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-rw-r--r--arch/arm/boot/dts/da850-lcdk.dts4
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-openblocks_a7.dts10
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/boot/dts/sun4i-a10.dtsi2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c225
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-master.dtsi13
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-slave.dtsi9
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c20
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h37
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/time.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h57
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h13
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S44
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S137
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c139
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S9
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c90
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S9
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rmhandlers.S7
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_segment.S4
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c41
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c49
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c35
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/configs/defconfig75
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h8
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/irqflags.h10
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h12
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso-syscalls.h28
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/syscalls.h26
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S8
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kernel/process.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kernel/syscall_table.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S1
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/mm/fault.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/sh/boards/mach-se/770x/setup.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/sh/include/mach-se/mach/se.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig15
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Makefile8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/calling.h36
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S16
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S23
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h25
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h218
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/pci_x86.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c28
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c221
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/idt.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/setup.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c11
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c21
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S48
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c356
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S80
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pti.c32
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/common.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/pci/fixup.c29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_bt.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h2
114 files changed, 2178 insertions, 620 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/da850-lcdk.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/da850-lcdk.dts
index eed89e659143..a1f4d6d5a569 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/da850-lcdk.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/da850-lcdk.dts
@@ -293,12 +293,12 @@
label = "u-boot env";
reg = <0 0x020000>;
};
- partition@0x020000 {
+ partition@20000 {
/* The LCDK defaults to booting from this partition */
label = "u-boot";
reg = <0x020000 0x080000>;
};
- partition@0x0a0000 {
+ partition@a0000 {
label = "free space";
reg = <0x0a0000 0>;
};
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-openblocks_a7.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-openblocks_a7.dts
index cf2f5240e176..27cc913ca0f5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-openblocks_a7.dts
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/kirkwood-openblocks_a7.dts
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@
};
pinctrl: pin-controller@10000 {
- pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header>;
+ pinctrl-0 = <&pmx_dip_switches &pmx_gpio_header
+ &pmx_gpio_header_gpo>;
pinctrl-names = "default";
pmx_uart0: pmx-uart0 {
@@ -85,11 +86,16 @@
* ground.
*/
pmx_gpio_header: pmx-gpio-header {
- marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp7", "mpp29", "mpp28",
+ marvell,pins = "mpp17", "mpp29", "mpp28",
"mpp35", "mpp34", "mpp40";
marvell,function = "gpio";
};
+ pmx_gpio_header_gpo: pxm-gpio-header-gpo {
+ marvell,pins = "mpp7";
+ marvell,function = "gpo";
+ };
+
pmx_gpio_init: pmx-init {
marvell,pins = "mpp38";
marvell,function = "gpio";
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun4i-a10.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun4i-a10.dtsi
index 5840f5c75c3b..4f2f2eea0755 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun4i-a10.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun4i-a10.dtsi
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@
be1_out_tcon0: endpoint@0 {
reg = <0>;
- remote-endpoint = <&tcon1_in_be0>;
+ remote-endpoint = <&tcon0_in_be1>;
};
be1_out_tcon1: endpoint@1 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi
index 59655e42e4b0..bd0cd3204273 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/sun7i-a20.dtsi
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@
be1_out_tcon0: endpoint@0 {
reg = <0>;
- remote-endpoint = <&tcon1_in_be0>;
+ remote-endpoint = <&tcon0_in_be1>;
};
be1_out_tcon1: endpoint@1 {
diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig
index 5caaf971fb50..df433abfcb02 100644
--- a/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/configs/sunxi_defconfig
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y
CONFIG_NR_CPUS=8
CONFIG_AEABI=y
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y
+CONFIG_CMA=y
CONFIG_ARM_APPENDED_DTB=y
CONFIG_ARM_ATAG_DTB_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ=y
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ CONFIG_CAN_SUN4I=y
# CONFIG_WIRELESS is not set
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y
+CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y
CONFIG_ATA=y
CONFIG_AHCI_SUNXI=y
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
index c199990e12b6..323a4df59a6c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
+++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c
@@ -27,14 +27,58 @@
int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly;
+/*
+ * eBPF prog stack layout:
+ *
+ * high
+ * original ARM_SP => +-----+
+ * | | callee saved registers
+ * +-----+ <= (BPF_FP + SCRATCH_SIZE)
+ * | ... | eBPF JIT scratch space
+ * eBPF fp register => +-----+
+ * (BPF_FP) | ... | eBPF prog stack
+ * +-----+
+ * |RSVD | JIT scratchpad
+ * current ARM_SP => +-----+ <= (BPF_FP - STACK_SIZE + SCRATCH_SIZE)
+ * | |
+ * | ... | Function call stack
+ * | |
+ * +-----+
+ * low
+ *
+ * The callee saved registers depends on whether frame pointers are enabled.
+ * With frame pointers (to be compliant with the ABI):
+ *
+ * high
+ * original ARM_SP => +------------------+ \
+ * | pc | |
+ * current ARM_FP => +------------------+ } callee saved registers
+ * |r4-r8,r10,fp,ip,lr| |
+ * +------------------+ /
+ * low
+ *
+ * Without frame pointers:
+ *
+ * high
+ * original ARM_SP => +------------------+
+ * | r4-r8,r10,fp,lr | callee saved registers
+ * current ARM_FP => +------------------+
+ * low
+ *
+ * When popping registers off the stack at the end of a BPF function, we
+ * reference them via the current ARM_FP register.
+ */
+#define CALLEE_MASK (1 << ARM_R4 | 1 << ARM_R5 | 1 << ARM_R6 | \
+ 1 << ARM_R7 | 1 << ARM_R8 | 1 << ARM_R10 | \
+ 1 << ARM_FP)
+#define CALLEE_PUSH_MASK (CALLEE_MASK | 1 << ARM_LR)
+#define CALLEE_POP_MASK (CALLEE_MASK | 1 << ARM_PC)
+
#define STACK_OFFSET(k) (k)
#define TMP_REG_1 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 0) /* TEMP Register 1 */
#define TMP_REG_2 (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 1) /* TEMP Register 2 */
#define TCALL_CNT (MAX_BPF_JIT_REG + 2) /* Tail Call Count */
-/* Flags used for JIT optimization */
-#define SEEN_CALL (1 << 0)
-
#define FLAG_IMM_OVERFLOW (1 << 0)
/*
@@ -95,7 +139,6 @@ static const u8 bpf2a32[][2] = {
* idx : index of current last JITed instruction.
* prologue_bytes : bytes used in prologue.
* epilogue_offset : offset of epilogue starting.
- * seen : bit mask used for JIT optimization.
* offsets : array of eBPF instruction offsets in
* JITed code.
* target : final JITed code.
@@ -110,7 +153,6 @@ struct jit_ctx {
unsigned int idx;
unsigned int prologue_bytes;
unsigned int epilogue_offset;
- u32 seen;
u32 flags;
u32 *offsets;
u32 *target;
@@ -179,8 +221,13 @@ static void jit_fill_hole(void *area, unsigned int size)
*ptr++ = __opcode_to_mem_arm(ARM_INST_UDF);
}
-/* Stack must be multiples of 16 Bytes */
-#define STACK_ALIGN(sz) (((sz) + 3) & ~3)
+#if defined(CONFIG_AEABI) && (__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 5)
+/* EABI requires the stack to be aligned to 64-bit boundaries */
+#define STACK_ALIGNMENT 8
+#else
+/* Stack must be aligned to 32-bit boundaries */
+#define STACK_ALIGNMENT 4
+#endif
/* Stack space for BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4,
* BPF_REG_5, BPF_REG_7, BPF_REG_8, BPF_REG_9,
@@ -194,7 +241,7 @@ static void jit_fill_hole(void *area, unsigned int size)
+ SCRATCH_SIZE + \
+ 4 /* extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */)
-#define STACK_SIZE STACK_ALIGN(_STACK_SIZE)
+#define STACK_SIZE ALIGN(_STACK_SIZE, STACK_ALIGNMENT)
/* Get the offset of eBPF REGISTERs stored on scratch space. */
#define STACK_VAR(off) (STACK_SIZE-off-4)
@@ -285,16 +332,19 @@ static inline void emit_mov_i(const u8 rd, u32 val, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
emit_mov_i_no8m(rd, val, ctx);
}
-static inline void emit_blx_r(u8 tgt_reg, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+static void emit_bx_r(u8 tgt_reg, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
-#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 5
- emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_LR, ARM_PC), ctx);
-
if (elf_hwcap & HWCAP_THUMB)
emit(ARM_BX(tgt_reg), ctx);
else
emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_PC, tgt_reg), ctx);
+}
+
+static inline void emit_blx_r(u8 tgt_reg, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
+{
+#if __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ < 5
+ emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_LR, ARM_PC), ctx);
+ emit_bx_r(tgt_reg, ctx);
#else
emit(ARM_BLX_R(tgt_reg), ctx);
#endif
@@ -354,7 +404,6 @@ static inline void emit_udivmod(u8 rd, u8 rm, u8 rn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, u8 op)
}
/* Call appropriate function */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit_mov_i(ARM_IP, op == BPF_DIV ?
(u32)jit_udiv32 : (u32)jit_mod32, ctx);
emit_blx_r(ARM_IP, ctx);
@@ -620,8 +669,6 @@ static inline void emit_a32_lsh_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
/* Do LSH operation */
emit(ARM_SUB_I(ARM_IP, rt, 32), ctx);
emit(ARM_RSB_I(tmp2[0], rt, 32), ctx);
- /* As we are using ARM_LR */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit(ARM_MOV_SR(ARM_LR, rm, SRTYPE_ASL, rt), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORR_SR(ARM_LR, ARM_LR, rd, SRTYPE_ASL, ARM_IP), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORR_SR(ARM_IP, ARM_LR, rd, SRTYPE_LSR, tmp2[0]), ctx);
@@ -656,8 +703,6 @@ static inline void emit_a32_arsh_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
/* Do the ARSH operation */
emit(ARM_RSB_I(ARM_IP, rt, 32), ctx);
emit(ARM_SUBS_I(tmp2[0], rt, 32), ctx);
- /* As we are using ARM_LR */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit(ARM_MOV_SR(ARM_LR, rd, SRTYPE_LSR, rt), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORR_SR(ARM_LR, ARM_LR, rm, SRTYPE_ASL, ARM_IP), ctx);
_emit(ARM_COND_MI, ARM_B(0), ctx);
@@ -692,8 +737,6 @@ static inline void emit_a32_lsr_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
/* Do LSH operation */
emit(ARM_RSB_I(ARM_IP, rt, 32), ctx);
emit(ARM_SUBS_I(tmp2[0], rt, 32), ctx);
- /* As we are using ARM_LR */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit(ARM_MOV_SR(ARM_LR, rd, SRTYPE_LSR, rt), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORR_SR(ARM_LR, ARM_LR, rm, SRTYPE_ASL, ARM_IP), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORR_SR(ARM_LR, ARM_LR, rm, SRTYPE_LSR, tmp2[0]), ctx);
@@ -828,8 +871,6 @@ static inline void emit_a32_mul_r64(const u8 dst[], const u8 src[], bool dstk,
/* Do Multiplication */
emit(ARM_MUL(ARM_IP, rd, rn), ctx);
emit(ARM_MUL(ARM_LR, rm, rt), ctx);
- /* As we are using ARM_LR */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit(ARM_ADD_R(ARM_LR, ARM_IP, ARM_LR), ctx);
emit(ARM_UMULL(ARM_IP, rm, rd, rt), ctx);
@@ -872,33 +913,53 @@ static inline void emit_str_r(const u8 dst, const u8 src, bool dstk,
}
/* dst = *(size*)(src + off) */
-static inline void emit_ldx_r(const u8 dst, const u8 src, bool dstk,
- const s32 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){
+static inline void emit_ldx_r(const u8 dst[], const u8 src, bool dstk,
+ s32 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){
const u8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1];
- u8 rd = dstk ? tmp[1] : dst;
+ const u8 *rd = dstk ? tmp : dst;
u8 rm = src;
+ s32 off_max;
- if (off) {
+ if (sz == BPF_H)
+ off_max = 0xff;
+ else
+ off_max = 0xfff;
+
+ if (off < 0 || off > off_max) {
emit_a32_mov_i(tmp[0], off, false, ctx);
emit(ARM_ADD_R(tmp[0], tmp[0], src), ctx);
rm = tmp[0];
+ off = 0;
+ } else if (rd[1] == rm) {
+ emit(ARM_MOV_R(tmp[0], rm), ctx);
+ rm = tmp[0];
}
switch (sz) {
- case BPF_W:
- /* Load a Word */
- emit(ARM_LDR_I(rd, rm, 0), ctx);
+ case BPF_B:
+ /* Load a Byte */
+ emit(ARM_LDRB_I(rd[1], rm, off), ctx);
+ emit_a32_mov_i(dst[0], 0, dstk, ctx);
break;
case BPF_H:
/* Load a HalfWord */
- emit(ARM_LDRH_I(rd, rm, 0), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_LDRH_I(rd[1], rm, off), ctx);
+ emit_a32_mov_i(dst[0], 0, dstk, ctx);
break;
- case BPF_B:
- /* Load a Byte */
- emit(ARM_LDRB_I(rd, rm, 0), ctx);
+ case BPF_W:
+ /* Load a Word */
+ emit(ARM_LDR_I(rd[1], rm, off), ctx);
+ emit_a32_mov_i(dst[0], 0, dstk, ctx);
+ break;
+ case BPF_DW:
+ /* Load a Double Word */
+ emit(ARM_LDR_I(rd[1], rm, off), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_LDR_I(rd[0], rm, off + 4), ctx);
break;
}
if (dstk)
- emit(ARM_STR_I(rd, ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(dst)), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_STR_I(rd[1], ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(dst[1])), ctx);
+ if (dstk && sz == BPF_DW)
+ emit(ARM_STR_I(rd[0], ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(dst[0])), ctx);
}
/* Arithmatic Operation */
@@ -906,7 +967,6 @@ static inline void emit_ar_r(const u8 rd, const u8 rt, const u8 rm,
const u8 rn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, u8 op) {
switch (op) {
case BPF_JSET:
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit(ARM_AND_R(ARM_IP, rt, rn), ctx);
emit(ARM_AND_R(ARM_LR, rd, rm), ctx);
emit(ARM_ORRS_R(ARM_IP, ARM_LR, ARM_IP), ctx);
@@ -945,7 +1005,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
const u8 *tcc = bpf2a32[TCALL_CNT];
const int idx0 = ctx->idx;
#define cur_offset (ctx->idx - idx0)
-#define jmp_offset (out_offset - (cur_offset))
+#define jmp_offset (out_offset - (cur_offset) - 2)
u32 off, lo, hi;
/* if (index >= array->map.max_entries)
@@ -956,7 +1016,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
emit_a32_mov_i(tmp[1], off, false, ctx);
emit(ARM_LDR_I(tmp2[1], ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(r2[1])), ctx);
emit(ARM_LDR_R(tmp[1], tmp2[1], tmp[1]), ctx);
- /* index (64 bit) */
+ /* index is 32-bit for arrays */
emit(ARM_LDR_I(tmp2[1], ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(r3[1])), ctx);
/* index >= array->map.max_entries */
emit(ARM_CMP_R(tmp2[1], tmp[1]), ctx);
@@ -997,7 +1057,7 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
emit_a32_mov_i(tmp2[1], off, false, ctx);
emit(ARM_LDR_R(tmp[1], tmp[1], tmp2[1]), ctx);
emit(ARM_ADD_I(tmp[1], tmp[1], ctx->prologue_bytes), ctx);
- emit(ARM_BX(tmp[1]), ctx);
+ emit_bx_r(tmp[1], ctx);
/* out: */
if (out_offset == -1)
@@ -1070,54 +1130,22 @@ static void build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
const u8 r2 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_1][1];
const u8 r3 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_1][0];
const u8 r4 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_6][1];
- const u8 r5 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_6][0];
- const u8 r6 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1][1];
- const u8 r7 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1][0];
- const u8 r8 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2][1];
- const u8 r10 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2][0];
const u8 fplo = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_FP][1];
const u8 fphi = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_FP][0];
- const u8 sp = ARM_SP;
const u8 *tcc = bpf2a32[TCALL_CNT];
- u16 reg_set = 0;
-
- /*
- * eBPF prog stack layout
- *
- * high
- * original ARM_SP => +-----+ eBPF prologue
- * |FP/LR|
- * current ARM_FP => +-----+
- * | ... | callee saved registers
- * eBPF fp register => +-----+ <= (BPF_FP)
- * | ... | eBPF JIT scratch space
- * | | eBPF prog stack
- * +-----+
- * |RSVD | JIT scratchpad
- * current A64_SP => +-----+ <= (BPF_FP - STACK_SIZE)
- * | |
- * | ... | Function call stack
- * | |
- * +-----+
- * low
- */
-
/* Save callee saved registers. */
- reg_set |= (1<<r4) | (1<<r5) | (1<<r6) | (1<<r7) | (1<<r8) | (1<<r10);
#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
- reg_set |= (1<<ARM_FP) | (1<<ARM_IP) | (1<<ARM_LR) | (1<<ARM_PC);
- emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_IP, sp), ctx);
+ u16 reg_set = CALLEE_PUSH_MASK | 1 << ARM_IP | 1 << ARM_PC;
+ emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_IP, ARM_SP), ctx);
emit(ARM_PUSH(reg_set), ctx);
emit(ARM_SUB_I(ARM_FP, ARM_IP, 4), ctx);
#else
- /* Check if call instruction exists in BPF body */
- if (ctx->seen & SEEN_CALL)
- reg_set |= (1<<ARM_LR);
- emit(ARM_PUSH(reg_set), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_PUSH(CALLEE_PUSH_MASK), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_FP, ARM_SP), ctx);
#endif
/* Save frame pointer for later */
- emit(ARM_SUB_I(ARM_IP, sp, SCRATCH_SIZE), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_SUB_I(ARM_IP, ARM_SP, SCRATCH_SIZE), ctx);
ctx->stack_size = imm8m(STACK_SIZE);
@@ -1140,33 +1168,19 @@ static void build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
/* end of prologue */
}
+/* restore callee saved registers. */
static void build_epilogue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
- const u8 r4 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_6][1];
- const u8 r5 = bpf2a32[BPF_REG_6][0];
- const u8 r6 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1][1];
- const u8 r7 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1][0];
- const u8 r8 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2][1];
- const u8 r10 = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_2][0];
- u16 reg_set = 0;
-
- /* unwind function call stack */
- emit(ARM_ADD_I(ARM_SP, ARM_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
-
- /* restore callee saved registers. */
- reg_set |= (1<<r4) | (1<<r5) | (1<<r6) | (1<<r7) | (1<<r8) | (1<<r10);
#ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
- /* the first instruction of the prologue was: mov ip, sp */
- reg_set |= (1<<ARM_FP) | (1<<ARM_SP) | (1<<ARM_PC);
+ /* When using frame pointers, some additional registers need to
+ * be loaded. */
+ u16 reg_set = CALLEE_POP_MASK | 1 << ARM_SP;
+ emit(ARM_SUB_I(ARM_SP, ARM_FP, hweight16(reg_set) * 4), ctx);
emit(ARM_LDM(ARM_SP, reg_set), ctx);
#else
- if (ctx->seen & SEEN_CALL)
- reg_set |= (1<<ARM_PC);
/* Restore callee saved registers. */
- emit(ARM_POP(reg_set), ctx);
- /* Return back to the callee function */
- if (!(ctx->seen & SEEN_CALL))
- emit(ARM_BX(ARM_LR), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_MOV_R(ARM_SP, ARM_FP), ctx);
+ emit(ARM_POP(CALLEE_POP_MASK), ctx);
#endif
}
@@ -1394,8 +1408,6 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx)
emit_rev32(rt, rt, ctx);
goto emit_bswap_uxt;
case 64:
- /* Because of the usage of ARM_LR */
- ctx->seen |= SEEN_CALL;
emit_rev32(ARM_LR, rt, ctx);
emit_rev32(rt, rd, ctx);
emit(ARM_MOV_R(rd, ARM_LR), ctx);
@@ -1448,22 +1460,7 @@ exit:
rn = sstk ? tmp2[1] : src_lo;
if (sstk)
emit(ARM_LDR_I(rn, ARM_SP, STACK_VAR(src_lo)), ctx);
- switch (BPF_SIZE(code)) {
- case BPF_W:
- /* Load a Word */
- case BPF_H:
- /* Load a Half-Word */
- case BPF_B:
- /* Load a Byte */
- emit_ldx_r(dst_lo, rn, dstk, off, ctx, BPF_SIZE(code));
- emit_a32_mov_i(dst_hi, 0, dstk, ctx);
- break;
- case BPF_DW:
- /* Load a double word */
- emit_ldx_r(dst_lo, rn, dstk, off, ctx, BPF_W);
- emit_ldx_r(dst_hi, rn, dstk, off+4, ctx, BPF_W);
- break;
- }
+ emit_ldx_r(dst, rn, dstk, off, ctx, BPF_SIZE(code));
break;
/* R0 = ntohx(*(size *)(((struct sk_buff *)R6)->data + imm)) */
case BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W:
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi
index 7c9bdc7ab50b..9db19314c60c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
<&cpu1>,
<&cpu2>,
<&cpu3>;
+ interrupt-parent = <&intc>;
};
psci {
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-master.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-master.dtsi
index e3b64d03fbd8..9c7724e82aff 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-master.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-master.dtsi
@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@
cpm_ethernet: ethernet@0 {
compatible = "marvell,armada-7k-pp22";
reg = <0x0 0x100000>, <0x129000 0xb000>;
- clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 3>, <&cpm_clk 1 9>, <&cpm_clk 1 5>;
- clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk";
+ clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 3>, <&cpm_clk 1 9>,
+ <&cpm_clk 1 5>, <&cpm_clk 1 18>;
+ clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk",
+ "mg_clk","axi_clk";
marvell,system-controller = <&cpm_syscon0>;
status = "disabled";
dma-coherent;
@@ -155,7 +157,8 @@
#size-cells = <0>;
compatible = "marvell,orion-mdio";
reg = <0x12a200 0x10>;
- clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 9>, <&cpm_clk 1 5>;
+ clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 9>, <&cpm_clk 1 5>,
+ <&cpm_clk 1 6>, <&cpm_clk 1 18>;
status = "disabled";
};
@@ -338,8 +341,8 @@
compatible = "marvell,armada-cp110-sdhci";
reg = <0x780000 0x300>;
interrupts = <ICU_GRP_NSR 27 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
- clock-names = "core";
- clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 4>;
+ clock-names = "core","axi";
+ clocks = <&cpm_clk 1 4>, <&cpm_clk 1 18>;
dma-coherent;
status = "disabled";
};
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-slave.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-slave.dtsi
index 0d51096c69f8..87ac68b2cf37 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-slave.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-cp110-slave.dtsi
@@ -63,8 +63,10 @@
cps_ethernet: ethernet@0 {
compatible = "marvell,armada-7k-pp22";
reg = <0x0 0x100000>, <0x129000 0xb000>;
- clocks = <&cps_clk 1 3>, <&cps_clk 1 9>, <&cps_clk 1 5>;
- clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk";
+ clocks = <&cps_clk 1 3>, <&cps_clk 1 9>,
+ <&cps_clk 1 5>, <&cps_clk 1 18>;
+ clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk",
+ "mg_clk", "axi_clk";
marvell,system-controller = <&cps_syscon0>;
status = "disabled";
dma-coherent;
@@ -155,7 +157,8 @@
#size-cells = <0>;
compatible = "marvell,orion-mdio";
reg = <0x12a200 0x10>;
- clocks = <&cps_clk 1 9>, <&cps_clk 1 5>;
+ clocks = <&cps_clk 1 9>, <&cps_clk 1 5>,
+ <&cps_clk 1 6>, <&cps_clk 1 18>;
status = "disabled";
};
diff --git a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ba38d403abb2..bb32f7f6dd0f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ static inline int epilogue_offset(const struct jit_ctx *ctx)
/* Stack must be multiples of 16B */
#define STACK_ALIGN(sz) (((sz) + 15) & ~15)
-#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 8
+/* Tail call offset to jump into */
+#define PROLOGUE_OFFSET 7
static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
{
@@ -200,19 +201,19 @@ static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
/* Initialize tail_call_cnt */
emit(A64_MOVZ(1, tcc, 0, 0), ctx);
- /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */
- ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4;
- ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size);
-
- /* Set up function call stack */
- emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
-
cur_offset = ctx->idx - idx0;
if (cur_offset != PROLOGUE_OFFSET) {
pr_err_once("PROLOGUE_OFFSET = %d, expected %d!\n",
cur_offset, PROLOGUE_OFFSET);
return -1;
}
+
+ /* 4 byte extra for skb_copy_bits buffer */
+ ctx->stack_size = prog->aux->stack_depth + 4;
+ ctx->stack_size = STACK_ALIGN(ctx->stack_size);
+
+ /* Set up function call stack */
+ emit(A64_SUB_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
return 0;
}
@@ -260,11 +261,12 @@ static int emit_bpf_tail_call(struct jit_ctx *ctx)
emit(A64_LDR64(prg, tmp, prg), ctx);
emit(A64_CBZ(1, prg, jmp_offset), ctx);
- /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size); */
+ /* goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_offset); */
off = offsetof(struct bpf_prog, bpf_func);
emit_a64_mov_i64(tmp, off, ctx);
emit(A64_LDR64(tmp, prg, tmp), ctx);
emit(A64_ADD_I(1, tmp, tmp, sizeof(u32) * PROLOGUE_OFFSET), ctx);
+ emit(A64_ADD_I(1, A64_SP, A64_SP, ctx->stack_size), ctx);
emit(A64_BR(tmp), ctx);
/* out: */
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h
index 28e02c99be6d..762eeb0fcc1d 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/atomic.h
@@ -65,29 +65,30 @@ ia64_atomic_fetch_##op (int i, atomic_t *v) \
ATOMIC_OPS(add, +)
ATOMIC_OPS(sub, -)
-#define atomic_add_return(i,v) \
+#ifdef __OPTIMIZE__
+#define __ia64_atomic_const(i) __builtin_constant_p(i) ? \
+ ((i) == 1 || (i) == 4 || (i) == 8 || (i) == 16 || \
+ (i) == -1 || (i) == -4 || (i) == -8 || (i) == -16) : 0
+
+#define atomic_add_return(i, v) \
({ \
- int __ia64_aar_i = (i); \
- (__builtin_constant_p(i) \
- && ( (__ia64_aar_i == 1) || (__ia64_aar_i == 4) \
- || (__ia64_aar_i == 8) || (__ia64_aar_i == 16) \
- || (__ia64_aar_i == -1) || (__ia64_aar_i == -4) \
- || (__ia64_aar_i == -8) || (__ia64_aar_i == -16))) \
- ? ia64_fetch_and_add(__ia64_aar_i, &(v)->counter) \
- : ia64_atomic_add(__ia64_aar_i, v); \
+ int __i = (i); \
+ static const int __ia64_atomic_p = __ia64_atomic_const(i); \
+ __ia64_atomic_p ? ia64_fetch_and_add(__i, &(v)->counter) : \
+ ia64_atomic_add(__i, v); \
})
-#define atomic_sub_return(i,v) \
+#define atomic_sub_return(i, v) \
({ \
- int __ia64_asr_i = (i); \
- (__builtin_constant_p(i) \
- && ( (__ia64_asr_i == 1) || (__ia64_asr_i == 4) \
- || (__ia64_asr_i == 8) || (__ia64_asr_i == 16) \
- || (__ia64_asr_i == -1) || (__ia64_asr_i == -4) \
- || (__ia64_asr_i == -8) || (__ia64_asr_i == -16))) \
- ? ia64_fetch_and_add(-__ia64_asr_i, &(v)->counter) \
- : ia64_atomic_sub(__ia64_asr_i, v); \
+ int __i = (i); \
+ static const int __ia64_atomic_p = __ia64_atomic_const(i); \
+ __ia64_atomic_p ? ia64_fetch_and_add(-__i, &(v)->counter) : \
+ ia64_atomic_sub(__i, v); \
})
+#else
+#define atomic_add_return(i, v) ia64_atomic_add(i, v)
+#define atomic_sub_return(i, v) ia64_atomic_sub(i, v)
+#endif
#define atomic_fetch_add(i,v) \
({ \
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/time.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/time.c
index c6ecb97151a2..9025699049ca 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/time.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/time.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ void vtime_flush(struct task_struct *tsk)
}
if (ti->softirq_time) {
- delta = cycle_to_nsec(ti->softirq_time));
+ delta = cycle_to_nsec(ti->softirq_time);
account_system_index_time(tsk, delta, CPUTIME_SOFTIRQ);
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index c51e6ce42e7a..2ed525a44734 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ config PPC
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST if SMP
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES if PPC_BOOK3S_64
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW_LEVEL
select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
index a703452d67b6..555e22d5e07f 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64e.h
@@ -209,5 +209,11 @@ exc_##label##_book3e:
ori r3,r3,vector_offset@l; \
mtspr SPRN_IVOR##vector_number,r3;
+#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ rfi
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER \
+ rfi
+
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_64E_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
index b27205297e1d..7197b179c1b1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h
@@ -74,6 +74,59 @@
*/
#define EX_R3 EX_DAR
+/*
+ * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
+ *
+ * The nop instructions allow us to insert one or more instructions to flush the
+ * L1-D cache when returning to userspace or a guest.
+ */
+#define RFI_FLUSH_SLOT \
+ RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \
+ nop; \
+ nop; \
+ nop
+
+#define RFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ rfid
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define RFI_TO_GUEST \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ rfid; \
+ b rfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_KERNEL \
+ hrfid
+
+#define HRFI_TO_USER \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_GUEST \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
+#define HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN \
+ RFI_FLUSH_SLOT; \
+ hrfid; \
+ b hrfi_flush_fallback
+
#ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
#define __EXCEPTION_RELON_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \
mfspr r11,SPRN_##h##SRR0; /* save SRR0 */ \
@@ -218,7 +271,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(ftr,ftr,943)
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR0,r12; \
mfspr r12,SPRN_##h##SRR1; /* and SRR1 */ \
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR1,r10; \
- h##rfid; \
+ h##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#define EXCEPTION_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h) \
__EXCEPTION_PROLOG_PSERIES_1(label, h)
@@ -232,7 +285,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_NESTED(ftr,ftr,943)
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR0,r12; \
mfspr r12,SPRN_##h##SRR1; /* and SRR1 */ \
mtspr SPRN_##h##SRR1,r10; \
- h##rfid; \
+ h##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#define EXCEPTION_PROLOG_PSERIES_1_NORI(label, h) \
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
index 8f88f771cc55..1e82eb3caabd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h
@@ -187,7 +187,20 @@ label##3: \
FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET label##1b-label##3b; \
.popsection;
+#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \
+951: \
+ .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
+ .align 2; \
+952: \
+ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 951b-952b; \
+ .popsection;
+
+
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;
+
void apply_feature_fixups(void);
void setup_feature_keys(void);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
index a409177be8bd..eca3f9c68907 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@
#define H_GET_HCA_INFO 0x1B8
#define H_GET_PERF_COUNT 0x1BC
#define H_MANAGE_TRACE 0x1C0
+#define H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS 0x1C8
#define H_FREE_LOGICAL_LAN_BUFFER 0x1D4
#define H_QUERY_INT_STATE 0x1E4
#define H_POLL_PENDING 0x1D8
@@ -330,6 +331,17 @@
#define H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET_ALL_OTHERS -2
/* >= 0 values are CPU number */
+/* H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS return values */
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3
+#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4
+
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
+#define H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2
+
/* Flag values used in H_REGISTER_PROC_TBL hcall */
#define PROC_TABLE_OP_MASK 0x18
#define PROC_TABLE_DEREG 0x10
@@ -341,6 +353,7 @@
#define PROC_TABLE_GTSE 0x01
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+#include <linux/types.h>
/**
* plpar_hcall_norets: - Make a pseries hypervisor call with no return arguments
@@ -436,6 +449,11 @@ static inline unsigned int get_longbusy_msecs(int longbusy_rc)
}
}
+struct h_cpu_char_result {
+ u64 character;
+ u64 behaviour;
+};
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_HVCALL_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
index 3892db93b837..23ac7fc0af23 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/paca.h
@@ -232,6 +232,16 @@ struct paca_struct {
struct sibling_subcore_state *sibling_subcore_state;
#endif
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+ /*
+ * rfi fallback flush must be in its own cacheline to prevent
+ * other paca data leaking into the L1d
+ */
+ u64 exrfi[EX_SIZE] __aligned(0x80);
+ void *rfi_flush_fallback_area;
+ u64 l1d_flush_congruence;
+ u64 l1d_flush_sets;
+#endif
};
extern void copy_mm_to_paca(struct mm_struct *mm);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
index 7f01b22fa6cb..55eddf50d149 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/plpar_wrappers.h
@@ -326,4 +326,18 @@ static inline long plapr_signal_sys_reset(long cpu)
return plpar_hcall_norets(H_SIGNAL_SYS_RESET, cpu);
}
+static inline long plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(struct h_cpu_char_result *p)
+{
+ unsigned long retbuf[PLPAR_HCALL_BUFSIZE];
+ long rc;
+
+ rc = plpar_hcall(H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS, retbuf);
+ if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
+ p->character = retbuf[0];
+ p->behaviour = retbuf[1];
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_PLPAR_WRAPPERS_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
index cf00ec26303a..469b7fdc9be4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -39,6 +39,19 @@ static inline void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void) {}
static inline void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
+void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable);
+
+/* These are bit flags */
+enum l1d_flush_type {
+ L1D_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
+ L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK = 0x2,
+ L1D_FLUSH_ORI = 0x4,
+ L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8,
+};
+
+void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
+void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
+
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 6b958414b4e0..f390d57cf2e1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -237,6 +237,11 @@ int main(void)
OFFSET(PACA_NMI_EMERG_SP, paca_struct, nmi_emergency_sp);
OFFSET(PACA_IN_MCE, paca_struct, in_mce);
OFFSET(PACA_IN_NMI, paca_struct, in_nmi);
+ OFFSET(PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA, paca_struct, rfi_flush_fallback_area);
+ OFFSET(PACA_EXRFI, paca_struct, exrfi);
+ OFFSET(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE, paca_struct, l1d_flush_congruence);
+ OFFSET(PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS, paca_struct, l1d_flush_sets);
+
#endif
OFFSET(PACAHWCPUID, paca_struct, hw_cpu_id);
OFFSET(PACAKEXECSTATE, paca_struct, kexec_state);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
index 3320bcac7192..2748584b767d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
#include <asm/tm.h>
#include <asm/ppc-opcode.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S
+#include <asm/exception-64s.h>
+#else
+#include <asm/exception-64e.h>
+#endif
/*
* System calls.
@@ -262,13 +267,23 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r13,GPR13(r1) /* only restore r13 if returning to usermode */
+ ld r2,GPR2(r1)
+ ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ mtlr r4
+ mtcr r5
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
+ RFI_TO_USER
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
+
+ /* exit to kernel */
1: ld r2,GPR2(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
mtlr r4
mtcr r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r7
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r8
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
.Lsyscall_error:
@@ -397,8 +412,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
mtmsrd r10, 1
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r11
mtspr SPRN_SRR1, r12
-
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_USER
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#endif
_ASM_NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(system_call_common);
@@ -878,7 +892,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ACCOUNT_CPU_USER_EXIT(r13, r2, r4)
REST_GPR(13, r1)
-1:
+
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
ld r2,_CCR(r1)
@@ -891,8 +905,22 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HAS_PPR)
ld r3,GPR3(r1)
ld r4,GPR4(r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ RFI_TO_USER
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
- rfid
+1: mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r3
+
+ ld r2,_CCR(r1)
+ mtcrf 0xFF,r2
+ ld r2,_NIP(r1)
+ mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r2
+
+ ld r0,GPR0(r1)
+ ld r2,GPR2(r1)
+ ld r3,GPR3(r1)
+ ld r4,GPR4(r1)
+ ld r1,GPR1(r1)
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */
@@ -1073,7 +1101,7 @@ __enter_rtas:
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r5
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r6
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
rtas_return_loc:
@@ -1098,7 +1126,7 @@ rtas_return_loc:
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r3
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r4
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
_ASM_NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__enter_rtas)
_ASM_NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(rtas_return_loc)
@@ -1171,7 +1199,7 @@ _GLOBAL(enter_prom)
LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r12, MSR_SF | MSR_ISF | MSR_LE)
andc r11,r11,r12
mtsrr1 r11
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E */
1: /* Return from OF */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
index e441b469dc8f..2dc10bf646b8 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
LOAD_HANDLER(r12, machine_check_handle_early)
1: mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r12
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r11
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
2:
/* Stack overflow. Stay on emergency stack and panic.
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(machine_check_handle_early)
li r3,MSR_ME
andc r10,r10,r3 /* Turn off MSR_ME */
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
2:
/*
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(machine_check_handle_early)
*/
bl machine_check_queue_event
MACHINE_CHECK_HANDLER_WINDUP
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL
9:
/* Deliver the machine check to host kernel in V mode. */
MACHINE_CHECK_HANDLER_WINDUP
@@ -598,6 +598,9 @@ EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(slb_miss_common)
stw r9,PACA_EXSLB+EX_CCR(r13) /* save CR in exc. frame */
std r10,PACA_EXSLB+EX_LR(r13) /* save LR */
+ andi. r9,r11,MSR_PR // Check for exception from userspace
+ cmpdi cr4,r9,MSR_PR // And save the result in CR4 for later
+
/*
* Test MSR_RI before calling slb_allocate_realmode, because the
* MSR in r11 gets clobbered. However we still want to allocate
@@ -624,9 +627,12 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
/* All done -- return from exception. */
+ bne cr4,1f /* returning to kernel */
+
.machine push
.machine "power4"
mtcrf 0x80,r9
+ mtcrf 0x08,r9 /* MSR[PR] indication is in cr4 */
mtcrf 0x04,r9 /* MSR[RI] indication is in cr5 */
mtcrf 0x02,r9 /* I/D indication is in cr6 */
mtcrf 0x01,r9 /* slb_allocate uses cr0 and cr7 */
@@ -640,9 +646,30 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_USER
+ b . /* prevent speculative execution */
+1:
+.machine push
+.machine "power4"
+ mtcrf 0x80,r9
+ mtcrf 0x08,r9 /* MSR[PR] indication is in cr4 */
+ mtcrf 0x04,r9 /* MSR[RI] indication is in cr5 */
+ mtcrf 0x02,r9 /* I/D indication is in cr6 */
+ mtcrf 0x01,r9 /* slb_allocate uses cr0 and cr7 */
+.machine pop
+
+ RESTORE_CTR(r9, PACA_EXSLB)
+ RESTORE_PPR_PACA(PACA_EXSLB, r9)
+ mr r3,r12
+ ld r9,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r13,PACA_EXSLB+EX_R13(r13)
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b . /* prevent speculative execution */
+
2: std r3,PACA_EXSLB+EX_DAR(r13)
mr r3,r12
mfspr r11,SPRN_SRR0
@@ -651,7 +678,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
8: std r3,PACA_EXSLB+EX_DAR(r13)
@@ -662,7 +689,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
EXC_COMMON_BEGIN(unrecov_slb)
@@ -901,7 +928,7 @@ EXC_COMMON(trap_0b_common, 0xb00, unknown_exception)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0,r10 ; \
ld r10,PACAKMSR(r13) ; \
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r10 ; \
- rfid ; \
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL ; \
b . ; /* prevent speculative execution */
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FAST_ENDIAN_SWITCH
@@ -917,7 +944,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_REAL_LE) \
xori r12,r12,MSR_LE ; \
mtspr SPRN_SRR1,r12 ; \
mr r13,r9 ; \
- rfid ; /* return to userspace */ \
+ RFI_TO_USER ; /* return to userspace */ \
b . ; /* prevent speculative execution */
#else
#define SYSCALL_FASTENDIAN_TEST
@@ -1063,7 +1090,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(hmi_exception_early)
mtcr r11
REST_GPR(11, r1)
ld r1,GPR1(r1)
- hrfid
+ HRFI_TO_USER_OR_KERNEL
1: mtcr r11
REST_GPR(11, r1)
@@ -1314,7 +1341,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_CFAR)
ld r11,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R11(r13)
ld r12,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R12(r13)
ld r13,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R13(r13)
- HRFID
+ HRFI_TO_UNKNOWN
b .
#endif
@@ -1418,10 +1445,94 @@ masked_##_H##interrupt: \
ld r10,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R10(r13); \
ld r11,PACA_EXGEN+EX_R11(r13); \
/* returns to kernel where r13 must be set up, so don't restore it */ \
- ##_H##rfid; \
+ ##_H##RFI_TO_KERNEL; \
b .; \
MASKED_DEC_HANDLER(_H)
+TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(rfi_flush_fallback)
+ SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ GET_PACA(r13);
+ std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ mfctr r9
+ ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13)
+ /*
+ * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
+ * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
+ * hurt).
+ */
+ addi r12,r12,8
+ mtctr r11
+ DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
+
+ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
+ sync
+1: li r8,0
+ .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */
+ ldx r11,r10,r8
+ add r8,r8,r12
+ xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not
+ add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx
+ .endr
+ addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */
+ bdnz 1b
+
+ mtctr r9
+ ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ rfid
+
+TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(hrfi_flush_fallback)
+ SET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ GET_PACA(r13);
+ std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ std r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ std r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ mfctr r9
+ ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SETS(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_CONGRUENCE(r13)
+ /*
+ * The load adresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines,
+ * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not
+ * hurt).
+ */
+ addi r12,r12,8
+ mtctr r11
+ DCBT_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */
+
+ /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */
+ sync
+1: li r8,0
+ .rept 8 /* 8-way set associative */
+ ldx r11,r10,r8
+ add r8,r8,r12
+ xor r11,r11,r11 // Ensure r11 is 0 even if fallback area is not
+ add r8,r8,r11 // Add 0, this creates a dependency on the ldx
+ .endr
+ addi r10,r10,128 /* 128 byte cache line */
+ bdnz 1b
+
+ mtctr r9
+ ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13)
+ ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13)
+ ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13)
+ ld r12,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R12(r13)
+ ld r8,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R13(r13)
+ GET_SCRATCH0(r13);
+ hrfid
+
/*
* Real mode exceptions actually use this too, but alternate
* instruction code patches (which end up in the common .text area)
@@ -1441,7 +1552,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_interrupt)
addi r13, r13, 4
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r13
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_Hinterrupt)
@@ -1453,7 +1564,7 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(kvmppc_skip_Hinterrupt)
addi r13, r13, 4
mtspr SPRN_HSRR0, r13
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
- hrfid
+ HRFI_TO_KERNEL
b .
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
index 9d213542a48b..8fd3a70047f1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup-common.c
@@ -242,14 +242,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
unsigned short maj;
unsigned short min;
- /* We only show online cpus: disable preempt (overzealous, I
- * knew) to prevent cpu going down. */
- preempt_disable();
- if (!cpu_online(cpu_id)) {
- preempt_enable();
- return 0;
- }
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
pvr = per_cpu(cpu_pvr, cpu_id);
#else
@@ -358,9 +350,6 @@ static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
seq_printf(m, "\n");
#endif
-
- preempt_enable();
-
/* If this is the last cpu, print the summary */
if (cpumask_next(cpu_id, cpu_online_mask) >= nr_cpu_ids)
show_cpuinfo_summary(m);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index 8956a9856604..e67413f4a8f0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <asm/debugfs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/kdump.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
@@ -801,3 +802,141 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_detector(void)
return 0;
}
early_initcall(disable_hardlockup_detector);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
+static void *l1d_flush_fallback_area;
+static bool no_rfi_flush;
+bool rfi_flush;
+
+static int __init handle_no_rfi_flush(char *p)
+{
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: disabled on command line.");
+ no_rfi_flush = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("no_rfi_flush", handle_no_rfi_flush);
+
+/*
+ * The RFI flush is not KPTI, but because users will see doco that says to use
+ * nopti we hijack that option here to also disable the RFI flush.
+ */
+static int __init handle_no_pti(char *p)
+{
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: disabling due to 'nopti' on command line.\n");
+ handle_no_rfi_flush(NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nopti", handle_no_pti);
+
+static void do_nothing(void *unused)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't need to do the flush explicitly, just enter+exit kernel is
+ * sufficient, the RFI exit handlers will do the right thing.
+ */
+}
+
+void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable)
+{
+ if (rfi_flush == enable)
+ return;
+
+ if (enable) {
+ do_rfi_flush_fixups(enabled_flush_types);
+ on_each_cpu(do_nothing, NULL, 1);
+ } else
+ do_rfi_flush_fixups(L1D_FLUSH_NONE);
+
+ rfi_flush = enable;
+}
+
+static void init_fallback_flush(void)
+{
+ u64 l1d_size, limit;
+ int cpu;
+
+ l1d_size = ppc64_caches.l1d.size;
+ limit = min(safe_stack_limit(), ppc64_rma_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Align to L1d size, and size it at 2x L1d size, to catch possible
+ * hardware prefetch runoff. We don't have a recipe for load patterns to
+ * reliably avoid the prefetcher.
+ */
+ l1d_flush_fallback_area = __va(memblock_alloc_base(l1d_size * 2, l1d_size, limit));
+ memset(l1d_flush_fallback_area, 0, l1d_size * 2);
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ /*
+ * The fallback flush is currently coded for 8-way
+ * associativity. Different associativity is possible, but it
+ * will be treated as 8-way and may not evict the lines as
+ * effectively.
+ *
+ * 128 byte lines are mandatory.
+ */
+ u64 c = l1d_size / 8;
+
+ paca[cpu].rfi_flush_fallback_area = l1d_flush_fallback_area;
+ paca[cpu].l1d_flush_congruence = c;
+ paca[cpu].l1d_flush_sets = c / 128;
+ }
+}
+
+void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
+{
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK) {
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n");
+ init_fallback_flush();
+ }
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI)
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n");
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+ pr_info("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n");
+
+ enabled_flush_types = types;
+
+ if (!no_rfi_flush)
+ rfi_flush_enable(enable);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static int rfi_flush_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ if (val == 1)
+ rfi_flush_enable(true);
+ else if (val == 0)
+ rfi_flush_enable(false);
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rfi_flush_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+ *val = rfi_flush ? 1 : 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(fops_rfi_flush, rfi_flush_get, rfi_flush_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ debugfs_create_file("rfi_flush", 0600, powerpc_debugfs_root, NULL, &fops_rfi_flush);
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(rfi_flush_debugfs_init);
+#endif
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (rfi_flush)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: RFI Flush\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 0494e1566ee2..307843d23682 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@ SECTIONS
/* Read-only data */
RO_DATA(PAGE_SIZE)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
+ . = ALIGN(8);
+ __rfi_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__rfi_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ __start___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
+ *(__rfi_flush_fixup)
+ __stop___rfi_flush_fixup = .;
+ }
+#endif
+
EXCEPTION_TABLE(0)
NOTES :kernel :notes
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
index 29ebe2fd5867..a93d719edc90 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu.c
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ static int kvmppc_mmu_book3s_64_xlate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t eaddr,
gpte->may_read = true;
gpte->may_write = true;
gpte->page_size = MMU_PAGE_4K;
+ gpte->wimg = HPTE_R_M;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
index 966097232d21..b73dbc9e797d 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_mmu_hv.c
@@ -65,11 +65,17 @@ struct kvm_resize_hpt {
u32 order;
/* These fields protected by kvm->lock */
+
+ /* Possible values and their usage:
+ * <0 an error occurred during allocation,
+ * -EBUSY allocation is in the progress,
+ * 0 allocation made successfuly.
+ */
int error;
- bool prepare_done;
- /* Private to the work thread, until prepare_done is true,
- * then protected by kvm->resize_hpt_sem */
+ /* Private to the work thread, until error != -EBUSY,
+ * then protected by kvm->lock.
+ */
struct kvm_hpt_info hpt;
};
@@ -159,8 +165,6 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *kvm, int order)
* Reset all the reverse-mapping chains for all memslots
*/
kvmppc_rmap_reset(kvm);
- /* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
- cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
err = 0;
goto out;
}
@@ -176,6 +180,10 @@ long kvmppc_alloc_reset_hpt(struct kvm *kvm, int order)
kvmppc_set_hpt(kvm, &info);
out:
+ if (err == 0)
+ /* Ensure that each vcpu will flush its TLB on next entry. */
+ cpumask_setall(&kvm->arch.need_tlb_flush);
+
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return err;
}
@@ -1413,16 +1421,20 @@ static void resize_hpt_pivot(struct kvm_resize_hpt *resize)
static void resize_hpt_release(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_resize_hpt *resize)
{
- BUG_ON(kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize);
+ if (WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&kvm->lock)))
+ return;
if (!resize)
return;
- if (resize->hpt.virt)
- kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+ if (resize->error != -EBUSY) {
+ if (resize->hpt.virt)
+ kvmppc_free_hpt(&resize->hpt);
+ kfree(resize);
+ }
- kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
- kfree(resize);
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize)
+ kvm->arch.resize_hpt = NULL;
}
static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -1431,17 +1443,41 @@ static void resize_hpt_prepare_work(struct work_struct *work)
struct kvm_resize_hpt,
work);
struct kvm *kvm = resize->kvm;
- int err;
+ int err = 0;
- resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
- resize->order);
-
- err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
+ if (WARN_ON(resize->error != -EBUSY))
+ return;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ /* Request is still current? */
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt == resize) {
+ /* We may request large allocations here:
+ * do not sleep with kvm->lock held for a while.
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ resize_hpt_debug(resize, "resize_hpt_prepare_work(): order = %d\n",
+ resize->order);
+
+ err = resize_hpt_allocate(resize);
+
+ /* We have strict assumption about -EBUSY
+ * when preparing for HPT resize.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON(err == -EBUSY))
+ err = -EINPROGRESS;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+ /* It is possible that kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize
+ * after we grab kvm->lock again.
+ */
+ }
+
resize->error = err;
- resize->prepare_done = true;
+
+ if (kvm->arch.resize_hpt != resize)
+ resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
}
@@ -1466,14 +1502,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(struct kvm *kvm,
if (resize) {
if (resize->order == shift) {
- /* Suitable resize in progress */
- if (resize->prepare_done) {
- ret = resize->error;
- if (ret != 0)
- resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
- } else {
+ /* Suitable resize in progress? */
+ ret = resize->error;
+ if (ret == -EBUSY)
ret = 100; /* estimated time in ms */
- }
+ else if (ret)
+ resize_hpt_release(kvm, resize);
goto out;
}
@@ -1493,6 +1527,8 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_prepare(struct kvm *kvm,
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
+
+ resize->error = -EBUSY;
resize->order = shift;
resize->kvm = kvm;
INIT_WORK(&resize->work, resize_hpt_prepare_work);
@@ -1547,16 +1583,12 @@ long kvm_vm_ioctl_resize_hpt_commit(struct kvm *kvm,
if (!resize || (resize->order != shift))
goto out;
- ret = -EBUSY;
- if (!resize->prepare_done)
- goto out;
-
ret = resize->error;
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret)
goto out;
ret = resize_hpt_rehash(resize);
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (ret)
goto out;
resize_hpt_pivot(resize);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
index 2659844784b8..9c61f736c75b 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ _GLOBAL_TOC(kvmppc_hv_entry_trampoline)
mtmsrd r0,1 /* clear RI in MSR */
mtsrr0 r5
mtsrr1 r6
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
kvmppc_call_hv_entry:
BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)
mtmsrd r6, 1 /* Clear RI in MSR */
mtsrr0 r8
mtsrr1 r7
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
/* Virtual-mode return */
.Lvirt_return:
@@ -1167,8 +1167,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300)
ld r0, VCPU_GPR(R0)(r4)
ld r4, VCPU_GPR(R4)(r4)
-
- hrfid
+ HRFI_TO_GUEST
b .
secondary_too_late:
@@ -3320,7 +3319,7 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
ld r4, PACAKMSR(r13)
mtspr SPRN_SRR0, r3
mtspr SPRN_SRR1, r4
- rfid
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
9: addi r3, r1, STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
bl kvmppc_bad_interrupt
b 9b
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
index d0dc8624198f..7deaeeb14b93 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_pr.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static void kvmppc_giveup_fac(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong fac);
#define MSR_USER32 MSR_USER
#define MSR_USER64 MSR_USER
#define HW_PAGE_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+#define HPTE_R_M _PAGE_COHERENT
#endif
static bool kvmppc_is_split_real(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ int kvmppc_handle_pagefault(struct kvm_run *run, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
pte.eaddr = eaddr;
pte.vpage = eaddr >> 12;
pte.page_size = MMU_PAGE_64K;
+ pte.wimg = HPTE_R_M;
}
switch (kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & (MSR_DR|MSR_IR)) {
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rmhandlers.S b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rmhandlers.S
index 42a4b237df5f..34a5adeff084 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rmhandlers.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_rmhandlers.S
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
#define FUNC(name) name
+#define RFI_TO_KERNEL RFI
+#define RFI_TO_GUEST RFI
+
.macro INTERRUPT_TRAMPOLINE intno
.global kvmppc_trampoline_\intno
@@ -141,7 +144,7 @@ kvmppc_handler_skip_ins:
GET_SCRATCH0(r13)
/* And get back into the code */
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
#endif
/*
@@ -164,6 +167,6 @@ _GLOBAL_TOC(kvmppc_entry_trampoline)
ori r5, r5, MSR_EE
mtsrr0 r7
mtsrr1 r6
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
#include "book3s_segment.S"
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_segment.S b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_segment.S
index 2a2b96d53999..93a180ceefad 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_segment.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_segment.S
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ no_dcbz32_on:
PPC_LL r9, SVCPU_R9(r3)
PPC_LL r3, (SVCPU_R3)(r3)
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_GUEST
kvmppc_handler_trampoline_enter_end:
@@ -407,5 +407,5 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)
cmpwi r12, BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_DOORBELL
beqa BOOK3S_INTERRUPT_DOORBELL
- RFI
+ RFI_TO_KERNEL
kvmppc_handler_trampoline_exit_end:
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
index 41cf5ae273cf..a95ea007d654 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c
@@ -116,6 +116,47 @@ void do_feature_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
+void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types)
+{
+ unsigned int instrs[3], *dest;
+ long *start, *end;
+ int i;
+
+ start = PTRRELOC(&__start___rfi_flush_fixup),
+ end = PTRRELOC(&__stop___rfi_flush_fixup);
+
+ instrs[0] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+ instrs[1] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+ instrs[2] = 0x60000000; /* nop */
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK)
+ /* b .+16 to fallback flush */
+ instrs[0] = 0x48000010;
+
+ i = 0;
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_ORI) {
+ instrs[i++] = 0x63ff0000; /* ori 31,31,0 speculation barrier */
+ instrs[i++] = 0x63de0000; /* ori 30,30,0 L1d flush*/
+ }
+
+ if (types & L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG)
+ instrs[i++] = 0x7c12dba6; /* mtspr TRIG2,r0 (SPR #882) */
+
+ for (i = 0; start < end; start++, i++) {
+ dest = (void *)start + *start;
+
+ pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);
+
+ patch_instruction(dest, instrs[0]);
+ patch_instruction(dest + 1, instrs[1]);
+ patch_instruction(dest + 2, instrs[2]);
+ }
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations\n", i);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
+
void do_lwsync_fixups(unsigned long value, void *fixup_start, void *fixup_end)
{
long *start, *end;
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
index 1edfbc1e40f4..4fb21e17504a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c
@@ -37,13 +37,62 @@
#include <asm/kexec.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/tm.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "powernv.h"
+static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)
+{
+ struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
+ enum l1d_flush_type type;
+ int enable;
+
+ /* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+ enable = 1;
+
+ np = of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "ibm,opal");
+ fw_features = of_get_child_by_name(np, "fw-features");
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ if (fw_features) {
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-trig2");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "enabled"))
+ type = L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ /* Enable unless firmware says NOT to */
+ enable = 2;
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
+ enable--;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+
+ np = of_get_child_by_name(fw_features, "needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1");
+ if (np && of_property_read_bool(np, "disabled"))
+ enable--;
+
+ of_node_put(np);
+ of_node_put(fw_features);
+ }
+
+ setup_rfi_flush(type, enable > 0);
+}
+
static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
+ pnv_setup_rfi_flush();
+
/* Initialize SMP */
pnv_smp_init();
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c
index 6e35780c5962..a0b20c03f078 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c
@@ -574,11 +574,26 @@ static ssize_t dlpar_show(struct class *class, struct class_attribute *attr,
static CLASS_ATTR_RW(dlpar);
-static int __init pseries_dlpar_init(void)
+int __init dlpar_workqueue_init(void)
{
+ if (pseries_hp_wq)
+ return 0;
+
pseries_hp_wq = alloc_workqueue("pseries hotplug workqueue",
- WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
+ WQ_UNBOUND, 1);
+
+ return pseries_hp_wq ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int __init dlpar_sysfs_init(void)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = dlpar_workqueue_init();
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
return sysfs_create_file(kernel_kobj, &class_attr_dlpar.attr);
}
-machine_device_initcall(pseries, pseries_dlpar_init);
+machine_device_initcall(pseries, dlpar_sysfs_init);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h
index 4470a3194311..1ae1d9f4dbe9 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h
@@ -98,4 +98,6 @@ static inline unsigned long cmo_get_page_size(void)
return CMO_PageSize;
}
+int dlpar_workqueue_init(void);
+
#endif /* _PSERIES_PSERIES_H */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
index 4923ffe230cf..81d8614e7379 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ras.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static int __init init_ras_IRQ(void)
/* Hotplug Events */
np = of_find_node_by_path("/event-sources/hot-plug-events");
if (np != NULL) {
- request_event_sources_irqs(np, ras_hotplug_interrupt,
+ if (dlpar_workqueue_init() == 0)
+ request_event_sources_irqs(np, ras_hotplug_interrupt,
"RAS_HOTPLUG");
of_node_put(np);
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
index a8531e012658..ae4f596273b5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c
@@ -459,6 +459,39 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(void)
of_pci_check_probe_only();
}
+static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)
+{
+ struct h_cpu_char_result result;
+ enum l1d_flush_type types;
+ bool enable;
+ long rc;
+
+ /* Enable by default */
+ enable = true;
+
+ rc = plpar_get_cpu_characteristics(&result);
+ if (rc == H_SUCCESS) {
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_NONE;
+
+ if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2)
+ types |= L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG;
+ if (result.character & H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30)
+ types |= L1D_FLUSH_ORI;
+
+ /* Use fallback if nothing set in hcall */
+ if (types == L1D_FLUSH_NONE)
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+
+ if (!(result.behaviour & H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR))
+ enable = false;
+ } else {
+ /* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */
+ types = L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK;
+ }
+
+ setup_rfi_flush(types, enable);
+}
+
static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
{
set_arch_panic_timeout(10, ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT);
@@ -476,6 +509,8 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)
fwnmi_init();
+ pseries_setup_rfi_flush();
+
/* By default, only probe PCI (can be overridden by rtas_pci) */
pci_add_flags(PCI_PROBE_ONLY);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
index cab24f549e7c..0ddc7ac6c5f1 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c
@@ -2344,10 +2344,10 @@ static void dump_one_paca(int cpu)
DUMP(p, kernel_toc, "lx");
DUMP(p, kernelbase, "lx");
DUMP(p, kernel_msr, "lx");
- DUMP(p, emergency_sp, "p");
+ DUMP(p, emergency_sp, "px");
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
- DUMP(p, nmi_emergency_sp, "p");
- DUMP(p, mc_emergency_sp, "p");
+ DUMP(p, nmi_emergency_sp, "px");
+ DUMP(p, mc_emergency_sp, "px");
DUMP(p, in_nmi, "x");
DUMP(p, in_mce, "x");
DUMP(p, hmi_event_available, "x");
@@ -2375,17 +2375,21 @@ static void dump_one_paca(int cpu)
DUMP(p, slb_cache_ptr, "x");
for (i = 0; i < SLB_CACHE_ENTRIES; i++)
printf(" slb_cache[%d]: = 0x%016lx\n", i, p->slb_cache[i]);
+
+ DUMP(p, rfi_flush_fallback_area, "px");
+ DUMP(p, l1d_flush_congruence, "llx");
+ DUMP(p, l1d_flush_sets, "llx");
#endif
DUMP(p, dscr_default, "llx");
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E
- DUMP(p, pgd, "p");
- DUMP(p, kernel_pgd, "p");
- DUMP(p, tcd_ptr, "p");
- DUMP(p, mc_kstack, "p");
- DUMP(p, crit_kstack, "p");
- DUMP(p, dbg_kstack, "p");
+ DUMP(p, pgd, "px");
+ DUMP(p, kernel_pgd, "px");
+ DUMP(p, tcd_ptr, "px");
+ DUMP(p, mc_kstack, "px");
+ DUMP(p, crit_kstack, "px");
+ DUMP(p, dbg_kstack, "px");
#endif
- DUMP(p, __current, "p");
+ DUMP(p, __current, "px");
DUMP(p, kstack, "lx");
printf(" kstack_base = 0x%016lx\n", p->kstack & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
DUMP(p, stab_rr, "lx");
@@ -2403,7 +2407,7 @@ static void dump_one_paca(int cpu)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
- DUMP(p, core_idle_state_ptr, "p");
+ DUMP(p, core_idle_state_ptr, "px");
DUMP(p, thread_idle_state, "x");
DUMP(p, thread_mask, "x");
DUMP(p, subcore_sibling_mask, "x");
diff --git a/arch/riscv/configs/defconfig b/arch/riscv/configs/defconfig
index e69de29bb2d1..47dacf06c679 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/configs/defconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/configs/defconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+CONFIG_SMP=y
+CONFIG_PCI=y
+CONFIG_PCIE_XILINX=y
+CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
+CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
+CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y
+CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC=y
+CONFIG_CGROUPS=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
+CONFIG_CFS_BANDWIDTH=y
+CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=y
+CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y
+CONFIG_USER_NS=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y
+CONFIG_EXPERT=y
+CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y
+CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_PACKET=y
+CONFIG_UNIX=y
+CONFIG_INET=y
+CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y
+CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y
+CONFIG_IP_PNP=y
+CONFIG_IP_PNP_DHCP=y
+CONFIG_IP_PNP_BOOTP=y
+CONFIG_IP_PNP_RARP=y
+CONFIG_NETLINK_DIAG=y
+CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y
+CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=y
+CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SR=y
+CONFIG_ATA=y
+CONFIG_SATA_AHCI=y
+CONFIG_SATA_AHCI_PLATFORM=y
+CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y
+CONFIG_VIRTIO_NET=y
+CONFIG_MACB=y
+CONFIG_E1000E=y
+CONFIG_R8169=y
+CONFIG_MICROSEMI_PHY=y
+CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_SERIAL_OF_PLATFORM=y
+# CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK is not set
+CONFIG_DRM=y
+CONFIG_DRM_RADEON=y
+CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=y
+CONFIG_USB=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_XHCI_PLATFORM=y
+CONFIG_USB_EHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_EHCI_HCD_PLATFORM=y
+CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD=y
+CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD_PLATFORM=y
+CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y
+CONFIG_USB_UAS=y
+CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO=y
+CONFIG_RAS=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS=y
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_AUTOFS4_FS=y
+CONFIG_MSDOS_FS=y
+CONFIG_VFAT_FS=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS=y
+CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y
+CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V4=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V4_1=y
+CONFIG_NFS_V4_2=y
+CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
+# CONFIG_RCU_TRACE is not set
+CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH=y
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
index 0d64bc9f4f91..3c7a2c97e377 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h
@@ -17,10 +17,10 @@
#include <linux/const.h>
/* Status register flags */
-#define SR_IE _AC(0x00000002, UL) /* Interrupt Enable */
-#define SR_PIE _AC(0x00000020, UL) /* Previous IE */
-#define SR_PS _AC(0x00000100, UL) /* Previously Supervisor */
-#define SR_SUM _AC(0x00040000, UL) /* Supervisor may access User Memory */
+#define SR_SIE _AC(0x00000002, UL) /* Supervisor Interrupt Enable */
+#define SR_SPIE _AC(0x00000020, UL) /* Previous Supervisor IE */
+#define SR_SPP _AC(0x00000100, UL) /* Previously Supervisor */
+#define SR_SUM _AC(0x00040000, UL) /* Supervisor may access User Memory */
#define SR_FS _AC(0x00006000, UL) /* Floating-point Status */
#define SR_FS_OFF _AC(0x00000000, UL)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h
index a82ce599b639..b269451e7e85 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/io.h
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-
extern void __iomem *ioremap(phys_addr_t offset, unsigned long size);
/*
@@ -36,8 +34,6 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap(phys_addr_t offset, unsigned long size);
extern void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr);
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
-
/* Generic IO read/write. These perform native-endian accesses. */
#define __raw_writeb __raw_writeb
static inline void __raw_writeb(u8 val, volatile void __iomem *addr)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/irqflags.h
index 6fdc860d7f84..07a3c6d5706f 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -27,25 +27,25 @@ static inline unsigned long arch_local_save_flags(void)
/* unconditionally enable interrupts */
static inline void arch_local_irq_enable(void)
{
- csr_set(sstatus, SR_IE);
+ csr_set(sstatus, SR_SIE);
}
/* unconditionally disable interrupts */
static inline void arch_local_irq_disable(void)
{
- csr_clear(sstatus, SR_IE);
+ csr_clear(sstatus, SR_SIE);
}
/* get status and disable interrupts */
static inline unsigned long arch_local_irq_save(void)
{
- return csr_read_clear(sstatus, SR_IE);
+ return csr_read_clear(sstatus, SR_SIE);
}
/* test flags */
static inline int arch_irqs_disabled_flags(unsigned long flags)
{
- return !(flags & SR_IE);
+ return !(flags & SR_SIE);
}
/* test hardware interrupt enable bit */
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static inline int arch_irqs_disabled(void)
/* set interrupt enabled status */
static inline void arch_local_irq_restore(unsigned long flags)
{
- csr_set(sstatus, flags & SR_IE);
+ csr_set(sstatus, flags & SR_SIE);
}
#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_IRQFLAGS_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 2cbd92ed1629..16301966d65b 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-
/* Page Upper Directory not used in RISC-V */
#include <asm-generic/pgtable-nopud.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -413,8 +411,6 @@ static inline void pgtable_cache_init(void)
/* No page table caches to initialize */
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
-
#define VMALLOC_SIZE (KERN_VIRT_SIZE >> 1)
#define VMALLOC_END (PAGE_OFFSET - 1)
#define VMALLOC_START (PAGE_OFFSET - VMALLOC_SIZE)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h
index 93b8956e25e4..2c5df945d43c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/ptrace.h
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct pt_regs {
#define REG_FMT "%08lx"
#endif
-#define user_mode(regs) (((regs)->sstatus & SR_PS) == 0)
+#define user_mode(regs) (((regs)->sstatus & SR_SPP) == 0)
/* Helpers for working with the instruction pointer */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 715b0f10af58..7b9c24ebdf52 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
#ifndef _ASM_RISCV_TLBFLUSH_H
#define _ASM_RISCV_TLBFLUSH_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
/*
@@ -64,6 +62,4 @@ static inline void flush_tlb_kernel_range(unsigned long start,
flush_tlb_all();
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
-
#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_TLBFLUSH_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 27b90d64814b..14b0b22fb578 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@ extern int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *state);
* call.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define __get_user_asm(insn, x, ptr, err) \
do { \
uintptr_t __tmp; \
@@ -153,13 +152,11 @@ do { \
__disable_user_access(); \
(x) = __x; \
} while (0)
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
#define __get_user_8(x, ptr, err) \
__get_user_asm("ld", x, ptr, err)
#else /* !CONFIG_64BIT */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define __get_user_8(x, ptr, err) \
do { \
u32 __user *__ptr = (u32 __user *)(ptr); \
@@ -193,7 +190,6 @@ do { \
(x) = (__typeof__(x))((__typeof__((x)-(x)))( \
(((u64)__hi << 32) | __lo))); \
} while (0)
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
@@ -267,8 +263,6 @@ do { \
((x) = 0, -EFAULT); \
})
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define __put_user_asm(insn, x, ptr, err) \
do { \
uintptr_t __tmp; \
@@ -292,14 +286,11 @@ do { \
: "rJ" (__x), "i" (-EFAULT)); \
__disable_user_access(); \
} while (0)
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
-
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
#define __put_user_8(x, ptr, err) \
__put_user_asm("sd", x, ptr, err)
#else /* !CONFIG_64BIT */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define __put_user_8(x, ptr, err) \
do { \
u32 __user *__ptr = (u32 __user *)(ptr); \
@@ -329,7 +320,6 @@ do { \
: "rJ" (__x), "rJ" (__x >> 32), "i" (-EFAULT)); \
__disable_user_access(); \
} while (0)
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#endif /* CONFIG_64BIT */
@@ -438,7 +428,6 @@ unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
* will set "err" to -EFAULT, while successful accesses return the previous
* value.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
#define __cmpxchg_user(ptr, old, new, err, size, lrb, scb) \
({ \
__typeof__(ptr) __ptr = (ptr); \
@@ -508,6 +497,5 @@ unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
(err) = __err; \
__ret; \
})
-#endif /* CONFIG_MMU */
#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_UACCESS_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
index 9f250ed007cd..2f704a5c4196 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/unistd.h
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@
#define __ARCH_HAVE_MMU
#define __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
#include <uapi/asm/unistd.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/syscalls.h>
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso-syscalls.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso-syscalls.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a2ccf1894929..000000000000
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso-syscalls.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 SiFive
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
- * published by the Free Software Foundation.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
- */
-
-#ifndef _ASM_RISCV_VDSO_SYSCALLS_H
-#define _ASM_RISCV_VDSO_SYSCALLS_H
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
-
-/* These syscalls are only used by the vDSO and are not in the uapi. */
-#define __NR_riscv_flush_icache (__NR_arch_specific_syscall + 15)
-__SYSCALL(__NR_riscv_flush_icache, sys_riscv_flush_icache)
-
-#endif
-
-#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_VDSO_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/syscalls.h b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/syscalls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..818655b0d535
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/syscalls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 SiFive
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASM__UAPI__SYSCALLS_H
+#define _ASM__UAPI__SYSCALLS_H
+
+/*
+ * Allows the instruction cache to be flushed from userspace. Despite RISC-V
+ * having a direct 'fence.i' instruction available to userspace (which we
+ * can't trap!), that's not actually viable when running on Linux because the
+ * kernel might schedule a process on another hart. There is no way for
+ * userspace to handle this without invoking the kernel (as it doesn't know the
+ * thread->hart mappings), so we've defined a RISC-V specific system call to
+ * flush the instruction cache.
+ *
+ * __NR_riscv_flush_icache is defined to flush the instruction cache over an
+ * address range, with the flush applying to either all threads or just the
+ * caller. We don't currently do anything with the address range, that's just
+ * in there for forwards compatibility.
+ */
+#define __NR_riscv_flush_icache (__NR_arch_specific_syscall + 15)
+__SYSCALL(__NR_riscv_flush_icache, sys_riscv_flush_icache)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index 20ee86f782a9..7404ec222406 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ handle_syscall:
addi s2, s2, 0x4
REG_S s2, PT_SEPC(sp)
/* System calls run with interrupts enabled */
- csrs sstatus, SR_IE
+ csrs sstatus, SR_SIE
/* Trace syscalls, but only if requested by the user. */
REG_L t0, TASK_TI_FLAGS(tp)
andi t0, t0, _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE
@@ -224,8 +224,8 @@ ret_from_syscall:
ret_from_exception:
REG_L s0, PT_SSTATUS(sp)
- csrc sstatus, SR_IE
- andi s0, s0, SR_PS
+ csrc sstatus, SR_SIE
+ andi s0, s0, SR_SPP
bnez s0, restore_all
resume_userspace:
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ work_pending:
bnez s1, work_resched
work_notifysig:
/* Handle pending signals and notify-resume requests */
- csrs sstatus, SR_IE /* Enable interrupts for do_notify_resume() */
+ csrs sstatus, SR_SIE /* Enable interrupts for do_notify_resume() */
move a0, sp /* pt_regs */
move a1, s0 /* current_thread_info->flags */
tail do_notify_resume
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
index 0d90dcc1fbd3..d74d4adf2d54 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ void show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs)
void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long pc,
unsigned long sp)
{
- regs->sstatus = SR_PIE /* User mode, irqs on */ | SR_FS_INITIAL;
+ regs->sstatus = SR_SPIE /* User mode, irqs on */ | SR_FS_INITIAL;
regs->sepc = pc;
regs->sp = sp;
set_fs(USER_DS);
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long usp,
const register unsigned long gp __asm__ ("gp");
memset(childregs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
childregs->gp = gp;
- childregs->sstatus = SR_PS | SR_PIE; /* Supervisor, irqs on */
+ childregs->sstatus = SR_SPP | SR_SPIE; /* Supervisor, irqs on */
p->thread.ra = (unsigned long)ret_from_kernel_thread;
p->thread.s[0] = usp; /* fn */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/syscall_table.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/syscall_table.c
index a5bd6401f95e..ade52b903a43 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/syscall_table.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/syscall_table.c
@@ -23,5 +23,4 @@
void *sys_call_table[__NR_syscalls] = {
[0 ... __NR_syscalls - 1] = sys_ni_syscall,
#include <asm/unistd.h>
-#include <asm/vdso-syscalls.h>
};
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S
index b0fbad74e873..023e4d4aef58 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
-#include <asm/vdso-syscalls.h>
.text
/* int __vdso_flush_icache(void *start, void *end, unsigned long flags); */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
index df2ca3c65048..0713f3c67ab4 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/fault.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
goto vmalloc_fault;
/* Enable interrupts if they were enabled in the parent context. */
- if (likely(regs->sstatus & SR_PIE))
+ if (likely(regs->sstatus & SR_SPIE))
local_irq_enable();
/*
diff --git a/arch/sh/boards/mach-se/770x/setup.c b/arch/sh/boards/mach-se/770x/setup.c
index 77c35350ee77..412326d59e6f 100644
--- a/arch/sh/boards/mach-se/770x/setup.c
+++ b/arch/sh/boards/mach-se/770x/setup.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/sh_eth.h>
#include <mach-se/mach/se.h>
#include <mach-se/mach/mrshpc.h>
#include <asm/machvec.h>
@@ -115,13 +116,23 @@ static struct platform_device heartbeat_device = {
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUBTYPE_SH7710) ||\
defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUBTYPE_SH7712)
/* SH771X Ethernet driver */
+static struct sh_eth_plat_data sh_eth_plat = {
+ .phy = PHY_ID,
+ .phy_interface = PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_MII,
+};
+
static struct resource sh_eth0_resources[] = {
[0] = {
.start = SH_ETH0_BASE,
- .end = SH_ETH0_BASE + 0x1B8,
+ .end = SH_ETH0_BASE + 0x1B8 - 1,
.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM,
},
[1] = {
+ .start = SH_TSU_BASE,
+ .end = SH_TSU_BASE + 0x200 - 1,
+ .flags = IORESOURCE_MEM,
+ },
+ [2] = {
.start = SH_ETH0_IRQ,
.end = SH_ETH0_IRQ,
.flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ,
@@ -132,7 +143,7 @@ static struct platform_device sh_eth0_device = {
.name = "sh771x-ether",
.id = 0,
.dev = {
- .platform_data = PHY_ID,
+ .platform_data = &sh_eth_plat,
},
.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(sh_eth0_resources),
.resource = sh_eth0_resources,
@@ -141,10 +152,15 @@ static struct platform_device sh_eth0_device = {
static struct resource sh_eth1_resources[] = {
[0] = {
.start = SH_ETH1_BASE,
- .end = SH_ETH1_BASE + 0x1B8,
+ .end = SH_ETH1_BASE + 0x1B8 - 1,
.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM,
},
[1] = {
+ .start = SH_TSU_BASE,
+ .end = SH_TSU_BASE + 0x200 - 1,
+ .flags = IORESOURCE_MEM,
+ },
+ [2] = {
.start = SH_ETH1_IRQ,
.end = SH_ETH1_IRQ,
.flags = IORESOURCE_IRQ,
@@ -155,7 +171,7 @@ static struct platform_device sh_eth1_device = {
.name = "sh771x-ether",
.id = 1,
.dev = {
- .platform_data = PHY_ID,
+ .platform_data = &sh_eth_plat,
},
.num_resources = ARRAY_SIZE(sh_eth1_resources),
.resource = sh_eth1_resources,
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/mach-se/mach/se.h b/arch/sh/include/mach-se/mach/se.h
index 4246ef9b07a3..aa83fe1ff0b1 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/mach-se/mach/se.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/mach-se/mach/se.h
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
/* Base address */
#define SH_ETH0_BASE 0xA7000000
#define SH_ETH1_BASE 0xA7000400
+#define SH_TSU_BASE 0xA7000800
/* PHY ID */
#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_SUBTYPE_SH7710)
# define PHY_ID 0x00
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d4fc98c50378..20da391b5f32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ config X86
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64
- # Causing hangs/crashes, see the commit that added this change for details.
select ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE if X86_64
select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
@@ -89,6 +88,7 @@ config X86
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST
select GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
+ select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
select GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT
select GENERIC_IOMAP
@@ -429,6 +429,19 @@ config GOLDFISH
def_bool y
depends on X86_GOLDFISH
+config RETPOLINE
+ bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
+ default y
+ help
+ Compile kernel with the retpoline compiler options to guard against
+ kernel-to-user data leaks by avoiding speculative indirect
+ branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
+ support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
+
+ Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler
+ code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path,
+ it is not entirely pointless.
+
config INTEL_RDT
bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support"
default n
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 3e73bc255e4e..fad55160dcb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -230,6 +230,14 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
#
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
+# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
+ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register)
+ ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
+ KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE
+ endif
+endif
+
archscripts: scripts_basic
$(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=arch/x86/tools relocs
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
index 16627fec80b2..3d09e3aca18d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* The following macros are used to move an (un)aligned 16 byte value to/from
@@ -2884,7 +2885,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
pxor INC, STATE4
movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
- call *%r11
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
@@ -2929,7 +2930,7 @@ ENTRY(aesni_xts_crypt8)
_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
movups IV, (IVP)
- call *%r11
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r11
movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
pxor INC, STATE1
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
index f7c495e2863c..a14af6eb09cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx-asm_64.S
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@@ -1227,7 +1228,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_16way:
vpxor 14 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm14;
vpxor 15 * 16(%rax), %xmm15, %xmm15;
- call *%r9;
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 16), %rsp;
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
index eee5b3982cfd..b66bbfa62f50 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/camellia-aesni-avx2-asm_64.S
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#define CAMELLIA_TABLE_BYTE_LEN 272
@@ -1343,7 +1344,7 @@ camellia_xts_crypt_32way:
vpxor 14 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm14;
vpxor 15 * 32(%rax), %ymm15, %ymm15;
- call *%r9;
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r9;
addq $(16 * 32), %rsp;
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
index 7a7de27c6f41..d9b734d0c8cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/crc32c-pcl-intel-asm_64.S
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/inst.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
## ISCSI CRC 32 Implementation with crc32 and pclmulqdq Instruction
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ continue_block:
movzxw (bufp, %rax, 2), len
lea crc_array(%rip), bufp
lea (bufp, len, 1), bufp
- jmp *bufp
+ JMP_NOSPEC bufp
################################################################
## 2a) PROCESS FULL BLOCKS:
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index 45a63e00a6af..3f48f695d5e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -198,8 +198,11 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
* PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k. Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
* halves:
*/
-#define PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK (1<<PAGE_SHIFT)
-#define PTI_SWITCH_MASK (PTI_SWITCH_PGTABLES_MASK|(1<<X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT))
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT PAGE_SHIFT
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK (1 << PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT)
+#define PTI_USER_PCID_BIT X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT
+#define PTI_USER_PCID_MASK (1 << PTI_USER_PCID_BIT)
+#define PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK (PTI_USER_PCID_MASK | PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK)
.macro SET_NOFLUSH_BIT reg:req
bts $X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT, \reg
@@ -208,7 +211,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
.macro ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 reg:req
ALTERNATIVE "", "SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \reg", X86_FEATURE_PCID
/* Clear PCID and "PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION bit", point CR3 at kernel pagetables: */
- andq $(~PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \reg
+ andq $(~PTI_USER_PGTABLE_AND_PCID_MASK), \reg
.endm
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
@@ -239,15 +242,19 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
/* Flush needed, clear the bit */
btr \scratch_reg, THIS_CPU_user_pcid_flush_mask
movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
- jmp .Lwrcr3_\@
+ jmp .Lwrcr3_pcid_\@
.Lnoflush_\@:
movq \scratch_reg2, \scratch_reg
SET_NOFLUSH_BIT \scratch_reg
+.Lwrcr3_pcid_\@:
+ /* Flip the ASID to the user version */
+ orq $(PTI_USER_PCID_MASK), \scratch_reg
+
.Lwrcr3_\@:
- /* Flip the PGD and ASID to the user version */
- orq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
+ /* Flip the PGD to the user version */
+ orq $(PTI_USER_PGTABLE_MASK), \scratch_reg
mov \scratch_reg, %cr3
.Lend_\@:
.endm
@@ -263,17 +270,12 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
movq %cr3, \scratch_reg
movq \scratch_reg, \save_reg
/*
- * Is the "switch mask" all zero? That means that both of
- * these are zero:
- *
- * 1. The user/kernel PCID bit, and
- * 2. The user/kernel "bit" that points CR3 to the
- * bottom half of the 8k PGD
- *
- * That indicates a kernel CR3 value, not a user CR3.
+ * Test the user pagetable bit. If set, then the user page tables
+ * are active. If clear CR3 already has the kernel page table
+ * active.
*/
- testq $(PTI_SWITCH_MASK), \scratch_reg
- jz .Ldone_\@
+ bt $PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \scratch_reg
+ jnc .Ldone_\@
ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
movq \scratch_reg, %cr3
@@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
* KERNEL pages can always resume with NOFLUSH as we do
* explicit flushes.
*/
- bt $X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT, \save_reg
+ bt $PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \save_reg
jnc .Lnoflush_\@
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index ace8f321a5a1..60c4c342316c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.section .entry.text, "ax"
@@ -243,6 +244,17 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(stack_canary)+stack_canary_offset
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
+ * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
+ * with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
+ * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
+ * speculative execution to prevent attack.
+ */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+#endif
+
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popl %esi
popl %edi
@@ -290,7 +302,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
/* kernel thread */
1: movl %edi, %eax
- call *%ebx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %ebx
/*
* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
* calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
@@ -919,7 +931,7 @@ common_exception:
movl %ecx, %es
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
- call *%edi
+ CALL_NOSPEC %edi
jmp ret_from_exception
END(common_exception)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index f048e384ff54..aa15b4c0e3d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include "calling.h"
@@ -191,7 +192,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
*/
pushq %rdi
movq $entry_SYSCALL_64_stage2, %rdi
- jmp *%rdi
+ JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
END(entry_SYSCALL_64_trampoline)
.popsection
@@ -270,7 +271,12 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
* It might end up jumping to the slow path. If it jumps, RAX
* and all argument registers are clobbered.
*/
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ movq sys_call_table(, %rax, 8), %rax
+ call __x86_indirect_thunk_rax
+#else
call *sys_call_table(, %rax, 8)
+#endif
.Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call:
movq %rax, RAX(%rsp)
@@ -442,7 +448,7 @@ ENTRY(stub_ptregs_64)
jmp entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path
1:
- jmp *%rax /* Called from C */
+ JMP_NOSPEC %rax /* Called from C */
END(stub_ptregs_64)
.macro ptregs_stub func
@@ -485,6 +491,17 @@ ENTRY(__switch_to_asm)
movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union)+stack_canary_offset
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ /*
+ * When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
+ * the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
+ * with userspace addresses. On CPUs where those concerns
+ * exist, overwrite the RSB with entries which capture
+ * speculative execution to prevent attack.
+ */
+ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
+#endif
+
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popq %r15
popq %r14
@@ -521,7 +538,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
1:
/* kernel thread */
movq %r12, %rdi
- call *%rbx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %rbx
/*
* A kernel thread is allowed to return here after successfully
* calling do_execve(). Exit to userspace to complete the execve()
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 141e07b06216..24ffa1e88cf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -582,6 +582,24 @@ static __init int bts_init(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DTES64) || !x86_pmu.bts)
return -ENODEV;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI)) {
+ /*
+ * BTS hardware writes through a virtual memory map we must
+ * either use the kernel physical map, or the user mapping of
+ * the AUX buffer.
+ *
+ * However, since this driver supports per-CPU and per-task inherit
+ * we cannot use the user mapping since it will not be availble
+ * if we're not running the owning process.
+ *
+ * With PTI we can't use the kernal map either, because its not
+ * there when we run userspace.
+ *
+ * For now, disable this driver when using PTI.
+ */
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
bts_pmu.capabilities = PERF_PMU_CAP_AUX_NO_SG | PERF_PMU_CAP_ITRACE |
PERF_PMU_CAP_EXCLUSIVE;
bts_pmu.task_ctx_nr = perf_sw_context;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
index 005908ee9333..a2efb490f743 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/rapl.c
@@ -755,14 +755,14 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id rapl_cpu_match[] __initconst = {
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, snbep_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE, hsw_rapl_init),
- X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, hsw_rapl_init),
+ X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, hsx_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT, hsw_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E, hsw_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE, hsw_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E, hsw_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, hsx_rapl_init),
- X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, hsw_rapl_init),
+ X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D, hsx_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL, knl_rapl_init),
X86_RAPL_MODEL_MATCH(INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM, knl_rapl_init),
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index a9e57f08bfa6..98722773391d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ extern void disconnect_bsp_APIC(int virt_wire_setup);
extern void disable_local_APIC(void);
extern void lapic_shutdown(void);
extern void sync_Arb_IDs(void);
+extern void init_bsp_APIC(void);
extern void apic_intr_mode_init(void);
extern void setup_local_APIC(void);
extern void init_apic_mappings(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
index ff700d81e91e..0927cdc4f946 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h
@@ -11,7 +11,32 @@
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/special_insns.h>
#include <asm/preempt.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64
extern void cmpxchg8b_emu(void);
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_e ## reg(void);
+#else
+#define INDIRECT_THUNK(reg) extern asmlinkage void __x86_indirect_thunk_r ## reg(void);
+INDIRECT_THUNK(8)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(9)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(10)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(11)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(12)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(13)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(14)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(15)
+#endif
+INDIRECT_THUNK(ax)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(cx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(dx)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(si)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(di)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(bp)
+INDIRECT_THUNK(sp)
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 21ac898df2d8..25b9375c1484 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -203,12 +203,14 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
#define X86_FEATURE_PTI ( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE ( 7*32+12) /* Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
-#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW ( 7*32+16) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS ( 7*32+17) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -243,6 +245,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA ( 9*32+21) /* AVX-512 Integer Fused Multiply-Add instructions */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT ( 9*32+23) /* CLFLUSHOPT instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_CLWB ( 9*32+24) /* CLWB instruction */
+#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 9*32+25) /* Intel Processor Trace */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF ( 9*32+26) /* AVX-512 Prefetch */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER ( 9*32+27) /* AVX-512 Exponential and Reciprocal */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD ( 9*32+28) /* AVX-512 Conflict Detection */
@@ -342,5 +345,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index c9459a4c3c68..22c5f3e6f820 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data);
void __init sme_early_init(void);
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void);
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp);
void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
int __init early_set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size);
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
-static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
static inline bool sme_active(void) { return false; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
index 5400add2885b..8bf450b13d9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/hyperv.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
/*
* The below CPUID leaves are present if VersionAndFeatures.HypervisorPresent
@@ -186,10 +187,11 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output)
return U64_MAX;
__asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n"
- "call *%5"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
: "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
"+c" (control), "+d" (input_address)
- : "r" (output_address), "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+ : "r" (output_address),
+ THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
: "cc", "memory", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11");
#else
u32 input_address_hi = upper_32_bits(input_address);
@@ -200,13 +202,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output)
if (!hv_hypercall_pg)
return U64_MAX;
- __asm__ __volatile__("call *%7"
+ __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC
: "=A" (hv_status),
"+c" (input_address_lo), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "A" (control),
"b" (input_address_hi),
"D"(output_address_hi), "S"(output_address_lo),
- "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+ THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
: "cc", "memory");
#endif /* !x86_64 */
return hv_status;
@@ -227,10 +229,10 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u16 code, u64 input1)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
{
- __asm__ __volatile__("call *%4"
+ __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC
: "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
"+c" (control), "+d" (input1)
- : "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+ : THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
: "cc", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11");
}
#else
@@ -238,13 +240,13 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u16 code, u64 input1)
u32 input1_hi = upper_32_bits(input1);
u32 input1_lo = lower_32_bits(input1);
- __asm__ __volatile__ ("call *%5"
+ __asm__ __volatile__ (CALL_NOSPEC
: "=A"(hv_status),
"+c"(input1_lo),
ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "A" (control),
"b" (input1_hi),
- "m" (hv_hypercall_pg)
+ THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg)
: "cc", "edi", "esi");
}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 34c4922bbc3f..e7b983a35506 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -355,6 +355,9 @@
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK 0xfffffffULL
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT 20
#define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
+#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
/* K8 MSRs */
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7b45d8424150
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifndef __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+#define __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+
+/*
+ * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
+ *
+ * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
+ * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
+ *
+ * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
+ * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
+ * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
+ * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
+ * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
+ *
+ * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
+ * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
+ * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
+ */
+
+#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
+#define RSB_FILL_LOOPS 16 /* To avoid underflow */
+
+/*
+ * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
+ * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
+ * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
+ mov $(nr/2), reg; \
+771: \
+ call 772f; \
+773: /* speculation trap */ \
+ pause; \
+ lfence; \
+ jmp 773b; \
+772: \
+ call 774f; \
+775: /* speculation trap */ \
+ pause; \
+ lfence; \
+ jmp 775b; \
+774: \
+ dec reg; \
+ jnz 771b; \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
+
+#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative. It tells
+ * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
+ * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
+ * alternatives.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ .Lannotate_\@:
+ .pushsection .discard.nospec
+ .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
+ .popsection
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
+ * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
+ * invocation below less ugly.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
+ call .Ldo_rop_\@
+.Lspec_trap_\@:
+ pause
+ lfence
+ jmp .Lspec_trap_\@
+.Ldo_rop_\@:
+ mov \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
+ ret
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
+ * returns to the instruction after the macro.
+ */
+.macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
+ jmp .Ldo_call_\@
+.Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
+ RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
+.Ldo_call_\@:
+ call .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
+ * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
+ * attack.
+ */
+.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(jmp *\reg), \
+ __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
+ __stringify(lfence; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+ jmp *\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(call *\reg), \
+ __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
+ __stringify(lfence; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
+#else
+ call *\reg
+#endif
+.endm
+
+ /*
+ * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
+ * monstrosity above, manually.
+ */
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)) \
+ \ftr
+.Lskip_rsb_\@:
+#endif
+.endm
+
+#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+
+#define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
+ "999:\n\t" \
+ ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t" \
+ ".long 999b - .\n\t" \
+ ".popsection\n\t"
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
+
+/*
+ * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
+ * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC \
+ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \
+ ALTERNATIVE( \
+ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
+
+#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+/*
+ * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
+ * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
+ * here, anyway.
+ */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC ALTERNATIVE("call *%[thunk_target]\n", \
+ " jmp 904f;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "901: call 903f;\n" \
+ "902: pause;\n" \
+ " lfence;\n" \
+ " jmp 902b;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "903: addl $4, %%esp;\n" \
+ " pushl %[thunk_target];\n" \
+ " ret;\n" \
+ " .align 16\n" \
+ "904: call 901b;\n", \
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
+# define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
+# define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
+#endif
+
+/* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+ SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
+};
+
+/*
+ * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
+ * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
+ * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
+ * CPUs with IBRS_ATT *might* it be avoided.
+ */
+static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ unsigned long loops = RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS / 2;
+
+ asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
+ ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
+ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
+ "910:"
+ : "=&r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+ : "r" (loops) : "memory" );
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pci_x86.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pci_x86.h
index 7a5d6695abd3..eb66fa9cd0fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pci_x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pci_x86.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ do { \
#define PCI_NOASSIGN_ROMS 0x80000
#define PCI_ROOT_NO_CRS 0x100000
#define PCI_NOASSIGN_BARS 0x200000
+#define PCI_BIG_ROOT_WINDOW 0x400000
extern unsigned int pci_probe;
extern unsigned long pirq_table_addr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index 6a60fea90b9d..625a52a5594f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
#define CR3_NOFLUSH BIT_ULL(63)
#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
-# define X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT 11
+# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT 11
#endif
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index 4a08dd2ab32a..d33e4a26dc7e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
* Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not confict with the
* bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
*/
- BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS >= (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT));
/*
* The ASID being passed in here should have respected the
* MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE and thus never have the switch bit set.
*/
- VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT));
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid & (1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT));
#endif
/*
* The dynamically-assigned ASIDs that get passed in are small
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
{
u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
- ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_SWITCH_BIT;
+ ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
#endif
return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
index 7cb282e9e587..bfd882617613 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
#include <xen/interface/sched.h>
@@ -217,9 +218,9 @@ privcmd_call(unsigned call,
__HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5);
stac();
- asm volatile("call *%[call]"
+ asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC
: __HYPERCALL_5PARAM
- : [call] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
+ : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call])
: __HYPERCALL_CLOBBER5);
clac();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index dbaf14d69ebd..4817d743c263 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -344,9 +344,12 @@ done:
static void __init_or_module noinline optimize_nops(struct alt_instr *a, u8 *instr)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
- if (instr[0] != 0x90)
- return;
+ for (i = 0; i < a->padlen; i++) {
+ if (instr[i] != 0x90)
+ return;
+ }
local_irq_save(flags);
add_nops(instr + (a->instrlen - a->padlen), a->padlen);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index 880441f24146..25ddf02598d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1286,6 +1286,55 @@ static int __init apic_intr_mode_select(void)
return APIC_SYMMETRIC_IO;
}
+/*
+ * An initial setup of the virtual wire mode.
+ */
+void __init init_bsp_APIC(void)
+{
+ unsigned int value;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't do the setup now if we have a SMP BIOS as the
+ * through-I/O-APIC virtual wire mode might be active.
+ */
+ if (smp_found_config || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Do not trust the local APIC being empty at bootup.
+ */
+ clear_local_APIC();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable APIC.
+ */
+ value = apic_read(APIC_SPIV);
+ value &= ~APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
+ value |= APIC_SPIV_APIC_ENABLED;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /* This bit is reserved on P4/Xeon and should be cleared */
+ if ((boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 15))
+ value &= ~APIC_SPIV_FOCUS_DISABLED;
+ else
+#endif
+ value |= APIC_SPIV_FOCUS_DISABLED;
+ value |= SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR;
+ apic_write(APIC_SPIV, value);
+
+ /*
+ * Set up the virtual wire mode.
+ */
+ apic_write(APIC_LVT0, APIC_DM_EXTINT);
+ value = APIC_DM_NMI;
+ if (!lapic_is_integrated()) /* 82489DX */
+ value |= APIC_LVT_LEVEL_TRIGGER;
+ if (apic_extnmi == APIC_EXTNMI_NONE)
+ value |= APIC_LVT_MASKED;
+ apic_write(APIC_LVT1, value);
+}
+
/* Init the interrupt delivery mode for the BSP */
void __init apic_intr_mode_init(void)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
index f8b03bb8e725..3cc471beb50b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
@@ -542,14 +542,17 @@ static int x86_vector_alloc_irqs(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq,
err = assign_irq_vector_policy(irqd, info);
trace_vector_setup(virq + i, false, err);
- if (err)
+ if (err) {
+ irqd->chip_data = NULL;
+ free_apic_chip_data(apicd);
goto error;
+ }
}
return 0;
error:
- x86_vector_free_irqs(domain, virq, i + 1);
+ x86_vector_free_irqs(domain, virq, i);
return err;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index bcb75dc97d44..ea831c858195 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -829,8 +829,32 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
- /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
- set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+ unsigned long long val;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * A serializing LFENCE has less overhead than MFENCE, so
+ * use it for execution serialization. On families which
+ * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
+ * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
+ * is not present.
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_F10H_DECFG,
+ MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the MSR write was successful (could be running
+ * under a hypervisor) and only then assume that LFENCE is
+ * serializing.
+ */
+ ret = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F10H_DECFG, &val);
+ if (!ret && (val & MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE)) {
+ /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ } else {
+ /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC);
+ }
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ba0b2424c9b0..390b3dc3d438 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -19,6 +23,9 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
void __init check_bugs(void)
{
@@ -29,6 +36,9 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
}
+ /* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/*
* Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -60,3 +70,214 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
#endif
}
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
+};
+
+static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
+};
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 mitigation: " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ pr_info("%s\n", reason);
+}
+
+static inline bool retp_compiler(void)
+{
+ return __is_defined(RETPOLINE);
+}
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+ int len = strlen(opt);
+
+ return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg,
+ sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ if (match_option(arg, ret, "off")) {
+ goto disable;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "on")) {
+ spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
+ } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+disable:
+ spec2_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
+static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+ /*
+ * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+ * then nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+ (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+ return;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+ /* FALLTRHU */
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_amd;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
+ goto retpoline_auto;
+ break;
+ }
+ pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return;
+
+retpoline_auto:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ retpoline_amd:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
+ goto retpoline_generic;
+ }
+ mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ } else {
+ retpoline_generic:
+ mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
+ SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ }
+
+ spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+ /*
+ * If neither SMEP or KPTI are available, there is a risk of
+ * hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
+ * from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
+ * the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
+ *
+ * Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
+ * RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
+ * The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
+ * or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
+ * switch is required.
+ */
+ if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+ pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+ }
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 39d7ea865207..ef29ad001991 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -926,6 +926,9 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
fpu__init_system(c);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.c
index 88dcf8479013..99442370de40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt.c
@@ -525,10 +525,6 @@ static void domain_remove_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
*/
if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_mon_enable_key))
rmdir_mondata_subdir_allrdtgrp(r, d->id);
- kfree(d->ctrl_val);
- kfree(d->rmid_busy_llc);
- kfree(d->mbm_total);
- kfree(d->mbm_local);
list_del(&d->list);
if (is_mbm_enabled())
cancel_delayed_work(&d->mbm_over);
@@ -545,6 +541,10 @@ static void domain_remove_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
cancel_delayed_work(&d->cqm_limbo);
}
+ kfree(d->ctrl_val);
+ kfree(d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ kfree(d->mbm_total);
+ kfree(d->mbm_local);
kfree(d);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
index 8ccdca6d3f9e..d9e460fc7a3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -910,8 +910,17 @@ static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int cpu)
{
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
- if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
- pr_err_once("late loading on model 79 is disabled.\n");
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * may result in a system hang. This behavior is documented in item
+ * BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_mask == 0x01 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 05459ad3db46..d0e69769abfd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
- { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT, CPUID_EBX, 25, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, CPUID_EDX, 3, 0x00000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
index b6c6468e10bc..4c8440de3355 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_32.S
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#ifdef CC_USING_FENTRY
# define function_hook __fentry__
@@ -197,7 +198,8 @@ ftrace_stub:
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
- call *ftrace_trace_function
+ movl ftrace_trace_function, %ecx
+ CALL_NOSPEC %ecx
popl %edx
popl %ecx
@@ -241,5 +243,5 @@ return_to_handler:
movl %eax, %ecx
popl %edx
popl %eax
- jmp *%ecx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ecx
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
index c832291d948a..7cb8ba08beb9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace_64.S
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
-
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
.code64
.section .entry.text, "ax"
@@ -286,8 +286,8 @@ trace:
* ip and parent ip are used and the list function is called when
* function tracing is enabled.
*/
- call *ftrace_trace_function
-
+ movq ftrace_trace_function, %r8
+ CALL_NOSPEC %r8
restore_mcount_regs
jmp fgraph_trace
@@ -329,5 +329,5 @@ GLOBAL(return_to_handler)
movq 8(%rsp), %rdx
movq (%rsp), %rax
addq $24, %rsp
- jmp *%rdi
+ JMP_NOSPEC %rdi
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 6a5d757b9cfd..7ba5d819ebe3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -157,8 +157,8 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
p = fixup_pointer(&phys_base, physaddr);
*p += load_delta - sme_get_me_mask();
- /* Encrypt the kernel (if SME is active) */
- sme_encrypt_kernel();
+ /* Encrypt the kernel and related (if SME is active) */
+ sme_encrypt_kernel(bp);
/*
* Return the SME encryption mask (if SME is active) to be used as a
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index d985cef3984f..56d99be3706a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ struct idt_data {
* Early traps running on the DEFAULT_STACK because the other interrupt
* stacks work only after cpu_init().
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_DB, debug),
SYSG(X86_TRAP_BP, int3),
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static const __initdata struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
* the traps which use them are reinitialized with IST after cpu_init() has
* set up TSS.
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_DE, divide_error),
INTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, nmi),
INTG(X86_TRAP_BR, bounds),
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const __initdata struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
/*
* The APIC and SMP idt entries
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data apic_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data apic_idts[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
INTG(RESCHEDULE_VECTOR, reschedule_interrupt),
INTG(CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, call_function_interrupt),
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static const __initdata struct idt_data apic_idts[] = {
* Early traps running on the DEFAULT_STACK because the other interrupt
* stacks work only after cpu_init().
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data early_pf_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data early_pf_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_PF, page_fault),
};
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static const __initdata struct idt_data early_pf_idts[] = {
* Override for the debug_idt. Same as the default, but with interrupt
* stack set to DEFAULT_STACK (0). Required for NMI trap handling.
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data dbg_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data dbg_idts[] = {
INTG(X86_TRAP_DB, debug),
INTG(X86_TRAP_BP, int3),
};
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ gate_desc debug_idt_table[IDT_ENTRIES] __page_aligned_bss;
* The exceptions which use Interrupt stacks. They are setup after
* cpu_init() when the TSS has been initialized.
*/
-static const __initdata struct idt_data ist_idts[] = {
+static const __initconst struct idt_data ist_idts[] = {
ISTG(X86_TRAP_DB, debug, DEBUG_STACK),
ISTG(X86_TRAP_NMI, nmi, NMI_STACK),
SISTG(X86_TRAP_BP, int3, DEBUG_STACK),
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
index a83b3346a0e1..c1bdbd3d3232 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_32.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW
@@ -55,11 +56,11 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct irq_stack *, softirq_stack);
static void call_on_stack(void *func, void *stack)
{
asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
- "call *%%edi \n"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
"movl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
: "=b" (stack)
: "0" (stack),
- "D"(func)
+ [thunk_target] "D"(func)
: "memory", "cc", "edx", "ecx", "eax");
}
@@ -95,11 +96,11 @@ static inline int execute_on_irq_stack(int overflow, struct irq_desc *desc)
call_on_stack(print_stack_overflow, isp);
asm volatile("xchgl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
- "call *%%edi \n"
+ CALL_NOSPEC
"movl %%ebx,%%esp \n"
: "=a" (arg1), "=b" (isp)
: "0" (desc), "1" (isp),
- "D" (desc->handle_irq)
+ [thunk_target] "D" (desc->handle_irq)
: "memory", "cc", "ecx");
return 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
index 8da3e909e967..a539410c4ea9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ void __init init_ISA_irqs(void)
struct irq_chip *chip = legacy_pic->chip;
int i;
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC)
+ init_bsp_APIC();
+#endif
legacy_pic->init(0);
for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_irqs(); i++)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 145810b0edf6..68d7ab81c62f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -364,16 +364,6 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
!ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
return; /* No initrd provided by bootloader */
- /*
- * If SME is active, this memory will be marked encrypted by the
- * kernel when it is accessed (including relocation). However, the
- * ramdisk image was loaded decrypted by the bootloader, so make
- * sure that it is encrypted before accessing it. For SEV the
- * ramdisk will already be encrypted, so only do this for SME.
- */
- if (sme_active())
- sme_early_encrypt(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);
-
initrd_start = 0;
mapped_size = memblock_mem_size(max_pfn_mapped);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
index a4eb27918ceb..a2486f444073 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
@@ -138,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long pfn,
return -1;
set_pte_at(&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte, pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
pte_unmap(pte);
+
+ /*
+ * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
+ * name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute
+ * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
+ *
+ * Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_
+ * pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging.
+ */
+ pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
+
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index 8ea117f8142e..e169e85db434 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -602,7 +602,6 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP:
crystal_khz = 24000; /* 24.0 MHz */
break;
- case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON:
crystal_khz = 25000; /* 25.0 MHz */
break;
@@ -612,6 +611,8 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
}
}
+ if (crystal_khz == 0)
+ return 0;
/*
* TSC frequency determined by CPUID is a "hardware reported"
* frequency and is the most accurate one so far we have. This
@@ -1315,6 +1316,12 @@ void __init tsc_init(void)
(unsigned long)cpu_khz / 1000,
(unsigned long)cpu_khz % 1000);
+ if (cpu_khz != tsc_khz) {
+ pr_info("Detected %lu.%03lu MHz TSC",
+ (unsigned long)tsc_khz / 1000,
+ (unsigned long)tsc_khz % 1000);
+ }
+
/* Sanitize TSC ADJUST before cyc2ns gets initialized */
tsc_store_and_check_tsc_adjust(true);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index c4deb1f34faa..2b8eb4da4d08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3781,7 +3781,8 @@ static int kvm_arch_setup_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn)
bool kvm_can_do_async_pf(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (unlikely(!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) ||
- kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu)))
+ kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu) ||
+ vcpu->arch.exception.pending))
return false;
if (!vcpu->arch.apf.delivery_as_pf_vmexit && is_guest_mode(vcpu))
@@ -5465,30 +5466,34 @@ static void mmu_destroy_caches(void)
int kvm_mmu_module_init(void)
{
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
kvm_mmu_clear_all_pte_masks();
pte_list_desc_cache = kmem_cache_create("pte_list_desc",
sizeof(struct pte_list_desc),
0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
if (!pte_list_desc_cache)
- goto nomem;
+ goto out;
mmu_page_header_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_mmu_page_header",
sizeof(struct kvm_mmu_page),
0, SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL);
if (!mmu_page_header_cache)
- goto nomem;
+ goto out;
if (percpu_counter_init(&kvm_total_used_mmu_pages, 0, GFP_KERNEL))
- goto nomem;
+ goto out;
- register_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker);
+ ret = register_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
return 0;
-nomem:
+out:
mmu_destroy_caches();
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return ret;
}
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index bb31c801f1fc..f40d0da1f1d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include <asm/virtext.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -361,7 +362,6 @@ static void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *c, *h;
struct nested_state *g;
- u32 h_intercept_exceptions;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS);
@@ -372,14 +372,9 @@ static void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
h = &svm->nested.hsave->control;
g = &svm->nested;
- /* No need to intercept #UD if L1 doesn't intercept it */
- h_intercept_exceptions =
- h->intercept_exceptions & ~(1U << UD_VECTOR);
-
c->intercept_cr = h->intercept_cr | g->intercept_cr;
c->intercept_dr = h->intercept_dr | g->intercept_dr;
- c->intercept_exceptions =
- h_intercept_exceptions | g->intercept_exceptions;
+ c->intercept_exceptions = h->intercept_exceptions | g->intercept_exceptions;
c->intercept = h->intercept | g->intercept;
}
@@ -2202,7 +2197,6 @@ static int ud_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int er;
- WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(&svm->vcpu));
er = emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
return 0;
@@ -5034,6 +5028,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 5c14d65f676a..c829d89e2e63 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
#include "trace.h"
#include "pmu.h"
@@ -899,8 +900,16 @@ static inline short vmcs_field_to_offset(unsigned long field)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) > SHRT_MAX);
- if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table) ||
- vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
+ if (field >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmcs_field_to_offset_table))
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Mitigation for CVE-2017-5753. To be replaced with a
+ * generic mechanism.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
+ if (vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field] == 0)
return -ENOENT;
return vmcs_field_to_offset_table[field];
@@ -1887,7 +1896,7 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 eb;
- eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
+ eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
(1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
@@ -1905,8 +1914,6 @@ static void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
- else
- eb |= 1u << UD_VECTOR;
vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
}
@@ -5917,7 +5924,6 @@ static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) {
- WARN_ON_ONCE(is_guest_mode(vcpu));
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er == EMULATE_USER_EXIT)
return 0;
@@ -9485,6 +9491,9 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */
+ vmexit_fill_RSB();
+
/* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
if (debugctlmsr)
update_debugctlmsr(debugctlmsr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index 7b181b61170e..f23934bbaf4e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ lib-y += memcpy_$(BITS).o
lib-$(CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM) += rwsem.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
index 4d34bb548b41..46e71a74e612 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/export.h>
-
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
/*
* computes a partial checksum, e.g. for TCP/UDP fragments
*/
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial)
negl %ebx
lea 45f(%ebx,%ebx,2), %ebx
testl %esi, %esi
- jmp *%ebx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
# Handle 2-byte-aligned regions
20: addw (%esi), %ax
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ ENTRY(csum_partial_copy_generic)
andl $-32,%edx
lea 3f(%ebx,%ebx), %ebx
testl %esi, %esi
- jmp *%ebx
+ JMP_NOSPEC %ebx
1: addl $64,%esi
addl $64,%edi
SRC(movb -32(%edx),%bl) ; SRC(movb (%edx),%bl)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cb45c6cb465f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/dwarf2.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
+#include <asm/export.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
+.macro THUNK reg
+ .section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk.\reg
+
+ENTRY(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+ CFI_STARTPROC
+ JMP_NOSPEC %\reg
+ CFI_ENDPROC
+ENDPROC(__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg)
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Despite being an assembler file we can't just use .irp here
+ * because __KSYM_DEPS__ only uses the C preprocessor and would
+ * only see one instance of "__x86_indirect_thunk_\reg" rather
+ * than one per register with the correct names. So we do it
+ * the simple and nasty way...
+ */
+#define EXPORT_THUNK(reg) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg)
+#define GENERATE_THUNK(reg) THUNK reg ; EXPORT_THUNK(reg)
+
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_AX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_CX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DX)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_DI)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_BP)
+GENERATE_THUNK(_ASM_SP)
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+GENERATE_THUNK(r8)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r9)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r10)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r11)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r12)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r13)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r14)
+GENERATE_THUNK(r15)
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 06fe3d51d385..b3e40773dce0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -172,14 +172,15 @@ is_prefetch(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long addr)
* 6. T1 : reaches here, sees vma_pkey(vma)=5, when we really
* faulted on a pte with its pkey=4.
*/
-static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_code, siginfo_t *info, u32 *pkey)
+static void fill_sig_info_pkey(int si_signo, int si_code, siginfo_t *info,
+ u32 *pkey)
{
/* This is effectively an #ifdef */
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
return;
/* Fault not from Protection Keys: nothing to do */
- if (si_code != SEGV_PKUERR)
+ if ((si_code != SEGV_PKUERR) || (si_signo != SIGSEGV))
return;
/*
* force_sig_info_fault() is called from a number of
@@ -218,7 +219,7 @@ force_sig_info_fault(int si_signo, int si_code, unsigned long address,
lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
info.si_addr_lsb = lsb;
- fill_sig_info_pkey(si_code, &info, pkey);
+ fill_sig_info_pkey(si_signo, si_code, &info, pkey);
force_sig_info(si_signo, &info, tsk);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 47388f0c0e59..af6f2f9c6a26 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@ extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
static p4d_t tmp_p4d_table[PTRS_PER_P4D] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-static __init void *early_alloc(size_t size, int nid)
+static __init void *early_alloc(size_t size, int nid, bool panic)
{
- return memblock_virt_alloc_try_nid_nopanic(size, size,
- __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS), BOOTMEM_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, nid);
+ if (panic)
+ return memblock_virt_alloc_try_nid(size, size,
+ __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS), BOOTMEM_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, nid);
+ else
+ return memblock_virt_alloc_try_nid_nopanic(size, size,
+ __pa(MAX_DMA_ADDRESS), BOOTMEM_ALLOC_ACCESSIBLE, nid);
}
static void __init kasan_populate_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
@@ -38,14 +42,14 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSE) &&
((end - addr) == PMD_SIZE) &&
IS_ALIGNED(addr, PMD_SIZE)) {
- p = early_alloc(PMD_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PMD_SIZE, nid, false);
if (p && pmd_set_huge(pmd, __pa(p), PAGE_KERNEL))
return;
else if (p)
memblock_free(__pa(p), PMD_SIZE);
}
- p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid, true);
pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, p);
}
@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_pmd(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr,
if (!pte_none(*pte))
continue;
- p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid, true);
entry = pfn_pte(PFN_DOWN(__pa(p)), PAGE_KERNEL);
set_pte_at(&init_mm, addr, pte, entry);
} while (pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
@@ -75,14 +79,14 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_pud(pud_t *pud, unsigned long addr,
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_GBPAGES) &&
((end - addr) == PUD_SIZE) &&
IS_ALIGNED(addr, PUD_SIZE)) {
- p = early_alloc(PUD_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PUD_SIZE, nid, false);
if (p && pud_set_huge(pud, __pa(p), PAGE_KERNEL))
return;
else if (p)
memblock_free(__pa(p), PUD_SIZE);
}
- p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid, true);
pud_populate(&init_mm, pud, p);
}
@@ -101,7 +105,7 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_p4d(p4d_t *p4d, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long next;
if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
- void *p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid);
+ void *p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid, true);
p4d_populate(&init_mm, p4d, p);
}
@@ -122,7 +126,7 @@ static void __init kasan_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long next;
if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
- p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid);
+ p = early_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, nid, true);
pgd_populate(&init_mm, pgd, p);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 391b13402e40..3ef362f598e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -464,37 +464,62 @@ void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
-static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start,
- unsigned long end)
+struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
+ void *pgtable_area;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+
+ pmdval_t pmd_flags;
+ pteval_t pte_flags;
+ unsigned long paddr;
+
+ unsigned long vaddr;
+ unsigned long vaddr_end;
+};
+
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
pgd_t *pgd_p;
- pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK;
- pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK;
+ pgd_start = ppd->vaddr & PGDIR_MASK;
+ pgd_end = ppd->vaddr_end & PGDIR_MASK;
- pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1);
- pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t);
+ pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1) * sizeof(pgd_t);
- pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start);
+ pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
}
-#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
-#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
-#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
-#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PMD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_LARGE (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC PMD_FLAGS_LARGE
+#define PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PMD_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
+ (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
+
+#define PMD_FLAGS_ENC (PMD_FLAGS_LARGE | _PAGE_ENC)
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC PTE_FLAGS
+#define PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP ((PTE_FLAGS_DEC & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | \
+ (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT))
+
+#define PTE_FLAGS_ENC (PTE_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC)
-static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
- unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val)
+static pmd_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pgd_t *pgd_p;
p4d_t *p4d_p;
pud_t *pud_p;
pmd_t *pmd_p;
- pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr);
+ pgd_p = ppd->pgd + pgd_index(ppd->vaddr);
if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL))
p4d_p = (p4d_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
@@ -504,15 +529,15 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
pgd_t pgd;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
- p4d_p = pgtable_area;
+ p4d_p = ppd->pgtable_area;
memset(p4d_p, 0, sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D);
- pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)p4d_p + PGD_FLAGS);
} else {
- pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area;
memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
- pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)pud_p + PGD_FLAGS);
}
@@ -520,58 +545,160 @@ static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
}
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
- p4d_p += p4d_index(vaddr);
+ p4d_p += p4d_index(ppd->vaddr);
if (native_p4d_val(*p4d_p)) {
pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_p4d_val(*p4d_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
} else {
p4d_t p4d;
- pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ pud_p = ppd->pgtable_area;
memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
- pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
p4d = native_make_p4d((pudval_t)pud_p + P4D_FLAGS);
native_set_p4d(p4d_p, p4d);
}
}
- pud_p += pud_index(vaddr);
+ pud_p += pud_index(ppd->vaddr);
if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) {
if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE)
- goto out;
+ return NULL;
pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
} else {
pud_t pud;
- pmd_p = pgtable_area;
+ pmd_p = ppd->pgtable_area;
memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
- pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
pud = native_make_pud((pmdval_t)pmd_p + PUD_FLAGS);
native_set_pud(pud_p, pud);
}
- pmd_p += pmd_index(vaddr);
+ return pmd_p;
+}
+
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ pmd_t *pmd_p;
+
+ pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
+ if (!pmd_p)
+ return;
+
+ pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr);
if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE))
- native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(pmd_val));
+ native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
+}
-out:
- return pgtable_area;
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ pmd_t *pmd_p;
+ pte_t *pte_p;
+
+ pmd_p = sme_prepare_pgd(ppd);
+ if (!pmd_p)
+ return;
+
+ pmd_p += pmd_index(ppd->vaddr);
+ if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p)) {
+ if (native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE)
+ return;
+
+ pte_p = (pte_t *)(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ pmd_t pmd;
+
+ pte_p = ppd->pgtable_area;
+ memset(pte_p, 0, sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte_p) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+
+ pmd = native_make_pmd((pteval_t)pte_p + PMD_FLAGS);
+ native_set_pmd(pmd_p, pmd);
+ }
+
+ pte_p += pte_index(ppd->vaddr);
+ if (!native_pte_val(*pte_p))
+ native_set_pte(pte_p, native_make_pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
+ sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
+
+ ppd->vaddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ ppd->paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
+ sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
+
+ ppd->vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ ppd->paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
+ pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr_end;
+
+ ppd->pmd_flags = pmd_flags;
+ ppd->pte_flags = pte_flags;
+
+ /* Save original end value since we modify the struct value */
+ vaddr_end = ppd->vaddr_end;
+
+ /* If start is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
+ ppd->vaddr_end = ALIGN(ppd->vaddr, PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+ __sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
+
+ /* Create PMD entries */
+ ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end & PMD_PAGE_MASK;
+ __sme_map_range_pmd(ppd);
+
+ /* If end is not 2MB aligned, create PTE entries */
+ ppd->vaddr_end = vaddr_end;
+ __sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+{
+ __sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
}
static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
{
- unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size;
+ unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size, pte_size;
unsigned long total;
/*
* Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable
- * entries that are needed. That mappings will be covered by 2MB
- * PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
+ * entries that are needed. Those mappings will be covered mostly
+ * by 2MB PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
* number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the
- * mappings. Incrementing the count for each covers the case where
- * the addresses cross entries.
+ * mappings. For mappings that are not 2MB aligned, PTE mappings
+ * would be needed for the start and end portion of the address range
+ * that fall outside of the 2MB alignment. This results in, at most,
+ * two extra pages to hold PTE entries for each range that is mapped.
+ * Incrementing the count for each covers the case where the addresses
+ * cross entries.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
p4d_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1;
@@ -585,8 +712,9 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
}
pmd_size = (ALIGN(len, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE) + 1;
pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+ pte_size = 2 * sizeof(pte_t) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
- total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size;
+ total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size + pte_size;
/*
* Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate
@@ -610,29 +738,29 @@ static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
return total;
}
-void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
+ unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_end, initrd_len;
+ struct sme_populate_pgd_data ppd;
unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
- unsigned long paddr, pmd_flags;
unsigned long decrypted_base;
- void *pgtable_area;
- pgd_t *pgd;
if (!sme_active())
return;
/*
- * Prepare for encrypting the kernel by building new pagetables with
- * the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the kernel in place.
+ * Prepare for encrypting the kernel and initrd by building new
+ * pagetables with the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the
+ * kernel in place.
*
* One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
- * by the kernel as encrypted.
+ * by the kernel and initrd as encrypted.
*
* Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
- * by the kernel as decrypted and write-protected.
+ * by the kernel and initrd as decrypted and write-protected.
*
* The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
* memory from being cached.
@@ -643,6 +771,20 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
+ initrd_start = 0;
+ initrd_end = 0;
+ initrd_len = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+ initrd_len = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_size |
+ ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_size << 32);
+ if (initrd_len) {
+ initrd_start = (unsigned long)bp->hdr.ramdisk_image |
+ ((unsigned long)bp->ext_ramdisk_image << 32);
+ initrd_end = PAGE_ALIGN(initrd_start + initrd_len);
+ initrd_len = initrd_end - initrd_start;
+ }
+#endif
+
/* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
workarea_start = kernel_end;
@@ -665,16 +807,21 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
*/
pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
+ if (initrd_len)
+ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(initrd_len) * 2;
/* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
/*
* The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and
- * the pagetable area.
+ * the pagetable area. The start of the workarea is already 2MB
+ * aligned, align the end of the workarea on a 2MB boundary so that
+ * we don't try to create/allocate PTE entries from the workarea
+ * before it is mapped.
*/
workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len;
- workarea_end = workarea_start + workarea_len;
+ workarea_end = ALIGN(workarea_start + workarea_len, PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
/*
* Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable
@@ -683,45 +830,30 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
* pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
* mappings are populated.
*/
- pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
+ ppd.pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
/*
* Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
* addressing the workarea.
*/
- pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
- paddr = workarea_start;
- while (paddr < workarea_end) {
- pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
- paddr,
- paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
-
- paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
- }
+ ppd.pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
+ ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
+ sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
/*
* A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
- * to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will then be
- * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted
- * kernel mappings are created.
+ * and initrd to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will
+ * then be populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and
+ * decrypted kernel mappings are created.
*/
- pgd = pgtable_area;
- memset(pgd, 0, sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
- pgtable_area += sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
-
- /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
- pmd_flags = PMD_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC;
- paddr = kernel_start;
- while (paddr < kernel_end) {
- pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
- paddr,
- paddr + pmd_flags);
-
- paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
- }
+ ppd.pgd = ppd.pgtable_area;
+ memset(ppd.pgd, 0, sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
+ ppd.pgtable_area += sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
/*
* A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
@@ -730,47 +862,79 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
* the base of the mapping.
*/
decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+ if (initrd_len) {
+ unsigned long check_base;
+
+ check_base = (pgd_index(initrd_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+ decrypted_base = max(decrypted_base, check_base);
+ }
decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
+ /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
+ ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = kernel_start;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end;
+ sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
+
/* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
- pmd_flags = (PMD_FLAGS & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT);
- paddr = kernel_start;
- while (paddr < kernel_end) {
- pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
- paddr + decrypted_base,
- paddr + pmd_flags);
-
- paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ ppd.paddr = kernel_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
+
+ if (initrd_len) {
+ /* Add encrypted initrd (identity) mappings */
+ ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = initrd_start;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end;
+ sme_map_range_encrypted(&ppd);
+ /*
+ * Add decrypted, write-protected initrd (non-identity) mappings
+ */
+ ppd.paddr = initrd_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(&ppd);
}
/* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
- paddr = workarea_start;
- while (paddr < workarea_end) {
- pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
- paddr,
- paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+ ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = workarea_start;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end;
+ sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
- pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
- paddr + decrypted_base,
- paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
-
- paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
- }
+ ppd.paddr = workarea_start;
+ ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_map_range_decrypted(&ppd);
/* Perform the encryption */
sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
- kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)pgd);
+ kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
+
+ if (initrd_len)
+ sme_encrypt_execute(initrd_start, initrd_start + decrypted_base,
+ initrd_len, workarea_start,
+ (unsigned long)ppd.pgd);
/*
* At this point we are running encrypted. Remove the mappings for
* the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
* the PGD entry/entries.
*/
- sme_clear_pgd(pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
- kernel_end + decrypted_base);
+ ppd.vaddr = kernel_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = kernel_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+
+ if (initrd_len) {
+ ppd.vaddr = initrd_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = initrd_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
+ }
- sme_clear_pgd(pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base,
- workarea_end + decrypted_base);
+ ppd.vaddr = workarea_start + decrypted_base;
+ ppd.vaddr_end = workarea_end + decrypted_base;
+ sme_clear_pgd(&ppd);
/* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
index 730e6d541df1..01f682cf77a8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
/*
* Entry parameters:
- * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
- * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
- * RDX - length of kernel
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping
+ * RDX - length to encrypt
* RCX - virtual address of the encryption workarea, including:
* - stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
* - encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
addq $PAGE_SIZE, %rax /* Workarea encryption routine */
push %r12
- movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted kernel */
- movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted kernel */
- movq %rdx, %r12 /* Kernel length */
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted area */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted area */
+ movq %rdx, %r12 /* Area length */
/* Copy encryption routine into the workarea */
movq %rax, %rdi /* Workarea encryption routine */
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@ ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
rep movsb
/* Setup registers for call */
- movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted kernel */
- movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted kernel */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted area */
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted area */
movq %r8, %rdx /* Pagetables used for encryption */
- movq %r12, %rcx /* Kernel length */
+ movq %r12, %rcx /* Area length */
movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */
addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ ENDPROC(sme_encrypt_execute)
ENTRY(__enc_copy)
/*
- * Routine used to encrypt kernel.
+ * Routine used to encrypt memory in place.
* This routine must be run outside of the kernel proper since
* the kernel will be encrypted during the process. So this
* routine is defined here and then copied to an area outside
@@ -79,19 +79,19 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy)
* during execution.
*
* On entry the registers must be:
- * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
- * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted mapping
* RDX - address of the pagetables to use for encryption
- * RCX - length of kernel
+ * RCX - length of area
* R8 - intermediate copy buffer
*
* RAX - points to this routine
*
- * The kernel will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
- * kernel space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
- * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted kernel space. The physical
- * addresses of the two kernel space mappings are the same which
- * results in the kernel being encrypted "in place".
+ * The area will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
+ * memory space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
+ * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted memory space. The physical
+ * addresses of the two mappings are the same which results in the area
+ * being encrypted "in place".
*/
/* Enable the new page tables */
mov %rdx, %cr3
@@ -103,47 +103,55 @@ ENTRY(__enc_copy)
orq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx
mov %rdx, %cr4
+ push %r15
+ push %r12
+
+ movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save area length */
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted area address */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted area address */
+
/* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */
- push %rcx
movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
rdmsr
- push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
+ mov %rdx, %r15 /* Save original PAT value */
andl $0xffff00ff, %edx /* Clear PA5 */
orl $0x00000500, %edx /* Set PA5 to WP */
wrmsr
- pop %rdx /* RDX contains original PAT value */
- pop %rcx
-
- movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */
- movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */
- movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */
wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */
- /* Copy/encrypt 2MB at a time */
+ /* Copy/encrypt up to 2MB at a time */
+ movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r12
1:
- movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted kernel */
+ cmpq %r12, %r9
+ jnb 2f
+ movq %r9, %r12
+
+2:
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted area */
movq %r8, %rdi /* Dest - intermediate copy buffer */
- movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ movq %r12, %rcx
rep movsb
movq %r8, %rsi /* Source - intermediate copy buffer */
- movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted kernel */
- movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted area */
+ movq %r12, %rcx
rep movsb
- addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r11
- addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r10
- subq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */
+ addq %r12, %r11
+ addq %r12, %r10
+ subq %r12, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */
jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */
/* Restore PAT register */
- push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
rdmsr
- pop %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */
+ mov %r15, %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */
wrmsr
+ pop %r12
+ pop %r15
+
ret
.L__enc_copy_end:
ENDPROC(__enc_copy)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 43d4a4a29037..ce38f165489b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgd(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
*
* Returns a pointer to a P4D on success, or NULL on failure.
*/
-static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
+static __init p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
{
pgd_t *pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd_offset_k(address));
gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
@@ -164,12 +164,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
if (!new_p4d_page)
return NULL;
- if (pgd_none(*pgd)) {
- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
- new_p4d_page = 0;
- }
- if (new_p4d_page)
- free_page(new_p4d_page);
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_p4d_page)));
}
BUILD_BUG_ON(pgd_large(*pgd) != 0);
@@ -182,7 +177,7 @@ static p4d_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(unsigned long address)
*
* Returns a pointer to a PMD on success, or NULL on failure.
*/
-static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
+static __init pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
{
gfp_t gfp = (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOTRACK | __GFP_ZERO);
p4d_t *p4d = pti_user_pagetable_walk_p4d(address);
@@ -194,12 +189,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
if (!new_pud_page)
return NULL;
- if (p4d_none(*p4d)) {
- set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
- new_pud_page = 0;
- }
- if (new_pud_page)
- free_page(new_pud_page);
+ set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pud_page)));
}
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
@@ -213,12 +203,7 @@ static pmd_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pmd(unsigned long address)
if (!new_pmd_page)
return NULL;
- if (pud_none(*pud)) {
- set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
- new_pmd_page = 0;
- }
- if (new_pmd_page)
- free_page(new_pmd_page);
+ set_pud(pud, __pud(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pmd_page)));
}
return pmd_offset(pud, address);
@@ -251,12 +236,7 @@ static __init pte_t *pti_user_pagetable_walk_pte(unsigned long address)
if (!new_pte_page)
return NULL;
- if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
- set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
- new_pte_page = 0;
- }
- if (new_pte_page)
- free_page(new_pte_page);
+ set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(_KERNPG_TABLE | __pa(new_pte_page)));
}
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/common.c b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
index 7a5350d08cef..563049c483a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/common.c
@@ -594,6 +594,11 @@ char *__init pcibios_setup(char *str)
} else if (!strcmp(str, "nocrs")) {
pci_probe |= PCI_ROOT_NO_CRS;
return NULL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "big_root_window")) {
+ pci_probe |= PCI_BIG_ROOT_WINDOW;
+ return NULL;
+#endif
} else if (!strcmp(str, "earlydump")) {
pci_early_dump_regs = 1;
return NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
index e663d6bf1328..f6a26e3cb476 100644
--- a/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/pci/fixup.c
@@ -662,10 +662,14 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_EARLY(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2033, quirk_no_aersid);
*/
static void pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar(struct pci_dev *dev)
{
- unsigned i;
u32 base, limit, high;
- struct resource *res, *conflict;
struct pci_dev *other;
+ struct resource *res;
+ unsigned i;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!(pci_probe & PCI_BIG_ROOT_WINDOW))
+ return;
/* Check that we are the only device of that type */
other = pci_get_device(dev->vendor, dev->device, NULL);
@@ -699,22 +703,25 @@ static void pci_amd_enable_64bit_bar(struct pci_dev *dev)
if (!res)
return;
+ /*
+ * Allocate a 256GB window directly below the 0xfd00000000 hardware
+ * limit (see AMD Family 15h Models 30h-3Fh BKDG, sec 2.4.6).
+ */
res->name = "PCI Bus 0000:00";
res->flags = IORESOURCE_PREFETCH | IORESOURCE_MEM |
IORESOURCE_MEM_64 | IORESOURCE_WINDOW;
- res->start = 0x100000000ull;
+ res->start = 0xbd00000000ull;
res->end = 0xfd00000000ull - 1;
- /* Just grab the free area behind system memory for this */
- while ((conflict = request_resource_conflict(&iomem_resource, res))) {
- if (conflict->end >= res->end) {
- kfree(res);
- return;
- }
- res->start = conflict->end + 1;
+ r = request_resource(&iomem_resource, res);
+ if (r) {
+ kfree(res);
+ return;
}
- dev_info(&dev->dev, "adding root bus resource %pR\n", res);
+ dev_info(&dev->dev, "adding root bus resource %pR (tainting kernel)\n",
+ res);
+ add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
base = ((res->start >> 8) & AMD_141b_MMIO_BASE_MMIOBASE_MASK) |
AMD_141b_MMIO_BASE_RE_MASK | AMD_141b_MMIO_BASE_WE_MASK;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index d87ac96e37ed..2dd15e967c3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -135,7 +135,9 @@ pgd_t * __init efi_call_phys_prolog(void)
pud[j] = *pud_offset(p4d_k, vaddr);
}
}
+ pgd_offset_k(pgd * PGDIR_SIZE)->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;
}
+
out:
__flush_tlb_all();
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_bt.c b/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_bt.c
index dc036e511f48..5a0483e7bf66 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_bt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/intel-mid/device_libs/platform_bt.c
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int __init tng_bt_sfi_setup(struct bt_sfi_data *ddata)
return 0;
}
-static const struct bt_sfi_data tng_bt_sfi_data __initdata = {
+static struct bt_sfi_data tng_bt_sfi_data __initdata = {
.setup = tng_bt_sfi_setup,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
index 4d62c071b166..d85076223a69 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c
@@ -1325,20 +1325,18 @@ static void xen_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpus,
{
struct {
struct mmuext_op op;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, num_processors);
-#else
DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, NR_CPUS);
-#endif
} *args;
struct multicall_space mcs;
+ const size_t mc_entry_size = sizeof(args->op) +
+ sizeof(args->mask[0]) * BITS_TO_LONGS(num_possible_cpus());
trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb_others(cpus, info->mm, info->start, info->end);
if (cpumask_empty(cpus))
return; /* nothing to do */
- mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*args));
+ mcs = xen_mc_entry(mc_entry_size);
args = mcs.args;
args->op.arg2.vcpumask = to_cpumask(args->mask);
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
index 75011b80660f..3b34745d0a52 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ u64 xen_clocksource_read(void);
void xen_setup_cpu_clockevents(void);
void xen_save_time_memory_area(void);
void xen_restore_time_memory_area(void);
-void __init xen_init_time_ops(void);
+void __ref xen_init_time_ops(void);
void __init xen_hvm_init_time_ops(void);
irqreturn_t xen_debug_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id);