From c78193e9c7bcbf25b8237ad0dec82f805c4ea69b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Linus Torvalds Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2011 10:35:30 -0700 Subject: next_pidmap: fix overflow condition MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc. Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range (and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without checking the range of its arguments. So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT. The fact that we then do "last+1" doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to overflow). [ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ] Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy Analyzed-by: Robert Święcki Cc: Eric W. Biederman Cc: Pavel Emelyanov Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/pid.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'kernel/pid.c') diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c index 02f221274265..57a8346a270e 100644 --- a/kernel/pid.c +++ b/kernel/pid.c @@ -217,11 +217,14 @@ static int alloc_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns) return -1; } -int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, int last) +int next_pidmap(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, unsigned int last) { int offset; struct pidmap *map, *end; + if (last >= PID_MAX_LIMIT) + return -1; + offset = (last + 1) & BITS_PER_PAGE_MASK; map = &pid_ns->pidmap[(last + 1)/BITS_PER_PAGE]; end = &pid_ns->pidmap[PIDMAP_ENTRIES]; -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151