From 1a28979b322bb28d8f95f76f080c53dbb9a8222d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukasz Pawelczyk Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:31:06 +0100 Subject: smack: miscellaneous small fixes in function comments Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index f1b17a476e12..dcfaddd955d1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, /** * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file. + * @name: type of the label (attribute) * @ip: a pointer to the inode * @dp: a pointer to the dentry * @@ -254,7 +255,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp) /** * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob - * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob + * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task + * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available */ @@ -277,8 +280,9 @@ static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task, /** * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set - * @nhead - new rules header pointer - * @ohead - old rules header pointer + * @nhead: new rules header pointer + * @ohead: old rules header pointer + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error */ @@ -3834,11 +3838,11 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key) key->security = NULL; } -/* +/** * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key * @key_ref: gets to the object * @cred: the credentials to use - * @perm: unused + * @perm: requested key permissions * * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object, * an error code otherwise -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 68390ccf8b0a3470032f053d50379cfd49fbe952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukasz Pawelczyk Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2014 15:31:07 +0100 Subject: smack: fix logic in smack_inode_init_security function In principle if this function was called with "value" == NULL and "len" not NULL it could return different results for the "len" compared to a case where "name" was not NULL. This is a hypothetical case that does not exist in the kernel, but it's a logic bug nonetheless. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index dcfaddd955d1..048d92e81a34 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, if (name) *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX; - if (value) { + if (value && len) { rcu_read_lock(); may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known, &skp->smk_rules); @@ -821,10 +821,9 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS); if (*value == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - } - if (len) *len = strlen(isp->smk_known); + } return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 1d8c2326a4a2a4d942f9165b5702fe6f869ccf48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Łukasz Stelmach Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 16:53:08 +0100 Subject: smack: introduce a special case for tmpfs in smack_d_instantiate() MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Files created with __shmem_file_stup() appear to have somewhat fake dentries which make them look like root directories and not get the label the current process or ("*") star meant for tmpfs files. Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 048d92e81a34..2160e88a2e4e 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3036,7 +3036,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) * of the superblock. */ if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) { - if (sbp->s_magic == CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) { + switch (sbp->s_magic) { + case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC: /* * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted, * so there's no opportunity to set the mount @@ -3044,8 +3045,19 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star; sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star; + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + break; + case TMPFS_MAGIC: + /* + * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry + * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()? + */ + isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current(); + break; + default: + isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; + break; } - isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root; isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT; goto unlockandout; } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 96be7b5424948ae39d29d5149eaec0bd6edd7404 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zbigniew Jasinski Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 15:34:58 +0100 Subject: smack: Fix a bidirectional UDS connect check typo The 54e70ec5eb090193b03e69d551fa6771a5a217c4 commit introduced a bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access between two labels. Due to a typo subject's OUT label is checked with object's OUT. Should be OUT to IN. Signed-off-by: Zbigniew Jasinski --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 2160e88a2e4e..654345de62e7 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3312,7 +3312,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) { skp = ssp->smk_out; - okp = osp->smk_out; + okp = osp->smk_in; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); @@ -3320,6 +3320,8 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc); if (rc == 0) { + okp = osp->smk_out; + skp = ssp->smk_in; rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, rc); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 5e7270a6dd14fa6e3bb10128f200305b4a75f350 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 17:19:19 -0800 Subject: Smack: Rework file hooks This is one of those cases where you look at code you did years ago and wonder what you might have been thinking. There are a number of LSM hooks that work off of file pointers, and most of them really want the security data from the inode. Some, however, really want the security context that the process had when the file was opened. The difference went undetected in Smack until it started getting used in a real system with real testing. At that point it was clear that something was amiss. This patch corrects the misuse of the f_security value in several of the hooks. The behavior will not usually be any different, as the process had to be able to open the file in the first place, and the old check almost always succeeded, as will the new, but for different reasons. Thanks to the Samsung Tizen development team that identified this. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 654345de62e7..1fa72317bbec 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) { struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task; - struct inode *inode = file->f_inode; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; if (rc <= 0) @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", - sskp->smk_known, (char *)file->f_security, acc, + sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file, current->comm); return 0; @@ -1347,6 +1347,9 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master * label list, so no allocation is done. * + * f_security is the owner security information. It + * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio. + * * Returns 0 */ static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) @@ -1384,17 +1387,18 @@ static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, { int rc = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) { - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); } if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) { - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc); } @@ -1412,10 +1416,11 @@ static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); return rc; } @@ -1437,7 +1442,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, { struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc = 0; - + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); switch (cmd) { case F_GETLK: @@ -1446,14 +1451,14 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, case F_SETLKW: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_LOCK, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc); break; case F_SETOWN: case F_SETSIG: smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc); break; default: @@ -1571,14 +1576,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file, * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value * @file: object in question * - * Returns 0 - * Further research may be required on this one. */ static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); - - file->f_security = skp; + file->f_security = smk_of_current(); } /** @@ -1630,6 +1631,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) int rc; int may = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); @@ -1641,7 +1643,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) may |= MAY_WRITE; - rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad); + rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad); rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc); return rc; } @@ -1661,21 +1663,17 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file) static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) { struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; - struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security; + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct smk_audit_info ad; int rc; - if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) { - file->f_security = isp->smk_inode; + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; - } smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH); smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path); - rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad); + rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad); rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc); - if (rc == 0) - file->f_security = isp->smk_inode; return rc; } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 69f287ae6fc8357e0bc561353a2d585b89ee8cdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 17:08:40 -0800 Subject: Smack: secmark support for netfilter Smack uses CIPSO to label internet packets and thus provide for access control on delivery of packets. The netfilter facility was not used to allow for Smack to work properly without netfilter configuration. Smack does not need netfilter, however there are cases where it would be handy. As a side effect, the labeling of local IPv4 packets can be optimized and the handling of local IPv6 packets is just all out better. The best part is that the netfilter tools use "contexts" that are just strings, and they work just as well for Smack as they do for SELinux. All of the conditional compilation for IPv6 was implemented by Rafal Krypa Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/Kconfig | 12 +++++ security/smack/Makefile | 1 + security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 196 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/smack/smack_netfilter.c (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig index b065f9789418..271adae81796 100644 --- a/security/smack/Kconfig +++ b/security/smack/Kconfig @@ -28,3 +28,15 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP access rule set once the behavior is well understood. This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused "permissive" mode of other systems. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + bool "Packet marking using secmarks for netfilter" + depends on SECURITY_SMACK + depends on NETWORK_SECMARK + depends on NETFILTER + default n + help + This enables security marking of network packets using + Smack labels. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile index 67a63aaec827..616cf93b368e 100644 --- a/security/smack/Makefile +++ b/security/smack/Makefile @@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o +smack-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index b828a379377c..7629eaeb1fb2 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); /* * Shared data. */ +extern int smack_enabled; extern int smack_cipso_direct; extern int smack_cipso_mapped; extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 1fa72317bbec..81b30e32c526 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -52,8 +52,11 @@ #define SMK_RECEIVING 1 #define SMK_SENDING 2 +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache; +int smack_enabled; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s) @@ -2213,6 +2216,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap) return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl); } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) /** * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management * @sock: socket @@ -2362,6 +2366,7 @@ auditout: rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 port check", skp, object, MAY_WRITE, rc); return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ /** * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs @@ -2422,8 +2427,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, } else return -EOPNOTSUPP; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ return 0; } @@ -2451,6 +2458,7 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET); } +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER /** * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information. * @sock: the socket @@ -2464,11 +2472,14 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address); +#endif return 0; } +#endif /* !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ /** * smack_socket_connect - connect access check @@ -2497,8 +2508,10 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, case PF_INET6: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) return -EINVAL; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap, SMK_CONNECTING); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ break; } return rc; @@ -3381,7 +3394,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ int rc = 0; /* @@ -3395,7 +3410,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip); break; case AF_INET6: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING); +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 && !CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ break; } return rc; @@ -3486,6 +3503,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, return smack_net_ambient; } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) { u8 nexthdr; @@ -3532,6 +3550,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip) } return proto; } +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ /** * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check @@ -3544,15 +3563,30 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security; - struct smack_known *skp; - struct sockaddr_in6 sadd; + struct smack_known *skp = NULL; int rc = 0; struct smk_audit_info ad; #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct lsm_network_audit net; #endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + struct sockaddr_in6 sadd; + int proto; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ + switch (sk->sk_family) { case PF_INET: +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + /* + * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label. + * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO. + * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better. + */ + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) { + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); + goto access_check; + } +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ /* * Translate what netlabel gave us. */ @@ -3566,6 +3600,9 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER +access_check: +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; @@ -3584,14 +3621,32 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) if (rc != 0) netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0); break; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case PF_INET6: - rc = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd); - if (rc == IPPROTO_UDP || rc == IPPROTO_TCP) - rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING); + proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd); + if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP) + break; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) + skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark); else - rc = 0; + skp = smack_net_ambient; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net); + ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; + ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; + ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); + rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in, + MAY_WRITE, rc); +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ + rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING); +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ break; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ } + return rc; } @@ -3653,16 +3708,25 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, if (skb != NULL) { if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) family = PF_INET; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) family = PF_INET6; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ } if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL) family = sock->sk->sk_family; - if (family == PF_UNIX) { + switch (family) { + case PF_UNIX: ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid; - } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { + break; + case PF_INET: +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + s = skb->secmark; + if (s != 0) + break; +#endif /* * Translate what netlabel gave us. */ @@ -3675,6 +3739,14 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, s = skp->smk_secid; } netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr); + break; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case PF_INET6: +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER + s = skb->secmark; +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ + break; +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ } *secid = s; if (s == 0) @@ -3730,6 +3802,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsm_network_audit net; #endif +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) if (family == PF_INET6) { /* * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving @@ -3741,6 +3814,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, else return 0; } +#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr); @@ -4199,7 +4273,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = { .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send, .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create, +#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER .socket_bind = smack_socket_bind, +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */ .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect, .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg, .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb, @@ -4280,6 +4356,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) return 0; + smack_enabled = 1; + smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0); if (!smack_inode_cache) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c952632afb0d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +/* + * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module + * + * This file contains the Smack netfilter implementation + * + * Author: + * Casey Schaufler + * + * Copyright (C) 2014 Casey Schaufler + * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include "smack.h" + +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) + +static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct smack_known *skp; + + if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) { + ssp = skb->sk->sk_security; + skp = ssp->smk_out; + skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; + } + + return NF_ACCEPT; +} +#endif /* IPV6 */ + +static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, + struct sk_buff *skb, + const struct net_device *in, + const struct net_device *out, + int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *)) +{ + struct socket_smack *ssp; + struct smack_known *skp; + + if (skb && skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_security) { + ssp = skb->sk->sk_security; + skp = ssp->smk_out; + skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; + } + + return NF_ACCEPT; +} + +static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = { + { + .hook = smack_ipv4_output, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, + .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, + .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + }, +#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) + { + .hook = smack_ipv6_output, + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, + .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, + .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, + }, +#endif /* IPV6 */ +}; + +static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void) +{ + int err; + + if (smack_enabled == 0) + return 0; + + printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); + + err = nf_register_hooks(smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops)); + if (err) + pr_info("Smack: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err); + + return 0; +} + +__initcall(smack_nf_ip_init); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 138a868f009bfca8633032cdb91e2b02e292658b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rafal Krypa Date: Thu, 8 Jan 2015 18:52:45 +0100 Subject: smack: Add missing logging in bidirectional UDS connect check During UDS connection check, both sides are checked for write access to the other side. But only the first check is performed with audit support. The second one didn't produce any audit logs. This simple patch fixes that. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa --- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 81b30e32c526..f60ded3a8da1 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -3333,7 +3333,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, if (rc == 0) { okp = osp->smk_out; skp = ssp->smk_in; - rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); + rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad); rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, rc); } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 6d1cff2a885850b78b40c34777b46cf5da5d1050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrey Ryabinin Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 18:52:40 +0300 Subject: smack: fix possible use after frees in task_security() callers We hit use after free on dereferncing pointer to task_smack struct in smk_of_task() called from smack_task_to_inode(). task_security() macro uses task_cred_xxx() to get pointer to the task_smack. task_cred_xxx() could be used only for non-pointer members of task's credentials. It cannot be used for pointer members since what they point to may disapper after dropping RCU read lock. Mainly task_security() used this way: smk_of_task(task_security(p)) Intead of this introduce function smk_of_task_struct() which takes task_struct as argument and returns pointer to smk_known struct and do this under RCU read lock. Bogus task_security() macro is not used anymore, so remove it. KASan's report for this: AddressSanitizer: use after free in smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70 at addr c4635600 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: PO): kasan error ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 age=39 cpu=0 pid=1866 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x88/0x1bc new_task_smack+0x44/0xd8 smack_cred_prepare+0x48/0x21c security_prepare_creds+0x44/0x4c prepare_creds+0xdc/0x110 smack_setprocattr+0x104/0x150 security_setprocattr+0x4c/0x54 proc_pid_attr_write+0x12c/0x194 vfs_write+0x1b0/0x370 SyS_write+0x5c/0x94 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48 INFO: Freed in smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 age=27 cpu=0 pid=1564 kfree+0x270/0x290 smack_cred_free+0xc4/0xd0 security_cred_free+0x34/0x3c put_cred_rcu+0x58/0xcc rcu_process_callbacks+0x738/0x998 __do_softirq+0x264/0x4cc do_softirq+0x94/0xf4 irq_exit+0xbc/0x120 handle_IRQ+0x104/0x134 gic_handle_irq+0x70/0xac __irq_svc+0x44/0x78 _raw_spin_unlock+0x18/0x48 sync_inodes_sb+0x17c/0x1d8 sync_filesystem+0xac/0xfc vdfs_file_fsync+0x90/0xc0 vfs_fsync_range+0x74/0x7c INFO: Slab 0xd3b23f50 objects=32 used=31 fp=0xc4635600 flags=0x4080 INFO: Object 0xc4635600 @offset=5632 fp=0x (null) Bytes b4 c46355f0: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Object c4635600: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635610: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635620: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk Object c4635630: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk. Redzone c4635640: bb bb bb bb .... Padding c46356e8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Padding c46356f8: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZ CPU: 5 PID: 834 Comm: launchpad_prelo Tainted: PBO 3.10.30 #1 Backtrace: [] (dump_backtrace+0x0/0x158) from [] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) r7:c4634010 r6:d3b23f50 r5:c4635600 r4:d1002140 [] (show_stack+0x0/0x24) from [] (dump_stack+0x20/0x28) [] (dump_stack+0x0/0x28) from [] (print_trailer+0x124/0x144) [] (print_trailer+0x0/0x144) from [] (object_err+0x3c/0x44) r7:c4635600 r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c4635600 [] (object_err+0x0/0x44) from [] (kasan_report_error+0x2b8/0x538) r6:d1002140 r5:d3b23f50 r4:c6429cf8 r3:c09e1aa7 [] (kasan_report_error+0x0/0x538) from [] (__asan_load4+0xd4/0xf8) [] (__asan_load4+0x0/0xf8) from [] (smack_task_to_inode+0x50/0x70) r5:c4635600 r4:ca9da000 [] (smack_task_to_inode+0x0/0x70) from [] (security_task_to_inode+0x3c/0x44) r5:cca25e80 r4:c0ba9780 [] (security_task_to_inode+0x0/0x44) from [] (pid_revalidate+0x124/0x178) r6:00000000 r5:cca25e80 r4:cbabe3c0 r3:00008124 [] (pid_revalidate+0x0/0x178) from [] (lookup_fast+0x35c/0x43y4) r9:c6429efc r8:00000101 r7:c079d940 r6:c6429e90 r5:c6429ed8 r4:c83c4148 [] (lookup_fast+0x0/0x434) from [] (do_last.isra.24+0x1c0/0x1108) [] (do_last.isra.24+0x0/0x1108) from [] (path_openat.isra.25+0xf4/0x648) [] (path_openat.isra.25+0x0/0x648) from [] (do_filp_open+0x3c/0x88) [] (do_filp_open+0x0/0x88) from [] (do_sys_open+0xf0/0x198) r7:00000001 r6:c0ea2180 r5:0000000b r4:00000000 [] (do_sys_open+0x0/0x198) from [] (SyS_open+0x30/0x34) [] (SyS_open+0x0/0x34) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48) Read of size 4 by thread T834: Memory state around the buggy address: c4635380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635500: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >c4635600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ c4635680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb c4635700: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635780: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635800: 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc c4635880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin Cc: --- security/smack/smack.h | 10 ++++++++++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 7629eaeb1fb2..67ccb7b2b89b 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -299,6 +299,16 @@ static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp) return tsp->smk_task; } +static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t) +{ + struct smack_known *skp; + + rcu_read_lock(); + skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security); + rcu_read_unlock(); + return skp; +} + /* * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob. */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index f60ded3a8da1..a0ccce4e46f8 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ #include #include "smack.h" -#define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security)) - #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE" #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4 @@ -123,7 +121,7 @@ static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp, static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc) { struct task_smack *tsp = current_security(); - struct task_smack *otsp = task_security(otp); + struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp); char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; if (rc <= 0) @@ -131,7 +129,7 @@ static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc) smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); pr_info("Smack Bringup: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", - tsp->smk_task->smk_known, otsp->smk_task->smk_known, acc, + tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc, current->comm, otp->comm); return 0; } @@ -352,7 +350,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, saip = &ad; } - tsp = task_security(tracer); + rcu_read_lock(); + tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security; tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp); if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) && @@ -372,11 +371,14 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, tracee_known->smk_known, 0, rc, saip); + rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip); + + rcu_read_unlock(); return rc; } @@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode) if (rc != 0) return rc; - skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp)); + skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp); rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__); return rc; @@ -1830,7 +1832,7 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access, const char *caller) { struct smk_audit_info ad; - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); int rc; smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -1883,7 +1885,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) */ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); *secid = skp->smk_secid; } @@ -1990,7 +1992,7 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, { struct smk_audit_info ad; struct smack_known *skp; - struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p); int rc; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -2044,7 +2046,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security; - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); isp->smk_inode = skp; } @@ -3226,7 +3228,7 @@ unlockandout: */ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p)); + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p); char *cp; int slen; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From dabd39cc2fb1b0e97313ebbe7309ea8e05b7cfb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2015 22:34:32 +0000 Subject: KEYS: Make /proc/keys unconditional if CONFIG_KEYS=y Now that /proc/keys is used by libkeyutils to look up a key by type and description, we should make it unconditional and remove CONFIG_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS. Reported-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Jiri Kosina --- Documentation/security/keys.txt | 2 -- security/keys/Kconfig | 18 ------------------ security/keys/proc.c | 8 -------- 3 files changed, 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt index 821c936e1a63..c9e7f4f223a5 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt +++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt @@ -323,8 +323,6 @@ about the status of the key service: U Under construction by callback to userspace N Negative key - This file must be enabled at kernel configuration time as it allows anyone - to list the keys database. (*) /proc/key-users diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a4f3f8c48d6e..72483b8f1be5 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -80,21 +80,3 @@ config ENCRYPTED_KEYS Userspace only ever sees/stores encrypted blobs. If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. - -config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - bool "Enable the /proc/keys file by which keys may be viewed" - depends on KEYS - help - This option turns on support for the /proc/keys file - through which - can be listed all the keys on the system that are viewable by the - reading process. - - The only keys included in the list are those that grant View - permission to the reading process whether or not it possesses them. - Note that LSM security checks are still performed, and may further - filter out keys that the current process is not authorised to view. - - Only key attributes are listed here; key payloads are not included in - the resulting table. - - If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index 972eeb336b81..f0611a6368cd 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ #include #include "internal.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos); static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos); @@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_keys_fops = { .llseek = seq_lseek, .release = seq_release, }; -#endif static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos); @@ -67,11 +65,9 @@ static int __init key_proc_init(void) { struct proc_dir_entry *p; -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS p = proc_create("keys", 0, NULL, &proc_keys_fops); if (!p) panic("Cannot create /proc/keys\n"); -#endif p = proc_create("key-users", 0, NULL, &proc_key_users_fops); if (!p) @@ -86,8 +82,6 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init); * Implement "/proc/keys" to provide a list of the keys on the system that * grant View permission to the caller. */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct seq_file *p, struct rb_node *n) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(p); @@ -275,8 +269,6 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } -#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */ - static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct rb_node *n) { while (n) { -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 82b0b2c2b1e64ad6c5309a9eeba806af9812666b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Casey Schaufler Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2015 09:31:01 -0800 Subject: Smack: Repair netfilter dependency MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 1/23/2015 8:20 AM, Jim Davis wrote: > Building with the attached random configuration file, > > security/smack/smack_netfilter.c: In function ‘smack_ipv4_output’: > security/smack/smack_netfilter.c:55:6: error: ‘struct sk_buff’ has no > member named ‘secmark’ > skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; > ^ > make[2]: *** [security/smack/smack_netfilter.o] Error 1 The existing Makefile used the wrong configuration option to determine if smack_netfilter should be built. This sets it right. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/smack/Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile index 616cf93b368e..ee2ebd504541 100644 --- a/security/smack/Makefile +++ b/security/smack/Makefile @@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o -smack-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o +smack-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 11cd64a234d5a1a7111627ef947beb0e5fad9e71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Howells Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 11:04:12 +0000 Subject: ima: /proc/keys is now mandatory /proc/keys is now mandatory and its config option no longer exists, so it doesn't need selecting. Reported-by: Paul Bolle Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 57515bc915c0..df303346029b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -126,7 +126,6 @@ config IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING bool "Require all keys on the .ima keyring be signed" depends on IMA_APPRAISE && SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS - select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS default y help This option requires that all keys added to the .ima -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e230f12c98232de0c40a81f28a34d2cff8450e7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rickard Strandqvist Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 11:34:30 -0500 Subject: selinux: Remove unused function avc_sidcmp() Remove the function avc_sidcmp() that is not used anywhere. This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck. Signed-off-by: Rickard Strandqvist [PM: rewrite the patch subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/avc.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index a18f1fa6440b..afcc0aed9393 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -517,11 +517,6 @@ out: return rc; } -static inline int avc_sidcmp(u32 x, u32 y) -{ - return (x == y || x == SECSID_WILD || y == SECSID_WILD); -} - /** * avc_update_node Update an AVC entry * @event : Updating event -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 2088d60e3b2f53d0c9590a0202eeff85b288b1eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Moore Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 11:34:30 -0500 Subject: selinux: quiet the filesystem labeling behavior message While the filesystem labeling method is only printed at the KERN_DEBUG level, this still appears in dmesg and on modern Linux distributions that create a lot of tmpfs mounts for session handling, the dmesg can easily be filled with a lot of "SELinux: initialized (dev X ..." messages. This patch removes this notification for the normal case but leaves the error message intact (displayed when mounting a filesystem with an unknown labeling behavior). Reported-by: Dave Jones Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 6da7532893a1..c253caa90bb4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -456,10 +456,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); - else - printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n", - sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, - labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d5f3a5f6e7e7822df5680d4fe39bf0b6979a1535 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Salyzyn Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 11:34:30 -0500 Subject: selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs - add "pstore" and "debugfs" to list of in-core exceptions - change fstype checks to boolean equation - change from strncmp to strcmp for checking Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn Acked-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: tweaked the subject line prefix to "selinux"] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 ++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c253caa90bb4..87a915656eab 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -401,23 +401,14 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) { struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || - sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK) - return 1; - - /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0) - return 1; - - /* - * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports - * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes. - */ - if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0) - return 1; - - return 0; + return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK || + /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs"); } static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 6eb4e2b41b264f57ee02d16ee61683952945484d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Carpenter Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 11:34:30 -0500 Subject: SELinux: fix error code in policydb_init() If hashtab_create() returns a NULL pointer then we should return -ENOMEM but instead the current code returns success. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'security') diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index bc2a586f095c..74aa224267c1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -289,12 +289,16 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p) goto out; p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp, (1 << 10)); - if (!p->filename_trans) + if (!p->filename_trans) { + rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; + } p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256); - if (!p->range_tr) + if (!p->range_tr) { + rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; + } ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes); ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151