diff options
author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-03-23 15:05:48 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2021-04-16 23:51:54 +0200 |
commit | 073815b756c51ba9d8384d924c5d1c03ca3d1ae4 (patch) | |
tree | 618347c5c7ee8cb2850bd11502863fa005a5a1f6 /kernel/bpf | |
parent | a6aaece00a57fa6f22575364b3903dfbccf5345d (diff) |
bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper
Move the bounds check in adjust_ptr_min_max_vals() into a small helper named
sanitize_check_bounds() in order to simplify the former a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 49 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f378d4ae405f..db77e2c670b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6075,6 +6075,37 @@ static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( return 0; } +static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + const struct bpf_insn *insn, + const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) +{ + u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; + + /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds + * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. + */ + if (env->bypass_spec_v1) + return 0; + + switch (dst_reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_STACK: + if (check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(env, dst, dst_reg, + dst_reg->off + dst_reg->var_off.value)) + return -EACCES; + break; + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: + if (check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { + verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " + "prohibited for !root\n", dst); + return -EACCES; + } + break; + default: + break; + } + + return 0; +} /* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off. * Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately. @@ -6300,22 +6331,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, __reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg); __reg_bound_offset(dst_reg); - /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds - * in order to be able to sanitize access later on. - */ - if (!env->bypass_spec_v1) { - if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE && - check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) { - verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " - "prohibited for !root\n", dst); - return -EACCES; - } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && - check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic( - env, dst, dst_reg, dst_reg->off + - dst_reg->var_off.value)) { - return -EACCES; - } - } + if (sanitize_check_bounds(env, insn, dst_reg) < 0) + return -EACCES; return 0; } |