From e40642dc01b87a8b202ce39013b0a4881025a816 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: zhanglin Date: Sat, 21 Sep 2019 09:57:15 +0800 Subject: selinux: remove load size limit Load size was limited to 64MB, this was legacy limitation due to vmalloc() which was removed a while ago. Signed-off-by: zhanglin [PM: removed comments in the description about 'real world use cases'] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index e6c7643c3fc0..ee94fa469c29 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -548,10 +548,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) goto out; - length = -EFBIG; - if (count > 64 * 1024 * 1024) - goto out; - length = -ENOMEM; data = vmalloc(count); if (!data) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 3e3e24b42043eceb97ed834102c2d094dfd7aaa6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Lebon Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 09:30:07 -0400 Subject: selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the `security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible to have newly created files with the correct label before actually loading the policy. This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently races with other processes trying to access those same files. Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]). One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g. laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former, labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when populating the new filesystem. This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways: 1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized 2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized; instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be attempted at a later time Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't accepted. [1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html [2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94 [3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 9625b99e677f..36e531b91df2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3144,6 +3144,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); } + if (!selinux_state.initialized) + return (inode_owner_or_capable(inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); + sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -3227,6 +3230,15 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } + if (!selinux_state.initialized) { + /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate + * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may + * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if + * we've since initialized. + */ + return; + } + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid); if (rc) { -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 42345b68c2e3e2b6549fc34b937ff44240dfc3b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Joshua Brindle Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 14:03:23 -0700 Subject: selinux: default_range glblub implementation A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of the two contexts. The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities and the and of each category bitmap. This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies, for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in. Some examples are: User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label ---------------------|----------------------|---------------- s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0 s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12 s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512 s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2 s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4 s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle [PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/include/security.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/ss/context.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 1 + security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 3 +++ security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +++++ security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'security/selinux') diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 111121281c47..ae840634e3c7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -40,10 +40,11 @@ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30 #define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND 31 +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB 32 /* Range of policy versions we understand*/ #define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE -#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND +#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB /* Mask for just the mount related flags */ #define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index 2260c44a568c..513e67f48878 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -95,6 +95,38 @@ out: return rc; } + +static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst, + struct context *c1, struct context *c2) +{ + struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range, *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range; + int rc = 0; + + if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens || + r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens) + /* These ranges have no common sensitivities */ + return -EINVAL; + + /* Take the greatest of the low */ + dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens); + + /* Take the least of the high */ + dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens); + + rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat, + &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat); + if (rc) + goto out; + + rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat, + &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat); + if (rc) + goto out; + +out: + return rc; +} + static inline int mls_context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2) { return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) && diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 09929fc5ab47..c8c3663111e2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -77,6 +77,24 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src) return 0; } +int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2) +{ + struct ebitmap_node *n; + int bit, rc; + + ebitmap_init(dst); + + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) { + if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) { + rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + } + } + return 0; +} + + #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL /** * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 6aa7cf6a2197..9a23b81b8832 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); +int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit); int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit); int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 5e05f5b902d7..ec5e3d1da9ac 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -529,6 +529,9 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext); case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH: return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext); + case DEFAULT_GLBLUB: + return mls_context_glblub(newcontext, + scontext, tcontext); } /* Fallthrough */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 1260f5fb766e..e20624a68f5d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -160,6 +160,11 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = { .sym_num = SYM_NUM, .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, }, + { + .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB, + .sym_num = SYM_NUM, + .ocon_num = OCON_NUM, + }, }; static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h index 162d0e79b85b..bc56b14e2216 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ struct class_datum { #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4 #define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5 #define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6 +#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB 7 char default_range; }; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151