e.g. dlopen().
- We no longer deny write access to the elf interpreter after exec
completed, treating it just like shared libraries (which it often
is).
- We always deny write access to the file linked via /proc/pid/exe:
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE) will fail if write access to the
file cannot be denied, and write access to the file will remain
denied until the link is effectivel gone (exec, termination,
sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_MAP/EXE_FILE)) -- just as if exec'ing the file.
Cross-compiled for a bunch of architectures (alpha, microblaze, i386,
s390x, ...) and verified via ltp that especially the relevant tests
(i.e., creat07 and execve04) continue working as expected"
* tag 'denywrite-for-5.15' of git://github.com/davidhildenbrand/linux:
fs: update documentation of get_write_access() and friends
mm: ignore MAP_DENYWRITE in ksys_mmap_pgoff()
mm: remove VM_DENYWRITE
binfmt: remove in-tree usage of MAP_DENYWRITE
kernel/fork: always deny write access to current MM exe_file
kernel/fork: factor out replacing the current MM exe_file
binfmt: don't use MAP_DENYWRITE when loading shared libraries via uselib()
|
|
Let's factor the main logic out into replace_mm_exe_file(), such that
all mm->exe_file logic is contained in kernel/fork.c.
While at it, perform some simple cleanups that are possible now that
we're simplifying the individual functions.
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
|
|
in copy_process(): non root users but with capability CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
or CAP_SYS_ADMIN will clean PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag even
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds. Add the same capability check logic here.
Align the permission checks in copy_process() and set_user(). In
copy_process() CAP_SYS_RESOURCE or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable users will be
able to circumvent and clear the PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED flag whereas they
aren't able to the same in set_user(). There's no obvious logic to this
and trying to unearth the reason in the thread didn't go anywhere.
The gist seems to be that this code wants to make sure that a program
can't successfully exec if it has gone through a set*id() transition
while exceeding its RLIMIT_NPROC.
A capable but non-INIT_USER caller getting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED set during
a set*id() transition wouldn't be able to exec right away if they still
exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC at the time of exec. So their exec would fail
in fs/exec.c:
if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) &&
is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
goto out_ret;
}
However, if the caller were to fork() right after the set*id()
transition but before the exec while still exceeding their RLIMIT_NPROC
then they would get PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED cleared (while the child would
inherit it):
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) {
if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
goto bad_fork_free;
}
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
which means a subsequent exec by the capable caller would now succeed
even though they could still exceed their RLIMIT_NPROC limit. This seems
inconsistent. Allow a CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capable user to
avoid PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED as they already can in copy_process().
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>, , ,
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210728072629.530435-1-ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ran Xiaokai <ran.xiaokai@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman:
"This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the
rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users
to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user
namespace."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
|
|
This patch provides support for setting and copying core scheduling
'task cookies' between threads (PID), processes (TGID), and process
groups (PGID).
The value of core scheduling isn't that tasks don't share a core,
'nosmt' can do that. The value lies in exploiting all the sharing
opportunities that exist to recover possible lost performance and that
requires a degree of flexibility in the API.
From a security perspective (and there are others), the thread,
process and process group distinction is an existent hierarchal
categorization of tasks that reflects many of the security concerns
about 'data sharing'. For example, protecting against cache-snooping
by a thread that can just read the memory directly isn't all that
useful.
With this in mind, subcommands to CREATE/SHARE (TO/FROM) provide a
mechanism to create and share cookies. CREATE/SHARE_TO specify a
target pid with enum pidtype used to specify the scope of the targeted
tasks. For example, PIDTYPE_TGID will share the cookie with the
process and all of it's threads as typically desired in a security
scenario.
API:
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_GET, tgtpid, pidtype, &cookie)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO, tgtpid, pidtype, NULL)
prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE, PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM, srcpid, pidtype, NULL)
where 'tgtpid/srcpid == 0' implies the current process and pidtype is
kernel enum pid_type {PIDTYPE_PID, PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PGID, ...}.
For return values, EINVAL, ENOMEM are what they say. ESRCH means the
tgtpid/srcpid was not found. EPERM indicates lack of PTRACE permission
access to tgtpid/srcpid. ENODEV indicates your machines lacks SMT.
[peterz: complete rewrite]
Signed-off-by: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Don Hiatt <dhiatt@digitalocean.com>
Tested-by: Hongyu Ning <hongyu.ning@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210422123309.039845339@infradead.org
|
|
change 'infite' to 'infinite'
change 'concurent' to 'concurrent'
change 'memvers' to 'members'
change 'decendants' to 'descendants'
change 'argumets' to 'arguments'
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210316112904.10661-1-cxfcosmos@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.
To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that
does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in
multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to
set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.
service-A
\- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1)
\- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)
The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1.
When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in
container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.
We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not
allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be
overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.
Changelog
v11:
* Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts.
* Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of
inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.
Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().
Changelog
v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
pointer empty.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
This change introduces a prctl that allows the user program to control
which PAC keys are enabled in a particular task. The main reason
why this is useful is to enable a userspace ABI that uses PAC to
sign and authenticate function pointers and other pointers exposed
outside of the function, while still allowing binaries conforming
to the ABI to interoperate with legacy binaries that do not sign or
authenticate pointers.
The idea is that a dynamic loader or early startup code would issue
this prctl very early after establishing that a process may load legacy
binaries, but before executing any PAC instructions.
This change adds a small amount of overhead to kernel entry and exit
due to additional required instruction sequences.
On a DragonBoard 845c (Cortex-A75) with the powersave governor, the
overhead of similar instruction sequences was measured as 4.9ns when
simulating the common case where IA is left enabled, or 43.7ns when
simulating the uncommon case where IA is disabled. These numbers can
be seen as the worst case scenario, since in more realistic scenarios
a better performing governor would be used and a newer chip would be
used that would support PAC unlike Cortex-A75 and would be expected
to be faster than Cortex-A75.
On an Apple M1 under a hypervisor, the overhead of the entry/exit
instruction sequences introduced by this patch was measured as 0.3ns
in the case where IA is left enabled, and 33.0ns in the case where
IA is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ibc41a5e6a76b275efbaa126b31119dc197b927a5
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6609065f8f40397a4124654eb68c9f490b4d477.1616123271.git.pcc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Doing a
prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_AUXV, addr, 1);
will copy 1 byte from userspace to (quite big) on-stack array
and then stash everything to mm->saved_auxv.
AT_NULL terminator will be inserted at the very end.
/proc/*/auxv handler will find that AT_NULL terminator
and copy original stack contents to userspace.
This devious scheme requires CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Fix false-positive build warnings for ARCH=ia64 builds
- Optimize dictionary size for module compression with xz
- Check the compiler and linker versions in Kconfig
- Fix misuse of extra-y
- Support DWARF v5 debug info
- Clamp SUBLEVEL to 255 because stable releases 4.4.x and 4.9.x
exceeded the limit
- Add generic syscall{tbl,hdr}.sh for cleanups across arches
- Minor cleanups of genksyms
- Minor cleanups of Kconfig
* tag 'kbuild-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (38 commits)
initramfs: Remove redundant dependency of RD_ZSTD on BLK_DEV_INITRD
kbuild: remove deprecated 'always' and 'hostprogs-y/m'
kbuild: parse C= and M= before changing the working directory
kbuild: reuse this-makefile to define abs_srctree
kconfig: unify rule of config, menuconfig, nconfig, gconfig, xconfig
kconfig: omit --oldaskconfig option for 'make config'
kconfig: fix 'invalid option' for help option
kconfig: remove dead code in conf_askvalue()
kconfig: clean up nested if-conditionals in check_conf()
kconfig: Remove duplicate call to sym_get_string_value()
Makefile: Remove # characters from compiler string
Makefile: reuse CC_VERSION_TEXT
kbuild: check the minimum linker version in Kconfig
kbuild: remove ld-version macro
scripts: add generic syscallhdr.sh
scripts: add generic syscalltbl.sh
arch: syscalls: remove $(srctree)/ prefix from syscall tables
arch: syscalls: add missing FORCE and fix 'targets' to make if_changed work
gen_compile_commands: prune some directories
kbuild: simplify access to the kernel's version
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
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Instead of storing the version in a single integer and having various
kernel (and userspace) code how it's constructed, export individual
(major, patchlevel, sublevel) components and simplify kernel code that
uses it.
This should also make it easier on userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
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The dcookies stuff was only used by the kernel's old oprofile code. Now
that oprofile's support is removed from the kernel, there is no need for
dcookies as well. Remove it.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>
Acked-by: William Cohen <wcohen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
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