Merge branch 'linus' into locking/core, to pick up fixes

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

8 files changed, 164 insertions, 7 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-cxl b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-cxl
index 640f65e79ef1..8e69345c37cc 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-cxl
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-cxl
@@ -244,3 +244,11 @@ Description:    read only
                 Returns 1 if the psl timebase register is synchronized
                 with the core timebase register, 0 otherwise.
 Users:          https://github.com/ibm-capi/libcxl
+
+What:           /sys/class/cxl/<card>/tunneled_ops_supported
+Date:           May 2018
+Contact:        linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
+Description:    read only
+                Returns 1 if tunneled operations are supported in capi mode,
+                0 otherwise.
+Users:          https://github.com/ibm-capi/libcxl
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 025b7cf3768d..bd4975e132d3 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 11fc28ecdb6d..f2040d46f095 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2680,6 +2680,9 @@
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
 			to spectre_v2=off.
 
+	nospec_store_bypass_disable
+			[HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability
+
 	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
 			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
 			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
@@ -4025,6 +4028,48 @@
 			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
 			spectre_v2=auto.
 
+	spec_store_bypass_disable=
+			[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
+			(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against a
+			a common industry wide performance optimization known
+			as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which recent stores
+			to the same memory location may not be observed by
+			later loads during speculative execution. The idea
+			is that such stores are unlikely and that they can
+			be detected prior to instruction retirement at the
+			end of a particular speculation execution window.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			store can be used in a cache side channel attack, for
+			example to read memory to which the attacker does not
+			directly have access (e.g. inside sandboxed code).
+
+			This parameter controls whether the Speculative Store
+			Bypass optimization is used.
+
+			on      - Unconditionally disable Speculative Store Bypass
+			off     - Unconditionally enable Speculative Store Bypass
+			auto    - Kernel detects whether the CPU model contains an
+				  implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and
+				  picks the most appropriate mitigation. If the
+				  CPU is not vulnerable, "off" is selected. If the
+				  CPU is vulnerable the default mitigation is
+				  architecture and Kconfig dependent. See below.
+			prctl   - Control Speculative Store Bypass per thread
+				  via prctl. Speculative Store Bypass is enabled
+				  for a process by default. The state of the control
+				  is inherited on fork.
+			seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads
+				  will disable SSB unless they explicitly opt out.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			spec_store_bypass_disable=auto.
+
+			Default mitigations:
+			X86:	If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
 	spia_io_base=	[HW,MTD]
 	spia_fio_base=
 	spia_pedr=
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-pp2.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-pp2.txt
index 1814fa13f6ab..fc019df0d863 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-pp2.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/marvell-pp2.txt
@@ -21,9 +21,10 @@ Required properties:
 	- main controller clock (for both armada-375-pp2 and armada-7k-pp2)
 	- GOP clock (for both armada-375-pp2 and armada-7k-pp2)
 	- MG clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
+	- MG Core clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
 	- AXI clock (only for armada-7k-pp2)
-- clock-names: names of used clocks, must be "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk"
-  and "axi_clk" (the 2 latter only for armada-7k-pp2).
+- clock-names: names of used clocks, must be "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk",
+  "mg_core_clk" and "axi_clk" (the 3 latter only for armada-7k-pp2).
 
 The ethernet ports are represented by subnodes. At least one port is
 required.
@@ -80,8 +81,8 @@ cpm_ethernet: ethernet@0 {
 	compatible = "marvell,armada-7k-pp22";
 	reg = <0x0 0x100000>, <0x129000 0xb000>;
 	clocks = <&cpm_syscon0 1 3>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 9>,
-		 <&cpm_syscon0 1 5>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 18>;
-	clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "gp_clk", "axi_clk";
+		 <&cpm_syscon0 1 5>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 6>, <&cpm_syscon0 1 18>;
+	clock-names = "pp_clk", "gop_clk", "mg_clk", "mg_core_clk", "axi_clk";
 
 	eth0: eth0 {
 		interrupts = <ICU_GRP_NSR 39 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ksz90x1.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ksz90x1.txt
index 42a248301615..e22d8cfea687 100644
--- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ksz90x1.txt
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ksz90x1.txt
@@ -57,6 +57,13 @@ KSZ9031:
       - txd2-skew-ps : Skew control of TX data 2 pad
       - txd3-skew-ps : Skew control of TX data 3 pad
 
+    - micrel,force-master:
+        Boolean, force phy to master mode. Only set this option if the phy
+        reference clock provided at CLK125_NDO pin is used as MAC reference
+        clock because the clock jitter in slave mode is to high (errata#2).
+        Attention: The link partner must be configurable as slave otherwise
+        no link will be established.
+
 Examples:
 
 	mdio {
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
index 7b2eb1b7d4ca..a3233da7fa88 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ place where this information is gathered.
    no_new_privs
    seccomp_filter
    unshare
+   spec_ctrl
 
 .. only::  subproject and html
 
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..32f3d55c54b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+===================
+Speculation Control
+===================
+
+Quite some CPUs have speculation-related misfeatures which are in
+fact vulnerabilities causing data leaks in various forms even across
+privilege domains.
+
+The kernel provides mitigation for such vulnerabilities in various
+forms. Some of these mitigations are compile-time configurable and some
+can be supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+There is also a class of mitigations which are very expensive, but they can
+be restricted to a certain set of processes or tasks in controlled
+environments. The mechanism to control these mitigations is via
+:manpage:`prctl(2)`.
+
+There are two prctl options which are related to this:
+
+ * PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+ * PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature
+which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bits 0-3 with
+the following meaning:
+
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+Bit  Define                Description
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+0    PR_SPEC_PRCTL         Mitigation can be controlled per task by
+                           PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+1    PR_SPEC_ENABLE        The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is
+                           disabled.
+2    PR_SPEC_DISABLE       The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is
+                           enabled.
+3    PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE Same as PR_SPEC_DISABLE, but cannot be undone. A
+                           subsequent prctl(..., PR_SPEC_ENABLE) will fail.
+==== ===================== ===================================================
+
+If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature.
+
+If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per-task control of the mitigation is
+available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation
+misfeature will fail.
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL
+-----------------------
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which
+is selected by arg2 of :manpage:`prctl(2)` per task. arg3 is used to hand
+in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE or
+PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+Common error codes
+------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+EINVAL  The prctl is not implemented by the architecture or unused
+        prctl(2) arguments are not 0.
+
+ENODEV  arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature.
+======= =================================================================
+
+PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL error codes
+-----------------------------------
+======= =================================================================
+Value   Meaning
+======= =================================================================
+0       Success
+
+ERANGE  arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's neither PR_SPEC_ENABLE nor
+        PR_SPEC_DISABLE nor PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE.
+
+ENXIO   Control of the selected speculation misfeature is not possible.
+        See PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL.
+
+EPERM   Speculation was disabled with PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and caller
+        tried to enable it again.
+======= =================================================================
+
+Speculation misfeature controls
+-------------------------------
+- PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: Speculative Store Bypass
+
+  Invocations:
+   * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, 0, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
+   * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0);
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt
index d4f33eb805dd..ab022dcd0911 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/cpuid.txt
@@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE_STABLE_BIT ||    24 || host will warn if no guest-side
 
 flag                               || value || meaning
 ==================================================================================
-KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED                ||     0 || guest checks this feature bit to
-                                   ||       || determine if there is vCPU pinning
-                                   ||       || and there is no vCPU over-commitment,
+KVM_HINTS_REALTIME                 ||     0 || guest checks this feature bit to
+                                   ||       || determine that vCPUs are never
+                                   ||       || preempted for an unlimited time,
                                    ||       || allowing optimizations
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------