diff options
author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-03-23 08:51:02 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-04-16 23:51:39 +0200 |
commit | 24c109bb1537c12c02aeed2d51a347b4d6a9b76e (patch) | |
tree | 17362854c4e4a2205a112ffbe9e7c4452a8174ed /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 6f55b2f2a1178856c19bbce2f71449926e731914 (diff) |
bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types
The mixed signed bounds check really belongs into retrieve_ptr_limit()
instead of outside of it in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(). The reason is
that this check is not tied to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE only, but to all pointer
types that we handle in retrieve_ptr_limit() and given errors from the latter
propagate back to adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() and lead to rejection of the
program, it's a better place to reside to avoid anything slipping through
for future types. The reason why we must reject such off_reg is that we
otherwise would not be able to derive a mask, see details in 9d7eceede769
("bpf: restrict unknown scalars of mixed signed bounds for unprivileged").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 4ee014dadac7..a21d7f1a0ba8 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5857,12 +5857,18 @@ static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) } static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, - u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg) + const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg, + u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode) { + bool off_is_neg = off_reg->smin_value < 0; bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) || (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg); u32 off, max; + if (!tnum_is_const(off_reg->var_off) && + (off_reg->smin_value < 0) != (off_reg->smax_value < 0)) + return -EACCES; + switch (ptr_reg->type) { case PTR_TO_STACK: /* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the @@ -5956,7 +5962,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ? BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST; - err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg); + err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, off_reg, &alu_limit, opcode); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -6036,8 +6042,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value; u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value, umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value; - u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; int ret; dst_reg = ®s[dst]; @@ -6085,13 +6091,6 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; - case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: - if (!env->env->bypass_spec_v1 && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) { - verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n", - off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src); - return -EACCES; - } - fallthrough; default: break; } |