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authorKrister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>2017-01-20 17:49:11 -0800
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2017-01-24 12:10:51 -0500
commit4548b683b78137f8eadeb312b94e20bb0d4a7141 (patch)
tree8b285d141f533807625336c4524411bf31d48d9f /net
parentd140199af510ad4749dc5e38b7922135258ba5fd (diff)
Introduce a sysctl that modifies the value of PROT_SOCK.
Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may not overlap. The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace. Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/af_inet.c5
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c50
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/af_inet6.c3
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c7
-rw-r--r--net/sctp/socket.c10
5 files changed, 64 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
index aae410bb655a..28fe8da4e1ac 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ int inet_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
snum = ntohs(addr->sin_port);
err = -EACCES;
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+ if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
goto out;
@@ -1700,6 +1700,9 @@ static __net_init int inet_init_net(struct net *net)
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl = IPDEFTTL;
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr = 0;
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = PROT_SOCK;
+#endif
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index c8d283615c6f..1b861997fdc5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
+static int ip_privileged_port_min;
+static int ip_privileged_port_max = 65535;
static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
static int ip_ttl_max = 255;
static int tcp_syn_retries_min = 1;
@@ -79,7 +81,12 @@ static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
- if (range[1] < range[0])
+ /* Ensure that the upper limit is not smaller than the lower,
+ * and that the lower does not encroach upon the privileged
+ * port limit.
+ */
+ if ((range[1] < range[0]) ||
+ (range[0] < net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock))
ret = -EINVAL;
else
set_local_port_range(net, range);
@@ -88,6 +95,40 @@ static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
return ret;
}
+/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
+static int ipv4_privileged_ports(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
+ ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
+ int ret;
+ int pports;
+ int range[2];
+ struct ctl_table tmp = {
+ .data = &pports,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(pports),
+ .mode = table->mode,
+ .extra1 = &ip_privileged_port_min,
+ .extra2 = &ip_privileged_port_max,
+ };
+
+ pports = net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock;
+
+ ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+ if (write && ret == 0) {
+ inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
+ /* Ensure that the local port range doesn't overlap with the
+ * privileged port range.
+ */
+ if (range[0] < pports)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock = pports;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
static void inet_get_ping_group_range_table(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t *low, kgid_t *high)
{
@@ -964,6 +1005,13 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = {
.extra2 = &one,
},
#endif
+ {
+ .procname = "ip_unprivileged_port_start",
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock,
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = ipv4_privileged_ports,
+ },
{ }
};
diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
index aa42123bc301..04db40620ea6 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK && !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
+ if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
lock_sock(sk);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
index 55e0169caa4c..8b7416f4e01a 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c
@@ -426,10 +426,9 @@ ip_vs_service_find(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, __u32 fwmark, __u16 protocol
*/
svc = __ip_vs_service_find(ipvs, af, protocol, vaddr, vport);
- if (svc == NULL
- && protocol == IPPROTO_TCP
- && atomic_read(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter)
- && (vport == FTPDATA || ntohs(vport) >= PROT_SOCK)) {
+ if (!svc && protocol == IPPROTO_TCP &&
+ atomic_read(&ipvs->ftpsvc_counter) &&
+ (vport == FTPDATA || ntohs(vport) >= inet_prot_sock(ipvs->net))) {
/*
* Check if ftp service entry exists, the packet
* might belong to FTP data connections.
diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c
index bee4dd3feabb..d699d2cbf275 100644
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
+++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
}
}
- if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
+ if (snum && snum < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
@@ -1152,8 +1152,10 @@ static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk,
* accept new associations, but it SHOULD NOT
* be permitted to open new associations.
*/
- if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
- !ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
+ if (ep->base.bind_addr.port <
+ inet_prot_sock(net) &&
+ !ns_capable(net->user_ns,
+ CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_free;
}
@@ -1818,7 +1820,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
* but it SHOULD NOT be permitted to open new
* associations.
*/
- if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
+ if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;