From 522ed7767e800cff6c650ec64b0ee0677303119c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Miloslav Trmac Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2007 23:40:56 -0700 Subject: Audit: add TTY input auditing Add TTY input auditing, used to audit system administrator's actions. This is required by various security standards such as DCID 6/3 and PCI to provide non-repudiation of administrator's actions and to allow a review of past actions if the administrator seems to overstep their duties or if the system becomes misconfigured for unknown reasons. These requirements do not make it necessary to audit TTY output as well. Compared to an user-space keylogger, this approach records TTY input using the audit subsystem, correlated with other audit events, and it is completely transparent to the user-space application (e.g. the console ioctls still work). TTY input auditing works on a higher level than auditing all system calls within the session, which would produce an overwhelming amount of mostly useless audit events. Add an "audit_tty" attribute, inherited across fork (). Data read from TTYs by process with the attribute is sent to the audit subsystem by the kernel. The audit netlink interface is extended to allow modifying the audit_tty attribute, and to allow sending explanatory audit events from user-space (for example, a shell might send an event containing the final command, after the interactive command-line editing and history expansion is performed, which might be difficult to decipher from the TTY input alone). Because the "audit_tty" attribute is inherited across fork (), it would be set e.g. for sshd restarted within an audited session. To prevent this, the audit_tty attribute is cleared when a process with no open TTY file descriptors (e.g. after daemon startup) opens a TTY. See https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2007-June/msg00000.html for a more detailed rationale document for an older version of this patch. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] Signed-off-by: Miloslav Trmac Cc: Al Viro Cc: Alan Cox Cc: Paul Fulghum Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Steve Grubb Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- include/linux/audit.h | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux/audit.h') diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index fccc6e50298a..8ca7ca0b47f0 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -63,9 +63,12 @@ #define AUDIT_ADD_RULE 1011 /* Add syscall filtering rule */ #define AUDIT_DEL_RULE 1012 /* Delete syscall filtering rule */ #define AUDIT_LIST_RULES 1013 /* List syscall filtering rules */ +#define AUDIT_TTY_GET 1014 /* Get TTY auditing status */ +#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1015 /* Set TTY auditing status */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */ +#define AUDIT_USER_TTY 1124 /* Non-ICANON TTY input meaning */ #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG 1199 #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 2100 /* More user space messages */ #define AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2 2999 @@ -92,6 +95,7 @@ #define AUDIT_KERNEL_OTHER 1316 /* For use by 3rd party modules */ #define AUDIT_FD_PAIR 1317 /* audit record for pipe/socketpair */ #define AUDIT_OBJ_PID 1318 /* ptrace target */ +#define AUDIT_TTY 1319 /* Input on an administrative TTY */ #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ @@ -289,6 +293,10 @@ struct audit_status { __u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */ }; +struct audit_tty_status { + __u32 enabled; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */ +}; + /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and * AUDIT_LIST_RULES requests. @@ -515,11 +523,13 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt); +extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid); +extern int audit_enabled; #else #define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; }) @@ -530,6 +540,7 @@ extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, #define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_n_untrustedstring(a,n,s) do { ; } while (0) #define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_enabled 0 #endif #endif #endif -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151