diff options
author | Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com> | 2019-06-23 23:23:29 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2019-06-24 08:29:57 -0400 |
commit | b0935123a18360d19f1dcc779ea33841cdc304cc (patch) | |
tree | f7f069f94312da4302ad6b1b793d4f6c90eb5bc0 /security | |
parent | 19453ce0bcfbdf7332a104eebf5d835977af7284 (diff) |
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
Currently during soft reboot(kexec_file_load) boot command line
arguments are not measured. Define hooks needed to measure kexec
command line arguments during soft reboot(kexec_file_load).
- A new ima hook ima_kexec_cmdline is defined to be called by the
kexec code.
- A new function process_buffer_measurement is defined to measure
the buffer hash into the IMA measurement list.
- A new func policy KEXEC_CMDLINE is defined to control the
measurement.
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 72 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 |
4 files changed, 81 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index e7b9ea7732d9..bdca641f9e51 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) \ hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK) \ hook(POLICY_CHECK) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE) \ hook(MAX_CHECK) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c0cf4bcfc82f..d426d4d1fe04 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ err_out: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a7e7e2d7224c..2507bee1b762 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -609,6 +609,78 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) return 0; } +/* + * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. + * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. + * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). + * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. + * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation. + * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated. + * + * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. + */ +static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, + const char *eventname, + const struct cred *cred, u32 secid) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; + struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {}; + struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint, + .filename = eventname}; + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL; + struct { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + } hash = {}; + int violation = 0; + int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; + int action = 0; + + action = ima_get_action(NULL, cred, secid, 0, KEXEC_CMDLINE, &pcr, + &template_desc); + if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) + return; + + iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr; + iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; + iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); + + if (ret < 0) + ima_free_template_entry(entry); + +out: + return; +} + +/** + * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args + * @buf: pointer to buffer + * @size: size of buffer + * + * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) +{ + u32 secid; + + if (buf && size != 0) { + security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", + current_cred(), secid); + } +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 98c289559079..a3058b03a955 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -374,6 +374,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, { int i; + if (func == KEXEC_CMDLINE) { + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func)) + return true; + return false; + } if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; @@ -956,6 +961,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->func = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK; else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = POLICY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "KEXEC_CMDLINE") == 0) + entry->func = KEXEC_CMDLINE; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) |