diff options
author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2023-01-13 12:49:30 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> | 2023-01-19 09:24:29 +0100 |
commit | e67fe63341b8117d7e0d9acf0f1222d5138b9266 (patch) | |
tree | bff98b058b122ca18afb6e97a61a420804443eaa /fs/namei.c | |
parent | 0dbe12f2e49c046444461b5f4be49df2cafb3a40 (diff) |
fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Remove legacy file_mnt_user_ns() and mnt_user_ns().
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namei.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 50 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index ed9e877f72c7..1bf6256daffd 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -335,12 +335,11 @@ static int check_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, static int acl_permission_check(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, int mask) { - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode; vfsuid_t vfsuid; /* Are we the owner? If so, ACL's don't matter */ - vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); if (likely(vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))) { mask &= 7; mode >>= 6; @@ -363,7 +362,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * about? Need to check group ownership if so. */ if (mask & (mode ^ (mode >> 3))) { - vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode); if (vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid)) mode >>= 3; } @@ -1095,14 +1094,14 @@ fs_initcall(init_fs_namei_sysctls); */ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode) { - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; + struct mnt_idmap *idmap; vfsuid_t vfsuid; if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks) return 0; - mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt); - vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + idmap = mnt_idmap(nd->path.mnt); + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode); /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */ if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) return 0; @@ -1181,12 +1180,11 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, */ int may_linkat(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *link) { - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode; /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */ - if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) || - !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode))) + if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode)) || + !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode))) return -EOVERFLOW; if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks) @@ -1207,7 +1205,7 @@ int may_linkat(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *link) * may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory * should be allowed, or not, on files that already * exist. - * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from + * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data * @inode: the inode of the file to open * @@ -1222,15 +1220,15 @@ int may_linkat(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *link) * the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will * be enough. * - * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of - * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take - * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions. + * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the idmap of + * the vfsmount must be passed through @idmap. This function will then take + * care to map the inode according to @idmap before checking permissions. * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the - * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns. + * raw inode simply pass @nop_mnt_idmap. * * Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error. */ -static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, +static int may_create_in_sticky(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *const inode) { umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode; @@ -1239,8 +1237,8 @@ static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) || likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) || - vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), dir_vfsuid) || - vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid())) + vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), dir_vfsuid) || + vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), current_fsuid())) return 0; if (likely(dir_mode & 0002) || @@ -2256,13 +2254,11 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd) /* At this point we know we have a real path component. */ for(;;) { struct mnt_idmap *idmap; - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; const char *link; u64 hash_len; int type; idmap = mnt_idmap(nd->path.mnt); - mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); err = may_lookup(idmap, nd); if (err) return err; @@ -2311,7 +2307,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd) OK: /* pathname or trailing symlink, done */ if (!depth) { - nd->dir_vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, nd->inode); + nd->dir_vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, nd->inode); nd->dir_mode = nd->inode->i_mode; nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT; return 0; @@ -2888,11 +2884,10 @@ int __check_sticky(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) { kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid)) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode), fsuid)) return 0; - if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid)) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, dir), fsuid)) return 0; return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(idmap, inode, CAP_FOWNER); } @@ -2921,7 +2916,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky); static int may_delete(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir) { - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(victim); int error; @@ -2932,8 +2926,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir); /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */ - if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) || - !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode))) + if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode)) || + !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(idmap, inode))) return -EOVERFLOW; audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE); @@ -3522,7 +3516,6 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file, const struct open_flags *op) { struct mnt_idmap *idmap; - struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; int open_flag = op->open_flag; bool do_truncate; int acc_mode; @@ -3536,13 +3529,12 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd, if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)) audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0); idmap = mnt_idmap(nd->path.mnt); - mnt_userns = mnt_idmap_owner(idmap); if (open_flag & O_CREAT) { if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED)) return -EEXIST; if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry)) return -EISDIR; - error = may_create_in_sticky(mnt_userns, nd, + error = may_create_in_sticky(idmap, nd, d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry)); if (unlikely(error)) return error; |