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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-02 09:48:13 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-02 09:48:13 -0800 |
commit | d9a7fa67b4bfe6ce93ee9aab23ae2e7ca0763e84 (patch) | |
tree | ea15c22c088160107c09da1c8d380753bb0c8d21 /Documentation | |
parent | f218a29c25ad8abdb961435d6b8139f462061364 (diff) | |
parent | 55b8cbe470d103b44104c64dbf89e5cad525d4e0 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull seccomp updates from James Morris:
- Add SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
- seccomp fixes for sparse warnings and s390 build (Tycho)
* 'next-seccomp' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
seccomp, s390: fix build for syscall type change
seccomp: fix poor type promotion
samples: add an example of seccomp user trap
seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace
seccomp: switch system call argument type to void *
seccomp: hoist struct seccomp_data recalculation higher
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst | 84 |
2 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt index af6f6ba1fe80..c9558146ac58 100644 --- a/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt +++ b/Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ Code Seq#(hex) Include File Comments 0x1b all InfiniBand Subsystem <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/> 0x20 all drivers/cdrom/cm206.h 0x22 all scsi/sg.h +'!' 00-1F uapi/linux/seccomp.h '#' 00-3F IEEE 1394 Subsystem Block for the entire subsystem '$' 00-0F linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h '%' 00-0F include/uapi/linux/stm.h diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst index 82a468bc7560..b1b846d8a094 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst @@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ In precedence order, they are: Results in the lower 16-bits of the return value being passed to userland as the errno without executing the system call. +``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF``: + Results in a ``struct seccomp_notif`` message sent on the userspace + notification fd, if it is attached, or ``-ENOSYS`` if it is not. See below + on discussion of how to handle user notifications. + ``SECCOMP_RET_TRACE``: When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to notify a ``ptrace()``-based tracer prior to executing the system @@ -183,6 +188,85 @@ The ``samples/seccomp/`` directory contains both an x86-specific example and a more generic example of a higher level macro interface for BPF program generation. +Userspace Notification +====================== + +The ``SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF`` return code lets seccomp filters pass a +particular syscall to userspace to be handled. This may be useful for +applications like container managers, which wish to intercept particular +syscalls (``mount()``, ``finit_module()``, etc.) and change their behavior. + +To acquire a notification FD, use the ``SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER`` +argument to the ``seccomp()`` syscall: + +.. code-block:: c + + fd = seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER, &prog); + +which (on success) will return a listener fd for the filter, which can then be +passed around via ``SCM_RIGHTS`` or similar. Note that filter fds correspond to +a particular filter, and not a particular task. So if this task then forks, +notifications from both tasks will appear on the same filter fd. Reads and +writes to/from a filter fd are also synchronized, so a filter fd can safely +have many readers. + +The interface for a seccomp notification fd consists of two structures: + +.. code-block:: c + + struct seccomp_notif_sizes { + __u16 seccomp_notif; + __u16 seccomp_notif_resp; + __u16 seccomp_data; + }; + + struct seccomp_notif { + __u64 id; + __u32 pid; + __u32 flags; + struct seccomp_data data; + }; + + struct seccomp_notif_resp { + __u64 id; + __s64 val; + __s32 error; + __u32 flags; + }; + +The ``struct seccomp_notif_sizes`` structure can be used to determine the size +of the various structures used in seccomp notifications. The size of ``struct +seccomp_data`` may change in the future, so code should use: + +.. code-block:: c + + struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes; + seccomp(SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES, 0, &sizes); + +to determine the size of the various structures to allocate. See +samples/seccomp/user-trap.c for an example. + +Users can read via ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV)`` (or ``poll()``) on a +seccomp notification fd to receive a ``struct seccomp_notif``, which contains +five members: the input length of the structure, a unique-per-filter ``id``, +the ``pid`` of the task which triggered this request (which may be 0 if the +task is in a pid ns not visible from the listener's pid namespace), a ``flags`` +member which for now only has ``SECCOMP_NOTIF_FLAG_SIGNALED``, representing +whether or not the notification is a result of a non-fatal signal, and the +``data`` passed to seccomp. Userspace can then make a decision based on this +information about what to do, and ``ioctl(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND)`` a +response, indicating what should be returned to userspace. The ``id`` member of +``struct seccomp_notif_resp`` should be the same ``id`` as in ``struct +seccomp_notif``. + +It is worth noting that ``struct seccomp_data`` contains the values of register +arguments to the syscall, but does not contain pointers to memory. The task's +memory is accessible to suitably privileged traces via ``ptrace()`` or +``/proc/pid/mem``. However, care should be taken to avoid the TOCTOU mentioned +above in this document: all arguments being read from the tracee's memory +should be read into the tracer's memory before any policy decisions are made. +This allows for an atomic decision on syscall arguments. + Sysctls ======= |