diff options
author | Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org> | 2012-07-30 14:42:26 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2012-07-30 17:25:20 -0700 |
commit | e8905ec27e2f4ea1b9f7e03df68a060b3ae6fca8 (patch) | |
tree | 9c9cdb2e443338be6e46c61469bd12833bce7853 /kernel/stacktrace.c | |
parent | 108ceeb020bb3558fe175a3fc8b60fd6c1a2a279 (diff) |
proc: environ_read() make sure offset points to environment address range
Currently the following offset and environment address range check in
environ_read() of /proc/<pid>/environ is buggy:
int this_len = mm->env_end - (mm->env_start + src);
if (this_len <= 0)
break;
Large or negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ converted to 'unsigned
long' may pass this check since '(mm->env_start + src)' can overflow and
'this_len' will be positive.
This can turn /proc/<pid>/environ to act like /proc/<pid>/mem since
(mm->env_start + src) will point and read from another VMA.
There are two fixes here plus some code cleaning:
1) Fix the overflow by checking if the offset that was converted to
unsigned long will always point to the [mm->env_start, mm->env_end]
address range.
2) Remove the truncation that was made to the result of the check,
storing the result in 'int this_len' will alter its value and we can
not depend on it.
For kernels that have commit b409e578d ("proc: clean up
/proc/<pid>/environ handling") which adds the appropriate ptrace check and
saves the 'mm' at ->open() time, this is not a security issue.
This patch is taken from the grsecurity patch since it was just made
available.
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/stacktrace.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions