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authorPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2024-07-17 13:04:48 -0400
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2024-07-26 14:46:14 -0400
commit5932ca411e533e7ad2b97c47b4357a05fa06c2a5 (patch)
tree7a164c01d4fb3b3f840d9b464d7685c9ba109a76
parentc2adcf051be01d3da1e138c178a680514299461b (diff)
KVM: x86: disallow pre-fault for SNP VMs before initialization
KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY for an SNP guest can race with sev_gmem_post_populate() in bad ways. The following sequence for instance can potentially trigger an RMP fault: thread A, sev_gmem_post_populate: called thread B, sev_gmem_prepare: places below 'pfn' in a private state in RMP thread A, sev_gmem_post_populate: *vaddr = kmap_local_pfn(pfn + i); thread A, sev_gmem_post_populate: copy_from_user(vaddr, src + i * PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); RMP #PF Fix this by only allowing KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY to run after a guest's initial private memory contents have been finalized via KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH. Beyond fixing this issue, it just sort of makes sense to enforce this, since the KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY documentation states: "KVM maps memory as if the vCPU generated a stage-2 read page fault" which sort of implies we should be acting on the same guest state that a vCPU would see post-launch after the initial guest memory is all set up. Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-rw-r--r--Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c3
6 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index ec1cd8aa1d56..7b512286f8d2 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -6402,6 +6402,12 @@ for the current vCPU state. KVM maps memory as if the vCPU generated a
stage-2 read page fault, e.g. faults in memory as needed, but doesn't break
CoW. However, KVM does not mark any newly created stage-2 PTE as Accessed.
+In the case of confidential VM types where there is an initial set up of
+private guest memory before the guest is 'finalized'/measured, this ioctl
+should only be issued after completing all the necessary setup to put the
+guest into a 'finalized' state so that the above semantics can be reliably
+ensured.
+
In some cases, multiple vCPUs might share the page tables. In this
case, the ioctl can be called in parallel.
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 950a03e0181e..94e7b5a4fafe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1305,6 +1305,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
u8 vm_type;
bool has_private_mem;
bool has_protected_state;
+ bool pre_fault_allowed;
struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 901be9e420a4..26ef5b6ac3c1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4743,6 +4743,9 @@ long kvm_arch_vcpu_pre_fault_memory(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u64 end;
int r;
+ if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
/*
* reload is efficient when called repeatedly, so we can do it on
* every iteration.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index a16c873b3232..6589091e8ce0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2549,6 +2549,14 @@ static int snp_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
+ /*
+ * Now that there will be no more SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE ioctls, private pages
+ * can be given to the guest simply by marking the RMP entry as private.
+ * This can happen on first access and also with KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY.
+ */
+ if (!ret)
+ kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed = true;
+
kfree(id_auth);
e_free_id_block:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index c115d26844f7..d6f252555ab3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4949,6 +4949,7 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
kvm->arch.has_private_mem = (type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed = !kvm->arch.has_private_mem;
}
if (!pause_filter_count || !pause_filter_thresh)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index af6c8cf6a37a..52778689cef4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12646,6 +12646,9 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+ /* Decided by the vendor code for other VM types. */
+ kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed =
+ type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
ret = kvm_page_track_init(kvm);
if (ret)