From d4c5efdb97773f59a2b711754ca0953f24516739 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2014 23:16:35 -0400 Subject: random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing data zatimend has reported that in his environment (3.16/gcc4.8.3/corei7) memset() calls which clear out sensitive data in extract_{buf,entropy, entropy_user}() in random driver are being optimized away by gcc. Add a helper memzero_explicit() (similarly as explicit_bzero() variants) that can be used in such cases where a variable with sensitive data is being cleared out in the end. Other use cases might also be in crypto code. [ I have put this into lib/string.c though, as it's always built-in and doesn't need any dependencies then. ] Fixes kernel bugzilla: 82041 Reported-by: zatimend@hotmail.co.uk Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org --- lib/string.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) (limited to 'lib/string.c') diff --git a/lib/string.c b/lib/string.c index 992bf30af759..3a3120452a1d 100644 --- a/lib/string.c +++ b/lib/string.c @@ -604,6 +604,22 @@ void *memset(void *s, int c, size_t count) EXPORT_SYMBOL(memset); #endif +/** + * memzero_explicit - Fill a region of memory (e.g. sensitive + * keying data) with 0s. + * @s: Pointer to the start of the area. + * @count: The size of the area. + * + * memzero_explicit() doesn't need an arch-specific version as + * it just invokes the one of memset() implicitly. + */ +void memzero_explicit(void *s, size_t count) +{ + memset(s, 0, count); + OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(s); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(memzero_explicit); + #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY /** * memcpy - Copy one area of memory to another -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151