From 45040978c8994d1401baf5cc5ac71c1495d4e120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 20:32:21 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ipset: Fix set:list type crash when flush/dump set in parallel Flushing/listing entries was not RCU safe, so parallel flush/dump could lead to kernel crash. Bug reported by Deniz Eren. Fixes netfilter bugzilla id #1050. Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 3 ++ net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c index 95db43fc0303..7e6568cad494 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c @@ -985,6 +985,9 @@ static int ip_set_destroy(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (unlikely(protocol_failed(attr))) return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL; + /* Must wait for flush to be really finished in list:set */ + rcu_barrier(); + /* Commands are serialized and references are * protected by the ip_set_ref_lock. * External systems (i.e. xt_set) must call diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c index bbede95c9f68..24c6c1962aea 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_list_set.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ MODULE_ALIAS("ip_set_list:set"); struct set_elem { struct rcu_head rcu; struct list_head list; + struct ip_set *set; /* Sigh, in order to cleanup reference */ ip_set_id_t id; } __aligned(__alignof__(u64)); @@ -151,30 +152,29 @@ list_set_kadt(struct ip_set *set, const struct sk_buff *skb, /* Userspace interfaces: we are protected by the nfnl mutex */ static void -__list_set_del(struct ip_set *set, struct set_elem *e) +__list_set_del_rcu(struct rcu_head * rcu) { + struct set_elem *e = container_of(rcu, struct set_elem, rcu); + struct ip_set *set = e->set; struct list_set *map = set->data; ip_set_put_byindex(map->net, e->id); - /* We may call it, because we don't have a to be destroyed - * extension which is used by the kernel. - */ ip_set_ext_destroy(set, e); - kfree_rcu(e, rcu); + kfree(e); } static inline void list_set_del(struct ip_set *set, struct set_elem *e) { list_del_rcu(&e->list); - __list_set_del(set, e); + call_rcu(&e->rcu, __list_set_del_rcu); } static inline void -list_set_replace(struct ip_set *set, struct set_elem *e, struct set_elem *old) +list_set_replace(struct set_elem *e, struct set_elem *old) { list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &e->list); - __list_set_del(set, old); + call_rcu(&old->rcu, __list_set_del_rcu); } static void @@ -244,9 +244,6 @@ list_set_uadd(struct ip_set *set, void *value, const struct ip_set_ext *ext, struct set_elem *e, *n, *prev, *next; bool flag_exist = flags & IPSET_FLAG_EXIST; - if (SET_WITH_TIMEOUT(set)) - set_cleanup_entries(set); - /* Find where to add the new entry */ n = prev = next = NULL; list_for_each_entry(e, &map->members, list) { @@ -301,10 +298,11 @@ list_set_uadd(struct ip_set *set, void *value, const struct ip_set_ext *ext, if (!e) return -ENOMEM; e->id = d->id; + e->set = set; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&e->list); list_set_init_extensions(set, ext, e); if (n) - list_set_replace(set, e, n); + list_set_replace(e, n); else if (next) list_add_tail_rcu(&e->list, &next->list); else if (prev) @@ -431,6 +429,7 @@ list_set_destroy(struct ip_set *set) if (SET_WITH_TIMEOUT(set)) del_timer_sync(&map->gc); + list_for_each_entry_safe(e, n, &map->members, list) { list_del(&e->list); ip_set_put_byindex(map->net, e->id); @@ -450,8 +449,10 @@ list_set_head(struct ip_set *set, struct sk_buff *skb) struct set_elem *e; u32 n = 0; - list_for_each_entry(e, &map->members, list) + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &map->members, list) n++; + rcu_read_unlock(); nested = ipset_nest_start(skb, IPSET_ATTR_DATA); if (!nested) @@ -483,33 +484,25 @@ list_set_list(const struct ip_set *set, atd = ipset_nest_start(skb, IPSET_ATTR_ADT); if (!atd) return -EMSGSIZE; - list_for_each_entry(e, &map->members, list) { - if (i == first) - break; - i++; - } rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_from(e, &map->members, list) { - i++; - if (SET_WITH_TIMEOUT(set) && - ip_set_timeout_expired(ext_timeout(e, set))) + list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &map->members, list) { + if (i < first || + (SET_WITH_TIMEOUT(set) && + ip_set_timeout_expired(ext_timeout(e, set)))) { + i++; continue; + } nested = ipset_nest_start(skb, IPSET_ATTR_DATA); - if (!nested) { - if (i == first) { - nla_nest_cancel(skb, atd); - ret = -EMSGSIZE; - goto out; - } + if (!nested) goto nla_put_failure; - } if (nla_put_string(skb, IPSET_ATTR_NAME, ip_set_name_byindex(map->net, e->id))) goto nla_put_failure; if (ip_set_put_extensions(skb, set, e, true)) goto nla_put_failure; ipset_nest_end(skb, nested); + i++; } ipset_nest_end(skb, atd); @@ -520,10 +513,12 @@ list_set_list(const struct ip_set *set, nla_put_failure: nla_nest_cancel(skb, nested); if (unlikely(i == first)) { + nla_nest_cancel(skb, atd); cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0] = 0; ret = -EMSGSIZE; + } else { + cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0] = i; } - cb->args[IPSET_CB_ARG0] = i - 1; ipset_nest_end(skb, atd); out: rcu_read_unlock(); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 017b1b6d28c479f1ad9a7a41f775545a3e1cba35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Phil Turnbull Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 15:34:43 -0500 Subject: netfilter: nfnetlink_acct: validate NFACCT_FILTER parameters nfacct_filter_alloc doesn't validate the NFACCT_FILTER_MASK and NFACCT_FILTER_VALUE parameters which can trigger a NULL pointer dereference. CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bug. Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c index 5274b04c42a6..4c2b4c0c4d5f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_acct.c @@ -242,6 +242,9 @@ nfacct_filter_alloc(const struct nlattr * const attr) if (err < 0) return ERR_PTR(err); + if (!tb[NFACCT_FILTER_MASK] || !tb[NFACCT_FILTER_VALUE]) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfacct_filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (!filter) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 3f20efba41916ee17ce82f0fdd02581ada2872b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Arnd Bergmann Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 14:52:02 +0100 Subject: ipvs: handle ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off failure ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() may not find an IP header, and gcc has determined that ip_vs_sip_fill_param() then incorrectly accesses the protocol fields: net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c: In function 'ip_vs_sip_fill_param': net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:76:5: error: 'iph.protocol' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] if (iph.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) ^ net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c:81:10: error: 'iph.len' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized] dataoff = iph.len + sizeof(struct udphdr); ^ This adds a check for the ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off() return code before looking at the ip header data returned from it. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Fixes: b0e010c527de ("ipvs: replace ip_vs_fill_ip4hdr with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb_off") Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c index 1b8d594e493a..c4e9ca016a88 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c @@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ ip_vs_sip_fill_param(struct ip_vs_conn_param *p, struct sk_buff *skb) const char *dptr; int retc; - ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(p->af, skb, false, &iph); + retc = ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(p->af, skb, false, &iph); /* Only useful with UDP */ - if (iph.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) + if (!retc || iph.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) return -EINVAL; /* todo: IPv6 fragments: * I think this only should be done for the first fragment. /HS -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From f719e3754ee2f7275437e61a6afd520181fdd43b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Anastasov Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2016 15:03:22 +0200 Subject: ipvs: drop first packet to redirect conntrack Jiri Bohac is reporting for a problem where the attempt to reschedule existing connection to another real server needs proper redirect for the conntrack used by the IPVS connection. For example, when IPVS connection is created to NAT-ed real server we alter the reply direction of conntrack. If we later decide to select different real server we can not alter again the conntrack. And if we expire the old connection, the new connection is left without conntrack. So, the only way to redirect both the IPVS connection and the Netfilter's conntrack is to drop the SYN packet that hits existing connection, to wait for the next jiffie to expire the old connection and its conntrack and to rely on client's retransmission to create new connection as usually. Jiri Bohac provided a fix that drops all SYNs on rescheduling, I extended his patch to do such drops only for connections that use conntrack. Here is the original report from Jiri Bohac: Since commit dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server is dead"), new connections to dead servers are redistributed immediately to new servers. The old connection is expired using ip_vs_conn_expire_now() which sets the connection timer to expire immediately. However, before the timer callback, ip_vs_conn_expire(), is run to clean the connection's conntrack entry, the new redistributed connection may already be established and its conntrack removed instead. Fix this by dropping the first packet of the new connection instead, like we do when the destination server is not available. The timer will have deleted the old conntrack entry long before the first packet of the new connection is retransmitted. Fixes: dc7b3eb900aa ("ipvs: Fix reuse connection if real server is dead") Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- include/net/ip_vs.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/net/ip_vs.h b/include/net/ip_vs.h index 0816c872b689..a6cc576fd467 100644 --- a/include/net/ip_vs.h +++ b/include/net/ip_vs.h @@ -1588,6 +1588,23 @@ static inline void ip_vs_conn_drop_conntrack(struct ip_vs_conn *cp) } #endif /* CONFIG_IP_VS_NFCT */ +/* Really using conntrack? */ +static inline bool ip_vs_conn_uses_conntrack(struct ip_vs_conn *cp, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IP_VS_NFCT + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *ct; + + if (!(cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_NFCT)) + return false; + ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); + if (ct && !nf_ct_is_untracked(ct)) + return true; +#endif + return false; +} + static inline int ip_vs_dest_conn_overhead(struct ip_vs_dest *dest) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c index f57b4dcdb233..4da560005b0e 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c @@ -1757,15 +1757,34 @@ ip_vs_in(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, unsigned int hooknum, struct sk_buff *skb, int cp = pp->conn_in_get(ipvs, af, skb, &iph); conn_reuse_mode = sysctl_conn_reuse_mode(ipvs); - if (conn_reuse_mode && !iph.fragoffs && - is_new_conn(skb, &iph) && cp && - ((unlikely(sysctl_expire_nodest_conn(ipvs)) && cp->dest && - unlikely(!atomic_read(&cp->dest->weight))) || - unlikely(is_new_conn_expected(cp, conn_reuse_mode)))) { - if (!atomic_read(&cp->n_control)) - ip_vs_conn_expire_now(cp); - __ip_vs_conn_put(cp); - cp = NULL; + if (conn_reuse_mode && !iph.fragoffs && is_new_conn(skb, &iph) && cp) { + bool uses_ct = false, resched = false; + + if (unlikely(sysctl_expire_nodest_conn(ipvs)) && cp->dest && + unlikely(!atomic_read(&cp->dest->weight))) { + resched = true; + uses_ct = ip_vs_conn_uses_conntrack(cp, skb); + } else if (is_new_conn_expected(cp, conn_reuse_mode)) { + uses_ct = ip_vs_conn_uses_conntrack(cp, skb); + if (!atomic_read(&cp->n_control)) { + resched = true; + } else { + /* Do not reschedule controlling connection + * that uses conntrack while it is still + * referenced by controlled connection(s). + */ + resched = !uses_ct; + } + } + + if (resched) { + if (!atomic_read(&cp->n_control)) + ip_vs_conn_expire_now(cp); + __ip_vs_conn_put(cp); + if (uses_ct) + return NF_DROP; + cp = NULL; + } } if (unlikely(!cp)) { -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From f911b675a06d05211da52cf8267db80c81b6aee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Anastasov Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2016 15:03:23 +0200 Subject: ipvs: allow rescheduling after RST "RFC 5961, 4.2. Mitigation" describes a mechanism to request client to confirm with RST the restart of TCP connection before resending its SYN. As result, IPVS can see SYNs for existing connection in CLOSE state. Add check to allow rescheduling in this state. Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c index 4da560005b0e..b9a4082afa3a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c @@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ static inline bool is_new_conn_expected(const struct ip_vs_conn *cp, switch (cp->protocol) { case IPPROTO_TCP: return (cp->state == IP_VS_TCP_S_TIME_WAIT) || + (cp->state == IP_VS_TCP_S_CLOSE) || ((conn_reuse_mode & 2) && (cp->state == IP_VS_TCP_S_FIN_WAIT) && (cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_NOOUTPUT)); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 7617a24f83b5d67f4dab1844956be1cebc44aec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marco Angaroni Date: Sat, 5 Mar 2016 12:10:02 +0100 Subject: ipvs: correct initial offset of Call-ID header search in SIP persistence engine The IPVS SIP persistence engine is not able to parse the SIP header "Call-ID" when such header is inserted in the first positions of the SIP message. When IPVS is configured with "--pe sip" option, like for example: ipvsadm -A -u 1.2.3.4:5060 -s rr --pe sip -p 120 -o some particular messages (see below for details) do not create entries in the connection template table, which can be listed with: ipvsadm -Lcn --persistent-conn Problematic SIP messages are SIP responses having "Call-ID" header positioned just after message first line: SIP/2.0 200 OK [Call-ID header here] [rest of the headers] When "Call-ID" header is positioned down (after a few other headers) it is correctly recognized. This is due to the data offset used in get_callid function call inside ip_vs_pe_sip.c file: since dptr already points to the start of the SIP message, the value of dataoff should be initially 0. Otherwise the header is searched starting from some bytes after the first character of the SIP message. Fixes: 758ff0338722 ("IPVS: sip persistence engine") Signed-off-by: Marco Angaroni Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c index c4e9ca016a88..0a6eb5c0d9e9 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_pe_sip.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ ip_vs_sip_fill_param(struct ip_vs_conn_param *p, struct sk_buff *skb) dptr = skb->data + dataoff; datalen = skb->len - dataoff; - if (get_callid(dptr, dataoff, datalen, &matchoff, &matchlen)) + if (get_callid(dptr, 0, datalen, &matchoff, &matchlen)) return -EINVAL; /* N.B: pe_data is only set on success, -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d8aacd87180141ff6b812b53de77a4336e87c91a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jozsef Kadlecsik Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2016 20:29:10 +0100 Subject: netfilter: ipset: Check IPSET_ATTR_ETHER netlink attribute length Julia Lawall pointed out that IPSET_ATTR_ETHER netlink attribute length was not checked explicitly, just for the maximum possible size. Malicious netlink clients could send shorter attribute and thus resulting a kernel read after the buffer. The patch adds the explicit length checkings. Reported-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c index 29dde208381d..9a065f672d3a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ipmac.c @@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ bitmap_ipmac_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[], e.id = ip_to_id(map, ip); if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) { + if (nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN) + return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL; memcpy(e.ether, nla_data(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]), ETH_ALEN); e.add_mac = 1; } diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c index f1e7d2c0f685..8f004edad396 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c @@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ hash_mac4_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[], if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO]) *lineno = nla_get_u32(tb[IPSET_ATTR_LINENO]); - if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER])) + if (unlikely(!tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER] || + nla_len(tb[IPSET_ATTR_ETHER]) != ETH_ALEN)) return -IPSET_ERR_PROTOCOL; ret = ip_set_get_extensions(set, tb, &ext); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From f0716cd6eb89f769bff3b37120219720c994bb7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 00:04:21 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nft_compat: check match/targetinfo attr size We copy according to ->target|matchsize, so check that the netlink attribute (which can include padding and might be larger) contains enough data. Reported-by: Julia Lawall Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c index 454841baa4d0..6228c422c766 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_compat.c @@ -660,6 +660,9 @@ nft_match_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (IS_ERR(match)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + if (match->matchsize > nla_len(tb[NFTA_MATCH_INFO])) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + /* This is the first time we use this match, allocate operations */ nft_match = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nft_xt), GFP_KERNEL); if (nft_match == NULL) @@ -740,6 +743,9 @@ nft_target_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, if (IS_ERR(target)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + if (target->targetsize > nla_len(tb[NFTA_TARGET_INFO])) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + /* This is the first time we use this target, allocate operations */ nft_target = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nft_xt), GFP_KERNEL); if (nft_target == NULL) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Florian Westphal Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 01:56:23 +0100 Subject: netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow Ben Hawkes says: integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap corruption. Reported-by: Ben Hawkes Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c index d0cd2b9bf844..582c9cfd6567 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c +++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c @@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size) struct xt_table_info *info = NULL; size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size; + if (sz < sizeof(*info)) + return NULL; + /* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */ if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages) return NULL; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From bfa3f9d7f3b349acea8982d2248e33a0ed84c687 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:16 -0800 Subject: netfilter: Remove IP_CT_NEW_REPLY definition. Remove the definition of IP_CT_NEW_REPLY from the kernel as it does not make sense. This allows the definition of IP_CT_NUMBER to be simplified as well. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h | 12 +++++++++--- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h index 319f47128db8..6d074d14ee27 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_common.h @@ -20,9 +20,15 @@ enum ip_conntrack_info { IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY = IP_CT_ESTABLISHED + IP_CT_IS_REPLY, IP_CT_RELATED_REPLY = IP_CT_RELATED + IP_CT_IS_REPLY, - IP_CT_NEW_REPLY = IP_CT_NEW + IP_CT_IS_REPLY, - /* Number of distinct IP_CT types (no NEW in reply dirn). */ - IP_CT_NUMBER = IP_CT_IS_REPLY * 2 - 1 + /* No NEW in reply direction. */ + + /* Number of distinct IP_CT types. */ + IP_CT_NUMBER, + + /* only for userspace compatibility */ +#ifndef __KERNEL__ + IP_CT_NEW_REPLY = IP_CT_NUMBER, +#endif }; #define NF_CT_STATE_INVALID_BIT (1 << 0) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index ee6ff8ffc12d..304529015744 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ static u8 ovs_ct_get_state(enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) switch (ctinfo) { case IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY: case IP_CT_RELATED_REPLY: - case IP_CT_NEW_REPLY: ct_state |= OVS_CS_F_REPLY_DIR; break; default: @@ -92,7 +91,6 @@ static u8 ovs_ct_get_state(enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) ct_state |= OVS_CS_F_RELATED; break; case IP_CT_NEW: - case IP_CT_NEW_REPLY: ct_state |= OVS_CS_F_NEW; break; default: -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 264619055bd52bc2278af848472176642d759874 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:17 -0800 Subject: netfilter: Allow calling into nat helper without skb_dst. NAT checksum recalculation code assumes existence of skb_dst, which becomes a problem for a later patch in the series ("openvswitch: Interface with NAT."). Simplify this by removing the check on skb_dst, as the checksum will be dealt with later in the stack. Suggested-by: Pravin Shelar Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 30 ++++++++---------------------- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 30 ++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c index 61c7cc22ea68..f8aad03d674b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c @@ -127,29 +127,15 @@ static void nf_nat_ipv4_csum_recalc(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto, void *data, __sum16 *check, int datalen, int oldlen) { - const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); - struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb); - if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { - if (!(rt->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL) && - (!skb->dev || skb->dev->features & - (NETIF_F_IP_CSUM | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM))) { - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; - skb->csum_start = skb_headroom(skb) + - skb_network_offset(skb) + - ip_hdrlen(skb); - skb->csum_offset = (void *)check - data; - *check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, - datalen, proto, 0); - } else { - *check = 0; - *check = csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, - datalen, proto, - csum_partial(data, datalen, - 0)); - if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP && !*check) - *check = CSUM_MANGLED_0; - } + const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); + + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; + skb->csum_start = skb_headroom(skb) + skb_network_offset(skb) + + ip_hdrlen(skb); + skb->csum_offset = (void *)check - data; + *check = ~csum_tcpudp_magic(iph->saddr, iph->daddr, datalen, + proto, 0); } else inet_proto_csum_replace2(check, skb, htons(oldlen), htons(datalen), true); diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c index 6ce309928841..e0be97e636a4 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c @@ -131,29 +131,15 @@ static void nf_nat_ipv6_csum_recalc(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto, void *data, __sum16 *check, int datalen, int oldlen) { - const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); - struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb); - if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) { - if (!(rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_LOCAL) && - (!skb->dev || skb->dev->features & - (NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM))) { - skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; - skb->csum_start = skb_headroom(skb) + - skb_network_offset(skb) + - (data - (void *)skb->data); - skb->csum_offset = (void *)check - data; - *check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr, - datalen, proto, 0); - } else { - *check = 0; - *check = csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr, - datalen, proto, - csum_partial(data, datalen, - 0)); - if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP && !*check) - *check = CSUM_MANGLED_0; - } + const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb); + + skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; + skb->csum_start = skb_headroom(skb) + skb_network_offset(skb) + + (data - (void *)skb->data); + skb->csum_offset = (void *)check - data; + *check = ~csum_ipv6_magic(&ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr, + datalen, proto, 0); } else inet_proto_csum_replace2(check, skb, htons(oldlen), htons(datalen), true); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 9f13ded8d3c715147c4759f937cfb712c185ca13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:18 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Add commentary to conntrack.c This makes the code easier to understand and the following patches more focused. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 304529015744..2c2bf071f6d6 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -152,8 +152,12 @@ static void ovs_ct_update_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); if (ct) { state = ovs_ct_get_state(ctinfo); + /* All unconfirmed entries are NEW connections. */ if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct)) state |= OVS_CS_F_NEW; + /* OVS persists the related flag for the duration of the + * connection. + */ if (ct->master) state |= OVS_CS_F_RELATED; zone = nf_ct_zone(ct); @@ -165,6 +169,9 @@ static void ovs_ct_update_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, __ovs_ct_update_key(key, state, zone, ct); } +/* This is called to initialize CT key fields possibly coming in from the local + * stack. + */ void ovs_ct_fill_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) { ovs_ct_update_key(skb, NULL, key, false); @@ -199,7 +206,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_set_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key, struct nf_conn *ct; u32 new_mark; - /* The connection could be invalid, in which case set_mark is no-op. */ ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); if (!ct) @@ -375,6 +381,11 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, return true; } +/* Pass 'skb' through conntrack in 'net', using zone configured in 'info', if + * not done already. Update key with new CT state. + * Note that if the packet is deemed invalid by conntrack, skb->nfct will be + * set to NULL and 0 will be returned. + */ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -418,6 +429,13 @@ static int ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, { struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp; + /* If we pass an expected packet through nf_conntrack_in() the + * expectation is typically removed, but the packet could still be + * lost in upcall processing. To prevent this from happening we + * perform an explicit expectation lookup. Expected connections are + * always new, and will be passed through conntrack only when they are + * committed, as it is OK to remove the expectation at that time. + */ exp = ovs_ct_expect_find(net, &info->zone, info->family, skb); if (exp) { u8 state; @@ -455,6 +473,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_commit(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, err = __ovs_ct_lookup(net, key, info, skb); if (err) return err; + /* This is a no-op if the connection has already been confirmed. */ if (nf_conntrack_confirm(skb) != NF_ACCEPT) return -EINVAL; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 394e910e909b174270b8231fd51942eb2f541fb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:19 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Update the CT state key only after nf_conntrack_in(). Only a successful nf_conntrack_in() call can effect a connection state change, so it suffices to update the key only after the nf_conntrack_in() returns. This change is needed for the later NAT patches. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 2c2bf071f6d6..a487bb3486e1 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, } /* Pass 'skb' through conntrack in 'net', using zone configured in 'info', if - * not done already. Update key with new CT state. + * not done already. Update key with new CT state after passing the packet + * through conntrack. * Note that if the packet is deemed invalid by conntrack, skb->nfct will be * set to NULL and 0 will be returned. */ @@ -411,14 +412,14 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, skb) != NF_ACCEPT) return -ENOENT; + ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true); + if (ovs_ct_helper(skb, info->family) != NF_ACCEPT) { WARN_ONCE(1, "helper rejected packet"); return -EINVAL; } } - ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true); - return 0; } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 289f225349cb2a97448fd14599ab34b741f706f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:20 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Find existing conntrack entry after upcall. Add a new function ovs_ct_find_existing() to find an existing conntrack entry for which this packet was already applied to. This is only to be called when there is evidence that the packet was already tracked and committed, but we lost the ct reference due to an userspace upcall. ovs_ct_find_existing() is called from skb_nfct_cached(), which can now hide the fact that the ct reference may have been lost due to an upcall. This allows ovs_ct_commit() to be simplified. This patch is needed by later "openvswitch: Interface with NAT" patch, as we need to be able to pass the packet through NAT using the original ct reference also after the reference is lost after an upcall. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index a487bb3486e1..ae36fe2ed483 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -356,14 +356,101 @@ ovs_ct_expect_find(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, return __nf_ct_expect_find(net, zone, &tuple); } +/* This replicates logic from nf_conntrack_core.c that is not exported. */ +static enum ip_conntrack_info +ovs_ct_get_info(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h) +{ + const struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); + + if (NF_CT_DIRECTION(h) == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) + return IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY; + /* Once we've had two way comms, always ESTABLISHED. */ + if (test_bit(IPS_SEEN_REPLY_BIT, &ct->status)) + return IP_CT_ESTABLISHED; + if (test_bit(IPS_EXPECTED_BIT, &ct->status)) + return IP_CT_RELATED; + return IP_CT_NEW; +} + +/* Find an existing connection which this packet belongs to without + * re-attributing statistics or modifying the connection state. This allows an + * skb->nfct lost due to an upcall to be recovered during actions execution. + * + * Must be called with rcu_read_lock. + * + * On success, populates skb->nfct and skb->nfctinfo, and returns the + * connection. Returns NULL if there is no existing entry. + */ +static struct nf_conn * +ovs_ct_find_existing(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, + u8 l3num, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct nf_conntrack_l3proto *l3proto; + struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto; + struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple; + struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *h; + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *ct; + unsigned int dataoff; + u8 protonum; + + l3proto = __nf_ct_l3proto_find(l3num); + if (!l3proto) { + pr_debug("ovs_ct_find_existing: Can't get l3proto\n"); + return NULL; + } + if (l3proto->get_l4proto(skb, skb_network_offset(skb), &dataoff, + &protonum) <= 0) { + pr_debug("ovs_ct_find_existing: Can't get protonum\n"); + return NULL; + } + l4proto = __nf_ct_l4proto_find(l3num, protonum); + if (!l4proto) { + pr_debug("ovs_ct_find_existing: Can't get l4proto\n"); + return NULL; + } + if (!nf_ct_get_tuple(skb, skb_network_offset(skb), dataoff, l3num, + protonum, net, &tuple, l3proto, l4proto)) { + pr_debug("ovs_ct_find_existing: Can't get tuple\n"); + return NULL; + } + + /* look for tuple match */ + h = nf_conntrack_find_get(net, zone, &tuple); + if (!h) + return NULL; /* Not found. */ + + ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h); + + ctinfo = ovs_ct_get_info(h); + if (ctinfo == IP_CT_NEW) { + /* This should not happen. */ + WARN_ONCE(1, "ovs_ct_find_existing: new packet for %p\n", ct); + } + skb->nfct = &ct->ct_general; + skb->nfctinfo = ctinfo; + return ct; +} + /* Determine whether skb->nfct is equal to the result of conntrack lookup. */ -static bool skb_nfct_cached(const struct net *net, const struct sk_buff *skb, - const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info) +static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net, + const struct sw_flow_key *key, + const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb) { enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; struct nf_conn *ct; ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); + /* If no ct, check if we have evidence that an existing conntrack entry + * might be found for this skb. This happens when we lose a skb->nfct + * due to an upcall. If the connection was not confirmed, it is not + * cached and needs to be run through conntrack again. + */ + if (!ct && key->ct.state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED && + !(key->ct.state & OVS_CS_F_INVALID) && + key->ct.zone == info->zone.id) + ct = ovs_ct_find_existing(net, &info->zone, info->family, skb); if (!ct) return false; if (!net_eq(net, read_pnet(&ct->ct_net))) @@ -396,7 +483,7 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, * actually run the packet through conntrack twice unless it's for a * different zone. */ - if (!skb_nfct_cached(net, skb, info)) { + if (!skb_nfct_cached(net, key, info, skb)) { struct nf_conn *tmpl = info->ct; /* Associate skb with specified zone. */ @@ -459,18 +546,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_commit(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, struct sk_buff *skb) { - u8 state; int err; - state = key->ct.state; - if (key->ct.zone == info->zone.id && - ((state & OVS_CS_F_TRACKED) && !(state & OVS_CS_F_NEW))) { - /* Previous lookup has shown that this connection is already - * tracked and committed. Skip committing. - */ - return 0; - } - err = __ovs_ct_lookup(net, key, info, skb); if (err) return err; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 5b6b929376a621e2bd3367f5de563d7123506597 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:21 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Handle NF_REPEAT in conntrack action. Repeat the nf_conntrack_in() call when it returns NF_REPEAT. This avoids dropping a SYN packet re-opening an existing TCP connection. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index ae36fe2ed483..85256b312455 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, */ if (!skb_nfct_cached(net, key, info, skb)) { struct nf_conn *tmpl = info->ct; + int err; /* Associate skb with specified zone. */ if (tmpl) { @@ -495,8 +496,13 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, skb->nfctinfo = IP_CT_NEW; } - if (nf_conntrack_in(net, info->family, NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING, - skb) != NF_ACCEPT) + /* Repeat if requested, see nf_iterate(). */ + do { + err = nf_conntrack_in(net, info->family, + NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING, skb); + } while (err == NF_REPEAT); + + if (err != NF_ACCEPT) return -ENOENT; ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 28b6e0c1ace45779c60e7cefe6d469b7ecb520b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:22 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Delay conntrack helper call for new connections. There is no need to help connections that are not confirmed, so we can delay helping new connections to the time when they are confirmed. This change is needed for NAT support, and having this as a separate patch will make the following NAT patch a bit easier to review. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 85256b312455..f718b724e650 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -483,7 +483,11 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, * actually run the packet through conntrack twice unless it's for a * different zone. */ - if (!skb_nfct_cached(net, key, info, skb)) { + bool cached = skb_nfct_cached(net, key, info, skb); + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + struct nf_conn *ct; + + if (!cached) { struct nf_conn *tmpl = info->ct; int err; @@ -506,11 +510,18 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, return -ENOENT; ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true); + } - if (ovs_ct_helper(skb, info->family) != NF_ACCEPT) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "helper rejected packet"); - return -EINVAL; - } + /* Call the helper only if: + * - nf_conntrack_in() was executed above ("!cached") for a confirmed + * connection, or + * - When committing an unconfirmed connection. + */ + ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); + if (ct && (nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) ? !cached : info->commit) && + ovs_ct_helper(skb, info->family) != NF_ACCEPT) { + WARN_ONCE(1, "helper rejected packet"); + return -EINVAL; } return 0; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 05752523e56502cd9975aec0a2ded465d51a71f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jarno Rajahalme Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 10:54:23 -0800 Subject: openvswitch: Interface with NAT. Extend OVS conntrack interface to cover NAT. New nested OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT attribute may be used to include NAT with a CT action. A bare OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT only mangles existing and expected connections. If OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC or OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST is included within the nested attributes, new (non-committed/non-confirmed) connections are mangled according to the rest of the nested attributes. The corresponding OVS userspace patch series includes test cases (in tests/system-traffic.at) that also serve as example uses. This work extends on a branch by Thomas Graf at https://github.com/tgraf/ovs/tree/nat. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme Acked-by: Thomas Graf Acked-by: Joe Stringer Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- include/uapi/linux/openvswitch.h | 49 ++++ net/openvswitch/Kconfig | 3 +- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 524 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/openvswitch/conntrack.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/openvswitch.h b/include/uapi/linux/openvswitch.h index a27222d5b413..616d04761730 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/openvswitch.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/openvswitch.h @@ -454,6 +454,14 @@ struct ovs_key_ct_labels { #define OVS_CS_F_REPLY_DIR 0x08 /* Flow is in the reply direction. */ #define OVS_CS_F_INVALID 0x10 /* Could not track connection. */ #define OVS_CS_F_TRACKED 0x20 /* Conntrack has occurred. */ +#define OVS_CS_F_SRC_NAT 0x40 /* Packet's source address/port was + * mangled by NAT. + */ +#define OVS_CS_F_DST_NAT 0x80 /* Packet's destination address/port + * was mangled by NAT. + */ + +#define OVS_CS_F_NAT_MASK (OVS_CS_F_SRC_NAT | OVS_CS_F_DST_NAT) /** * enum ovs_flow_attr - attributes for %OVS_FLOW_* commands. @@ -632,6 +640,8 @@ struct ovs_action_hash { * mask. For each bit set in the mask, the corresponding bit in the value is * copied to the connection tracking label field in the connection. * @OVS_CT_ATTR_HELPER: variable length string defining conntrack ALG. + * @OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT: Nested OVS_NAT_ATTR_* for performing L3 network address + * translation (NAT) on the packet. */ enum ovs_ct_attr { OVS_CT_ATTR_UNSPEC, @@ -641,11 +651,50 @@ enum ovs_ct_attr { OVS_CT_ATTR_LABELS, /* labels to associate with this connection. */ OVS_CT_ATTR_HELPER, /* netlink helper to assist detection of related connections. */ + OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT, /* Nested OVS_NAT_ATTR_* */ __OVS_CT_ATTR_MAX }; #define OVS_CT_ATTR_MAX (__OVS_CT_ATTR_MAX - 1) +/** + * enum ovs_nat_attr - Attributes for %OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT. + * + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC: Flag for Source NAT (mangle source address/port). + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST: Flag for Destination NAT (mangle destination + * address/port). Only one of (@OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC, @OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST) may be + * specified. Effective only for packets for ct_state NEW connections. + * Packets of committed connections are mangled by the NAT action according to + * the committed NAT type regardless of the flags specified. As a corollary, a + * NAT action without a NAT type flag will only mangle packets of committed + * connections. The following NAT attributes only apply for NEW + * (non-committed) connections, and they may be included only when the CT + * action has the @OVS_CT_ATTR_COMMIT flag and either @OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC or + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST is also included. + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN: struct in_addr or struct in6_addr + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX: struct in_addr or struct in6_addr + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MIN: u16 L4 protocol specific lower boundary (port) + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MAX: u16 L4 protocol specific upper boundary (port) + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_PERSISTENT: Flag for persistent IP mapping across reboots + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_HASH: Flag for pseudo random L4 port mapping (MD5) + * @OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_RANDOM: Flag for fully randomized L4 port mapping + */ +enum ovs_nat_attr { + OVS_NAT_ATTR_UNSPEC, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MIN, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MAX, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_PERSISTENT, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_HASH, + OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_RANDOM, + __OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX, +}; + +#define OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX (__OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX - 1) + /** * enum ovs_action_attr - Action types. * diff --git a/net/openvswitch/Kconfig b/net/openvswitch/Kconfig index cd5fd9d728a7..234a73344c6e 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/Kconfig +++ b/net/openvswitch/Kconfig @@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ config OPENVSWITCH tristate "Open vSwitch" depends on INET depends on !NF_CONNTRACK || \ - (NF_CONNTRACK && (!NF_DEFRAG_IPV6 || NF_DEFRAG_IPV6)) + (NF_CONNTRACK && ((!NF_DEFRAG_IPV6 || NF_DEFRAG_IPV6) && \ + (!NF_NAT || NF_NAT))) select LIBCRC32C select MPLS select NET_MPLS_GSO diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index f718b724e650..dc5eb29fe7d6 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -13,21 +13,31 @@ #include #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED +#include +#include +#include +#endif + #include "datapath.h" #include "conntrack.h" #include "flow.h" #include "flow_netlink.h" struct ovs_ct_len_tbl { - size_t maxlen; - size_t minlen; + int maxlen; + int minlen; }; /* Metadata mark for masked write to conntrack mark */ @@ -42,15 +52,25 @@ struct md_labels { struct ovs_key_ct_labels mask; }; +enum ovs_ct_nat { + OVS_CT_NAT = 1 << 0, /* NAT for committed connections only. */ + OVS_CT_SRC_NAT = 1 << 1, /* Source NAT for NEW connections. */ + OVS_CT_DST_NAT = 1 << 2, /* Destination NAT for NEW connections. */ +}; + /* Conntrack action context for execution. */ struct ovs_conntrack_info { struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper; struct nf_conntrack_zone zone; struct nf_conn *ct; u8 commit : 1; + u8 nat : 3; /* enum ovs_ct_nat */ u16 family; struct md_mark mark; struct md_labels labels; +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED + struct nf_nat_range range; /* Only present for SRC NAT and DST NAT. */ +#endif }; static void __ovs_ct_free_action(struct ovs_conntrack_info *ct_info); @@ -137,12 +157,15 @@ static void __ovs_ct_update_key(struct sw_flow_key *key, u8 state, ovs_ct_get_labels(ct, &key->ct.labels); } -/* Update 'key' based on skb->nfct. If 'post_ct' is true, then OVS has - * previously sent the packet to conntrack via the ct action. +/* Update 'key' based on skb->nfct. If 'post_ct' is true, then OVS has + * previously sent the packet to conntrack via the ct action. If + * 'keep_nat_flags' is true, the existing NAT flags retained, else they are + * initialized from the connection status. */ static void ovs_ct_update_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, - struct sw_flow_key *key, bool post_ct) + struct sw_flow_key *key, bool post_ct, + bool keep_nat_flags) { const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone = &nf_ct_zone_dflt; enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; @@ -160,6 +183,14 @@ static void ovs_ct_update_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, */ if (ct->master) state |= OVS_CS_F_RELATED; + if (keep_nat_flags) { + state |= key->ct.state & OVS_CS_F_NAT_MASK; + } else { + if (ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT) + state |= OVS_CS_F_SRC_NAT; + if (ct->status & IPS_DST_NAT) + state |= OVS_CS_F_DST_NAT; + } zone = nf_ct_zone(ct); } else if (post_ct) { state = OVS_CS_F_TRACKED | OVS_CS_F_INVALID; @@ -174,7 +205,7 @@ static void ovs_ct_update_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, */ void ovs_ct_fill_key(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct sw_flow_key *key) { - ovs_ct_update_key(skb, NULL, key, false); + ovs_ct_update_key(skb, NULL, key, false, false); } int ovs_ct_put_key(const struct sw_flow_key *key, struct sk_buff *skb) @@ -263,6 +294,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_helper(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 proto) enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; unsigned int protoff; struct nf_conn *ct; + int err; ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); if (!ct || ctinfo == IP_CT_RELATED_REPLY) @@ -299,7 +331,18 @@ static int ovs_ct_helper(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 proto) return NF_DROP; } - return helper->help(skb, protoff, ct, ctinfo); + err = helper->help(skb, protoff, ct, ctinfo); + if (err != NF_ACCEPT) + return err; + + /* Adjust seqs after helper. This is needed due to some helpers (e.g., + * FTP with NAT) adusting the TCP payload size when mangling IP + * addresses and/or port numbers in the text-based control connection. + */ + if (test_bit(IPS_SEQ_ADJUST_BIT, &ct->status) && + !nf_ct_seq_adjust(skb, ct, ctinfo, protoff)) + return NF_DROP; + return NF_ACCEPT; } /* Returns 0 on success, -EINPROGRESS if 'skb' is stolen, or other nonzero @@ -468,6 +511,200 @@ static bool skb_nfct_cached(struct net *net, return true; } +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED +/* Modelled after nf_nat_ipv[46]_fn(). + * range is only used for new, uninitialized NAT state. + * Returns either NF_ACCEPT or NF_DROP. + */ +static int ovs_ct_nat_execute(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo, + const struct nf_nat_range *range, + enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype) +{ + int hooknum, nh_off, err = NF_ACCEPT; + + nh_off = skb_network_offset(skb); + skb_pull(skb, nh_off); + + /* See HOOK2MANIP(). */ + if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC) + hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_IN; /* Source NAT */ + else + hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT; /* Destination NAT */ + + switch (ctinfo) { + case IP_CT_RELATED: + case IP_CT_RELATED_REPLY: + if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) && + ip_hdr(skb)->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP) { + if (!nf_nat_icmp_reply_translation(skb, ct, ctinfo, + hooknum)) + err = NF_DROP; + goto push; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) + } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { + __be16 frag_off; + u8 nexthdr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->nexthdr; + int hdrlen = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), + &nexthdr, &frag_off); + + if (hdrlen >= 0 && nexthdr == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) { + if (!nf_nat_icmpv6_reply_translation(skb, ct, + ctinfo, + hooknum, + hdrlen)) + err = NF_DROP; + goto push; + } +#endif + } + /* Non-ICMP, fall thru to initialize if needed. */ + case IP_CT_NEW: + /* Seen it before? This can happen for loopback, retrans, + * or local packets. + */ + if (!nf_nat_initialized(ct, maniptype)) { + /* Initialize according to the NAT action. */ + err = (range && range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) + /* Action is set up to establish a new + * mapping. + */ + ? nf_nat_setup_info(ct, range, maniptype) + : nf_nat_alloc_null_binding(ct, hooknum); + if (err != NF_ACCEPT) + goto push; + } + break; + + case IP_CT_ESTABLISHED: + case IP_CT_ESTABLISHED_REPLY: + break; + + default: + err = NF_DROP; + goto push; + } + + err = nf_nat_packet(ct, ctinfo, hooknum, skb); +push: + skb_push(skb, nh_off); + + return err; +} + +static void ovs_nat_update_key(struct sw_flow_key *key, + const struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype) +{ + if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC) { + __be16 src; + + key->ct.state |= OVS_CS_F_SRC_NAT; + if (key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + key->ipv4.addr.src = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr; + else if (key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + memcpy(&key->ipv6.addr.src, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, + sizeof(key->ipv6.addr.src)); + else + return; + + if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_UDP) + src = udp_hdr(skb)->source; + else if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_TCP) + src = tcp_hdr(skb)->source; + else if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_SCTP) + src = sctp_hdr(skb)->source; + else + return; + + key->tp.src = src; + } else { + __be16 dst; + + key->ct.state |= OVS_CS_F_DST_NAT; + if (key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + key->ipv4.addr.dst = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr; + else if (key->eth.type == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) + memcpy(&key->ipv6.addr.dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, + sizeof(key->ipv6.addr.dst)); + else + return; + + if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_UDP) + dst = udp_hdr(skb)->dest; + else if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_TCP) + dst = tcp_hdr(skb)->dest; + else if (key->ip.proto == IPPROTO_SCTP) + dst = sctp_hdr(skb)->dest; + else + return; + + key->tp.dst = dst; + } +} + +/* Returns NF_DROP if the packet should be dropped, NF_ACCEPT otherwise. */ +static int ovs_ct_nat(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, + const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) +{ + enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype; + int err; + + if (nf_ct_is_untracked(ct)) { + /* A NAT action may only be performed on tracked packets. */ + return NF_ACCEPT; + } + + /* Add NAT extension if not confirmed yet. */ + if (!nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) && !nf_ct_nat_ext_add(ct)) + return NF_ACCEPT; /* Can't NAT. */ + + /* Determine NAT type. + * Check if the NAT type can be deduced from the tracked connection. + * Make sure expected traffic is NATted only when committing. + */ + if (info->nat & OVS_CT_NAT && ctinfo != IP_CT_NEW && + ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK && + (!(ct->status & IPS_EXPECTED_BIT) || info->commit)) { + /* NAT an established or related connection like before. */ + if (CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo) == IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) + /* This is the REPLY direction for a connection + * for which NAT was applied in the forward + * direction. Do the reverse NAT. + */ + maniptype = ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT + ? NF_NAT_MANIP_DST : NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC; + else + maniptype = ct->status & IPS_SRC_NAT + ? NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC : NF_NAT_MANIP_DST; + } else if (info->nat & OVS_CT_SRC_NAT) { + maniptype = NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC; + } else if (info->nat & OVS_CT_DST_NAT) { + maniptype = NF_NAT_MANIP_DST; + } else { + return NF_ACCEPT; /* Connection is not NATed. */ + } + err = ovs_ct_nat_execute(skb, ct, ctinfo, &info->range, maniptype); + + /* Mark NAT done if successful and update the flow key. */ + if (err == NF_ACCEPT) + ovs_nat_update_key(key, skb, maniptype); + + return err; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED */ +static int ovs_ct_nat(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, + const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb, struct nf_conn *ct, + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo) +{ + return NF_ACCEPT; +} +#endif + /* Pass 'skb' through conntrack in 'net', using zone configured in 'info', if * not done already. Update key with new CT state after passing the packet * through conntrack. @@ -509,19 +746,43 @@ static int __ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, if (err != NF_ACCEPT) return -ENOENT; - ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true); + /* Clear CT state NAT flags to mark that we have not yet done + * NAT after the nf_conntrack_in() call. We can actually clear + * the whole state, as it will be re-initialized below. + */ + key->ct.state = 0; + + /* Update the key, but keep the NAT flags. */ + ovs_ct_update_key(skb, info, key, true, true); } - /* Call the helper only if: - * - nf_conntrack_in() was executed above ("!cached") for a confirmed - * connection, or - * - When committing an unconfirmed connection. - */ ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); - if (ct && (nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) ? !cached : info->commit) && - ovs_ct_helper(skb, info->family) != NF_ACCEPT) { - WARN_ONCE(1, "helper rejected packet"); - return -EINVAL; + if (ct) { + /* Packets starting a new connection must be NATted before the + * helper, so that the helper knows about the NAT. We enforce + * this by delaying both NAT and helper calls for unconfirmed + * connections until the committing CT action. For later + * packets NAT and Helper may be called in either order. + * + * NAT will be done only if the CT action has NAT, and only + * once per packet (per zone), as guarded by the NAT bits in + * the key->ct.state. + */ + if (info->nat && !(key->ct.state & OVS_CS_F_NAT_MASK) && + (nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) || info->commit) && + ovs_ct_nat(net, key, info, skb, ct, ctinfo) != NF_ACCEPT) { + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Call the helper only if: + * - nf_conntrack_in() was executed above ("!cached") for a + * confirmed connection, or + * - When committing an unconfirmed connection. + */ + if ((nf_ct_is_confirmed(ct) ? !cached : info->commit) && + ovs_ct_helper(skb, info->family) != NF_ACCEPT) { + return -EINVAL; + } } return 0; @@ -545,15 +806,13 @@ static int ovs_ct_lookup(struct net *net, struct sw_flow_key *key, if (exp) { u8 state; + /* NOTE: New connections are NATted and Helped only when + * committed, so we are not calling into NAT here. + */ state = OVS_CS_F_TRACKED | OVS_CS_F_NEW | OVS_CS_F_RELATED; __ovs_ct_update_key(key, state, &info->zone, exp->master); - } else { - int err; - - err = __ovs_ct_lookup(net, key, info, skb); - if (err) - return err; - } + } else + return __ovs_ct_lookup(net, key, info, skb); return 0; } @@ -653,6 +912,135 @@ static int ovs_ct_add_helper(struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, const char *name, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED +static int parse_nat(const struct nlattr *attr, + struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, bool log) +{ + struct nlattr *a; + int rem; + bool have_ip_max = false; + bool have_proto_max = false; + bool ip_vers = (info->family == NFPROTO_IPV6); + + nla_for_each_nested(a, attr, rem) { + static const int ovs_nat_attr_lens[OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX + 1][2] = { + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC] = {0, 0}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST] = {0, 0}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN] = {sizeof(struct in_addr), + sizeof(struct in6_addr)}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX] = {sizeof(struct in_addr), + sizeof(struct in6_addr)}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MIN] = {sizeof(u16), sizeof(u16)}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MAX] = {sizeof(u16), sizeof(u16)}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_PERSISTENT] = {0, 0}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_HASH] = {0, 0}, + [OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_RANDOM] = {0, 0}, + }; + int type = nla_type(a); + + if (type > OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX) { + OVS_NLERR(log, + "Unknown NAT attribute (type=%d, max=%d).\n", + type, OVS_NAT_ATTR_MAX); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (nla_len(a) != ovs_nat_attr_lens[type][ip_vers]) { + OVS_NLERR(log, + "NAT attribute type %d has unexpected length (%d != %d).\n", + type, nla_len(a), + ovs_nat_attr_lens[type][ip_vers]); + return -EINVAL; + } + + switch (type) { + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC: + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST: + if (info->nat) { + OVS_NLERR(log, + "Only one type of NAT may be specified.\n" + ); + return -ERANGE; + } + info->nat |= OVS_CT_NAT; + info->nat |= ((type == OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC) + ? OVS_CT_SRC_NAT : OVS_CT_DST_NAT); + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN: + nla_memcpy(&info->range.min_addr, a, nla_len(a)); + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX: + have_ip_max = true; + nla_memcpy(&info->range.max_addr, a, + sizeof(info->range.max_addr)); + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MIN: + info->range.min_proto.all = htons(nla_get_u16(a)); + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MAX: + have_proto_max = true; + info->range.max_proto.all = htons(nla_get_u16(a)); + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_PERSISTENT: + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PERSISTENT; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_HASH: + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM; + break; + + case OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_RANDOM: + info->range.flags |= NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_FULLY; + break; + + default: + OVS_NLERR(log, "Unknown nat attribute (%d).\n", type); + return -EINVAL; + } + } + + if (rem > 0) { + OVS_NLERR(log, "NAT attribute has %d unknown bytes.\n", rem); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!info->nat) { + /* Do not allow flags if no type is given. */ + if (info->range.flags) { + OVS_NLERR(log, + "NAT flags may be given only when NAT range (SRC or DST) is also specified.\n" + ); + return -EINVAL; + } + info->nat = OVS_CT_NAT; /* NAT existing connections. */ + } else if (!info->commit) { + OVS_NLERR(log, + "NAT attributes may be specified only when CT COMMIT flag is also specified.\n" + ); + return -EINVAL; + } + /* Allow missing IP_MAX. */ + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS && !have_ip_max) { + memcpy(&info->range.max_addr, &info->range.min_addr, + sizeof(info->range.max_addr)); + } + /* Allow missing PROTO_MAX. */ + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED && + !have_proto_max) { + info->range.max_proto.all = info->range.min_proto.all; + } + return 0; +} +#endif + static const struct ovs_ct_len_tbl ovs_ct_attr_lens[OVS_CT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { [OVS_CT_ATTR_COMMIT] = { .minlen = 0, .maxlen = 0 }, [OVS_CT_ATTR_ZONE] = { .minlen = sizeof(u16), @@ -662,7 +1050,11 @@ static const struct ovs_ct_len_tbl ovs_ct_attr_lens[OVS_CT_ATTR_MAX + 1] = { [OVS_CT_ATTR_LABELS] = { .minlen = sizeof(struct md_labels), .maxlen = sizeof(struct md_labels) }, [OVS_CT_ATTR_HELPER] = { .minlen = 1, - .maxlen = NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN } + .maxlen = NF_CT_HELPER_NAME_LEN }, +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED + /* NAT length is checked when parsing the nested attributes. */ + [OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT] = { .minlen = 0, .maxlen = INT_MAX }, +#endif }; static int parse_ct(const struct nlattr *attr, struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, @@ -729,6 +1121,15 @@ static int parse_ct(const struct nlattr *attr, struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, return -EINVAL; } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED + case OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT: { + int err = parse_nat(a, info, log); + + if (err) + return err; + break; + } +#endif default: OVS_NLERR(log, "Unknown conntrack attr (%d)", type); @@ -816,6 +1217,74 @@ err_free_ct: return err; } +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED +static bool ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *info, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct nlattr *start; + + start = nla_nest_start(skb, OVS_CT_ATTR_NAT); + if (!start) + return false; + + if (info->nat & OVS_CT_SRC_NAT) { + if (nla_put_flag(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_SRC)) + return false; + } else if (info->nat & OVS_CT_DST_NAT) { + if (nla_put_flag(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_DST)) + return false; + } else { + goto out; + } + + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_MAP_IPS) { + if (info->family == NFPROTO_IPV4) { + if (nla_put_in_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN, + info->range.min_addr.ip) || + (info->range.max_addr.ip + != info->range.min_addr.ip && + (nla_put_in_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX, + info->range.max_addr.ip)))) + return false; +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6) + } else if (info->family == NFPROTO_IPV6) { + if (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MIN, + &info->range.min_addr.in6) || + (memcmp(&info->range.max_addr.in6, + &info->range.min_addr.in6, + sizeof(info->range.max_addr.in6)) && + (nla_put_in6_addr(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_IP_MAX, + &info->range.max_addr.in6)))) + return false; +#endif + } else { + return false; + } + } + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED && + (nla_put_u16(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MIN, + ntohs(info->range.min_proto.all)) || + (info->range.max_proto.all != info->range.min_proto.all && + nla_put_u16(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_MAX, + ntohs(info->range.max_proto.all))))) + return false; + + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PERSISTENT && + nla_put_flag(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_PERSISTENT)) + return false; + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM && + nla_put_flag(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_HASH)) + return false; + if (info->range.flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_FULLY && + nla_put_flag(skb, OVS_NAT_ATTR_PROTO_RANDOM)) + return false; +out: + nla_nest_end(skb, start); + + return true; +} +#endif + int ovs_ct_action_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *ct_info, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -844,7 +1313,10 @@ int ovs_ct_action_to_attr(const struct ovs_conntrack_info *ct_info, ct_info->helper->name)) return -EMSGSIZE; } - +#ifdef CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED + if (ct_info->nat && !ovs_ct_nat_to_attr(ct_info, skb)) + return -EMSGSIZE; +#endif nla_nest_end(skb, start); return 0; diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h index a7544f405c16..8f6230bd6183 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ void ovs_ct_free_action(const struct nlattr *a); #define CT_SUPPORTED_MASK (OVS_CS_F_NEW | OVS_CS_F_ESTABLISHED | \ OVS_CS_F_RELATED | OVS_CS_F_REPLY_DIR | \ - OVS_CS_F_INVALID | OVS_CS_F_TRACKED) + OVS_CS_F_INVALID | OVS_CS_F_TRACKED | \ + OVS_CS_F_SRC_NAT | OVS_CS_F_DST_NAT) #else #include -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e39365be031e37b229f745ea49db0b25e82436fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nicholas Mc Guire Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 12:39:02 +0100 Subject: netfilter: nf_conntrack: consolidate lock/unlock into unlock_wait The spin_lock()/spin_unlock() is synchronizing on the nf_conntrack_locks_all_lock which is equivalent to spin_unlock_wait() but the later should be more efficient. Signed-off-by: Nicholas Mc Guire Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'net') diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index f60b4fdeeb8c..afde5f5e728a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -74,8 +74,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_lock(spinlock_t *lock) __acquires(lock) spin_lock(lock); while (unlikely(nf_conntrack_locks_all)) { spin_unlock(lock); - spin_lock(&nf_conntrack_locks_all_lock); - spin_unlock(&nf_conntrack_locks_all_lock); + spin_unlock_wait(&nf_conntrack_locks_all_lock); spin_lock(lock); } } @@ -121,8 +120,7 @@ static void nf_conntrack_all_lock(void) nf_conntrack_locks_all = true; for (i = 0; i < CONNTRACK_LOCKS; i++) { - spin_lock(&nf_conntrack_locks[i]); - spin_unlock(&nf_conntrack_locks[i]); + spin_unlock_wait(&nf_conntrack_locks[i]); } } -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151