/* * fs/cifs/cifsencrypt.c * * Encryption and hashing operations relating to NTLM, NTLMv2. See MS-NLMP * for more detailed information * * Copyright (C) International Business Machines Corp., 2005,2013 * Author(s): Steve French (sfrench@us.ibm.com) * * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published * by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See * the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License * along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA */ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include "cifspdu.h" #include "cifsglob.h" #include "cifs_debug.h" #include "cifs_unicode.h" #include "cifsproto.h" #include "ntlmssp.h" #include <linux/ctype.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> static int cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) { int rc; unsigned int size; if (server->secmech.sdescmd5 != NULL) return 0; /* already allocated */ server->secmech.md5 = crypto_alloc_shash("md5", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.md5)) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto md5\n"); rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.md5); server->secmech.md5 = NULL; return rc; } size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.md5); server->secmech.sdescmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5); server->secmech.md5 = NULL; return -ENOMEM; } server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.md5; server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash.flags = 0x0; return 0; } /* * Calculate and return the CIFS signature based on the mac key and SMB PDU. * The 16 byte signature must be allocated by the caller. Note we only use the * 1st eight bytes and that the smb header signature field on input contains * the sequence number before this function is called. Also, this function * should be called with the server->srv_mutex held. */ static int cifs_calc_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *signature) { int i; int rc; struct kvec *iov = rqst->rq_iov; int n_vec = rqst->rq_nvec; if (iov == NULL || signature == NULL || server == NULL) return -EINVAL; if (!server->secmech.sdescmd5) { rc = cifs_crypto_shash_md5_allocate(server); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Can't alloc md5 crypto\n", __func__); return -1; } } rc = crypto_shash_init(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init md5\n", __func__); return rc; } rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, server->session_key.response, server->session_key.len); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); return rc; } for (i = 0; i < n_vec; i++) { if (iov[i].iov_len == 0) continue; if (iov[i].iov_base == NULL) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "null iovec entry\n"); return -EIO; } /* The first entry includes a length field (which does not get signed that occupies the first 4 bytes before the header */ if (i == 0) { if (iov[0].iov_len <= 8) /* cmd field at offset 9 */ break; /* nothing to sign or corrupt header */ rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, iov[i].iov_base + 4, iov[i].iov_len - 4); } else { rc = crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, iov[i].iov_base, iov[i].iov_len); } if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with payload\n", __func__); return rc; } } /* now hash over the rq_pages array */ for (i = 0; i < rqst->rq_npages; i++) { struct kvec p_iov; cifs_rqst_page_to_kvec(rqst, i, &p_iov); crypto_shash_update(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, p_iov.iov_base, p_iov.iov_len); kunmap(rqst->rq_pages[i]); } rc = crypto_shash_final(&server->secmech.sdescmd5->shash, signature); if (rc) cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); return rc; } /* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */ int cifs_sign_rqst(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number) { int rc = 0; char smb_signature[20]; struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base; if ((cifs_pdu == NULL) || (server == NULL)) return -EINVAL; if (!(cifs_pdu->Flags2 & SMBFLG2_SECURITY_SIGNATURE) || server->tcpStatus == CifsNeedNegotiate) return rc; if (!server->session_estab) { memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL", 8); return rc; } cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber = cpu_to_le32(server->sequence_number); cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0; *pexpected_response_sequence_number = ++server->sequence_number; ++server->sequence_number; rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, smb_signature); if (rc) memset(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 0, 8); else memcpy(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, smb_signature, 8); return rc; } int cifs_sign_smbv(struct kvec *iov, int n_vec, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence) { struct smb_rqst rqst = { .rq_iov = iov, .rq_nvec = n_vec }; return cifs_sign_rqst(&rqst, server, pexpected_response_sequence); } /* must be called with server->srv_mutex held */ int cifs_sign_smb(struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u32 *pexpected_response_sequence_number) { struct kvec iov; iov.iov_base = cifs_pdu; iov.iov_len = be32_to_cpu(cifs_pdu->smb_buf_length) + 4; return cifs_sign_smbv(&iov, 1, server, pexpected_response_sequence_number); } int cifs_verify_signature(struct smb_rqst *rqst, struct TCP_Server_Info *server, __u32 expected_sequence_number) { unsigned int rc; char server_response_sig[8]; char what_we_think_sig_should_be[20]; struct smb_hdr *cifs_pdu = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base; if (cifs_pdu == NULL || server == NULL) return -EINVAL; if (!server->session_estab) return 0; if (cifs_pdu->Command == SMB_COM_LOCKING_ANDX) { struct smb_com_lock_req *pSMB = (struct smb_com_lock_req *)cifs_pdu; if (pSMB->LockType & LOCKING_ANDX_OPLOCK_RELEASE) return 0; } /* BB what if signatures are supposed to be on for session but server does not send one? BB */ /* Do not need to verify session setups with signature "BSRSPYL " */ if (memcmp(cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, "BSRSPYL ", 8) == 0) cifs_dbg(FYI, "dummy signature received for smb command 0x%x\n", cifs_pdu->Command); /* save off the origiginal signature so we can modify the smb and check its signature against what the server sent */ memcpy(server_response_sig, cifs_pdu->Signature.SecuritySignature, 8); cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.SequenceNumber = cpu_to_le32(expected_sequence_number); cifs_pdu->Signature.Sequence.Reserved = 0; mutex_lock(&server->srv_mutex); rc = cifs_calc_signature(rqst, server, what_we_think_sig_should_be); mutex_unlock(&server->srv_mutex); if (rc) return rc; /* cifs_dump_mem("what we think it should be: ", what_we_think_sig_should_be, 16); */ if (memcmp(server_response_sig, what_we_think_sig_should_be, 8)) return -EACCES; else return 0; } /* first calculate 24 bytes ntlm response and then 16 byte session key */ int setup_ntlm_response(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { int rc = 0; unsigned int temp_len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + CIFS_AUTH_RESP_SIZE; char temp_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; if (!ses) return -EINVAL; ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(temp_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ses->auth_key.response) return -ENOMEM; ses->auth_key.len = temp_len; rc = SMBNTencrypt(ses->password, ses->server->cryptkey, ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE, nls_cp); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM response, error: %d\n", __func__, rc); return rc; } rc = E_md4hash(ses->password, temp_key, nls_cp); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NT hash, error: %d\n", __func__, rc); return rc; } rc = mdfour(ses->auth_key.response, temp_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); if (rc) cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s Can't generate NTLM session key, error: %d\n", __func__, rc); return rc; } #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH int calc_lanman_hash(const char *password, const char *cryptkey, bool encrypt, char *lnm_session_key) { int i; int rc; char password_with_pad[CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE]; memset(password_with_pad, 0, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); if (password) strncpy(password_with_pad, password, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); if (!encrypt && global_secflags & CIFSSEC_MAY_PLNTXT) { memcpy(lnm_session_key, password_with_pad, CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE); return 0; } /* calculate old style session key */ /* calling toupper is less broken than repeatedly calling nls_toupper would be since that will never work for UTF8, but neither handles multibyte code pages but the only alternative would be converting to UCS-16 (Unicode) (using a routine something like UniStrupr) then uppercasing and then converting back from Unicode - which would only worth doing it if we knew it were utf8. Basically utf8 and other multibyte codepages each need their own strupper function since a byte at a time will ont work. */ for (i = 0; i < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE; i++) password_with_pad[i] = toupper(password_with_pad[i]); rc = SMBencrypt(password_with_pad, cryptkey, lnm_session_key); return rc; } #endif /* CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH */ /* Build a proper attribute value/target info pairs blob. * Fill in netbios and dns domain name and workstation name * and client time (total five av pairs and + one end of fields indicator. * Allocate domain name which gets freed when session struct is deallocated. */ static int build_avpair_blob(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { unsigned int dlen; unsigned int size = 2 * sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); char *defdmname = "WORKGROUP"; unsigned char *blobptr; struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr; if (!ses->domainName) { ses->domainName = kstrdup(defdmname, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ses->domainName) return -ENOMEM; } dlen = strlen(ses->domainName); /* * The length of this blob is two times the size of a * structure (av pair) which holds name/size * ( for NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME followed by NTLMSSP_AV_EOL ) + * unicode length of a netbios domain name */ ses->auth_key.len = size + 2 * dlen; ses->auth_key.response = kzalloc(ses->auth_key.len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ses->auth_key.response) { ses->auth_key.len = 0; return -ENOMEM; } blobptr = ses->auth_key.response; attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr; /* * As defined in MS-NTLM 3.3.2, just this av pair field * is sufficient as part of the temp */ attrptr->type = cpu_to_le16(NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME); attrptr->length = cpu_to_le16(2 * dlen); blobptr = (unsigned char *)attrptr + sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)blobptr, ses->domainName, dlen, nls_cp); return 0; } /* Server has provided av pairs/target info in the type 2 challenge * packet and we have plucked it and stored within smb session. * We parse that blob here to find netbios domain name to be used * as part of ntlmv2 authentication (in Target String), if not already * specified on the command line. * If this function returns without any error but without fetching * domain name, authentication may fail against some server but * may not fail against other (those who are not very particular * about target string i.e. for some, just user name might suffice. */ static int find_domain_name(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { unsigned int attrsize; unsigned int type; unsigned int onesize = sizeof(struct ntlmssp2_name); unsigned char *blobptr; unsigned char *blobend; struct ntlmssp2_name *attrptr; if (!ses->auth_key.len || !ses->auth_key.response) return 0; blobptr = ses->auth_key.response; blobend = blobptr + ses->auth_key.len; while (blobptr + onesize < blobend) { attrptr = (struct ntlmssp2_name *) blobptr; type = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->type); if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_EOL) break; blobptr += 2; /* advance attr type */ attrsize = le16_to_cpu(attrptr->length); blobptr += 2; /* advance attr size */ if (blobptr + attrsize > blobend) break; if (type == NTLMSSP_AV_NB_DOMAIN_NAME) { if (!attrsize || attrsize >= CIFS_MAX_DOMAINNAME_LEN) break; if (!ses->domainName) { ses->domainName = kmalloc(attrsize + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ses->domainName) return -ENOMEM; cifs_from_utf16(ses->domainName, (__le16 *)blobptr, attrsize, attrsize, nls_cp, NO_MAP_UNI_RSVD); break; } } blobptr += attrsize; /* advance attr value */ } return 0; } static int calc_ntlmv2_hash(struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { int rc = 0; int len; char nt_hash[CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE]; __le16 *user; wchar_t *domain; wchar_t *server; if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__); return -1; } /* calculate md4 hash of password */ E_md4hash(ses->password, nt_hash, nls_cp); rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, nt_hash, CIFS_NTHASH_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NT Hash as a key\n", __func__); return rc; } rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); return rc; } /* convert ses->user_name to unicode */ len = ses->user_name ? strlen(ses->user_name) : 0; user = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); if (user == NULL) { rc = -ENOMEM; return rc; } if (len) { len = cifs_strtoUTF16(user, ses->user_name, len, nls_cp); UniStrupr(user); } else { memset(user, '\0', 2); } rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, (char *)user, 2 * len); kfree(user); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with user\n", __func__); return rc; } /* convert ses->domainName to unicode and uppercase */ if (ses->domainName) { len = strlen(ses->domainName); domain = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); if (domain == NULL) { rc = -ENOMEM; return rc; } len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)domain, ses->domainName, len, nls_cp); rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, (char *)domain, 2 * len); kfree(domain); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with domain\n", __func__); return rc; } } else { /* We use ses->serverName if no domain name available */ len = strlen(ses->serverName); server = kmalloc(2 + (len * 2), GFP_KERNEL); if (server == NULL) { rc = -ENOMEM; return rc; } len = cifs_strtoUTF16((__le16 *)server, ses->serverName, len, nls_cp); rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, (char *)server, 2 * len); kfree(server); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with server\n", __func__); return rc; } } rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, ntlmv2_hash); if (rc) cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); return rc; } static int CalcNTLMv2_response(const struct cifs_ses *ses, char *ntlmv2_hash) { int rc; struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *) (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); unsigned int hash_len; /* The MD5 hash starts at challenge_key.key */ hash_len = ses->auth_key.len - (CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + offsetof(struct ntlmv2_resp, challenge.key[0])); if (!ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: can't generate ntlmv2 hash\n", __func__); return -1; } rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n", __func__); return rc; } rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); return rc; } if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, ses->ntlmssp->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); else memcpy(ntlmv2->challenge.key, ses->server->cryptkey, CIFS_SERVER_CHALLENGE_SIZE); rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, ntlmv2->challenge.key, hash_len); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); return rc; } /* Note that the MD5 digest over writes anon.challenge_key.key */ rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash); if (rc) cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); return rc; } static int crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) { int rc; unsigned int size; /* check if already allocated */ if (server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) return 0; server->secmech.hmacmd5 = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(md5)", 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5)) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto hmacmd5\n"); rc = PTR_ERR(server->secmech.hmacmd5); server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; return rc; } size = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(server->secmech.hmacmd5); server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5); server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; return -ENOMEM; } server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.tfm = server->secmech.hmacmd5; server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash.flags = 0x0; return 0; } int setup_ntlmv2_rsp(struct cifs_ses *ses, const struct nls_table *nls_cp) { int rc; int baselen; unsigned int tilen; struct ntlmv2_resp *ntlmv2; char ntlmv2_hash[16]; unsigned char *tiblob = NULL; /* target info blob */ if (ses->server->negflavor == CIFS_NEGFLAVOR_EXTENDED) { if (!ses->domainName) { rc = find_domain_name(ses, nls_cp); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d finding domain name\n", rc); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } } } else { rc = build_avpair_blob(ses, nls_cp); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d building av pair blob\n", rc); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } } baselen = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE + sizeof(struct ntlmv2_resp); tilen = ses->auth_key.len; tiblob = ses->auth_key.response; ses->auth_key.response = kmalloc(baselen + tilen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!ses->auth_key.response) { rc = ENOMEM; ses->auth_key.len = 0; goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } ses->auth_key.len += baselen; ntlmv2 = (struct ntlmv2_resp *) (ses->auth_key.response + CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); ntlmv2->blob_signature = cpu_to_le32(0x00000101); ntlmv2->reserved = 0; /* Must be within 5 minutes of the server */ ntlmv2->time = cpu_to_le64(cifs_UnixTimeToNT(CURRENT_TIME)); get_random_bytes(&ntlmv2->client_chal, sizeof(ntlmv2->client_chal)); ntlmv2->reserved2 = 0; memcpy(ses->auth_key.response + baselen, tiblob, tilen); rc = crypto_hmacmd5_alloc(ses->server); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not crypto alloc hmacmd5 rc %d\n", rc); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } /* calculate ntlmv2_hash */ rc = calc_ntlmv2_hash(ses, ntlmv2_hash, nls_cp); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not get v2 hash rc %d\n", rc); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } /* calculate first part of the client response (CR1) */ rc = CalcNTLMv2_response(ses, ntlmv2_hash); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "Could not calculate CR1 rc: %d\n", rc); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } /* now calculate the session key for NTLMv2 */ rc = crypto_shash_setkey(ses->server->secmech.hmacmd5, ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set NTLMV2 Hash as a key\n", __func__); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } rc = crypto_shash_init(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not init hmacmd5\n", __func__); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } rc = crypto_shash_update(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not update with response\n", __func__); goto setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret; } rc = crypto_shash_final(&ses->server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5->shash, ses->auth_key.response); if (rc) cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not generate md5 hash\n", __func__); setup_ntlmv2_rsp_ret: kfree(tiblob); return rc; } int calc_seckey(struct cifs_ses *ses) { int rc; struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_arc4; struct scatterlist sgin, sgout; struct blkcipher_desc desc; unsigned char sec_key[CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE]; /* a nonce */ get_random_bytes(sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); tfm_arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm_arc4)) { rc = PTR_ERR(tfm_arc4); cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not allocate crypto API arc4\n"); return rc; } desc.tfm = tfm_arc4; rc = crypto_blkcipher_setkey(tfm_arc4, ses->auth_key.response, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: Could not set response as a key\n", __func__); return rc; } sg_init_one(&sgin, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); sg_init_one(&sgout, ses->ntlmssp->ciphertext, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); rc = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, &sgout, &sgin, CIFS_CPHTXT_SIZE); if (rc) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not encrypt session key rc: %d\n", rc); crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4); return rc; } /* make secondary_key/nonce as session key */ memcpy(ses->auth_key.response, sec_key, CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE); /* and make len as that of session key only */ ses->auth_key.len = CIFS_SESS_KEY_SIZE; crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_arc4); return rc; } void cifs_crypto_shash_release(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) { if (server->secmech.cmacaes) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.cmacaes); server->secmech.cmacaes = NULL; } if (server->secmech.hmacsha256) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacsha256); server->secmech.hmacsha256 = NULL; } if (server->secmech.md5) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.md5); server->secmech.md5 = NULL; } if (server->secmech.hmacmd5) { crypto_free_shash(server->secmech.hmacmd5); server->secmech.hmacmd5 = NULL; } kfree(server->secmech.sdesccmacaes); server->secmech.sdesccmacaes = NULL; kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256); server->secmech.sdeschmacsha256 = NULL; kfree(server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5); server->secmech.sdeschmacmd5 = NULL; kfree(server->secmech.sdescmd5); server->secmech.sdescmd5 = NULL; }