diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-05-21 16:01:54 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-05-21 16:01:54 -0400 |
commit | 6f6e434aa267a6030477876d89444fe3a6b7a48d (patch) | |
tree | 67755c422f1e85451aa646eae21d4c6f3f389d9f /arch/x86 | |
parent | 44c752fe584d8b9f6e0756ecffa8691677471862 (diff) | |
parent | 6741c4bb389da103c0d79ad1961884628900bfe6 (diff) |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
S390 bpf_jit.S is removed in net-next and had changes in 'net',
since that code isn't used any more take the removal.
TLS data structures split the TX and RX components in 'net-next',
put the new struct members from the bug fix in 'net' into the RX
part.
The 'net-next' tree had some reworking of how the ERSPAN code works in
the GRE tunneling code, overlapping with a one-line headroom
calculation fix in 'net'.
Overlapping changes in __sock_map_ctx_update_elem(), keep the bits
that read the prog members via READ_ONCE() into local variables
before using them.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
28 files changed, 237 insertions, 100 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c index 47d3efff6805..09f36c0d9d4f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci32(efi_pci_io_protocol_32 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom) if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) goto free_struct; - memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize); + memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage, + pci->romsize); return status; free_struct: @@ -269,7 +270,8 @@ __setup_efi_pci64(efi_pci_io_protocol_64 *pci, struct pci_setup_rom **__rom) if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) goto free_struct; - memcpy(rom->romdata, pci->romimage, pci->romsize); + memcpy(rom->romdata, (void *)(unsigned long)pci->romimage, + pci->romsize); return status; free_struct: diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index fca012baba19..8169e8b7a4dc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -306,6 +306,25 @@ ENTRY(startup_64) leaq boot_stack_end(%rbx), %rsp /* + * paging_prepare() and cleanup_trampoline() below can have GOT + * references. Adjust the table with address we are running at. + * + * Zero RAX for adjust_got: the GOT was not adjusted before; + * there's no adjustment to undo. + */ + xorq %rax, %rax + + /* + * Calculate the address the binary is loaded at and use it as + * a GOT adjustment. + */ + call 1f +1: popq %rdi + subq $1b, %rdi + + call adjust_got + + /* * At this point we are in long mode with 4-level paging enabled, * but we might want to enable 5-level paging or vice versa. * @@ -370,10 +389,14 @@ trampoline_return: /* * cleanup_trampoline() would restore trampoline memory. * + * RDI is address of the page table to use instead of page table + * in trampoline memory (if required). + * * RSI holds real mode data and needs to be preserved across * this function call. */ pushq %rsi + leaq top_pgtable(%rbx), %rdi call cleanup_trampoline popq %rsi @@ -381,6 +404,21 @@ trampoline_return: pushq $0 popfq + /* + * Previously we've adjusted the GOT with address the binary was + * loaded at. Now we need to re-adjust for relocation address. + * + * Calculate the address the binary is loaded at, so that we can + * undo the previous GOT adjustment. + */ + call 1f +1: popq %rax + subq $1b, %rax + + /* The new adjustment is the relocation address */ + movq %rbx, %rdi + call adjust_got + /* * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer * where decompression in place becomes safe. @@ -482,19 +520,6 @@ relocated: rep stosq /* - * Adjust our own GOT - */ - leaq _got(%rip), %rdx - leaq _egot(%rip), %rcx -1: - cmpq %rcx, %rdx - jae 2f - addq %rbx, (%rdx) - addq $8, %rdx - jmp 1b -2: - -/* * Do the extraction, and jump to the new kernel.. */ pushq %rsi /* Save the real mode argument */ @@ -512,6 +537,27 @@ relocated: */ jmp *%rax +/* + * Adjust the global offset table + * + * RAX is the previous adjustment of the table to undo (use 0 if it's the + * first time we touch GOT). + * RDI is the new adjustment to apply. + */ +adjust_got: + /* Walk through the GOT adding the address to the entries */ + leaq _got(%rip), %rdx + leaq _egot(%rip), %rcx +1: + cmpq %rcx, %rdx + jae 2f + subq %rax, (%rdx) /* Undo previous adjustment */ + addq %rdi, (%rdx) /* Apply the new adjustment */ + addq $8, %rdx + jmp 1b +2: + ret + .code32 /* * This is the 32-bit trampoline that will be copied over to low memory. @@ -649,3 +695,10 @@ boot_stack_end: .balign 4096 pgtable: .fill BOOT_PGT_SIZE, 1, 0 + +/* + * The page table is going to be used instead of page table in the trampoline + * memory. + */ +top_pgtable: + .fill PAGE_SIZE, 1, 0 diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c index 32af1cbcd903..a362fa0b849c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c @@ -23,14 +23,6 @@ struct paging_config { static char trampoline_save[TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_SIZE]; /* - * The page table is going to be used instead of page table in the trampoline - * memory. - * - * It must not be in BSS as BSS is cleared after cleanup_trampoline(). - */ -static char top_pgtable[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) __section(.data); - -/* * Trampoline address will be printed by extract_kernel() for debugging * purposes. * @@ -134,7 +126,7 @@ out: return paging_config; } -void cleanup_trampoline(void) +void cleanup_trampoline(void *pgtable) { void *trampoline_pgtable; @@ -145,8 +137,8 @@ void cleanup_trampoline(void) * if it's there. */ if ((void *)__native_read_cr3() == trampoline_pgtable) { - memcpy(top_pgtable, trampoline_pgtable, PAGE_SIZE); - native_write_cr3((unsigned long)top_pgtable); + memcpy(pgtable, trampoline_pgtable, PAGE_SIZE); + native_write_cr3((unsigned long)pgtable); } /* Restore trampoline memory */ diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c deleted file mode 100644 index 541468e25265..000000000000 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32/vdso-fakesections.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -#include "../vdso-fakesections.c" diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c index a6006e7bb729..45b2b1c93d04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> @@ -304,17 +305,20 @@ set_ext_hw_attr(struct hw_perf_event *hwc, struct perf_event *event) config = attr->config; - cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff; + cache_type = (config >> 0) & 0xff; if (cache_type >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_type = array_index_nospec(cache_type, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_MAX); cache_op = (config >> 8) & 0xff; if (cache_op >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_op = array_index_nospec(cache_op, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_OP_MAX); cache_result = (config >> 16) & 0xff; if (cache_result >= PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cache_result = array_index_nospec(cache_result, PERF_COUNT_HW_CACHE_RESULT_MAX); val = hw_cache_event_ids[cache_type][cache_op][cache_result]; @@ -421,6 +425,8 @@ int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event) if (attr->config >= x86_pmu.max_events) return -EINVAL; + attr->config = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)attr->config, x86_pmu.max_events); + /* * The generic map: */ diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c index 9aca448bb8e6..9f8084f18d58 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/cstate.c @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> #include "../perf_event.h" @@ -302,6 +303,7 @@ static int cstate_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event) } else if (event->pmu == &cstate_pkg_pmu) { if (cfg >= PERF_CSTATE_PKG_EVENT_MAX) return -EINVAL; + cfg = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)cfg, PERF_CSTATE_PKG_EVENT_MAX); if (!pkg_msr[cfg].attr) return -EINVAL; event->hw.event_base = pkg_msr[cfg].msr; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/msr.c b/arch/x86/events/msr.c index e7edf19e64c2..b4771a6ddbc1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/msr.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/msr.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/perf_event.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <asm/intel-family.h> enum perf_msr_id { @@ -158,9 +159,6 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != event->pmu->type) return -ENOENT; - if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - /* unsupported modes and filters */ if (event->attr.exclude_user || event->attr.exclude_kernel || @@ -171,6 +169,11 @@ static int msr_event_init(struct perf_event *event) event->attr.sample_period) /* no sampling */ return -EINVAL; + if (cfg >= PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + cfg = array_index_nospec((unsigned long)cfg, PERF_MSR_EVENT_MAX); + if (!msr[cfg].attr) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h index b27da9602a6d..aced6c9290d6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -140,6 +140,20 @@ extern void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bit); #define setup_force_cpu_bug(bit) setup_force_cpu_cap(bit) +#if defined(__clang__) && !defined(CC_HAVE_ASM_GOTO) + +/* + * Workaround for the sake of BPF compilation which utilizes kernel + * headers, but clang does not support ASM GOTO and fails the build. + */ +#ifndef __BPF_TRACING__ +#warning "Compiler lacks ASM_GOTO support. Add -D __BPF_TRACING__ to your compiler arguments" +#endif + +#define static_cpu_has(bit) boot_cpu_has(bit) + +#else + /* * Static testing of CPU features. Used the same as boot_cpu_has(). * These will statically patch the target code for additional @@ -195,6 +209,7 @@ t_no: boot_cpu_has(bit) : \ _static_cpu_has(bit) \ ) +#endif #define cpu_has_bug(c, bit) cpu_has(c, (bit)) #define set_cpu_bug(c, bit) set_cpu_cap(c, (bit)) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h index b3e32b010ab1..c2c01f84df75 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h @@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn) return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes; } +#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f +#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e + +/* + * Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states; + * "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS + * instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is + * suppressed." + * This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these + * instructions, single stepping is suppressed. + */ +static inline int insn_masking_exception(struct insn *insn) +{ + return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == POP_SS_OPCODE || + (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == MOV_SREG_OPCODE && + X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.bytes[0]) == 2); +} + #endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h index 57e3785d0d26..cf9911b5a53c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk, #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) { - /* pkey 0 is the default and always allocated */ + /* pkey 0 is the default and allocated implicitly */ mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = 0x1; /* -1 means unallocated or invalid */ mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h index a0ba1ffda0df..851c04b7a092 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pkeys.h @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H #define _ASM_X86_PKEYS_H +#define ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY 0 + #define arch_max_pkey() (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE) ? 16 : 1) extern int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, @@ -15,7 +17,7 @@ extern int __execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm); static inline int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm) { if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) - return 0; + return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY; return __execute_only_pkey(mm); } @@ -49,13 +51,21 @@ bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey) { /* * "Allocated" pkeys are those that have been returned - * from pkey_alloc(). pkey 0 is special, and never - * returned from pkey_alloc(). + * from pkey_alloc() or pkey 0 which is allocated + * implicitly when the mm is created. */ - if (pkey <= 0) + if (pkey < 0) return false; if (pkey >= arch_max_pkey()) return false; + /* + * The exec-only pkey is set in the allocation map, but + * is not available to any of the user interfaces like + * mprotect_pkey(). + */ + if (pkey == mm->context.execute_only_pkey) + return false; + return mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & (1U << pkey); } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h index 4c851ebb3ceb..0ede697c3961 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #define KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH 9 #define KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT 10 -#define KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 /* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c index c88e0b127810..b481b95bd8f6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_nb.c @@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ #include <asm/amd_nb.h> #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_ROOT 0x1450 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_ROOT 0x15d0 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F3 0x1463 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F4 0x1464 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F3 0x15eb +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F4 0x15ec /* Protect the PCI config register pairs used for SMN and DF indirect access. */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smn_mutex); @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ static u32 *flush_words; static const struct pci_device_id amd_root_ids[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_ROOT) }, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_ROOT) }, {} }; @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ const struct pci_device_id amd_nb_misc_ids[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_NB_F3) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_M30H_NB_F3) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F3) }, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F3) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_CNB17H_F3) }, {} }; @@ -51,6 +56,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id amd_nb_link_ids[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_NB_F4) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_16H_M30H_NB_F4) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_DF_F4) }, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_17H_M10H_DF_F4) }, { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_AMD, PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_CNB17H_F4) }, {} }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c index 8b04234e010b..7685444a106b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_cluster.c @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static void init_x2apic_ldr(void) goto update; } cmsk = cluster_hotplug_mask; + cmsk->clusterid = cluster; cluster_hotplug_mask = NULL; update: this_cpu_write(cluster_masks, cmsk); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c index f7666eef4a87..c8e038800591 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c @@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ static struct smca_bank_name smca_names[] = { [SMCA_SMU] = { "smu", "System Management Unit" }, }; +static u32 smca_bank_addrs[MAX_NR_BANKS][NR_BLOCKS] __ro_after_init = +{ + [0 ... MAX_NR_BANKS - 1] = { [0 ... NR_BLOCKS - 1] = -1 } +}; + const char *smca_get_name(enum smca_bank_types t) { if (t >= N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES) @@ -443,20 +448,26 @@ static u32 smca_get_block_address(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank, if (!block) return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank); + /* Check our cache first: */ + if (smca_bank_addrs[bank][block] != -1) + return smca_bank_addrs[bank][block]; + /* * For SMCA enabled processors, BLKPTR field of the first MISC register * (MCx_MISC0) indicates presence of additional MISC regs set (MISC1-4). */ if (rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(bank), &low, &high)) - return addr; + goto out; if (!(low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX)) - return addr; + goto out; if (!rdmsr_safe_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank), &low, &high) && (low & MASK_BLKPTR_LO)) - return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISCy(bank, block - 1); + addr = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISCy(bank, block - 1); +out: + smca_bank_addrs[bank][block] = addr; return addr; } @@ -468,18 +479,6 @@ static u32 get_block_address(unsigned int cpu, u32 current_addr, u32 low, u32 hi if ((bank >= mca_cfg.banks) || (block >= NR_BLOCKS)) return addr; - /* Get address from already initialized block. */ - if (per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)) { - struct threshold_bank *bankp = per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)[bank]; - - if (bankp && bankp->blocks) { - struct threshold_block *blockp = &bankp->blocks[block]; - - if (blockp) - return blockp->address; - } - } - if (mce_flags.smca) return smca_get_block_address(cpu, bank, block); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c index 0c408f8c4ed4..2d29e47c056e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c @@ -104,6 +104,12 @@ static bool __head check_la57_support(unsigned long physaddr) } #endif +/* Code in __startup_64() can be relocated during execution, but the compiler + * doesn't have to generate PC-relative relocations when accessing globals from + * that function. Clang actually does not generate them, which leads to + * boot-time crashes. To work around this problem, every global pointer must + * be adjusted using fixup_pointer(). + */ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp) { @@ -113,6 +119,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, p4dval_t *p4d; pudval_t *pud; pmdval_t *pmd, pmd_entry; + pteval_t *mask_ptr; bool la57; int i; unsigned int *next_pgt_ptr; @@ -196,7 +203,8 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, pmd_entry = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL; /* Filter out unsupported __PAGE_KERNEL_* bits: */ - pmd_entry &= __supported_pte_mask; + mask_ptr = fixup_pointer(&__supported_pte_mask, physaddr); + pmd_entry &= *mask_ptr; pmd_entry += sme_get_me_mask(); pmd_entry += physaddr; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c index 0715f827607c..6f4d42377fe5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c @@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real, struct insn *insn) if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION) return 0; + /* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */ + if (insn_masking_exception(insn)) + return 0; + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* Only x86_64 has RIP relative instructions */ if (insn_rip_relative(insn)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c index 7867417cfaff..5b2300b818af 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c @@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static void __init sev_map_percpu_data(void) static void __init kvm_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) { native_smp_prepare_cpus(max_cpus); - if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED)) + if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME)) static_branch_disable(&virt_spin_lock_key); } @@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ static void __init kvm_guest_init(void) } if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) && - !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED) && + !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME) && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) pv_mmu_ops.flush_tlb_others = kvm_flush_tlb_others; @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ static __init int kvm_setup_pv_tlb_flush(void) int cpu; if (kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_TLB_FLUSH) && - !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED) && + !kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME) && kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME)) { for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { zalloc_cpumask_var_node(per_cpu_ptr(&__pv_tlb_mask, cpu), @@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ void __init kvm_spinlock_init(void) if (!kvm_para_has_feature(KVM_FEATURE_PV_UNHALT)) return; - if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED)) + if (kvm_para_has_hint(KVM_HINTS_REALTIME)) return; __pv_init_lock_hash(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c index 60cdec6628b0..d1ab07ec8c9a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c @@ -57,12 +57,17 @@ static void load_segments(void) static void machine_kexec_free_page_tables(struct kimage *image) { free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pgd); + image->arch.pgd = NULL; #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd0); + image->arch.pmd0 = NULL; free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd1); + image->arch.pmd1 = NULL; #endif free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte0); + image->arch.pte0 = NULL; free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte1); + image->arch.pte1 = NULL; } static int machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(struct kimage *image) @@ -79,7 +84,6 @@ static int machine_kexec_alloc_page_tables(struct kimage *image) !image->arch.pmd0 || !image->arch.pmd1 || #endif !image->arch.pte0 || !image->arch.pte1) { - machine_kexec_free_page_tables(image); return -ENOMEM; } return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c index a5e55d832d0a..6010449ca6d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c @@ -39,9 +39,13 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image) { free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.p4d); + image->arch.p4d = NULL; free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pud); + image->arch.pud = NULL; free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd); + image->arch.pmd = NULL; free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte); + image->arch.pte = NULL; } static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) @@ -91,7 +95,6 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd) set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC)); return 0; err: - free_transition_pgtable(image); return result; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index 4b100fe0f508..12bb445fb98d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -542,6 +542,7 @@ void set_personality_64bit(void) clear_thread_flag(TIF_X32); /* Pretend that this comes from a 64bit execve */ task_pt_regs(current)->orig_ax = __NR_execve; + current_thread_info()->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; /* Ensure the corresponding mm is not marked. */ if (current->mm) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index 85c7ef23d99f..c84bb5396958 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -299,6 +299,10 @@ static int uprobe_init_insn(struct arch_uprobe *auprobe, struct insn *insn, bool if (is_prefix_bad(insn)) return -ENOTSUPP; + /* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */ + if (insn_masking_exception(insn)) + return -ENOTSUPP; + if (x86_64) good_insns = good_insns_64; else diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index 98618e397342..5708e951a5c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -1265,7 +1265,7 @@ static int kvm_hv_hypercall_complete_userspace(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run; kvm_hv_hypercall_set_result(vcpu, run->hyperv.u.hcall.result); - return 1; + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } static u16 kvm_hvcall_signal_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool fast, u64 param) @@ -1296,8 +1296,10 @@ static u16 kvm_hvcall_signal_event(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool fast, u64 param) if (param & ~KVM_HYPERV_CONN_ID_MASK) return HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_INPUT; - /* conn_to_evt is protected by vcpu->kvm->srcu */ + /* the eventfd is protected by vcpu->kvm->srcu, but conn_to_evt isn't */ + rcu_read_lock(); eventfd = idr_find(&vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.conn_to_evt, param); + rcu_read_unlock(); if (!eventfd) return HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index c7668806163f..3f1696570b41 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -1494,6 +1494,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc(void) SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC; } +static bool vmx_umip_emulated(void) +{ + return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & + SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC; +} + static inline bool report_flexpriority(void) { return flexpriority_enabled; @@ -4761,14 +4767,16 @@ static int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4) else hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON; - if ((cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP)) { - vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, - SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC); - hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP; - } else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || - !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) - vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && vmx_umip_emulated()) { + if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) { + vmcs_set_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC); + hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP; + } else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || + !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) + vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC); + } if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) { /* @@ -9497,12 +9505,6 @@ static bool vmx_xsaves_supported(void) SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES; } -static bool vmx_umip_emulated(void) -{ - return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl & - SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC; -} - static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { u32 exit_intr_info; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 51ecd381793b..59371de5d722 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ module_param(ignore_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); static bool __read_mostly report_ignored_msrs = true; module_param(report_ignored_msrs, bool, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); -unsigned int min_timer_period_us = 500; +unsigned int min_timer_period_us = 200; module_param(min_timer_period_us, uint, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); static bool __read_mostly kvmclock_periodic_sync = true; @@ -843,7 +843,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_set_cr4); int kvm_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3) { #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - cr3 &= ~CR3_PCID_INVD; + bool pcid_enabled = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE); + + if (pcid_enabled) + cr3 &= ~CR3_PCID_INVD; #endif if (cr3 == kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) && !pdptrs_changed(vcpu)) { @@ -6671,12 +6674,13 @@ void kvm_vcpu_deactivate_apicv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { unsigned long nr, a0, a1, a2, a3, ret; - int op_64_bit, r; - - r = kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); + int op_64_bit; - if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) - return kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu); + if (kvm_hv_hypercall_enabled(vcpu->kvm)) { + if (!kvm_hv_hypercall(vcpu)) + return 0; + goto out; + } nr = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX); a0 = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RBX); @@ -6697,7 +6701,7 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) != 0) { ret = -KVM_EPERM; - goto out; + goto out_error; } switch (nr) { @@ -6717,12 +6721,14 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) ret = -KVM_ENOSYS; break; } -out: +out_error: if (!op_64_bit) ret = (u32)ret; kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX, ret); + +out: ++vcpu->stat.hypercalls; - return r; + return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_hypercall); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c index d7bc0eea20a5..6e98e0a7c923 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c @@ -94,26 +94,27 @@ int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int prot, int pkey */ if (pkey != -1) return pkey; - /* - * Look for a protection-key-drive execute-only mapping - * which is now being given permissions that are not - * execute-only. Move it back to the default pkey. - */ - if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma) && - (prot & (PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE))) { - return 0; - } + /* * The mapping is execute-only. Go try to get the * execute-only protection key. If we fail to do that, * fall through as if we do not have execute-only - * support. + * support in this mm. */ if (prot == PROT_EXEC) { pkey = execute_only_pkey(vma->vm_mm); if (pkey > 0) return pkey; + } else if (vma_is_pkey_exec_only(vma)) { + /* + * Protections are *not* PROT_EXEC, but the mapping + * is using the exec-only pkey. This mapping was + * PROT_EXEC and will no longer be. Move back to + * the default pkey. + */ + return ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY; } + /* * This is a vanilla, non-pkey mprotect (or we failed to * setup execute-only), inherit the pkey from the VMA we diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index d33e7dbe3129..2d76106788a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -42,13 +42,11 @@ xmaddr_t arbitrary_virt_to_machine(void *vaddr) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arbitrary_virt_to_machine); -static void xen_flush_tlb_all(void) +static noinline void xen_flush_tlb_all(void) { struct mmuext_op *op; struct multicall_space mcs; - trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb_all(0); - preempt_disable(); mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op)); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c index 486c0a34d00b..2c30cabfda90 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c @@ -1310,13 +1310,11 @@ unsigned long xen_read_cr2_direct(void) return this_cpu_read(xen_vcpu_info.arch.cr2); } -static void xen_flush_tlb(void) +static noinline void xen_flush_tlb(void) { struct mmuext_op *op; struct multicall_space mcs; - trace_xen_mmu_flush_tlb(0); - preempt_disable(); mcs = xen_mc_entry(sizeof(*op)); |