From 5513b411ea5b6bf1f1aa3a704eca0a4b352ab9c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Drew Fustini Date: Mon, 1 Mar 2021 21:30:58 -0800 Subject: Documentation: rename pinctl to pin-control pinctl is not ideal as pinctrl (with an 'r') is much more common. Linus state that pin-control.rst would be the best name for the documentation. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/20210126050817.GA187797@x1/#t Suggested-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: Drew Fustini Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302053059.1049035-4-drew@beagleboard.org Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..6a279837006b 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14103,7 +14103,7 @@ L: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/linusw/linux-pinctrl.git F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pinctrl/ -F: Documentation/driver-api/pinctl.rst +F: Documentation/driver-api/pin-control.rst F: drivers/pinctrl/ F: include/linux/pinctrl/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From ef6e01af398acff63eb33c58e72839e50a3e1c4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thara Gopinath Date: Fri, 19 Mar 2021 11:37:11 -0400 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add co-maintainer for Qualcomm tsens thermal drivers Add myself as the maintainer for Qualcomm tsens drivers so that I can help Daniel by taking care of/reviewing changes to these drivers. Signed-off-by: Thara Gopinath Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210319153711.2836652-1-thara.gopinath@linaro.org --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..f919aa861165 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14891,6 +14891,7 @@ F: include/linux/if_rmnet.h QUALCOMM TSENS THERMAL DRIVER M: Amit Kucheria +M: Thara Gopinath L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org L: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e0542cac435ba4bfb3b31da7d28f0df19703bf47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tiezhu Yang Date: Mon, 15 Mar 2021 11:56:32 +0800 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add Mailing list and Web-page for PERFORMANCE EVENTS SUBSYSTEM Add entry "L: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" to archive the related mail on https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/, add entry "W: https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/" so that newbies could get some useful materials. Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Namhyung Kim Cc: Peter Zijlstra Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1615780592-21838-1-git-send-email-yangtiezhu@loongson.cn Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo --- MAINTAINERS | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..607c0348fb61 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14020,8 +14020,10 @@ R: Mark Rutland R: Alexander Shishkin R: Jiri Olsa R: Namhyung Kim +L: linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org S: Supported +W: https://perf.wiki.kernel.org/ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf/core F: arch/*/events/* F: arch/*/events/*/* -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 52ab55dfe32357d5889eef2969a03dd662aa2b7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dongdong Liu Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 21:43:19 +0800 Subject: dt-bindings: PCI: hisi: Delete the obsolete HiSilicon PCIe file MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The hisilicon-pcie.txt file is no longer useful since commit c2fa6cf76d20 (PCI: dwc: hisi: Remove non-ECAM HiSilicon hip05/hip06 driver), so delete it and remove related code in MAINTAINERS file. Suggested-by: Zhou Wang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617111799-109749-1-git-send-email-liudongdong3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Dongdong Liu Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Wilczyński --- .../devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt | 43 ---------------------- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 2 files changed, 44 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt deleted file mode 100644 index d6796ef54ea1..000000000000 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -HiSilicon Hip05 and Hip06 PCIe host bridge DT description - -HiSilicon PCIe host controller is based on the Synopsys DesignWare PCI core. -It shares common functions with the PCIe DesignWare core driver and inherits -common properties defined in -Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/designware-pcie.txt. - -Additional properties are described here: - -Required properties -- compatible: Should contain "hisilicon,hip05-pcie" or "hisilicon,hip06-pcie". -- reg: Should contain rc_dbi, config registers location and length. -- reg-names: Must include the following entries: - "rc_dbi": controller configuration registers; - "config": PCIe configuration space registers. -- msi-parent: Should be its_pcie which is an ITS receiving MSI interrupts. -- port-id: Should be 0, 1, 2 or 3. - -Optional properties: -- status: Either "ok" or "disabled". -- dma-coherent: Present if DMA operations are coherent. - -Hip05 Example (note that Hip06 is the same except compatible): - pcie@b0080000 { - compatible = "hisilicon,hip05-pcie", "snps,dw-pcie"; - reg = <0 0xb0080000 0 0x10000>, <0x220 0x00000000 0 0x2000>; - reg-names = "rc_dbi", "config"; - bus-range = <0 15>; - msi-parent = <&its_pcie>; - #address-cells = <3>; - #size-cells = <2>; - device_type = "pci"; - dma-coherent; - ranges = <0x82000000 0 0x00000000 0x220 0x00000000 0 0x10000000>; - num-lanes = <8>; - port-id = <1>; - #interrupt-cells = <1>; - interrupt-map-mask = <0xf800 0 0 7>; - interrupt-map = <0x0 0 0 1 &mbigen_pcie 1 10 - 0x0 0 0 2 &mbigen_pcie 2 11 - 0x0 0 0 3 &mbigen_pcie 3 12 - 0x0 0 0 4 &mbigen_pcie 4 13>; - }; diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..8a154939ae27 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -13899,7 +13899,6 @@ PCIE DRIVER FOR HISILICON M: Zhou Wang L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/hisilicon-pcie.txt F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-hisi.c PCIE DRIVER FOR HISILICON KIRIN -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 70f5e4a6017b8d45a110ebbb4a56799e9a90102f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 14:16:20 +0100 Subject: KVM: arm64: Elect Alexandru as a replacement for Julien as a reviewer Julien's bandwidth for KVM reviewing has been pretty low lately, and Alexandru has accepted to step in and help with the reviewing. Many thanks to both! Cc: Julien Thierry Cc: Alexandru Elisei Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Acked-by: Alexandru Elisei Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210331131620.4005931-1-maz@kernel.org --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index aa84121c5611..803bd0551512 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9765,7 +9765,7 @@ F: virt/kvm/* KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64) M: Marc Zyngier R: James Morse -R: Julien Thierry +R: Alexandru Elisei R: Suzuki K Poulose L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) L: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 0adb3ad609f71193cec782fc4a2b7dcfb1b042ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Danil Kipnis Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2021 16:32:47 +0100 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Change maintainer for rtrs module Danil will step down, Haris will take over. Also update to email address to ionos.com, cloud.ionos.com will still work for sometime. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210325153308.1214057-2-gi-oh.kim@ionos.com Signed-off-by: Danil Kipnis Acked-by: Md Haris Iqbal Signed-off-by: Jack Wang Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe --- MAINTAINERS | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..7b2fb9b6fcc7 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -15541,8 +15541,8 @@ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jes/linux.git rtl8xxxu-deve F: drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/ RTRS TRANSPORT DRIVERS -M: Danil Kipnis -M: Jack Wang +M: Md. Haris Iqbal +M: Jack Wang L: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d907294b27d074c4d9813509bfee982ca70db33d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Weihang Li Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2021 16:46:24 +0800 Subject: MAINTAINERS: remove Xavier as maintainer of HISILICON ROCE DRIVER Wei Hu(Xavier) has left Hisilicon and his email address is invalid now. I'd be glad to add him back with another address if he wants to continue maintain this module. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1617007584-39842-1-git-send-email-liweihang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Weihang Li Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 7b2fb9b6fcc7..a1e3502eee8d 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8090,7 +8090,6 @@ F: drivers/crypto/hisilicon/zip/ HISILICON ROCE DRIVER M: Lijun Ou -M: Wei Hu(Xavier) M: Weihang Li L: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 4a7695429eade517b07ea72f9ec366130e81a076 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bence Csókás Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2021 19:19:21 +0000 Subject: i2c: cp2615: add i2c driver for Silicon Labs' CP2615 Digital Audio Bridge MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Create an i2c_adapter for CP2615's I2C master interface Signed-off-by: Bence Csókás [wsa: switched to '__packed', added some 'static' and an include] Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- MAINTAINERS | 5 + drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig | 10 ++ drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile | 1 + drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c | 330 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 346 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index aa84121c5611..bffcf6a77ae9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -4585,6 +4585,11 @@ F: drivers/counter/ F: include/linux/counter.h F: include/linux/counter_enum.h +CP2615 I2C DRIVER +M: Bence Csókás +S: Maintained +F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c + CPMAC ETHERNET DRIVER M: Florian Fainelli L: netdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig index 05ebf7546e3f..338a306ec39e 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig @@ -1199,6 +1199,16 @@ config I2C_DLN2 This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module will be called i2c-dln2. +config I2C_CP2615 + tristate "Silicon Labs CP2615 USB sound card and I2C adapter" + depends on USB + help + If you say yes to this option, support will be included for Silicon + Labs CP2615's I2C interface. + + This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module + will be called i2c-cp2615. + config I2C_PARPORT tristate "Parallel port adapter" depends on PARPORT diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile b/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile index 615f35e3e31f..45cd53515c77 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile @@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_RCAR) += i2c-rcar.o # External I2C/SMBus adapter drivers obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C) += i2c-diolan-u2c.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_DLN2) += i2c-dln2.o +obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_CP2615) += i2c-cp2615.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_PARPORT) += i2c-parport.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_ROBOTFUZZ_OSIF) += i2c-robotfuzz-osif.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_TAOS_EVM) += i2c-taos-evm.o diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..78cfecd1ea76 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-cp2615.c @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * i2c support for Silicon Labs' CP2615 Digital Audio Bridge + * + * (c) 2021, Bence Csókás + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +/** CP2615 I/O Protocol implementation */ + +#define CP2615_VID 0x10c4 +#define CP2615_PID 0xeac1 + +#define IOP_EP_IN 0x82 +#define IOP_EP_OUT 0x02 +#define IOP_IFN 1 +#define IOP_ALTSETTING 2 + +#define MAX_IOP_SIZE 64 +#define MAX_IOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE (MAX_IOP_SIZE - 6) +#define MAX_I2C_SIZE (MAX_IOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 4) + +enum cp2615_iop_msg_type { + iop_GetAccessoryInfo = 0xD100, + iop_AccessoryInfo = 0xA100, + iop_GetPortConfiguration = 0xD203, + iop_PortConfiguration = 0xA203, + iop_DoI2cTransfer = 0xD400, + iop_I2cTransferResult = 0xA400, + iop_GetSerialState = 0xD501, + iop_SerialState = 0xA501 +}; + +struct __packed cp2615_iop_msg { + __be16 preamble, length, msg; + u8 data[MAX_IOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; +}; + +#define PART_ID_A01 0x1400 +#define PART_ID_A02 0x1500 + +struct __packed cp2615_iop_accessory_info { + __be16 part_id, option_id, proto_ver; +}; + +struct __packed cp2615_i2c_transfer { + u8 tag, i2caddr, read_len, write_len; + u8 data[MAX_I2C_SIZE]; +}; + +/* Possible values for struct cp2615_i2c_transfer_result.status */ +enum cp2615_i2c_status { + /* Writing to the internal EEPROM failed, because it is locked */ + CP2615_CFG_LOCKED = -6, + /* read_len or write_len out of range */ + CP2615_INVALID_PARAM = -4, + /* I2C slave did not ACK in time */ + CP2615_TIMEOUT, + /* I2C bus busy */ + CP2615_BUS_BUSY, + /* I2C bus error (ie. device NAK'd the request) */ + CP2615_BUS_ERROR, + CP2615_SUCCESS +}; + +struct __packed cp2615_i2c_transfer_result { + u8 tag, i2caddr; + s8 status; + u8 read_len; + u8 data[MAX_I2C_SIZE]; +}; + +static int cp2615_init_iop_msg(struct cp2615_iop_msg *ret, enum cp2615_iop_msg_type msg, + const void *data, size_t data_len) +{ + if (data_len > MAX_IOP_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + return -EFBIG; + + if (!ret) + return -EINVAL; + + ret->preamble = 0x2A2A; + ret->length = htons(data_len + 6); + ret->msg = htons(msg); + if (data && data_len) + memcpy(&ret->data, data, data_len); + return 0; +} + +static int cp2615_init_i2c_msg(struct cp2615_iop_msg *ret, const struct cp2615_i2c_transfer *data) +{ + return cp2615_init_iop_msg(ret, iop_DoI2cTransfer, data, 4 + data->write_len); +} + +/* Translates status codes to Linux errno's */ +static int cp2615_check_status(enum cp2615_i2c_status status) +{ + switch (status) { + case CP2615_SUCCESS: + return 0; + case CP2615_BUS_ERROR: + return -ENXIO; + case CP2615_BUS_BUSY: + return -EAGAIN; + case CP2615_TIMEOUT: + return -ETIMEDOUT; + case CP2615_INVALID_PARAM: + return -EINVAL; + case CP2615_CFG_LOCKED: + return -EPERM; + } + /* Unknown error code */ + return -EPROTO; +} + +/** Driver code */ + +static int +cp2615_i2c_send(struct usb_interface *usbif, struct cp2615_i2c_transfer *i2c_w) +{ + struct cp2615_iop_msg *msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg), GFP_KERNEL); + struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif); + int res = cp2615_init_i2c_msg(msg, i2c_w); + + if (!res) + res = usb_bulk_msg(usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, IOP_EP_OUT), + msg, ntohs(msg->length), NULL, 0); + kfree(msg); + return res; +} + +static int +cp2615_i2c_recv(struct usb_interface *usbif, unsigned char tag, void *buf) +{ + struct cp2615_iop_msg *msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg), GFP_KERNEL); + struct cp2615_i2c_transfer_result *i2c_r = (struct cp2615_i2c_transfer_result *)&msg->data; + struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif); + int res = usb_bulk_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, IOP_EP_IN), + msg, sizeof(struct cp2615_iop_msg), NULL, 0); + + if (res < 0) { + kfree(msg); + return res; + } + + if (msg->msg != htons(iop_I2cTransferResult) || i2c_r->tag != tag) { + kfree(msg); + return -EIO; + } + + res = cp2615_check_status(i2c_r->status); + if (!res) + memcpy(buf, &i2c_r->data, i2c_r->read_len); + + kfree(msg); + return res; +} + +/* Checks if the IOP is functional by querying the part's ID */ +static int cp2615_check_iop(struct usb_interface *usbif) +{ + struct cp2615_iop_msg *msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*msg), GFP_KERNEL); + struct cp2615_iop_accessory_info *info = (struct cp2615_iop_accessory_info *)&msg->data; + struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif); + int res = cp2615_init_iop_msg(msg, iop_GetAccessoryInfo, NULL, 0); + + if (res) + goto out; + + res = usb_bulk_msg(usbdev, usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, IOP_EP_OUT), + msg, ntohs(msg->length), NULL, 0); + if (res) + goto out; + + res = usb_bulk_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, IOP_EP_IN), + msg, sizeof(struct cp2615_iop_msg), NULL, 0); + if (res) + goto out; + + if (msg->msg != htons(iop_AccessoryInfo)) { + res = -EIO; + goto out; + } + + switch (ntohs(info->part_id)) { + case PART_ID_A01: + dev_dbg(&usbif->dev, "Found A01 part. (WARNING: errata exists!)\n"); + break; + case PART_ID_A02: + dev_dbg(&usbif->dev, "Found good A02 part.\n"); + break; + default: + dev_warn(&usbif->dev, "Unknown part ID %04X\n", ntohs(info->part_id)); + } + +out: + kfree(msg); + return res; +} + +static int +cp2615_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msgs, int num) +{ + struct usb_interface *usbif = adap->algo_data; + int i = 0, ret = 0; + struct i2c_msg *msg; + struct cp2615_i2c_transfer i2c_w = {0}; + + dev_dbg(&usbif->dev, "Doing %d I2C transactions\n", num); + + for (; !ret && i < num; i++) { + msg = &msgs[i]; + + i2c_w.tag = 0xdd; + i2c_w.i2caddr = i2c_8bit_addr_from_msg(msg); + if (msg->flags & I2C_M_RD) { + i2c_w.read_len = msg->len; + i2c_w.write_len = 0; + } else { + i2c_w.read_len = 0; + i2c_w.write_len = msg->len; + memcpy(&i2c_w.data, msg->buf, i2c_w.write_len); + } + ret = cp2615_i2c_send(usbif, &i2c_w); + if (ret) + break; + ret = cp2615_i2c_recv(usbif, i2c_w.tag, msg->buf); + } + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + return i; +} + +static u32 +cp2615_i2c_func(struct i2c_adapter *adap) +{ + return I2C_FUNC_I2C | I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_EMUL; +} + +static const struct i2c_algorithm cp2615_i2c_algo = { + .master_xfer = cp2615_i2c_master_xfer, + .functionality = cp2615_i2c_func, +}; + +/* + * This chip has some limitations: one is that the USB endpoint + * can only receive 64 bytes/transfer, that leaves 54 bytes for + * the I2C transfer. On top of that, EITHER read_len OR write_len + * may be zero, but not both. If both are non-zero, the adapter + * issues a write followed by a read. And the chip does not + * support repeated START between the write and read phases. + */ +static struct i2c_adapter_quirks cp2615_i2c_quirks = { + .max_write_len = MAX_I2C_SIZE, + .max_read_len = MAX_I2C_SIZE, + .flags = I2C_AQ_COMB_WRITE_THEN_READ | I2C_AQ_NO_ZERO_LEN | I2C_AQ_NO_REP_START, + .max_comb_1st_msg_len = MAX_I2C_SIZE, + .max_comb_2nd_msg_len = MAX_I2C_SIZE +}; + +static void +cp2615_i2c_remove(struct usb_interface *usbif) +{ + struct i2c_adapter *adap = usb_get_intfdata(usbif); + + usb_set_intfdata(usbif, NULL); + i2c_del_adapter(adap); +} + +static int +cp2615_i2c_probe(struct usb_interface *usbif, const struct usb_device_id *id) +{ + int ret = 0; + struct i2c_adapter *adap; + struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif); + + ret = usb_set_interface(usbdev, IOP_IFN, IOP_ALTSETTING); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = cp2615_check_iop(usbif); + if (ret) + return ret; + + adap = devm_kzalloc(&usbif->dev, sizeof(struct i2c_adapter), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!adap) + return -ENOMEM; + + strncpy(adap->name, usbdev->serial, sizeof(adap->name) - 1); + adap->owner = THIS_MODULE; + adap->dev.parent = &usbif->dev; + adap->dev.of_node = usbif->dev.of_node; + adap->timeout = HZ; + adap->algo = &cp2615_i2c_algo; + adap->quirks = &cp2615_i2c_quirks; + adap->algo_data = usbif; + + ret = i2c_add_adapter(adap); + if (ret) + return ret; + + usb_set_intfdata(usbif, adap); + return 0; +} + +static const struct usb_device_id id_table[] = { + { USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_NUMBER(CP2615_VID, CP2615_PID, IOP_IFN) }, + { } +}; + +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(usb, id_table); + +static struct usb_driver cp2615_i2c_driver = { + .name = "i2c-cp2615", + .probe = cp2615_i2c_probe, + .disconnect = cp2615_i2c_remove, + .id_table = id_table, +}; + +module_usb_driver(cp2615_i2c_driver); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Bence Csókás "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("CP2615 I2C bus driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e7cc4f2303b0ce1ecb9d8d381a1763bfea15fea9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suzuki K Poulose Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2021 17:43:01 +0100 Subject: dts: bindings: Document device tree bindings for ETE Document the device tree bindings for Embedded Trace Extensions. ETE can be connected to legacy coresight components and thus could optionally contain a connection graph as described by the CoreSight bindings. Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Mike Leach Reviewed-by: Rob Herring Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210405164307.1720226-15-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 1 + 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7f9b2d1e1147 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only or BSD-2-Clause +# Copyright 2021, Arm Ltd +%YAML 1.2 +--- +$id: "http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/ete.yaml#" +$schema: "http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#" + +title: ARM Embedded Trace Extensions + +maintainers: + - Suzuki K Poulose + - Mathieu Poirier + +description: | + Arm Embedded Trace Extension(ETE) is a per CPU trace component that + allows tracing the CPU execution. It overlaps with the CoreSight ETMv4 + architecture and has extended support for future architecture changes. + The trace generated by the ETE could be stored via legacy CoreSight + components (e.g, TMC-ETR) or other means (e.g, using a per CPU buffer + Arm Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE)). Since the ETE can be connected to + legacy CoreSight components, a node must be listed per instance, along + with any optional connection graph as per the coresight bindings. + See bindings/arm/coresight.txt. + +properties: + $nodename: + pattern: "^ete([0-9a-f]+)$" + compatible: + items: + - const: arm,embedded-trace-extension + + cpu: + description: | + Handle to the cpu this ETE is bound to. + $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/phandle + + out-ports: + description: | + Output connections from the ETE to legacy CoreSight trace bus. + $ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/ports + properties: + port: + description: Output connection from the ETE to legacy CoreSight Trace bus. + $ref: /schemas/graph.yaml#/properties/port + +required: + - compatible + - cpu + +additionalProperties: false + +examples: + +# An ETE node without legacy CoreSight connections + - | + ete0 { + compatible = "arm,embedded-trace-extension"; + cpu = <&cpu_0>; + }; +# An ETE node with legacy CoreSight connections + - | + ete1 { + compatible = "arm,embedded-trace-extension"; + cpu = <&cpu_1>; + + out-ports { /* legacy coresight connection */ + port { + ete1_out_port: endpoint { + remote-endpoint = <&funnel_in_port0>; + }; + }; + }; + }; + +... diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index aa84121c5611..2a20a36c724a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -1761,6 +1761,7 @@ F: Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-coresight-devices-* F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight-cpu-debug.txt F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight-cti.yaml F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight.txt +F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml F: Documentation/trace/coresight/* F: drivers/hwtracing/coresight/* F: include/dt-bindings/arm/coresight-cti-dt.h -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 4fb13790417a7bf726f3867a5d2b9723efde488b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Suzuki K Poulose Date: Mon, 5 Apr 2021 17:43:07 +0100 Subject: dts: bindings: Document device tree bindings for Arm TRBE Document the device tree bindings for Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE). Cc: Anshuman Khandual Cc: Mathieu Poirier Cc: Rob Herring Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Rob Herring Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210405164307.1720226-21-suzuki.poulose@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 1 + 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4402d7bfd1fc --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only or BSD-2-Clause +# Copyright 2021, Arm Ltd +%YAML 1.2 +--- +$id: "http://devicetree.org/schemas/arm/trbe.yaml#" +$schema: "http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#" + +title: ARM Trace Buffer Extensions + +maintainers: + - Anshuman Khandual + +description: | + Arm Trace Buffer Extension (TRBE) is a per CPU component + for storing trace generated on the CPU to memory. It is + accessed via CPU system registers. The software can verify + if it is permitted to use the component by checking the + TRBIDR register. + +properties: + $nodename: + const: "trbe" + compatible: + items: + - const: arm,trace-buffer-extension + + interrupts: + description: | + Exactly 1 PPI must be listed. For heterogeneous systems where + TRBE is only supported on a subset of the CPUs, please consult + the arm,gic-v3 binding for details on describing a PPI partition. + maxItems: 1 + +required: + - compatible + - interrupts + +additionalProperties: false + +examples: + + - | + #include + + trbe { + compatible = "arm,trace-buffer-extension"; + interrupts = ; + }; +... diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2a20a36c724a..471d04bb2d5e 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -1762,6 +1762,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight-cpu-debug.txt F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight-cti.yaml F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/coresight.txt F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/ete.yaml +F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/trbe.yaml F: Documentation/trace/coresight/* F: drivers/hwtracing/coresight/* F: include/dt-bindings/arm/coresight-cti-dt.h -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 1a219e08ecd76a047b231f6e860c0a7d4dfb49b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Zyngier Date: Tue, 6 Apr 2021 14:10:33 +0100 Subject: KVM: arm64: Mark the kvmarm ML as moderated for non-subscribers The kvmarm mailing list is moderated for non-subscriber, but that was never advertised. Fix this with the hope that people will eventually subscribe before posting, saving me the hassle of letting their post through eventually. Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 803bd0551512..54b4f2bcfe19 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9768,7 +9768,7 @@ R: James Morse R: Alexandru Elisei R: Suzuki K Poulose L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) -L: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu +L: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu (moderated for non-subscribers) S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git F: arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm* -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d62fbdb99a85730af408399bfae9fa2aa708c6f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yicong Yang Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2021 19:17:19 +0800 Subject: i2c: add support for HiSilicon I2C controller Add HiSilicon I2C controller driver for the Kunpeng SoC. It provides the access to the i2c busses, which connects to the eeprom, rtc, etc. The driver works with IRQ mode, and supports basic I2C features and 10bit address. The DMA is not supported. Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- MAINTAINERS | 7 + drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile | 1 + drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c | 504 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 522 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2e7607a1f929..56e9e4d777d8 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8044,6 +8044,13 @@ F: drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre.h F: drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_crypto.c F: drivers/crypto/hisilicon/hpre/hpre_main.c +HISILICON I2C CONTROLLER DRIVER +M: Yicong Yang +L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +W: https://www.hisilicon.com +F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c + HISILICON LPC BUS DRIVER M: john.garry@huawei.com S: Maintained diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig index 338a306ec39e..0196d19955b7 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Kconfig @@ -645,6 +645,16 @@ config I2C_HIGHLANDER This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module will be called i2c-highlander. +config I2C_HISI + tristate "HiSilicon I2C controller" + depends on ARM64 || COMPILE_TEST + help + Say Y here if you want to have Hisilicon I2C controller support + available on the Kunpeng Server. + + This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module + will be called i2c-hisi. + config I2C_IBM_IIC tristate "IBM PPC 4xx on-chip I2C interface" depends on 4xx diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile b/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile index 45cd53515c77..69e9963615f6 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/Makefile @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2) += i2c-emev2.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_EXYNOS5) += i2c-exynos5.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_GPIO) += i2c-gpio.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_HIGHLANDER) += i2c-highlander.o +obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_HISI) += i2c-hisi.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_HIX5HD2) += i2c-hix5hd2.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_IBM_IIC) += i2c-ibm_iic.o obj-$(CONFIG_I2C_IMG) += i2c-img-scb.o diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..acf394812061 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-hisi.c @@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * HiSilicon I2C Controller Driver for Kunpeng SoC + * + * Copyright (c) 2021 HiSilicon Technologies Co., Ltd. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL 0x0000 +#define HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_SPEED_MODE GENMASK(1, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_ADDR_TEN BIT(2) +#define HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR 0x0004 +#define HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR_VAL GENMASK(9, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR_GC_S_MODE BIT(10) +#define HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR_GC_S_EN BIT(11) +#define HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA 0x0008 +#define HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_DATA GENMASK(7, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_RW BIT(8) +#define HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_P_EN BIT(9) +#define HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_SR_EN BIT(10) +#define HISI_I2C_RXDATA 0x000c +#define HISI_I2C_RXDATA_DATA GENMASK(7, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_SS_SCL_HCNT 0x0010 +#define HISI_I2C_SS_SCL_LCNT 0x0014 +#define HISI_I2C_FS_SCL_HCNT 0x0018 +#define HISI_I2C_FS_SCL_LCNT 0x001c +#define HISI_I2C_HS_SCL_HCNT 0x0020 +#define HISI_I2C_HS_SCL_LCNT 0x0024 +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_CTRL 0x0028 +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_RX_CLR BIT(0) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_TX_CLR BIT(1) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_RX_AF_THRESH GENMASK(7, 2) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_TX_AE_THRESH GENMASK(13, 8) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE 0x002c +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_RERR BIT(0) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_WERR BIT(1) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_EMPTY BIT(3) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_RERR BIT(6) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_WERR BIT(7) +#define HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_FULL BIT(11) +#define HISI_I2C_SDA_HOLD 0x0030 +#define HISI_I2C_SDA_HOLD_TX GENMASK(15, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_SDA_HOLD_RX GENMASK(23, 16) +#define HISI_I2C_FS_SPK_LEN 0x0038 +#define HISI_I2C_FS_SPK_LEN_CNT GENMASK(7, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_HS_SPK_LEN 0x003c +#define HISI_I2C_HS_SPK_LEN_CNT GENMASK(7, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_MSTAT 0x0044 +#define HISI_I2C_INT_CLR 0x0048 +#define HISI_I2C_INT_MASK 0x004C +#define HISI_I2C_TRANS_STATE 0x0050 +#define HISI_I2C_TRANS_ERR 0x0054 +#define HISI_I2C_VERSION 0x0058 + +#define HISI_I2C_INT_ALL GENMASK(4, 0) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_TRANS_CPLT BIT(0) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_TRANS_ERR BIT(1) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_FIFO_ERR BIT(2) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_RX_FULL BIT(3) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_TX_EMPTY BIT(4) +#define HISI_I2C_INT_ERR \ + (HISI_I2C_INT_TRANS_ERR | HISI_I2C_INT_FIFO_ERR) + +#define HISI_I2C_STD_SPEED_MODE 0 +#define HISI_I2C_FAST_SPEED_MODE 1 +#define HISI_I2C_HIGH_SPEED_MODE 2 + +#define HISI_I2C_TX_FIFO_DEPTH 64 +#define HISI_I2C_RX_FIFO_DEPTH 64 +#define HISI_I2C_TX_F_AE_THRESH 1 +#define HISI_I2C_RX_F_AF_THRESH 60 + +#define HZ_PER_KHZ 1000 + +#define NSEC_TO_CYCLES(ns, clk_rate_khz) \ + DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL((clk_rate_khz) * (ns), NSEC_PER_MSEC) + +struct hisi_i2c_controller { + struct i2c_adapter adapter; + void __iomem *iobase; + struct device *dev; + int irq; + + /* Intermediates for recording the transfer process */ + struct completion *completion; + struct i2c_msg *msgs; + int msg_num; + int msg_tx_idx; + int buf_tx_idx; + int msg_rx_idx; + int buf_rx_idx; + u16 tar_addr; + u32 xfer_err; + + /* I2C bus configuration */ + struct i2c_timings t; + u32 clk_rate_khz; + u32 spk_len; +}; + +static void hisi_i2c_enable_int(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr, u32 mask) +{ + writel_relaxed(mask, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_INT_MASK); +} + +static void hisi_i2c_disable_int(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr, u32 mask) +{ + writel_relaxed((~mask) & HISI_I2C_INT_ALL, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_INT_MASK); +} + +static void hisi_i2c_clear_int(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr, u32 mask) +{ + writel_relaxed(mask, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_INT_CLR); +} + +static void hisi_i2c_handle_errors(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + u32 int_err = ctlr->xfer_err, reg; + + if (int_err & HISI_I2C_INT_FIFO_ERR) { + reg = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE); + + if (reg & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_RERR) + dev_err(ctlr->dev, "rx fifo error read\n"); + + if (reg & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_WERR) + dev_err(ctlr->dev, "rx fifo error write\n"); + + if (reg & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_RERR) + dev_err(ctlr->dev, "tx fifo error read\n"); + + if (reg & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_WERR) + dev_err(ctlr->dev, "tx fifo error write\n"); + } +} + +static int hisi_i2c_start_xfer(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + struct i2c_msg *msg = ctlr->msgs; + u32 reg; + + reg = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL); + reg &= ~HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_ADDR_TEN; + if (msg->flags & I2C_M_TEN) + reg |= HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_ADDR_TEN; + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL); + + reg = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR); + reg &= ~HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR_VAL; + reg |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR_VAL, msg->addr); + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_SLV_ADDR); + + reg = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_CTRL); + reg |= HISI_I2C_FIFO_RX_CLR | HISI_I2C_FIFO_TX_CLR; + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_CTRL); + reg &= ~(HISI_I2C_FIFO_RX_CLR | HISI_I2C_FIFO_TX_CLR); + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_CTRL); + + hisi_i2c_clear_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + hisi_i2c_enable_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + + return 0; +} + +static void hisi_i2c_reset_xfer(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + ctlr->msg_num = 0; + ctlr->xfer_err = 0; + ctlr->msg_tx_idx = 0; + ctlr->msg_rx_idx = 0; + ctlr->buf_tx_idx = 0; + ctlr->buf_rx_idx = 0; +} + +/* + * Initialize the transfer information and start the I2C bus transfer. + * We only configure the transfer and do some pre/post works here, and + * wait for the transfer done. The major transfer process is performed + * in the IRQ handler. + */ +static int hisi_i2c_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msgs, + int num) +{ + struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr = i2c_get_adapdata(adap); + DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done); + int ret = num; + + hisi_i2c_reset_xfer(ctlr); + ctlr->completion = &done; + ctlr->msg_num = num; + ctlr->msgs = msgs; + + hisi_i2c_start_xfer(ctlr); + + if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(ctlr->completion, adap->timeout)) { + hisi_i2c_disable_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + synchronize_irq(ctlr->irq); + i2c_recover_bus(&ctlr->adapter); + dev_err(ctlr->dev, "bus transfer timeout\n"); + ret = -EIO; + } + + if (ctlr->xfer_err) { + hisi_i2c_handle_errors(ctlr); + ret = -EIO; + } + + hisi_i2c_reset_xfer(ctlr); + ctlr->completion = NULL; + + return ret; +} + +static u32 hisi_i2c_functionality(struct i2c_adapter *adap) +{ + return I2C_FUNC_I2C | I2C_FUNC_10BIT_ADDR | I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_EMUL; +} + +static const struct i2c_algorithm hisi_i2c_algo = { + .master_xfer = hisi_i2c_master_xfer, + .functionality = hisi_i2c_functionality, +}; + +static int hisi_i2c_read_rx_fifo(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + struct i2c_msg *cur_msg; + u32 fifo_state; + + while (ctlr->msg_rx_idx < ctlr->msg_num) { + cur_msg = ctlr->msgs + ctlr->msg_rx_idx; + + if (!(cur_msg->flags & I2C_M_RD)) { + ctlr->msg_rx_idx++; + continue; + } + + fifo_state = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE); + while (!(fifo_state & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_EMPTY) && + ctlr->buf_rx_idx < cur_msg->len) { + cur_msg->buf[ctlr->buf_rx_idx++] = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_RXDATA); + fifo_state = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE); + } + + if (ctlr->buf_rx_idx == cur_msg->len) { + ctlr->buf_rx_idx = 0; + ctlr->msg_rx_idx++; + } + + if (fifo_state & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_RX_EMPTY) + break; + } + + return 0; +} + +static void hisi_i2c_xfer_msg(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + int max_write = HISI_I2C_TX_FIFO_DEPTH; + bool need_restart = false, last_msg; + struct i2c_msg *cur_msg; + u32 cmd, fifo_state; + + while (ctlr->msg_tx_idx < ctlr->msg_num) { + cur_msg = ctlr->msgs + ctlr->msg_tx_idx; + last_msg = (ctlr->msg_tx_idx == ctlr->msg_num - 1); + + /* Signal the SR bit when we start transferring a new message */ + if (ctlr->msg_tx_idx && !ctlr->buf_tx_idx) + need_restart = true; + + fifo_state = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE); + while (!(fifo_state & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_FULL) && + ctlr->buf_tx_idx < cur_msg->len && max_write) { + cmd = 0; + + if (need_restart) { + cmd |= HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_SR_EN; + need_restart = false; + } + + /* Signal the STOP bit at the last frame of the last message */ + if (ctlr->buf_tx_idx == cur_msg->len - 1 && last_msg) + cmd |= HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_P_EN; + + if (cur_msg->flags & I2C_M_RD) + cmd |= HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_RW; + else + cmd |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA_DATA, + cur_msg->buf[ctlr->buf_tx_idx]); + + writel(cmd, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_CMD_TXDATA); + ctlr->buf_tx_idx++; + max_write--; + + fifo_state = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE); + } + + /* Update the transfer index after per message transfer is done. */ + if (ctlr->buf_tx_idx == cur_msg->len) { + ctlr->buf_tx_idx = 0; + ctlr->msg_tx_idx++; + } + + if ((fifo_state & HISI_I2C_FIFO_STATE_TX_FULL) || + max_write == 0) + break; + } +} + +static irqreturn_t hisi_i2c_irq(int irq, void *context) +{ + struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr = context; + u32 int_stat; + + int_stat = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_INT_MSTAT); + hisi_i2c_clear_int(ctlr, int_stat); + if (!(int_stat & HISI_I2C_INT_ALL)) + return IRQ_NONE; + + if (int_stat & HISI_I2C_INT_TX_EMPTY) + hisi_i2c_xfer_msg(ctlr); + + if (int_stat & HISI_I2C_INT_ERR) { + ctlr->xfer_err = int_stat; + goto out; + } + + /* Drain the rx fifo before finish the transfer */ + if (int_stat & (HISI_I2C_INT_TRANS_CPLT | HISI_I2C_INT_RX_FULL)) + hisi_i2c_read_rx_fifo(ctlr); + +out: + if (int_stat & HISI_I2C_INT_TRANS_CPLT || ctlr->xfer_err) { + hisi_i2c_disable_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + hisi_i2c_clear_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + complete(ctlr->completion); + } + + return IRQ_HANDLED; +} + +/* + * Helper function for calculating and configuring the HIGH and LOW + * periods of SCL clock. The caller will pass the ratio of the + * counts (divide / divisor) according to the target speed mode, + * and the target registers. + */ +static void hisi_i2c_set_scl(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr, + u32 divide, u32 divisor, + u32 reg_hcnt, u32 reg_lcnt) +{ + u32 total_cnt, t_scl_hcnt, t_scl_lcnt, scl_fall_cnt, scl_rise_cnt; + u32 scl_hcnt, scl_lcnt; + + /* Total SCL clock cycles per speed period */ + total_cnt = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(ctlr->clk_rate_khz * HZ_PER_KHZ, ctlr->t.bus_freq_hz); + /* Total HIGH level SCL clock cycles including edges */ + t_scl_hcnt = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(total_cnt * divide, divisor); + /* Total LOW level SCL clock cycles including edges */ + t_scl_lcnt = total_cnt - t_scl_hcnt; + /* Fall edge SCL clock cycles */ + scl_fall_cnt = NSEC_TO_CYCLES(ctlr->t.scl_fall_ns, ctlr->clk_rate_khz); + /* Rise edge SCL clock cycles */ + scl_rise_cnt = NSEC_TO_CYCLES(ctlr->t.scl_rise_ns, ctlr->clk_rate_khz); + + /* Calculated HIGH and LOW periods of SCL clock */ + scl_hcnt = t_scl_hcnt - ctlr->spk_len - 7 - scl_fall_cnt; + scl_lcnt = t_scl_lcnt - 1 - scl_rise_cnt; + + writel(scl_hcnt, ctlr->iobase + reg_hcnt); + writel(scl_lcnt, ctlr->iobase + reg_lcnt); +} + +static void hisi_i2c_configure_bus(struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr) +{ + u32 reg, sda_hold_cnt, speed_mode; + + i2c_parse_fw_timings(ctlr->dev, &ctlr->t, true); + ctlr->spk_len = NSEC_TO_CYCLES(ctlr->t.digital_filter_width_ns, ctlr->clk_rate_khz); + + switch (ctlr->t.bus_freq_hz) { + case I2C_MAX_FAST_MODE_FREQ: + speed_mode = HISI_I2C_FAST_SPEED_MODE; + hisi_i2c_set_scl(ctlr, 26, 76, HISI_I2C_FS_SCL_HCNT, HISI_I2C_FS_SCL_LCNT); + break; + case I2C_MAX_HIGH_SPEED_MODE_FREQ: + speed_mode = HISI_I2C_HIGH_SPEED_MODE; + hisi_i2c_set_scl(ctlr, 6, 22, HISI_I2C_HS_SCL_HCNT, HISI_I2C_HS_SCL_LCNT); + break; + case I2C_MAX_STANDARD_MODE_FREQ: + default: + speed_mode = HISI_I2C_STD_SPEED_MODE; + + /* For default condition force the bus speed to standard mode. */ + ctlr->t.bus_freq_hz = I2C_MAX_STANDARD_MODE_FREQ; + hisi_i2c_set_scl(ctlr, 40, 87, HISI_I2C_SS_SCL_HCNT, HISI_I2C_SS_SCL_LCNT); + break; + } + + reg = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL); + reg &= ~HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_SPEED_MODE; + reg |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL_SPEED_MODE, speed_mode); + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FRAME_CTRL); + + sda_hold_cnt = NSEC_TO_CYCLES(ctlr->t.sda_hold_ns, ctlr->clk_rate_khz); + + reg = FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_SDA_HOLD_TX, sda_hold_cnt); + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_SDA_HOLD); + + writel(ctlr->spk_len, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FS_SPK_LEN); + + reg = FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_FIFO_RX_AF_THRESH, HISI_I2C_RX_F_AF_THRESH); + reg |= FIELD_PREP(HISI_I2C_FIFO_TX_AE_THRESH, HISI_I2C_TX_F_AE_THRESH); + writel(reg, ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_FIFO_CTRL); +} + +static int hisi_i2c_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct hisi_i2c_controller *ctlr; + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct i2c_adapter *adapter; + u64 clk_rate_hz; + u32 hw_version; + int ret; + + ctlr = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*ctlr), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctlr) + return -ENOMEM; + + ctlr->iobase = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); + if (IS_ERR(ctlr->iobase)) + return PTR_ERR(ctlr->iobase); + + ctlr->irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0); + if (ctlr->irq < 0) + return ctlr->irq; + + ctlr->dev = dev; + + hisi_i2c_disable_int(ctlr, HISI_I2C_INT_ALL); + + ret = devm_request_irq(dev, ctlr->irq, hisi_i2c_irq, 0, "hisi-i2c", ctlr); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "failed to request irq handler, ret = %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = device_property_read_u64(dev, "clk_rate", &clk_rate_hz); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dev, "failed to get clock frequency, ret = %d\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ctlr->clk_rate_khz = DIV_ROUND_UP_ULL(clk_rate_hz, HZ_PER_KHZ); + + hisi_i2c_configure_bus(ctlr); + + adapter = &ctlr->adapter; + snprintf(adapter->name, sizeof(adapter->name), + "HiSilicon I2C Controller %s", dev_name(dev)); + adapter->owner = THIS_MODULE; + adapter->algo = &hisi_i2c_algo; + adapter->dev.parent = dev; + i2c_set_adapdata(adapter, ctlr); + + ret = devm_i2c_add_adapter(dev, adapter); + if (ret) + return ret; + + hw_version = readl(ctlr->iobase + HISI_I2C_VERSION); + dev_info(ctlr->dev, "speed mode is %s. hw version 0x%x\n", + i2c_freq_mode_string(ctlr->t.bus_freq_hz), hw_version); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct acpi_device_id hisi_i2c_acpi_ids[] = { + { "HISI03D1", 0 }, + { } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(acpi, hisi_i2c_acpi_ids); + +static struct platform_driver hisi_i2c_driver = { + .probe = hisi_i2c_probe, + .driver = { + .name = "hisi-i2c", + .acpi_match_table = hisi_i2c_acpi_ids, + }, +}; +module_platform_driver(hisi_i2c_driver); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Yicong Yang "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HiSilicon I2C Controller Driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e8bbc3497e63a887231f88b58e7aeb56906dc1c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chris Packham Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 17:09:56 +1200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add Chris Packham as FREESCALE MPC I2C maintainer Add Chris Packham as FREESCALE MPC I2C maintainer. Signed-off-by: Chris Packham Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- MAINTAINERS | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 56e9e4d777d8..3bc77ba8cd05 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -7135,6 +7135,13 @@ S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-imx-lpi2c.yaml F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx-lpi2c.c +FREESCALE MPC I2C DRIVER +M: Chris Packham +L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/i2c/i2c-mpc.yaml +F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-mpc.c + FREESCALE QORIQ DPAA ETHERNET DRIVER M: Madalin Bucur L: netdev@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d19989a2d9d79c226bb5c094d1cc9f0c8959e9f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giulio Benetti Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 18:46:41 -0700 Subject: dt-bindings: touchscreen: Add HY46XX bindings This adds device tree bindings for the Hycon HY46XX touchscreen series. Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti Reviewed-by: Rob Herring Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210413144446.2277817-3-giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov --- .../bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 6 ++ 2 files changed, 125 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..942562f1e45b --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause) +%YAML 1.2 +--- +$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml# +$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml# + +title: Hycon HY46XX series touchscreen controller bindings + +description: | + There are 6 variants of the chip for various touch panel sizes and cover lens material + Glass: 0.3mm--4.0mm + PET/PMMA: 0.2mm--2.0mm + HY4613(B)-N048 < 6" + HY4614(B)-N068 7" .. 10.1" + HY4621-NS32 < 5" + HY4623-NS48 5.1" .. 7" + Glass: 0.3mm--8.0mm + PET/PMMA: 0.2mm--4.0mm + HY4633(B)-N048 < 6" + HY4635(B)-N048 < 7" .. 10.1" + +maintainers: + - Giulio Benetti + +allOf: + - $ref: touchscreen.yaml# + +properties: + compatible: + enum: + - hycon,hy4613 + - hycon,hy4614 + - hycon,hy4621 + - hycon,hy4623 + - hycon,hy4633 + - hycon,hy4635 + + reg: + maxItems: 1 + + interrupts: + maxItems: 1 + + reset-gpios: + maxItems: 1 + + vcc-supply: true + + hycon,threshold: + description: Allows setting the sensitivity in the range from 0 to 255. + $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32 + minimum: 0 + maximum: 255 + + hycon,glove-enable: + type: boolean + description: Allows enabling glove setting. + + hycon,report-speed-hz: + description: Allows setting the report speed in Hertz. + minimum: 1 + maximum: 255 + + hycon,noise-filter-enable: + type: boolean + description: Allows enabling power noise filter. + + hycon,filter-data: + description: Allows setting how many samples throw before reporting touch + in the range from 0 to 5. + $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32 + minimum: 0 + maximum: 5 + + hycon,gain: + description: Allows setting the sensitivity distance in the range from 0 to 5. + $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32 + minimum: 0 + maximum: 5 + + hycon,edge-offset: + description: Allows setting the edge compensation in the range from 0 to 16. + $ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/uint32 + minimum: 0 + maximum: 16 + + touchscreen-size-x: true + touchscreen-size-y: true + touchscreen-fuzz-x: true + touchscreen-fuzz-y: true + touchscreen-inverted-x: true + touchscreen-inverted-y: true + touchscreen-swapped-x-y: true + interrupt-controller: true + +additionalProperties: false + +required: + - compatible + - reg + - interrupts + +examples: + - | + #include + #include + i2c { + #address-cells = <1>; + #size-cells = <0>; + touchscreen@1c { + compatible = "hycon,hy4633"; + reg = <0x1c>; + interrupt-parent = <&gpio2>; + interrupts = <5 IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_FALLING>; + reset-gpios = <&gpio2 6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; + }; + }; + +... diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 9e876927c60d..a27c8efaa681 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8244,6 +8244,12 @@ S: Maintained F: mm/hwpoison-inject.c F: mm/memory-failure.c +HYCON HY46XX TOUCHSCREEN SUPPORT +M: Giulio Benetti +L: linux-input@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml + HYGON PROCESSOR SUPPORT M: Pu Wen L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From aa2f62cf211a0985c14fd78a17d55296769698d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Giulio Benetti Date: Tue, 13 Apr 2021 18:46:53 -0700 Subject: Input: add driver for the Hycon HY46XX touchpanel series This patch adds support for Hycon HY46XX. Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210413144446.2277817-4-giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + drivers/input/touchscreen/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/input/touchscreen/Makefile | 1 + drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c | 591 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 604 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index a27c8efaa681..e2a4d7cb38a2 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8249,6 +8249,7 @@ M: Giulio Benetti L: linux-input@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml +F: drivers/input/touchscreen/hy46xx.c HYGON PROCESSOR SUPPORT M: Pu Wen diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/Kconfig b/drivers/input/touchscreen/Kconfig index 5f76192164c1..ad454cd2855a 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/Kconfig @@ -411,6 +411,17 @@ config TOUCHSCREEN_HIDEEP To compile this driver as a module, choose M here : the module will be called hideep_ts. +config TOUCHSCREEN_HYCON_HY46XX + tristate "Hycon hy46xx touchscreen support" + depends on I2C + help + Say Y here if you have a touchscreen using Hycon hy46xx + + If unsure, say N. + + To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the + module will be called hycon-hy46xx. + config TOUCHSCREEN_ILI210X tristate "Ilitek ILI210X based touchscreen" depends on I2C diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/Makefile b/drivers/input/touchscreen/Makefile index 92267fe53cdb..7d34100f7f22 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/Makefile +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_DA9052) += da9052_tsi.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_DYNAPRO) += dynapro.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EDT_FT5X06) += edt-ft5x06.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_HAMPSHIRE) += hampshire.o +obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_HYCON_HY46XX) += hycon-hy46xx.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_GUNZE) += gunze.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EETI) += eeti_ts.o obj-$(CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EKTF2127) += ektf2127.o diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..891d0430083e --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c @@ -0,0 +1,591 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2021 + * Author(s): Giulio Benetti + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#define HY46XX_CHKSUM_CODE 0x1 +#define HY46XX_FINGER_NUM 0x2 +#define HY46XX_CHKSUM_LEN 0x7 +#define HY46XX_THRESHOLD 0x80 +#define HY46XX_GLOVE_EN 0x84 +#define HY46XX_REPORT_SPEED 0x88 +#define HY46XX_PWR_NOISE_EN 0x89 +#define HY46XX_FILTER_DATA 0x8A +#define HY46XX_GAIN 0x92 +#define HY46XX_EDGE_OFFSET 0x93 +#define HY46XX_RX_NR_USED 0x94 +#define HY46XX_TX_NR_USED 0x95 +#define HY46XX_PWR_MODE 0xA5 +#define HY46XX_FW_VERSION 0xA6 +#define HY46XX_LIB_VERSION 0xA7 +#define HY46XX_TP_INFO 0xA8 +#define HY46XX_TP_CHIP_ID 0xA9 +#define HY46XX_BOOT_VER 0xB0 + +#define HY46XX_TPLEN 0x6 +#define HY46XX_REPORT_PKT_LEN 0x44 + +#define HY46XX_MAX_SUPPORTED_POINTS 11 + +#define TOUCH_EVENT_DOWN 0x00 +#define TOUCH_EVENT_UP 0x01 +#define TOUCH_EVENT_CONTACT 0x02 +#define TOUCH_EVENT_RESERVED 0x03 + +struct hycon_hy46xx_data { + struct i2c_client *client; + struct input_dev *input; + struct touchscreen_properties prop; + struct regulator *vcc; + + struct gpio_desc *reset_gpio; + + struct mutex mutex; + struct regmap *regmap; + + int threshold; + bool glove_enable; + int report_speed; + bool noise_filter_enable; + int filter_data; + int gain; + int edge_offset; + int rx_number_used; + int tx_number_used; + int power_mode; + int fw_version; + int lib_version; + int tp_information; + int tp_chip_id; + int bootloader_version; +}; + +static const struct regmap_config hycon_hy46xx_i2c_regmap_config = { + .reg_bits = 8, + .val_bits = 8, +}; + +static bool hycon_hy46xx_check_checksum(struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata, u8 *buf) +{ + u8 chksum = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 2; i < buf[HY46XX_CHKSUM_LEN]; i++) + chksum += buf[i]; + + if (chksum == buf[HY46XX_CHKSUM_CODE]) + return true; + + dev_err_ratelimited(&tsdata->client->dev, + "checksum error: 0x%02x expected, got 0x%02x\n", + chksum, buf[HY46XX_CHKSUM_CODE]); + + return false; +} + +static irqreturn_t hycon_hy46xx_isr(int irq, void *dev_id) +{ + struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata = dev_id; + struct device *dev = &tsdata->client->dev; + u8 rdbuf[HY46XX_REPORT_PKT_LEN]; + int i, x, y, id; + int error; + + memset(rdbuf, 0, sizeof(rdbuf)); + + error = regmap_bulk_read(tsdata->regmap, 0, rdbuf, sizeof(rdbuf)); + if (error) { + dev_err_ratelimited(dev, "Unable to fetch data, error: %d\n", + error); + goto out; + } + + if (!hycon_hy46xx_check_checksum(tsdata, rdbuf)) + goto out; + + for (i = 0; i < HY46XX_MAX_SUPPORTED_POINTS; i++) { + u8 *buf = &rdbuf[3 + (HY46XX_TPLEN * i)]; + int type = buf[0] >> 6; + + if (type == TOUCH_EVENT_RESERVED) + continue; + + x = get_unaligned_be16(buf) & 0x0fff; + y = get_unaligned_be16(buf + 2) & 0x0fff; + + id = buf[2] >> 4; + + input_mt_slot(tsdata->input, id); + if (input_mt_report_slot_state(tsdata->input, MT_TOOL_FINGER, + type != TOUCH_EVENT_UP)) + touchscreen_report_pos(tsdata->input, &tsdata->prop, + x, y, true); + } + + input_mt_report_pointer_emulation(tsdata->input, false); + input_sync(tsdata->input); + +out: + return IRQ_HANDLED; +} + +struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute { + struct device_attribute dattr; + size_t field_offset; + u8 address; + u8 limit_low; + u8 limit_high; +}; + +#define HYCON_ATTR_U8(_field, _mode, _address, _limit_low, _limit_high) \ + struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute hycon_hy46xx_attr_##_field = { \ + .dattr = __ATTR(_field, _mode, \ + hycon_hy46xx_setting_show, \ + hycon_hy46xx_setting_store), \ + .field_offset = offsetof(struct hycon_hy46xx_data, _field), \ + .address = _address, \ + .limit_low = _limit_low, \ + .limit_high = _limit_high, \ + } + +#define HYCON_ATTR_BOOL(_field, _mode, _address) \ + struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute hycon_hy46xx_attr_##_field = { \ + .dattr = __ATTR(_field, _mode, \ + hycon_hy46xx_setting_show, \ + hycon_hy46xx_setting_store), \ + .field_offset = offsetof(struct hycon_hy46xx_data, _field), \ + .address = _address, \ + .limit_low = false, \ + .limit_high = true, \ + } + +static ssize_t hycon_hy46xx_setting_show(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *dattr, char *buf) +{ + struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev); + struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata = i2c_get_clientdata(client); + struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute *attr = + container_of(dattr, struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute, dattr); + u8 *field = (u8 *)tsdata + attr->field_offset; + size_t count = 0; + int error = 0; + int val; + + mutex_lock(&tsdata->mutex); + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, attr->address, &val); + if (error < 0) { + dev_err(&tsdata->client->dev, + "Failed to fetch attribute %s, error %d\n", + dattr->attr.name, error); + goto out; + } + + if (val != *field) { + dev_warn(&tsdata->client->dev, + "%s: read (%d) and stored value (%d) differ\n", + dattr->attr.name, val, *field); + *field = val; + } + + count = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", val); + +out: + mutex_unlock(&tsdata->mutex); + return error ?: count; +} + +static ssize_t hycon_hy46xx_setting_store(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *dattr, + const char *buf, size_t count) +{ + struct i2c_client *client = to_i2c_client(dev); + struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata = i2c_get_clientdata(client); + struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute *attr = + container_of(dattr, struct hycon_hy46xx_attribute, dattr); + u8 *field = (u8 *)tsdata + attr->field_offset; + unsigned int val; + int error; + + mutex_lock(&tsdata->mutex); + + error = kstrtouint(buf, 0, &val); + if (error) + goto out; + + if (val < attr->limit_low || val > attr->limit_high) { + error = -ERANGE; + goto out; + } + + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, attr->address, val); + if (error < 0) { + dev_err(&tsdata->client->dev, + "Failed to update attribute %s, error: %d\n", + dattr->attr.name, error); + goto out; + } + *field = val; + +out: + mutex_unlock(&tsdata->mutex); + return error ?: count; +} + +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(threshold, 0644, HY46XX_THRESHOLD, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_BOOL(glove_enable, 0644, HY46XX_GLOVE_EN); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(report_speed, 0644, HY46XX_REPORT_SPEED, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_BOOL(noise_filter_enable, 0644, HY46XX_PWR_NOISE_EN); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(filter_data, 0644, HY46XX_FILTER_DATA, 0, 5); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(gain, 0644, HY46XX_GAIN, 0, 5); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(edge_offset, 0644, HY46XX_EDGE_OFFSET, 0, 5); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(fw_version, 0444, HY46XX_FW_VERSION, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(lib_version, 0444, HY46XX_LIB_VERSION, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(tp_information, 0444, HY46XX_TP_INFO, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(tp_chip_id, 0444, HY46XX_TP_CHIP_ID, 0, 255); +static HYCON_ATTR_U8(bootloader_version, 0444, HY46XX_BOOT_VER, 0, 255); + +static struct attribute *hycon_hy46xx_attrs[] = { + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_threshold.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_glove_enable.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_report_speed.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_noise_filter_enable.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_filter_data.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_gain.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_edge_offset.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_fw_version.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_lib_version.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_tp_information.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_tp_chip_id.dattr.attr, + &hycon_hy46xx_attr_bootloader_version.dattr.attr, + NULL +}; + +static const struct attribute_group hycon_hy46xx_attr_group = { + .attrs = hycon_hy46xx_attrs, +}; + +static void hycon_hy46xx_get_defaults(struct device *dev, struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata) +{ + bool val_bool; + int error; + u32 val; + + error = device_property_read_u32(dev, "hycon,threshold", &val); + if (!error) { + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_THRESHOLD, val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + + tsdata->threshold = val; + } + + val_bool = device_property_read_bool(dev, "hycon,glove-enable"); + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_GLOVE_EN, val_bool); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->glove_enable = val_bool; + + error = device_property_read_u32(dev, "hycon,report-speed-hz", &val); + if (!error) { + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_REPORT_SPEED, val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + + tsdata->report_speed = val; + } + + val_bool = device_property_read_bool(dev, "hycon,noise-filter-enable"); + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_PWR_NOISE_EN, val_bool); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->noise_filter_enable = val_bool; + + error = device_property_read_u32(dev, "hycon,filter-data", &val); + if (!error) { + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_FILTER_DATA, val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + + tsdata->filter_data = val; + } + + error = device_property_read_u32(dev, "hycon,gain", &val); + if (!error) { + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_GAIN, val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + + tsdata->gain = val; + } + + error = device_property_read_u32(dev, "hycon,edge-offset", &val); + if (!error) { + error = regmap_write(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_EDGE_OFFSET, val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + + tsdata->edge_offset = val; + } + + return; +out: + dev_err(&tsdata->client->dev, "Failed to set default settings"); +} + +static void hycon_hy46xx_get_parameters(struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata) +{ + int error; + u32 val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_THRESHOLD, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->threshold = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_GLOVE_EN, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->glove_enable = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_REPORT_SPEED, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->report_speed = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_PWR_NOISE_EN, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->noise_filter_enable = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_FILTER_DATA, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->filter_data = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_GAIN, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->gain = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_EDGE_OFFSET, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->edge_offset = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_RX_NR_USED, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->rx_number_used = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_TX_NR_USED, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->tx_number_used = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_PWR_MODE, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->power_mode = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_FW_VERSION, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->fw_version = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_LIB_VERSION, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->lib_version = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_TP_INFO, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->tp_information = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_TP_CHIP_ID, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->tp_chip_id = val; + + error = regmap_read(tsdata->regmap, HY46XX_BOOT_VER, &val); + if (error < 0) + goto out; + tsdata->bootloader_version = val; + + return; +out: + dev_err(&tsdata->client->dev, "Failed to read default settings"); +} + +static void hycon_hy46xx_disable_regulator(void *arg) +{ + struct hycon_hy46xx_data *data = arg; + + regulator_disable(data->vcc); +} + +static int hycon_hy46xx_probe(struct i2c_client *client, + const struct i2c_device_id *id) +{ + struct hycon_hy46xx_data *tsdata; + struct input_dev *input; + int error; + + dev_dbg(&client->dev, "probing for HYCON HY46XX I2C\n"); + + tsdata = devm_kzalloc(&client->dev, sizeof(*tsdata), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tsdata) + return -ENOMEM; + + tsdata->vcc = devm_regulator_get(&client->dev, "vcc"); + if (IS_ERR(tsdata->vcc)) { + error = PTR_ERR(tsdata->vcc); + if (error != -EPROBE_DEFER) + dev_err(&client->dev, + "failed to request regulator: %d\n", error); + return error; + } + + error = regulator_enable(tsdata->vcc); + if (error < 0) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "failed to enable vcc: %d\n", error); + return error; + } + + error = devm_add_action_or_reset(&client->dev, + hycon_hy46xx_disable_regulator, + tsdata); + if (error) + return error; + + tsdata->reset_gpio = devm_gpiod_get_optional(&client->dev, + "reset", GPIOD_OUT_LOW); + if (IS_ERR(tsdata->reset_gpio)) { + error = PTR_ERR(tsdata->reset_gpio); + dev_err(&client->dev, + "Failed to request GPIO reset pin, error %d\n", error); + return error; + } + + if (tsdata->reset_gpio) { + usleep_range(5000, 6000); + gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tsdata->reset_gpio, 1); + usleep_range(5000, 6000); + gpiod_set_value_cansleep(tsdata->reset_gpio, 0); + msleep(1000); + } + + input = devm_input_allocate_device(&client->dev); + if (!input) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "failed to allocate input device.\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + mutex_init(&tsdata->mutex); + tsdata->client = client; + tsdata->input = input; + + tsdata->regmap = devm_regmap_init_i2c(client, + &hycon_hy46xx_i2c_regmap_config); + if (IS_ERR(tsdata->regmap)) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "regmap allocation failed\n"); + return PTR_ERR(tsdata->regmap); + } + + hycon_hy46xx_get_defaults(&client->dev, tsdata); + hycon_hy46xx_get_parameters(tsdata); + + input->name = "Hycon Capacitive Touch"; + input->id.bustype = BUS_I2C; + input->dev.parent = &client->dev; + + input_set_abs_params(input, ABS_MT_POSITION_X, 0, -1, 0, 0); + input_set_abs_params(input, ABS_MT_POSITION_Y, 0, -1, 0, 0); + + touchscreen_parse_properties(input, true, &tsdata->prop); + + error = input_mt_init_slots(input, HY46XX_MAX_SUPPORTED_POINTS, + INPUT_MT_DIRECT); + if (error) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "Unable to init MT slots.\n"); + return error; + } + + i2c_set_clientdata(client, tsdata); + + error = devm_request_threaded_irq(&client->dev, client->irq, + NULL, hycon_hy46xx_isr, IRQF_ONESHOT, + client->name, tsdata); + if (error) { + dev_err(&client->dev, "Unable to request touchscreen IRQ.\n"); + return error; + } + + error = devm_device_add_group(&client->dev, &hycon_hy46xx_attr_group); + if (error) + return error; + + error = input_register_device(input); + if (error) + return error; + + dev_dbg(&client->dev, + "HYCON HY46XX initialized: IRQ %d, Reset pin %d.\n", + client->irq, + tsdata->reset_gpio ? desc_to_gpio(tsdata->reset_gpio) : -1); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct i2c_device_id hycon_hy46xx_id[] = { + { .name = "hy4613" }, + { .name = "hy4614" }, + { .name = "hy4621" }, + { .name = "hy4623" }, + { .name = "hy4633" }, + { .name = "hy4635" }, + { /* sentinel */ } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, hycon_hy46xx_id); + +static const struct of_device_id hycon_hy46xx_of_match[] = { + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4613" }, + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4614" }, + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4621" }, + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4623" }, + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4633" }, + { .compatible = "hycon,hy4635" }, + { /* sentinel */ } +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, hycon_hy46xx_of_match); + +static struct i2c_driver hycon_hy46xx_driver = { + .driver = { + .name = "hycon_hy46xx", + .of_match_table = hycon_hy46xx_of_match, + .probe_type = PROBE_PREFER_ASYNCHRONOUS, + }, + .id_table = hycon_hy46xx_id, + .probe = hycon_hy46xx_probe, +}; + +module_i2c_driver(hycon_hy46xx_driver); + +MODULE_AUTHOR("Giulio Benetti "); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("HYCON HY46XX I2C Touchscreen Driver"); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 5b5f1121d60bca8305951930d7aa2123fb213cb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukasz Luba Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 11:59:08 +0000 Subject: MAINTAINERS: update thermal CPU cooling section Update maintainers responsible for CPU cooling on Arm side. Signed-off-by: Lukasz Luba Acked-by: Viresh Kumar Acked-by: Javi Merino Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210217115908.22547-1-lukasz.luba@arm.com --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index f919aa861165..6926711e9cf8 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -17771,7 +17771,7 @@ THERMAL/CPU_COOLING M: Amit Daniel Kachhap M: Daniel Lezcano M: Viresh Kumar -M: Javi Merino +R: Lukasz Luba L: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org S: Supported F: Documentation/driver-api/thermal/cpu-cooling-api.rst -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d12b64b9764ea17554fb230784ebf91287ed807e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 22:40:26 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: repair reference in HYCON HY46XX TOUCHSCREEN SUPPORT Commit aa2f62cf211a ("Input: add driver for the Hycon HY46XX touchpanel series") adds the file ./drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c, but the file entry in MAINTAINERS refers to ./drivers/input/touchscreen/hy46xx.c. Hence, ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --self-test=patterns complains: warning: no file matches F: drivers/input/touchscreen/hy46xx.c Repair the file entry by referring to the right location. Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Acked-by: Giulio Benetti Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210419060023.3460-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index e2a4d7cb38a2..3799f33650f9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -8249,7 +8249,7 @@ M: Giulio Benetti L: linux-input@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/input/touchscreen/hycon,hy46xx.yaml -F: drivers/input/touchscreen/hy46xx.c +F: drivers/input/touchscreen/hycon-hy46xx.c HYGON PROCESSOR SUPPORT M: Pu Wen -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 90945448e9830aa1b39d7acaa4e0724a001e2ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:11 +0200 Subject: landlock: Add object management MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit A Landlock object enables to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). A Landlock rule is a set of access rights allowed on an object. Rules are grouped in rulesets that may be tied to a set of processes (i.e. subjects) to enforce a scoped access-control (i.e. a domain). Because Landlock's goal is to empower any process (especially unprivileged ones) to sandbox themselves, we cannot rely on a system-wide object identification such as file extended attributes. Indeed, we need innocuous, composable and modular access-controls. The main challenge with these constraints is to identify kernel objects while this identification is useful (i.e. when a security policy makes use of this object). But this identification data should be freed once no policy is using it. This ephemeral tagging should not and may not be written in the filesystem. We then need to manage the lifetime of a rule according to the lifetime of its objects. To avoid a global lock, this implementation make use of RCU and counters to safely reference objects. A following commit uses this generic object management for inodes. Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 10 +++++ security/Kconfig | 1 + security/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++ security/landlock/Makefile | 3 ++ security/landlock/object.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/object.h | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 195 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig create mode 100644 security/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/object.h (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index aa84121c5611..87a2738dfdec 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9997,6 +9997,16 @@ F: net/core/sock_map.c F: net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c F: net/ipv4/udp_bpf.c +LANDLOCK SECURITY MODULE +M: Mickaël Salaün +L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org +S: Supported +W: https://landlock.io +T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git +F: security/landlock/ +K: landlock +K: LANDLOCK + LANTIQ / INTEL Ethernet drivers M: Hauke Mehrtens L: netdev@vger.kernel.org diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 7561f6f99f1d..15a4342b5d01 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -238,6 +238,7 @@ source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" source "security/yama/Kconfig" source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" +source "security/landlock/Kconfig" source "security/integrity/Kconfig" diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index 3baf435de541..47e432900e24 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) += loadpin subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown subdir-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf +subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock # always enable default capabilities obj-y += commoncap.o @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) += safesetid/ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) += lockdown/ obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += device_cgroup.o obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) += bpf/ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) += landlock/ # Object integrity file lists subdir-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c1e862a38410 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock support" + depends on SECURITY + select SECURITY_PATH + help + Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict + themselves (and their future children) by gradually enforcing + tailored access control policies. A Landlock security policy is a + set of access rights (e.g. open a file in read-only, make a + directory, etc.) tied to a file hierarchy. Such policy can be + configured and enforced by any processes for themselves using the + dedicated system calls: landlock_create_ruleset(), + landlock_add_rule(), and landlock_restrict_self(). + + See Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst for further information. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. Otherwise, + you should also prepend "landlock," to the content of CONFIG_LSM to + enable Landlock at boot time. diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..cb6deefbf4c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o + +landlock-y := object.o diff --git a/security/landlock/object.c b/security/landlock/object.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d674fdf9ff04 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/object.c @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Object management + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "object.h" + +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, + void *const underobj) +{ + struct landlock_object *new_object; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!underops || !underobj)) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + new_object = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_object), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); + if (!new_object) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + refcount_set(&new_object->usage, 1); + spin_lock_init(&new_object->lock); + new_object->underops = underops; + new_object->underobj = underobj; + return new_object; +} + +/* + * The caller must own the object (i.e. thanks to object->usage) to safely put + * it. + */ +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object) +{ + /* + * The call to @object->underops->release(object) might sleep, e.g. + * because of iput(). + */ + might_sleep(); + if (!object) + return; + + /* + * If the @object's refcount cannot drop to zero, we can just decrement + * the refcount without holding a lock. Otherwise, the decrement must + * happen under @object->lock for synchronization with things like + * get_inode_object(). + */ + if (refcount_dec_and_lock(&object->usage, &object->lock)) { + __acquire(&object->lock); + /* + * With @object->lock initially held, remove the reference from + * @object->underobj to @object (if it still exists). + */ + object->underops->release(object); + kfree_rcu(object, rcu_free); + } +} diff --git a/security/landlock/object.h b/security/landlock/object.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f80674c6c8d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/object.h @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Object management + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H + +#include +#include +#include + +struct landlock_object; + +/** + * struct landlock_object_underops - Operations on an underlying object + */ +struct landlock_object_underops { + /** + * @release: Releases the underlying object (e.g. iput() for an inode). + */ + void (*release)(struct landlock_object *const object) + __releases(object->lock); +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_object - Security blob tied to a kernel object + * + * The goal of this structure is to enable to tie a set of ephemeral access + * rights (pertaining to different domains) to a kernel object (e.g an inode) + * in a safe way. This implies to handle concurrent use and modification. + * + * The lifetime of a &struct landlock_object depends on the rules referring to + * it. + */ +struct landlock_object { + /** + * @usage: This counter is used to tie an object to the rules matching + * it or to keep it alive while adding a new rule. If this counter + * reaches zero, this struct must not be modified, but this counter can + * still be read from within an RCU read-side critical section. When + * adding a new rule to an object with a usage counter of zero, we must + * wait until the pointer to this object is set to NULL (or recycled). + */ + refcount_t usage; + /** + * @lock: Protects against concurrent modifications. This lock must be + * held from the time @usage drops to zero until any weak references + * from @underobj to this object have been cleaned up. + * + * Lock ordering: inode->i_lock nests inside this. + */ + spinlock_t lock; + /** + * @underobj: Used when cleaning up an object and to mark an object as + * tied to its underlying kernel structure. This pointer is protected + * by @lock. Cf. landlock_release_inodes() and release_inode(). + */ + void *underobj; + union { + /** + * @rcu_free: Enables lockless use of @usage, @lock and + * @underobj from within an RCU read-side critical section. + * @rcu_free and @underops are only used by + * landlock_put_object(). + */ + struct rcu_head rcu_free; + /** + * @underops: Enables landlock_put_object() to release the + * underlying object (e.g. inode). + */ + const struct landlock_object_underops *underops; + }; +}; + +struct landlock_object *landlock_create_object( + const struct landlock_object_underops *const underops, + void *const underobj); + +void landlock_put_object(struct landlock_object *const object); + +static inline void landlock_get_object(struct landlock_object *const object) +{ + if (object) + refcount_inc(&object->usage); +} + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_OBJECT_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From cb2c7d1a1776057c9a1f48ed1250d85e94d4850d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:17 +0200 Subject: landlock: Support filesystem access-control MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Using Landlock objects and ruleset, it is possible to tag inodes according to a process's domain. To enable an unprivileged process to express a file hierarchy, it first needs to open a directory (or a file) and pass this file descriptor to the kernel through landlock_add_rule(2). When checking if a file access request is allowed, we walk from the requested dentry to the real root, following the different mount layers. The access to each "tagged" inodes are collected according to their rule layer level, and ANDed to create access to the requested file hierarchy. This makes possible to identify a lot of files without tagging every inodes nor modifying the filesystem, while still following the view and understanding the user has from the filesystem. Add a new ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES for UML because it currently does not keep the same struct inodes for the same inodes whereas these inodes are in use. This commit adds a minimal set of supported filesystem access-control which doesn't enable to restrict all file-related actions. This is the result of multiple discussions to minimize the code of Landlock to ease review. Thanks to the Landlock design, extending this access-control without breaking user space will not be a problem. Moreover, seccomp filters can be used to restrict the use of syscall families which may not be currently handled by Landlock. Cc: Al Viro Cc: Anton Ivanov Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-8-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + arch/Kconfig | 7 + arch/um/Kconfig | 1 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 76 +++++ security/landlock/Kconfig | 2 +- security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +- security/landlock/fs.c | 692 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/fs.h | 70 +++++ security/landlock/limits.h | 4 + security/landlock/ruleset.c | 4 + security/landlock/setup.c | 7 + security/landlock/setup.h | 2 + 12 files changed, 866 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/fs.h (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 87a2738dfdec..70ec117efa8a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10003,6 +10003,7 @@ L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported W: https://landlock.io T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git +F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h F: security/landlock/ K: landlock K: LANDLOCK diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index ecfd3520b676..8160ab7e3e03 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1013,6 +1013,13 @@ config COMPAT_32BIT_TIME config ARCH_NO_PREEMPT bool +config ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES + def_bool n + help + An arch should select this symbol if it doesn't keep track of inode + instances on its own, but instead relies on something else (e.g. the + host kernel for an UML kernel). + config ARCH_SUPPORTS_RT bool diff --git a/arch/um/Kconfig b/arch/um/Kconfig index c3030db3325f..57cfd9a1c082 100644 --- a/arch/um/Kconfig +++ b/arch/um/Kconfig @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ menu "UML-specific options" config UML bool default y + select ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES select ARCH_HAS_KCOV select ARCH_NO_PREEMPT select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b1a81b5a8b86 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ +/* + * Landlock - User space API + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H +#define _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H + +/** + * DOC: fs_access + * + * A set of actions on kernel objects may be defined by an attribute (e.g. + * &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr) including a bitmask of access. + * + * Filesystem flags + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + * + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of actions on + * files and directories. Files or directories opened before the sandboxing + * are not subject to these restrictions. + * + * A file can only receive these access rights: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. + * + * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The + * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the + * directories beneath it: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR: Open a directory or list its content. + * + * However, the following access rights only apply to the content of a + * directory, not the directory itself: + * + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR: Remove an empty directory or rename one. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE: Unlink (or rename) a file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR: Create (or rename or link) a character + * device. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR: Create (or rename) a directory. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG: Create (or rename or link) a regular file. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK: Create (or rename or link) a UNIX domain + * socket. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO: Create (or rename or link) a named pipe. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK: Create (or rename or link) a block device. + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM: Create (or rename or link) a symbolic link. + * + * .. warning:: + * + * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions + * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, + * :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, + * :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, + * :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, + * :manpage:`access(2)`. + * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. + */ +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE (1ULL << 0) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE (1ULL << 1) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE (1ULL << 2) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR (1ULL << 3) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR (1ULL << 4) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE (1ULL << 5) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR (1ULL << 6) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR (1ULL << 7) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG (1ULL << 8) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK (1ULL << 9) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO (1ULL << 10) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12) + +#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig index c1e862a38410..8e33c4e8ffb8 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK bool "Landlock support" - depends on SECURITY + depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES select SECURITY_PATH help Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index f1d1eb72fa76..92e3d80ab8ed 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := setup.o object.o ruleset.o \ - cred.o ptrace.o + cred.o ptrace.o fs.o diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..97b8e421f617 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -0,0 +1,692 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" +#include "cred.h" +#include "fs.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "object.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/* Underlying object management */ + +static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object) + __releases(object->lock) +{ + struct inode *const inode = object->underobj; + struct super_block *sb; + + if (!inode) { + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + return; + } + + /* + * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference + * to the underlying inode. + */ + object->underobj = NULL; + /* + * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted, + * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput(). + */ + sb = inode->i_sb; + atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + /* + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and + * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. It is therefore + * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); + /* + * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object(). + */ + + iput(inode); + if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)) + wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs); +} + +static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = { + .release = release_inode +}; + +/* Ruleset management */ + +static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode) +{ + struct landlock_object *object, *new_object; + struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode); + + rcu_read_lock(); +retry: + object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object); + if (object) { + if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + return object; + } + /* + * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going + * away. Wait for release_inode(), then retry. + */ + spin_lock(&object->lock); + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + goto retry; + } + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without + * holding any locks). + */ + new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode); + if (IS_ERR(new_object)) + return new_object; + + /* + * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or + * hook_sb_delete(). + */ + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) { + /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */ + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + kfree(new_object); + + rcu_read_lock(); + goto retry; + } + + /* + * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock + * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the + * related object. + */ + ihold(inode); + rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + return new_object; +} + +/* All access rights that can be tied to files. */ +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + +/* + * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd(). + */ +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_rights) +{ + int err; + struct landlock_object *object; + + /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */ + if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) && (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != + ACCESS_FILE) + return -EINVAL; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]; + object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)); + if (IS_ERR(object)) + return PTR_ERR(object); + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights); + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); + /* + * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule() + * increments the refcount for the new object if needed. + */ + landlock_put_object(object); + return err; +} + +/* Access-control management */ + +static inline u64 unmask_layers( + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + const struct path *const path, const u32 access_request, + u64 layer_mask) +{ + const struct landlock_rule *rule; + const struct inode *inode; + size_t i; + + if (d_is_negative(path->dentry)) + /* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */ + return layer_mask; + inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); + rcu_read_lock(); + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, + rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!rule) + return layer_mask; + + /* + * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule + * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses, + * regardless of their position in the layer stack. We must then check + * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to + * the last one. + */ + for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) { + const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i]; + const u64 layer_level = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1); + + /* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */ + if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) { + layer_mask &= ~layer_level; + + if (layer_mask == 0) + return layer_mask; + } + } + return layer_mask; +} + +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_request) +{ + bool allowed = false; + struct path walker_path; + u64 layer_mask; + size_t i; + + /* Make sure all layers can be checked. */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask) < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + + if (!access_request) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path)) + return 0; + /* + * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable + * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through + * /proc//fd/ . + */ + if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) || + (d_is_positive(path->dentry) && + unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + /* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */ + layer_mask = 0; + for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) { + if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request) + layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i); + } + /* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */ + if (layer_mask == 0) + return 0; + + walker_path = *path; + path_get(&walker_path); + /* + * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant + * restriction. + */ + while (true) { + struct dentry *parent_dentry; + + layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path, + access_request, layer_mask); + if (layer_mask == 0) { + /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */ + allowed = true; + break; + } + +jump_up: + if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) { + if (follow_up(&walker_path)) { + /* Ignores hidden mount points. */ + goto jump_up; + } else { + /* + * Stops at the real root. Denies access + * because not all layers have granted access. + */ + allowed = false; + break; + } + } + if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) { + /* + * Stops at disconnected root directories. Only allows + * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is + * reachable through /proc//ns/). + */ + allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL); + break; + } + parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry); + dput(walker_path.dentry); + walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry; + } + path_put(&walker_path); + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; +} + +static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path, + const u32 access_request) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request); +} + +/* Inode hooks */ + +static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode) +{ + /* + * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by + * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete(). + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object); +} + +/* Super-block hooks */ + +/* + * Release the inodes used in a security policy. + * + * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes() + */ +static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) +{ + struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL; + + if (!landlock_initialized) + return; + + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { + struct landlock_object *object; + + /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ + if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) + continue; + + /* + * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g. + * from get_inode_object()). + */ + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + /* + * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE to protect against a race + * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which + * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a + * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object. Also + * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object. + */ + if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) { + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + continue; + } + + rcu_read_lock(); + object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object); + if (!object) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + continue; + } + /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */ + __iget(inode); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + + /* + * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we + * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we + * will just wait for it to finish. + */ + spin_lock(&object->lock); + if (object->underobj == inode) { + object->underobj = NULL; + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * Because object->underobj was not NULL, + * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee + * that it is safe to reset + * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL. + * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock. + */ + rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL); + /* + * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was + * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the + * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop + * walk. Therefore the following call to iput() will + * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at + * least two references to it. + */ + iput(inode); + } else { + spin_unlock(&object->lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); + } + + if (prev_inode) { + /* + * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference + * that we just set in this loop walk. Therefore we + * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't + * disappear from under us until the next loop walk. + */ + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + /* + * We can now actually put the inode reference from the + * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore. + */ + iput(prev_inode); + cond_resched(); + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + } + prev_inode = inode; + } + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + + /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */ + if (prev_inode) + iput(prev_inode); + /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */ + wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs, !atomic_long_read( + &landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs)); +} + +/* + * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem + * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files + * not previously allowed. + * + * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked + * processes. Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a + * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide + * access-control security policy. + * + * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount + * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process. Indeed, we could + * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into + * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point. + * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically + * inherit these new constraints. Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons, + * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag). + */ +static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name, + const struct path *const path, const char *const type, + const unsigned long flags, void *const data) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path, + const struct path *const to_path) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* + * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which + * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden. + */ +static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* + * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace. It must + * then be forbidden for a landlocked process. + * + * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root + * directory of the current process. Moreover, it can be used to restrict the + * view of the filesystem. + */ +static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path, + const struct path *const new_path) +{ + if (!landlock_get_current_domain()) + return 0; + return -EPERM; +} + +/* Path hooks */ + +static inline u32 get_mode_access(const umode_t mode) +{ + switch (mode & S_IFMT) { + case S_IFLNK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM; + case 0: + /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */ + case S_IFREG: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG; + case S_IFDIR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR; + case S_IFCHR: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR; + case S_IFBLK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK; + case S_IFIFO: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO; + case S_IFSOCK: + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK; + default: + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); + return 0; + } +} + +/* + * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not + * handled properly. Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more + * privileges by being accessible from the destination. This is getting more + * complex when dealing with multiple layers. The whole picture can be seen as + * a multilayer partial ordering problem. A future version of Landlock will + * deal with that. + */ +static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry, + const struct path *const new_dir, + struct dentry *const new_dentry) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ + if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry) + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ + return -EXDEV; + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) + return -ENOENT; + return check_access_path(dom, new_dir, + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); +} + +static inline u32 maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + if (d_is_negative(dentry)) + return 0; + return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR : + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE; +} + +static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir, + struct dentry *const old_dentry, + const struct path *const new_dir, + struct dentry *const new_dentry) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */ + if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry) + /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */ + return -EXDEV; + if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry))) + return -ENOENT; + /* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */ + return check_access_path(dom, old_dir, maybe_remove(old_dentry) | + maybe_remove(new_dentry) | + get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode)); +} + +static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR); +} + +static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode, + const unsigned int dev) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode)); +} + +static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry, const char *const old_name) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM); +} + +static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE); +} + +static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir, + struct dentry *const dentry) +{ + return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR); +} + +/* File hooks */ + +static inline u32 get_file_access(const struct file *const file) +{ + u32 access = 0; + + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) { + /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */ + if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; + } + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE; + /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */ + if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC) + access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; + return access; +} + +static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + /* + * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may + * return 0. This case will be handled with a future Landlock + * evolution. + */ + return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file)); +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), + + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..187284b421c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/fs.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +/** + * struct landlock_inode_security - Inode security blob + * + * Enable to reference a &struct landlock_object tied to an inode (i.e. + * underlying object). + */ +struct landlock_inode_security { + /** + * @object: Weak pointer to an allocated object. All assignments of a + * new object are protected by the underlying inode->i_lock. However, + * atomically disassociating @object from the inode is only protected + * by @object->lock, from the time @object's usage refcount drops to + * zero to the time this pointer is nulled out (cf. release_inode() and + * hook_sb_delete()). Indeed, such disassociation doesn't require + * inode->i_lock thanks to the careful rcu_access_pointer() check + * performed by get_inode_object(). + */ + struct landlock_object __rcu *object; +}; + +/** + * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob + * + * Enable hook_sb_delete() to wait for concurrent calls to release_inode(). + */ +struct landlock_superblock_security { + /** + * @inode_refs: Number of pending inodes (from this superblock) that + * are being released by release_inode(). + * Cf. struct super_block->s_fsnotify_inode_refs . + */ + atomic_long_t inode_refs; +}; + +static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode( + const struct inode *const inode) +{ + return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode; +} + +static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *landlock_superblock( + const struct super_block *const superblock) +{ + return superblock->s_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; +} + +__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void); + +int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + const struct path *const path, u32 access_hierarchy); + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h index b734f597bb0e..2a0a1095ee27 100644 --- a/security/landlock/limits.h +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h @@ -10,8 +10,12 @@ #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H #include +#include #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 64 #define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1) + #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c index 2e616f6d5274..ec72b9262bf3 100644 --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c @@ -116,9 +116,11 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void) .num_rules = ~0, .num_layers = ~0, }; + typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0; BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES); BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); } /** @@ -217,9 +219,11 @@ static void build_check_layer(void) { const struct landlock_layer layer = { .level = ~0, + .access = ~0, }; BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.level < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); + BUILD_BUG_ON(layer.access < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS); } /* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */ diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index a5d6ef334991..f8e8e980454c 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -11,17 +11,24 @@ #include "common.h" #include "cred.h" +#include "fs.h" #include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" +bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; + struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct landlock_cred_security), + .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct landlock_inode_security), + .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security), }; static int __init landlock_init(void) { landlock_add_cred_hooks(); landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); + landlock_add_fs_hooks(); + landlock_initialized = true; pr_info("Up and running.\n"); return 0; } diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h index 9fdbf33fcc33..1daffab1ab4b 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.h +++ b/security/landlock/setup.h @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include +extern bool landlock_initialized; + extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes; #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e1199815b47be83346c03e20a3de76f934e4bb34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:20 +0200 Subject: selftests/landlock: Add user space tests MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Test all Landlock system calls, ptrace hooks semantic and filesystem access-control with multiple layouts. Test coverage for security/landlock/ is 93.6% of lines. The code not covered only deals with internal kernel errors (e.g. memory allocation) and race conditions. Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Cc: Shuah Khan Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-11-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/Makefile | 1 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore | 2 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile | 24 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 219 ++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 183 ++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 7 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 2791 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c | 337 +++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c | 5 + 10 files changed, 3570 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 70ec117efa8a..8cab5854844e 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10005,6 +10005,7 @@ W: https://landlock.io T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h F: security/landlock/ +F: tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ K: landlock K: LANDLOCK diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile index 6c575cf34a71..bc3299a20338 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/Makefile @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ TARGETS += ir TARGETS += kcmp TARGETS += kexec TARGETS += kvm +TARGETS += landlock TARGETS += lib TARGETS += livepatch TARGETS += lkdtm diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..470203a7cd73 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +/*_test +/true diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a99596ca9882 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 + +src_test := $(wildcard *_test.c) + +TEST_GEN_PROGS := $(src_test:.c=) + +TEST_GEN_PROGS_EXTENDED := true + +KSFT_KHDR_INSTALL := 1 +OVERRIDE_TARGETS := 1 +include ../lib.mk + +khdr_dir = $(top_srcdir)/usr/include + +$(khdr_dir)/linux/landlock.h: khdr + @: + +$(OUTPUT)/true: true.c + $(LINK.c) $< $(LDLIBS) -o $@ -static + +$(OUTPUT)/%_test: %_test.c $(khdr_dir)/linux/landlock.h ../kselftest_harness.h common.h + $(LINK.c) $< $(LDLIBS) -o $@ -lcap -I$(khdr_dir) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..262c3c8d953a --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - Common user space base + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#ifndef O_PATH +#define O_PATH 010000000 +#endif + +TEST(inconsistent_attr) { + const long page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE); + char *const buf = malloc(page_size + 1); + struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const ruleset_attr = (void *)buf; + + ASSERT_NE(NULL, buf); + + /* Checks copy_from_user(). */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 0, 0)); + /* The size if less than sizeof(struct landlock_attr_enforce). */ + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, 1, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 1, 0)); + /* The size if less than sizeof(struct landlock_attr_enforce). */ + ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, + sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr), 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size + 1, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, + sizeof(struct landlock_ruleset_attr), 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno); + + /* Checks non-zero value. */ + buf[page_size - 2] = '.'; + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr, page_size + 1, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno); + + free(buf); +} + +TEST(empty_path_beneath_attr) { + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + }; + const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + /* Similar to struct landlock_path_beneath_attr.parent_fd = 0 */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + NULL, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EFAULT, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +TEST(inval_fd_enforce) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(-1, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EBADF, errno); +} + +TEST(unpriv_enforce_without_no_new_privs) { + int err; + + drop_caps(_metadata); + err = landlock_restrict_self(-1, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(err, -1); +} + +TEST(ruleset_fd_io) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }; + int ruleset_fd; + char buf; + + drop_caps(_metadata); + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, write(ruleset_fd, ".", 1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, read(ruleset_fd, &buf, 1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +/* Tests enforcement of a ruleset FD transferred through a UNIX socket. */ +TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, + }; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr = { + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, + }; + int ruleset_fd_tx, dir_fd; + union { + /* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */ + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx))]; + struct cmsghdr _align; + } cmsg_tx = {}; + char data_tx = '.'; + struct iovec io = { + .iov_base = &data_tx, + .iov_len = sizeof(data_tx), + }; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_iov = &io, + .msg_iovlen = 1, + .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf, + .msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsg_tx.buf), + }; + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; + int socket_fds[2]; + pid_t child; + int status; + + drop_caps(_metadata); + + /* Creates a test ruleset with a simple rule. */ + ruleset_fd_tx = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_tx); + path_beneath_attr.parent_fd = open("/tmp", O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW | + O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_tx, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath_attr, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd)); + + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + ASSERT_NE(NULL, cmsg); + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)); + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; + memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &ruleset_fd_tx, sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)); + + /* Sends the ruleset FD over a socketpair and then close it. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0, socket_fds)); + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx), sendmsg(socket_fds[0], &msg, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[0])); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_tx)); + + child = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child); + if (child == 0) { + int ruleset_fd_rx; + + *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base = '\0'; + ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(data_tx), recvmsg(socket_fds[1], &msg, MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC)); + ASSERT_EQ('.', *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1])); + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); + ASSERT_EQ(cmsg->cmsg_len, CMSG_LEN(sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx))); + memcpy(&ruleset_fd_rx, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(ruleset_fd_tx)); + + /* Enforces the received ruleset on the child. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd_rx, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_rx)); + + /* Checks that the ruleset enforcement. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + dir_fd = open("/tmp", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd)); + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE); + return; + } + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(socket_fds[1])); + + /* Checks that the parent is unrestricted. */ + dir_fd = open("/", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd)); + dir_fd = open("/tmp", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, dir_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dir_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status)); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..20e2a9286d71 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Landlock test helpers + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + * Copyright © 2021 Microsoft Corporation + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "../kselftest_harness.h" + +#ifndef ARRAY_SIZE +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) +#endif + +/* + * TEST_F_FORK() is useful when a test drop privileges but the corresponding + * FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() requires them (e.g. to remove files from a directory + * where write actions are denied). For convenience, FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() is + * also called when the test failed, but not when FIXTURE_SETUP() failed. For + * this to be possible, we must not call abort() but instead exit smoothly + * (hence the step print). + */ +#define TEST_F_FORK(fixture_name, test_name) \ + static void fixture_name##_##test_name##_child( \ + struct __test_metadata *_metadata, \ + FIXTURE_DATA(fixture_name) *self, \ + const FIXTURE_VARIANT(fixture_name) *variant); \ + TEST_F(fixture_name, test_name) \ + { \ + int status; \ + const pid_t child = fork(); \ + if (child < 0) \ + abort(); \ + if (child == 0) { \ + _metadata->no_print = 1; \ + fixture_name##_##test_name##_child(_metadata, self, variant); \ + if (_metadata->skip) \ + _exit(255); \ + if (_metadata->passed) \ + _exit(0); \ + _exit(_metadata->step); \ + } \ + if (child != waitpid(child, &status, 0)) \ + abort(); \ + if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status)) { \ + _metadata->passed = 0; \ + _metadata->step = 1; \ + return; \ + } \ + switch (WEXITSTATUS(status)) { \ + case 0: \ + _metadata->passed = 1; \ + break; \ + case 255: \ + _metadata->passed = 1; \ + _metadata->skip = 1; \ + break; \ + default: \ + _metadata->passed = 0; \ + _metadata->step = WEXITSTATUS(status); \ + break; \ + } \ + } \ + static void fixture_name##_##test_name##_child( \ + struct __test_metadata __attribute__((unused)) *_metadata, \ + FIXTURE_DATA(fixture_name) __attribute__((unused)) *self, \ + const FIXTURE_VARIANT(fixture_name) \ + __attribute__((unused)) *variant) + +#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset +static inline int landlock_create_ruleset( + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr, + const size_t size, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_add_rule +static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd, + const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, + const void *const rule_attr, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, + rule_attr, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_restrict_self +static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd, + const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags); +} +#endif + +static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all) +{ + cap_t cap_p; + /* Only these three capabilities are useful for the tests. */ + const cap_value_t caps[] = { + CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, + CAP_MKNOD, + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + CAP_SYS_CHROOT, + }; + + cap_p = cap_get_proc(); + EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_get_proc: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_clear(cap_p)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_clear: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + if (!drop_all) { + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_flag(cap_p, CAP_PERMITTED, + ARRAY_SIZE(caps), caps, CAP_SET)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_set_flag: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_proc(cap_p)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_set_proc: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_free(cap_p)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_free: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +/* We cannot put such helpers in a library because of kselftest_harness.h . */ +__attribute__((__unused__)) +static void disable_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + _init_caps(_metadata, false); +} + +__attribute__((__unused__)) +static void drop_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + _init_caps(_metadata, true); +} + +static void _effective_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const cap_value_t caps, const cap_flag_value_t value) +{ + cap_t cap_p; + + cap_p = cap_get_proc(); + EXPECT_NE(NULL, cap_p) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_get_proc: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_flag(cap_p, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, &caps, value)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_set_flag: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_set_proc(cap_p)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_set_proc: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_NE(-1, cap_free(cap_p)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to cap_free: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +__attribute__((__unused__)) +static void set_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const cap_value_t caps) +{ + _effective_cap(_metadata, caps, CAP_SET); +} + +__attribute__((__unused__)) +static void clear_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const cap_value_t caps) +{ + _effective_cap(_metadata, caps, CAP_CLEAR); +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0f0a65287bac --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y +CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y +CONFIG_SECURITY=y +CONFIG_SHMEM=y +CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y +CONFIG_TMPFS=y diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..10c9a1e4ebd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,2791 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - Filesystem + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2020 ANSSI + * Copyright © 2020-2021 Microsoft Corporation + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" + +#define TMP_DIR "tmp" +#define BINARY_PATH "./true" + +/* Paths (sibling number and depth) */ +static const char dir_s1d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1"; +static const char file1_s1d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/f1"; +static const char file2_s1d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/f2"; +static const char dir_s1d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2"; +static const char file1_s1d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2/f1"; +static const char file2_s1d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2/f2"; +static const char dir_s1d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2/s1d3"; +static const char file1_s1d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2/s1d3/f1"; +static const char file2_s1d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s1d1/s1d2/s1d3/f2"; + +static const char dir_s2d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1"; +static const char file1_s2d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/f1"; +static const char dir_s2d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2"; +static const char file1_s2d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/f1"; +static const char dir_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3"; +static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1"; +static const char file2_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2"; + +static const char dir_s3d1[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1"; +/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ +static const char dir_s3d2[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2"; +static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3"; + +/* + * layout1 hierarchy: + * + * tmp + * ├── s1d1 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   ├── f2 + * │   └── s1d2 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   ├── f2 + * │   └── s1d3 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── f2 + * ├── s2d1 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── s2d2 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── s2d3 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── f2 + * └── s3d1 + * └── s3d2 + * └── s3d3 + */ + +static void mkdir_parents(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const char *const path) +{ + char *walker; + const char *parent; + int i, err; + + ASSERT_NE(path[0], '\0'); + walker = strdup(path); + ASSERT_NE(NULL, walker); + parent = walker; + for (i = 1; walker[i]; i++) { + if (walker[i] != '/') + continue; + walker[i] = '\0'; + err = mkdir(parent, 0700); + ASSERT_FALSE(err && errno != EEXIST) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create directory \"%s\": %s", + parent, strerror(errno)); + } + walker[i] = '/'; + } + free(walker); +} + +static void create_directory(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const char *const path) +{ + mkdir_parents(_metadata, path); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(path, 0700)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create directory \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } +} + +static void create_file(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const char *const path) +{ + mkdir_parents(_metadata, path); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(path, S_IFREG | 0700, 0)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create file \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } +} + +static int remove_path(const char *const path) +{ + char *walker; + int i, ret, err = 0; + + walker = strdup(path); + if (!walker) { + err = ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + if (unlink(path) && rmdir(path)) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + err = errno; + goto out; + } + for (i = strlen(walker); i > 0; i--) { + if (walker[i] != '/') + continue; + walker[i] = '\0'; + ret = rmdir(walker); + if (ret) { + if (errno != ENOTEMPTY && errno != EBUSY) + err = errno; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(walker, TMP_DIR) == 0) + goto out; + } + +out: + free(walker); + return err; +} + +static void prepare_layout(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + disable_caps(_metadata); + umask(0077); + create_directory(_metadata, TMP_DIR); + + /* + * Do not pollute the rest of the system: creates a private mount point + * for tests relying on pivot_root(2) and move_mount(2). + */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNS)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", TMP_DIR, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700")); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount(NULL, TMP_DIR, NULL, MS_PRIVATE | MS_REC, NULL)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +static void cleanup_layout(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(TMP_DIR)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(TMP_DIR)); +} + +static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + create_file(_metadata, file1_s1d1); + create_file(_metadata, file1_s1d2); + create_file(_metadata, file1_s1d3); + create_file(_metadata, file2_s1d1); + create_file(_metadata, file2_s1d2); + create_file(_metadata, file2_s1d3); + + create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d1); + create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d2); + create_file(_metadata, file1_s2d3); + create_file(_metadata, file2_s2d3); + + create_directory(_metadata, dir_s3d2); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", dir_s3d2, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700")); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_s3d3, 0700)); +} + +static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file2_s1d3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file2_s1d2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file2_s1d1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s1d3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s1d2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s1d1)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file2_s2d3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(file1_s2d1)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d3)); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + umount(dir_s3d2); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(dir_s3d2)); +} + +FIXTURE(layout1) { +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(layout1) +{ + prepare_layout(_metadata); + + create_layout1(_metadata); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(layout1) +{ + remove_layout1(_metadata); + + cleanup_layout(_metadata); +} + +/* + * This helper enables to use the ASSERT_* macros and print the line number + * pointing to the test caller. + */ +static int test_open_rel(const int dirfd, const char *const path, const int flags) +{ + int fd; + + /* Works with file and directories. */ + fd = openat(dirfd, path, flags | O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + /* + * Mixing error codes from close(2) and open(2) should not lead to any + * (access type) confusion for this test. + */ + if (close(fd) != 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +static int test_open(const char *const path, const int flags) +{ + return test_open_rel(AT_FDCWD, path, flags); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, no_restriction) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval) +{ + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + .parent_fd = -1, + }; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(dir_s1d2, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | + O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd); + + ruleset_fd = open(dir_s1d1, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + /* Returns EBADF because ruleset_fd is not a landlock-ruleset FD. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EBADF, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ruleset_fd = open(dir_s1d1, O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + /* Returns EBADFD because ruleset_fd is not a valid ruleset. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EBADFD, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Gets a real ruleset. */ + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); + + /* Tests without O_PATH. */ + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(dir_s1d2, O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); + + /* Tests with a ruleset FD. */ + path_beneath.parent_fd = ruleset_fd; + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EBADFD, errno); + + /* Checks unhandled allowed_access. */ + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(dir_s1d2, O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | + O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd); + + /* Test with legitimate values. */ + path_beneath.allowed_access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + path_beneath.allowed_access &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE; + + /* Test with unknown (64-bits) value. */ + path_beneath.allowed_access |= (1ULL << 60); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + path_beneath.allowed_access &= ~(1ULL << 60); + + /* Test with no access. */ + path_beneath.allowed_access = 0; + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno); + path_beneath.allowed_access &= ~(1ULL << 60); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); + + /* Enforces the ruleset. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM + +#define ACCESS_ALL ( \ + ACCESS_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ + ACCESS_LAST) + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, file_access_rights) +{ + __u64 access; + int err; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = {}; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_ALL, + }; + const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + /* Tests access rights for files. */ + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(file1_s1d2, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd); + for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) { + path_beneath.allowed_access = access; + err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0); + if ((access | ACCESS_FILE) == ACCESS_FILE) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, err); + } else { + ASSERT_EQ(-1, err); + ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno); + } + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); +} + +static void add_path_beneath(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const int ruleset_fd, const __u64 allowed_access, + const char *const path) +{ + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { + .allowed_access = allowed_access, + }; + + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path, O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd) { + TH_LOG("Failed to open directory \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); +} + +struct rule { + const char *path; + __u64 access; +}; + +#define ACCESS_RO ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR) + +#define ACCESS_RW ( \ + ACCESS_RO | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE) + +static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const __u64 handled_access_fs, const struct rule rules[]) +{ + int ruleset_fd, i; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = handled_access_fs, + }; + + ASSERT_NE(NULL, rules) { + TH_LOG("No rule list"); + } + ASSERT_NE(NULL, rules[0].path) { + TH_LOG("Empty rule list"); + } + + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create a ruleset: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + + for (i = 0; rules[i].path; i++) { + add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, rules[i].access, + rules[i].path); + } + return ruleset_fd; +} + +static void enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const int ruleset_fd) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno)); + } +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_nsfs) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = "/dev/null", + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/dev", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/dev/full", O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/proc", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/proc/self", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/proc/self/ns", O_RDONLY)); + /* + * Because nsfs is an internal filesystem, /proc/self/ns/mnt is a + * disconnected path. Such path cannot be identified and must then be + * allowed. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_RDONLY)); + + /* + * Checks that it is not possible to add nsfs-like filesystem + * references to a ruleset. + */ + path_beneath.allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + path_beneath.parent_fd = open("/proc/self/ns/mnt", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, path_beneath.parent_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EBADFD, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(path_beneath.parent_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unpriv) { + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + drop_caps(_metadata); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RO, rules); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + + /* enforce_ruleset() calls prctl(no_new_privs). */ + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, effective_access) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + .path = file1_s2d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + char buf; + int reg_fd; + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Tests on a directory. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + /* Tests on a file. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + + /* Checks effective read and write actions. */ + reg_fd = open(file1_s2d2, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, reg_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(reg_fd, ".", 1)); + ASSERT_LE(0, lseek(reg_fd, 0, SEEK_SET)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(reg_fd, &buf, 1)); + ASSERT_EQ('.', buf); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(reg_fd)); + + /* Just in case, double-checks effective actions. */ + reg_fd = open(file1_s2d2, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, reg_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, write(reg_fd, &buf, 1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EBADF, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(reg_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, unhandled_access) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + /* Here, we only handle read accesses, not write accesses. */ + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RO, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* + * Because the policy does not handle LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + * opening for write-only should be allowed, but not read-write. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDWR)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ruleset_overlap) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + /* These rules should be ORed among them. */ + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks s1d1 hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Checks s1d2 hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Checks s1d3 hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, non_overlapping_accesses) +{ + const struct rule layer1[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer2[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, + layer1); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, S_IFREG | 0700, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file1_s1d2, S_IFREG | 0700, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, + layer2); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Unchanged accesses for file creation. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, S_IFREG | 0700, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file1_s1d2, S_IFREG | 0700, 0)); + + /* Checks file removing. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, interleaved_masked_accesses) +{ + /* + * Checks overly restrictive rules: + * layer 1: allows R s1d1/s1d2/s1d3/file1 + * layer 2: allows RW s1d1/s1d2/s1d3 + * allows W s1d1/s1d2 + * denies R s1d1/s1d2 + * layer 3: allows R s1d1 + * layer 4: allows R s1d1/s1d2 + * denies W s1d1/s1d2 + * layer 5: allows R s1d1/s1d2 + * layer 6: allows X ---- + * layer 7: allows W s1d1/s1d2 + * denies R s1d1/s1d2 + */ + const struct rule layer1_read[] = { + /* Allows read access to file1_s1d3 with the first layer. */ + { + .path = file1_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + /* First rule with write restrictions. */ + const struct rule layer2_read_write[] = { + /* Start by granting read-write access via its parent directory... */ + { + .path = dir_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + /* ...but also denies read access via its grandparent directory. */ + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer3_read[] = { + /* Allows read access via its great-grandparent directory. */ + { + .path = dir_s1d1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer4_read_write[] = { + /* + * Try to confuse the deny access by denying write (but not + * read) access via its grandparent directory. + */ + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer5_read[] = { + /* + * Try to override layer2's deny read access by explicitly + * allowing read access via file1_s1d3's grandparent. + */ + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer6_execute[] = { + /* + * Restricts an unrelated file hierarchy with a new access + * (non-overlapping) type. + */ + { + .path = dir_s2d1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer7_read_write[] = { + /* + * Finally, denies read access to file1_s1d3 via its + * grandparent. + */ + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + layer1_read); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks that read access is granted for file1_s1d3 with layer 1. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, layer2_read_write); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + layer3_read); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + + /* This time, denies write access for the file hierarchy. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, layer4_read_write); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* + * Checks that the only change with layer 4 is that write access is + * denied. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + layer5_read); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 5. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + layer6_execute); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks that previous access rights are unchanged with layer 6. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, layer7_read_write); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks read access is now denied with layer 7. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file2_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inherit_subset) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Write access is forbidden. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Write access is forbidden. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* + * Tests shared rule extension: the following rules should not grant + * any new access, only remove some. Once enforced, these rules are + * ANDed with the previous ones. + */ + add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + dir_s1d2); + /* + * According to ruleset_fd, dir_s1d2 should now have the + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE + * access rights (even if this directory is opened a second time). + * However, when enforcing this updated ruleset, the ruleset tied to + * the current process (i.e. its domain) will still only have the + * dir_s1d2 with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR accesses, but + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE must not be allowed because it would + * be a privilege escalation. + */ + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + /* Same tests and results as above. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* + * Try to get more privileges by adding new access rights to the parent + * directory: dir_s1d1. + */ + add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, ACCESS_RW, dir_s1d1); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + /* Same tests and results as above. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* + * Now, dir_s1d3 get a new rule tied to it, only allowing + * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. The (kernel internal) difference is + * that there was no rule tied to it before. + */ + add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + dir_s1d3); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* + * Same tests and results as above, except for open(dir_s1d3) which is + * now denied because the new rule mask the rule previously inherited + * from dir_s1d2. + */ + + /* Same tests and results as above. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* It is still forbidden to write in file1_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + /* + * Readdir of dir_s1d3 is still allowed because of the OR policy inside + * the same layer. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inherit_superset) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d3, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + /* Readdir access is denied for dir_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + /* Readdir access is allowed for dir_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + /* File access is allowed for file1_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + /* Now dir_s1d2, parent of dir_s1d3, gets a new rule tied to it. */ + add_path_beneath(_metadata, ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, dir_s1d2); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Readdir access is still denied for dir_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + /* Readdir access is still allowed for dir_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + /* File access is still allowed for file1_s1d3. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, max_layers) +{ + int i, err; + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + err = landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, err); + ASSERT_EQ(E2BIG, errno); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, empty_or_same_ruleset) +{ + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {}; + int ruleset_fd; + + /* Tests empty handled_access_fs. */ + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(-1, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno); + + /* Enforces policy which deny read access to all files. */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + + /* Nests a policy which deny read access to all directories. */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR; + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + + /* Enforces a second time with the same ruleset. */ + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_on_mountpoint) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d1, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + /* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ + .path = dir_s3d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s3d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_mountpoint) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d1, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + /* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ + .path = dir_s3d1, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +/* + * This test verifies that we can apply a landlock rule on the root directory + * (which might require special handling). + */ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_root_allow_then_deny) +{ + struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = "/", + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks allowed access. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + + rules[0].access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE; + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks denied access (on a directory). */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_over_root_deny) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = "/", + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks denied access (on a directory). */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rule_inside_mount_ns) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = "s3d3", + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(SYS_pivot_root, dir_s3d2, dir_s3d3)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to pivot root: %s", strerror(errno)); + }; + ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir("/")); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open("s3d3", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open("/", O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, mount_and_pivot) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s3d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mount(NULL, dir_s3d2, NULL, MS_RDONLY, NULL)); + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, syscall(SYS_pivot_root, dir_s3d2, dir_s3d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, move_mount) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s3d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(SYS_move_mount, AT_FDCWD, dir_s3d2, AT_FDCWD, + dir_s1d2, 0)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to move mount: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + + ASSERT_EQ(0, syscall(SYS_move_mount, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d2, AT_FDCWD, + dir_s3d2, 0)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, syscall(SYS_move_mount, AT_FDCWD, dir_s3d2, AT_FDCWD, + dir_s1d2, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, release_inodes) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d1, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + .path = dir_s3d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + .path = dir_s3d3, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + /* Unmount a file hierarchy while it is being used by a ruleset. */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, umount(dir_s3d2)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s3d2, O_RDONLY)); + /* This dir_s3d3 would not be allowed and does not exist anyway. */ + ASSERT_EQ(ENOENT, test_open(dir_s3d3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +enum relative_access { + REL_OPEN, + REL_CHDIR, + REL_CHROOT_ONLY, + REL_CHROOT_CHDIR, +}; + +static void test_relative_path(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const enum relative_access rel) +{ + /* + * Common layer to check that chroot doesn't ignore it (i.e. a chroot + * is not a disconnected root directory). + */ + const struct rule layer1_base[] = { + { + .path = TMP_DIR, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer2_subs[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + .path = dir_s2d2, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + {} + }; + int dirfd, ruleset_fd; + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_subs); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + switch (rel) { + case REL_OPEN: + case REL_CHDIR: + break; + case REL_CHROOT_ONLY: + ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir(dir_s2d2)); + break; + case REL_CHROOT_CHDIR: + ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir(dir_s1d2)); + break; + default: + ASSERT_TRUE(false); + return; + } + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_CHROOT); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + + switch (rel) { + case REL_OPEN: + dirfd = open(dir_s1d2, O_DIRECTORY); + ASSERT_LE(0, dirfd); + break; + case REL_CHDIR: + ASSERT_EQ(0, chdir(dir_s1d2)); + dirfd = AT_FDCWD; + break; + case REL_CHROOT_ONLY: + /* Do chroot into dir_s1d2 (relative to dir_s2d2). */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, chroot("../../s1d1/s1d2")) { + TH_LOG("Failed to chroot: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + dirfd = AT_FDCWD; + break; + case REL_CHROOT_CHDIR: + /* Do chroot into dir_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, chroot(".")) { + TH_LOG("Failed to chroot: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + dirfd = AT_FDCWD; + break; + } + + ASSERT_EQ((rel == REL_CHROOT_CHDIR) ? 0 : EACCES, + test_open_rel(dirfd, "..", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, ".", O_RDONLY)); + + if (rel == REL_CHROOT_ONLY) { + /* The current directory is dir_s2d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "./s2d3", O_RDONLY)); + } else { + /* The current directory is dir_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "./s1d3", O_RDONLY)); + } + + if (rel == REL_CHROOT_ONLY || rel == REL_CHROOT_CHDIR) { + /* Checks the root dir_s1d2. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "/..", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "/", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "/f1", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "/s1d3", O_RDONLY)); + } + + if (rel != REL_CHROOT_CHDIR) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s1d1", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s1d1/s1d2", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s1d1/s1d2/s1d3", O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s2d1", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s2d1/s2d2", O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open_rel(dirfd, "../../s2d1/s2d2/s2d3", O_RDONLY)); + } + + if (rel == REL_OPEN) + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dirfd)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, relative_open) +{ + test_relative_path(_metadata, REL_OPEN); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, relative_chdir) +{ + test_relative_path(_metadata, REL_CHDIR); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, relative_chroot_only) +{ + test_relative_path(_metadata, REL_CHROOT_ONLY); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, relative_chroot_chdir) +{ + test_relative_path(_metadata, REL_CHROOT_CHDIR); +} + +static void copy_binary(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const char *const dst_path) +{ + int dst_fd, src_fd; + struct stat statbuf; + + dst_fd = open(dst_path, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, dst_fd) { + TH_LOG("Failed to open \"%s\": %s", dst_path, + strerror(errno)); + } + src_fd = open(BINARY_PATH, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, src_fd) { + TH_LOG("Failed to open \"" BINARY_PATH "\": %s", + strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, fstat(src_fd, &statbuf)); + ASSERT_EQ(statbuf.st_size, sendfile(dst_fd, src_fd, 0, + statbuf.st_size)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(src_fd)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(dst_fd)); +} + +static void test_execute(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const int err, const char *const path) +{ + int status; + char *const argv[] = {(char *)path, NULL}; + const pid_t child = fork(); + + ASSERT_LE(0, child); + if (child == 0) { + ASSERT_EQ(err ? -1 : 0, execve(path, argv, NULL)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to execute \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + }; + ASSERT_EQ(err, errno); + _exit(_metadata->passed ? 2 : 1); + return; + } + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(err ? 2 : 0, WEXITSTATUS(status)) { + TH_LOG("Unexpected return code for \"%s\": %s", path, + strerror(errno)); + }; +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, execute) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d1); + copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d2); + copy_binary(_metadata, file1_s1d3); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + test_execute(_metadata, EACCES, file1_s1d1); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d2); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + test_execute(_metadata, 0, file1_s1d3); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, link) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + /* Denies linking because of reparenting. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file1_s2d1, file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file2_s1d2, file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file2_s1d2, file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file2_s1d3, file1_s1d3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rename_file) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = dir_s2d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* + * Tries to replace a file, from a directory that allows file removal, + * but to a different directory (which also allows file removal). + */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s2d3, file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d3, AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d3, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + + /* + * Tries to replace a file, from a directory that denies file removal, + * to a different directory (which allows file removal). + */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s2d1, file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d1, AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d2, AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + + /* Exchanges files and directories that partially allow removal. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d2, AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d1, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d1, AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d2, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + + /* Renames files with different parents. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s2d2, file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file1_s2d1, file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + + /* Exchanges and renames files with same parent. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file2_s2d3, AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file2_s2d3, file1_s2d3)); + + /* Exchanges files and directories with same parent, twice. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d2, AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d2, AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, rename_dir) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR, + }, + { + .path = dir_s2d1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + /* Empties dir_s1d3 to allow renaming. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Exchanges and renames directory to a different parent. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d3, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(dir_s2d3, dir_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s2d2, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EXDEV, errno); + + /* + * Exchanges directory to the same parent, which doesn't allow + * directory removal. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d1, AT_FDCWD, dir_s2d1, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d1, AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d2, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + + /* + * Exchanges and renames directory to the same parent, which allows + * directory removal. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, renameat2(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d2, + RENAME_EXCHANGE)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(dir_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_s1d3, 0700)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s1d2, dir_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rmdir(dir_s1d3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, remove_dir) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, rmdir(dir_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(dir_s1d3, 0700)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d3, AT_REMOVEDIR)); + + /* dir_s1d2 itself cannot be removed. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d2, AT_REMOVEDIR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rmdir(dir_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, dir_s1d1, AT_REMOVEDIR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, remove_file) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d1, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, file1_s1d3, 0)); +} + +static void test_make_file(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, + const __u64 access, const mode_t mode, const dev_t dev) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = access, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, access, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file2_s1d1, mode | 0400, dev)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to make file \"%s\": %s", + file2_s1d1, strerror(errno)); + }; + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d2)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mknod(file1_s1d1, mode | 0400, dev)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file1_s1d2, mode | 0400, dev)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to make file \"%s\": %s", + file1_s1d2, strerror(errno)); + }; + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, mknod(file1_s1d3, mode | 0400, dev)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_char) +{ + /* Creates a /dev/null device. */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_MKNOD); + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR, S_IFCHR, + makedev(1, 3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_block) +{ + /* Creates a /dev/loop0 device. */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_MKNOD); + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK, S_IFBLK, + makedev(7, 0)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_reg_1) +{ + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, S_IFREG, 0); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_reg_2) +{ + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG, 0, 0); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_sock) +{ + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK, S_IFSOCK, 0); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_fifo) +{ + test_make_file(_metadata, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO, S_IFIFO, 0); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_sym) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink("none", file2_s1d1)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d2)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(-1, symlink("none", file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, link(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, rename(file2_s1d1, file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink("none", file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s1d2, file2_s1d2)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, symlink("none", file1_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, link(file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file2_s1d3)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, rename(file1_s1d3, file2_s1d3)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, make_dir) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR, + }, + {} + }; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d1)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d3)); + + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Uses file_* as directory names. */ + ASSERT_EQ(-1, mkdir(file1_s1d1, 0700)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(file1_s1d2, 0700)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(file1_s1d3, 0700)); +} + +static int open_proc_fd(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int fd, + const int open_flags) +{ + static const char path_template[] = "/proc/self/fd/%d"; + char procfd_path[sizeof(path_template) + 10]; + const int procfd_path_size = snprintf(procfd_path, sizeof(procfd_path), + path_template, fd); + + ASSERT_LT(procfd_path_size, sizeof(procfd_path)); + return open(procfd_path, open_flags); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_unlinked_file) +{ + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file1_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + int reg_fd, proc_fd; + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + reg_fd = open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, reg_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, unlink(file1_s1d2)); + + proc_fd = open_proc_fd(_metadata, reg_fd, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, proc_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(proc_fd)); + + proc_fd = open_proc_fd(_metadata, reg_fd, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_EQ(-1, proc_fd) { + TH_LOG("Successfully opened /proc/self/fd/%d: %s", + reg_fd, strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(reg_fd)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) +{ + int proc_fd; + int pipe_fds[2]; + char buf = '\0'; + const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + /* Limits read and write access to files tied to the filesystem. */ + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, rules[0].access, + rules); + + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks enforcement for normal files. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDWR)); + + /* Checks access to pipes through FD. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_fds, O_CLOEXEC)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_fds[1], ".", 1)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to write in pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_fds[0], &buf, 1)); + ASSERT_EQ('.', buf); + + /* Checks write access to pipe through /proc/self/fd . */ + proc_fd = open_proc_fd(_metadata, pipe_fds[1], O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, proc_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(proc_fd, ".", 1)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to write through /proc/self/fd/%d: %s", + pipe_fds[1], strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(proc_fd)); + + /* Checks read access to pipe through /proc/self/fd . */ + proc_fd = open_proc_fd(_metadata, pipe_fds[0], O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + ASSERT_LE(0, proc_fd); + buf = '\0'; + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(proc_fd, &buf, 1)) { + TH_LOG("Failed to read through /proc/self/fd/%d: %s", + pipe_fds[1], strerror(errno)); + } + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(proc_fd)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_fds[0])); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_fds[1])); +} + +FIXTURE(layout1_bind) { +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(layout1_bind) +{ + prepare_layout(_metadata); + + create_layout1(_metadata); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount(dir_s1d2, dir_s2d2, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(layout1_bind) +{ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(dir_s2d2)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + + remove_layout1(_metadata); + + cleanup_layout(_metadata); +} + +static const char bind_dir_s1d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s1d3"; +static const char bind_file1_s1d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s1d3/f1"; + +/* + * layout1_bind hierarchy: + * + * tmp + * ├── s1d1 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   ├── f2 + * │   └── s1d2 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   ├── f2 + * │   └── s1d3 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── f2 + * ├── s2d1 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── s2d2 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   ├── f2 + * │   └── s1d3 + * │   ├── f1 + * │   └── f2 + * └── s3d1 + * └── s3d2 + * └── s3d3 + */ + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, no_restriction) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOENT, test_open(dir_s2d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(ENOENT, test_open(file1_s2d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(bind_dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(bind_file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s3d1, O_RDONLY)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1_bind, same_content_same_file) +{ + /* + * Sets access right on parent directories of both source and + * destination mount points. + */ + const struct rule layer1_parent[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d1, + .access = ACCESS_RO, + }, + { + .path = dir_s2d1, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + {} + }; + /* + * Sets access rights on the same bind-mounted directories. The result + * should be ACCESS_RW for both directories, but not both hierarchies + * because of the first layer. + */ + const struct rule layer2_mount_point[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = dir_s2d2, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + {} + }; + /* Only allow read-access to the s1d3 hierarchies. */ + const struct rule layer3_source[] = { + { + .path = dir_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + /* Removes all access rights. */ + const struct rule layer4_destination[] = { + { + .path = bind_file1_s1d3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + + /* Sets rules for the parent directories. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_parent); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks source hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Checks destination hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d1, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Sets rules for the mount points. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_mount_point); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks source hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Checks destination hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s2d1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s2d1, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s2d1, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDWR)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(bind_dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Sets a (shared) rule only on the source. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_source); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks source hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Checks destination hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s2d2, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(dir_s2d2, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(bind_file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(bind_file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(bind_dir_s1d3, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + + /* Sets a (shared) rule only on the destination. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_destination); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks source hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); + + /* Checks destination hierarchy. */ + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(bind_file1_s1d3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(bind_file1_s1d3, O_WRONLY)); +} + +#define LOWER_BASE TMP_DIR "/lower" +#define LOWER_DATA LOWER_BASE "/data" +static const char lower_fl1[] = LOWER_DATA "/fl1"; +static const char lower_dl1[] = LOWER_DATA "/dl1"; +static const char lower_dl1_fl2[] = LOWER_DATA "/dl1/fl2"; +static const char lower_fo1[] = LOWER_DATA "/fo1"; +static const char lower_do1[] = LOWER_DATA "/do1"; +static const char lower_do1_fo2[] = LOWER_DATA "/do1/fo2"; +static const char lower_do1_fl3[] = LOWER_DATA "/do1/fl3"; + +static const char (*lower_base_files[])[] = { + &lower_fl1, + &lower_fo1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*lower_base_directories[])[] = { + &lower_dl1, + &lower_do1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*lower_sub_files[])[] = { + &lower_dl1_fl2, + &lower_do1_fo2, + &lower_do1_fl3, + NULL +}; + +#define UPPER_BASE TMP_DIR "/upper" +#define UPPER_DATA UPPER_BASE "/data" +#define UPPER_WORK UPPER_BASE "/work" +static const char upper_fu1[] = UPPER_DATA "/fu1"; +static const char upper_du1[] = UPPER_DATA "/du1"; +static const char upper_du1_fu2[] = UPPER_DATA "/du1/fu2"; +static const char upper_fo1[] = UPPER_DATA "/fo1"; +static const char upper_do1[] = UPPER_DATA "/do1"; +static const char upper_do1_fo2[] = UPPER_DATA "/do1/fo2"; +static const char upper_do1_fu3[] = UPPER_DATA "/do1/fu3"; + +static const char (*upper_base_files[])[] = { + &upper_fu1, + &upper_fo1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*upper_base_directories[])[] = { + &upper_du1, + &upper_do1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*upper_sub_files[])[] = { + &upper_du1_fu2, + &upper_do1_fo2, + &upper_do1_fu3, + NULL +}; + +#define MERGE_BASE TMP_DIR "/merge" +#define MERGE_DATA MERGE_BASE "/data" +static const char merge_fl1[] = MERGE_DATA "/fl1"; +static const char merge_dl1[] = MERGE_DATA "/dl1"; +static const char merge_dl1_fl2[] = MERGE_DATA "/dl1/fl2"; +static const char merge_fu1[] = MERGE_DATA "/fu1"; +static const char merge_du1[] = MERGE_DATA "/du1"; +static const char merge_du1_fu2[] = MERGE_DATA "/du1/fu2"; +static const char merge_fo1[] = MERGE_DATA "/fo1"; +static const char merge_do1[] = MERGE_DATA "/do1"; +static const char merge_do1_fo2[] = MERGE_DATA "/do1/fo2"; +static const char merge_do1_fl3[] = MERGE_DATA "/do1/fl3"; +static const char merge_do1_fu3[] = MERGE_DATA "/do1/fu3"; + +static const char (*merge_base_files[])[] = { + &merge_fl1, + &merge_fu1, + &merge_fo1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*merge_base_directories[])[] = { + &merge_dl1, + &merge_du1, + &merge_do1, + NULL +}; +static const char (*merge_sub_files[])[] = { + &merge_dl1_fl2, + &merge_du1_fu2, + &merge_do1_fo2, + &merge_do1_fl3, + &merge_do1_fu3, + NULL +}; + +/* + * layout2_overlay hierarchy: + * + * tmp + * ├── lower + * │   └── data + * │   ├── dl1 + * │   │   └── fl2 + * │   ├── do1 + * │   │   ├── fl3 + * │   │   └── fo2 + * │   ├── fl1 + * │   └── fo1 + * ├── merge + * │   └── data + * │   ├── dl1 + * │   │   └── fl2 + * │   ├── do1 + * │   │   ├── fl3 + * │   │   ├── fo2 + * │   │   └── fu3 + * │   ├── du1 + * │   │   └── fu2 + * │   ├── fl1 + * │   ├── fo1 + * │   └── fu1 + * └── upper + * ├── data + * │   ├── do1 + * │   │   ├── fo2 + * │   │   └── fu3 + * │   ├── du1 + * │   │   └── fu2 + * │   ├── fo1 + * │   └── fu1 + * └── work + * └── work + */ + +FIXTURE(layout2_overlay) { +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(layout2_overlay) +{ + prepare_layout(_metadata); + + create_directory(_metadata, LOWER_BASE); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + /* Creates tmpfs mount points to get deterministic overlayfs. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", LOWER_BASE, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700")); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + create_file(_metadata, lower_fl1); + create_file(_metadata, lower_dl1_fl2); + create_file(_metadata, lower_fo1); + create_file(_metadata, lower_do1_fo2); + create_file(_metadata, lower_do1_fl3); + + create_directory(_metadata, UPPER_BASE); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("tmp", UPPER_BASE, "tmpfs", 0, "size=4m,mode=700")); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + create_file(_metadata, upper_fu1); + create_file(_metadata, upper_du1_fu2); + create_file(_metadata, upper_fo1); + create_file(_metadata, upper_do1_fo2); + create_file(_metadata, upper_do1_fu3); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(UPPER_WORK, 0700)); + + create_directory(_metadata, MERGE_DATA); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE); + ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("overlay", MERGE_DATA, "overlay", 0, + "lowerdir=" LOWER_DATA + ",upperdir=" UPPER_DATA + ",workdir=" UPPER_WORK)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(layout2_overlay) +{ + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(lower_do1_fl3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(lower_dl1_fl2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(lower_fl1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(lower_do1_fo2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(lower_fo1)); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(LOWER_BASE)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(LOWER_BASE)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(upper_do1_fu3)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(upper_du1_fu2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(upper_fu1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(upper_do1_fo2)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(upper_fo1)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(UPPER_WORK "/work")); + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(UPPER_BASE)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(UPPER_BASE)); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, umount(MERGE_DATA)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + EXPECT_EQ(0, remove_path(MERGE_DATA)); + + cleanup_layout(_metadata); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, no_restriction) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_fl1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_dl1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_dl1_fl2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_fo1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_do1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_do1_fo2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(lower_do1_fl3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_fu1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_du1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_du1_fu2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_fo1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_do1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_do1_fo2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(upper_do1_fu3, O_RDONLY)); + + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_fl1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_dl1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_dl1_fl2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_fu1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_du1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_du1_fu2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_fo1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_do1, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_do1_fo2, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_do1_fl3, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(merge_do1_fu3, O_RDONLY)); +} + +#define for_each_path(path_list, path_entry, i) \ + for (i = 0, path_entry = *path_list[i]; path_list[i]; \ + path_entry = *path_list[++i]) + +TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file) +{ + /* Sets access right on parent directories of both layers. */ + const struct rule layer1_base[] = { + { + .path = LOWER_BASE, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = UPPER_BASE, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = MERGE_BASE, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer2_data[] = { + { + .path = LOWER_DATA, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = UPPER_DATA, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = MERGE_DATA, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + {} + }; + /* Sets access right on directories inside both layers. */ + const struct rule layer3_subdirs[] = { + { + .path = lower_dl1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = lower_do1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = upper_du1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = upper_do1, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_dl1, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + { + .path = merge_du1, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + { + .path = merge_do1, + .access = ACCESS_RW, + }, + {} + }; + /* Tighten access rights to the files. */ + const struct rule layer4_files[] = { + { + .path = lower_dl1_fl2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = lower_do1_fo2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = lower_do1_fl3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = upper_du1_fu2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = upper_do1_fo2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = upper_do1_fu3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_dl1_fl2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_du1_fu2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_do1_fo2, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_do1_fl3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + { + .path = merge_do1_fu3, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + const struct rule layer5_merge_only[] = { + { + .path = MERGE_DATA, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {} + }; + int ruleset_fd; + size_t i; + const char *path_entry; + + /* Sets rules on base directories (i.e. outside overlay scope). */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer1_base); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks lower layer. */ + for_each_path(lower_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + for_each_path(lower_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(lower_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + /* Checks upper layer. */ + for_each_path(upper_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + for_each_path(upper_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(upper_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + /* + * Checks that access rights are independent from the lower and upper + * layers: write access to upper files viewed through the merge point + * is still allowed, and write access to lower file viewed (and copied) + * through the merge point is still allowed. + */ + for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + for_each_path(merge_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(merge_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + + /* Sets rules on data directories (i.e. inside overlay scope). */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer2_data); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks merge. */ + for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + for_each_path(merge_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(merge_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + + /* Same checks with tighter rules. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer3_subdirs); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks changes for lower layer. */ + for_each_path(lower_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + } + /* Checks changes for upper layer. */ + for_each_path(upper_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + } + /* Checks all merge accesses. */ + for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + for_each_path(merge_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(merge_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + + /* Sets rules directly on overlayed files. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer4_files); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks unchanged accesses on lower layer. */ + for_each_path(lower_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + /* Checks unchanged accesses on upper layer. */ + for_each_path(upper_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_WRONLY)); + } + /* Checks all merge accesses. */ + for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + for_each_path(merge_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(merge_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + + /* Only allowes access to the merge hierarchy. */ + ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, layer5_merge_only); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + /* Checks new accesses on lower layer. */ + for_each_path(lower_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + } + /* Checks new accesses on upper layer. */ + for_each_path(upper_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY)); + } + /* Checks all merge accesses. */ + for_each_path(merge_base_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } + for_each_path(merge_base_directories, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, test_open(path_entry, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY)); + } + for_each_path(merge_sub_files, path_entry, i) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(path_entry, O_RDWR)); + } +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..15fbef9cc849 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ptrace_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Landlock tests - Ptrace + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "common.h" + +static void create_domain(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +{ + int ruleset_fd; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK, + }; + + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + EXPECT_LE(0, ruleset_fd) { + TH_LOG("Failed to create a ruleset: %s", strerror(errno)); + } + EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + +static int test_ptrace_read(const pid_t pid) +{ + static const char path_template[] = "/proc/%d/environ"; + char procenv_path[sizeof(path_template) + 10]; + int procenv_path_size, fd; + + procenv_path_size = snprintf(procenv_path, sizeof(procenv_path), + path_template, pid); + if (procenv_path_size >= sizeof(procenv_path)) + return E2BIG; + + fd = open(procenv_path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC); + if (fd < 0) + return errno; + /* + * Mixing error codes from close(2) and open(2) should not lead to any + * (access type) confusion for this test. + */ + if (close(fd) != 0) + return errno; + return 0; +} + +FIXTURE(hierarchy) { }; + +FIXTURE_VARIANT(hierarchy) { + const bool domain_both; + const bool domain_parent; + const bool domain_child; +}; + +/* + * Test multiple tracing combinations between a parent process P1 and a child + * process P2. + * + * Yama's scoped ptrace is presumed disabled. If enabled, this optional + * restriction is enforced in addition to any Landlock check, which means that + * all P2 requests to trace P1 would be denied. + */ + +/* + * No domain + * + * P1-. P1 -> P2 : allow + * \ P2 -> P1 : allow + * 'P2 + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_without_domain) { + .domain_both = false, + .domain_parent = false, + .domain_child = false, +}; + +/* + * Child domain + * + * P1--. P1 -> P2 : allow + * \ P2 -> P1 : deny + * .'-----. + * | P2 | + * '------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_with_one_domain) { + .domain_both = false, + .domain_parent = false, + .domain_child = true, +}; + +/* + * Parent domain + * .------. + * | P1 --. P1 -> P2 : deny + * '------' \ P2 -> P1 : allow + * ' + * P2 + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_parent_domain) { + .domain_both = false, + .domain_parent = true, + .domain_child = false, +}; + +/* + * Parent + child domain (siblings) + * .------. + * | P1 ---. P1 -> P2 : deny + * '------' \ P2 -> P1 : deny + * .---'--. + * | P2 | + * '------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_sibling_domain) { + .domain_both = false, + .domain_parent = true, + .domain_child = true, +}; + +/* + * Same domain (inherited) + * .-------------. + * | P1----. | P1 -> P2 : allow + * | \ | P2 -> P1 : allow + * | ' | + * | P2 | + * '-------------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_sibling_domain) { + .domain_both = true, + .domain_parent = false, + .domain_child = false, +}; + +/* + * Inherited + child domain + * .-----------------. + * | P1----. | P1 -> P2 : allow + * | \ | P2 -> P1 : deny + * | .-'----. | + * | | P2 | | + * | '------' | + * '-----------------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, allow_with_nested_domain) { + .domain_both = true, + .domain_parent = false, + .domain_child = true, +}; + +/* + * Inherited + parent domain + * .-----------------. + * |.------. | P1 -> P2 : deny + * || P1 ----. | P2 -> P1 : allow + * |'------' \ | + * | ' | + * | P2 | + * '-----------------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_nested_and_parent_domain) { + .domain_both = true, + .domain_parent = true, + .domain_child = false, +}; + +/* + * Inherited + parent and child domain (siblings) + * .-----------------. + * | .------. | P1 -> P2 : deny + * | | P1 . | P2 -> P1 : deny + * | '------'\ | + * | \ | + * | .--'---. | + * | | P2 | | + * | '------' | + * '-----------------' + */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(hierarchy, deny_with_forked_domain) { + .domain_both = true, + .domain_parent = true, + .domain_child = true, +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(hierarchy) +{ } + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(hierarchy) +{ } + +/* Test PTRACE_TRACEME and PTRACE_ATTACH for parent and child. */ +TEST_F(hierarchy, trace) +{ + pid_t child, parent; + int status, err_proc_read; + int pipe_child[2], pipe_parent[2]; + char buf_parent; + long ret; + + /* + * Removes all effective and permitted capabilities to not interfere + * with cap_ptrace_access_check() in case of PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS. + */ + drop_caps(_metadata); + + parent = getpid(); + ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC)); + if (variant->domain_both) { + create_domain(_metadata); + if (!_metadata->passed) + /* Aborts before forking. */ + return; + } + + child = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child); + if (child == 0) { + char buf_child; + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1])); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0])); + if (variant->domain_child) + create_domain(_metadata); + + /* Waits for the parent to be in a domain, if any. */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_parent[0], &buf_child, 1)); + + /* Tests PTRACE_ATTACH and PTRACE_MODE_READ on the parent. */ + err_proc_read = test_ptrace_read(parent); + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, parent, NULL, 0); + if (variant->domain_child) { + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, err_proc_read); + } else { + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(0, err_proc_read); + } + if (ret == 0) { + ASSERT_EQ(parent, waitpid(parent, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, parent, NULL, 0)); + } + + /* Tests child PTRACE_TRACEME. */ + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME); + if (variant->domain_parent) { + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + } else { + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret); + } + + /* + * Signals that the PTRACE_ATTACH test is done and the + * PTRACE_TRACEME test is ongoing. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_child[1], ".", 1)); + + if (!variant->domain_parent) { + ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGSTOP)); + } + + /* Waits for the parent PTRACE_ATTACH test. */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_parent[0], &buf_child, 1)); + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE); + return; + } + + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[1])); + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0])); + if (variant->domain_parent) + create_domain(_metadata); + + /* Signals that the parent is in a domain, if any. */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1)); + + /* + * Waits for the child to test PTRACE_ATTACH on the parent and start + * testing PTRACE_TRACEME. + */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf_parent, 1)); + + /* Tests child PTRACE_TRACEME. */ + if (!variant->domain_parent) { + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, NULL, 0)); + } else { + /* The child should not be traced by the parent. */ + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, NULL, 0)); + EXPECT_EQ(ESRCH, errno); + } + + /* Tests PTRACE_ATTACH and PTRACE_MODE_READ on the child. */ + err_proc_read = test_ptrace_read(child); + ret = ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, child, NULL, 0); + if (variant->domain_parent) { + EXPECT_EQ(-1, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, err_proc_read); + } else { + EXPECT_EQ(0, ret); + EXPECT_EQ(0, err_proc_read); + } + if (ret == 0) { + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFSTOPPED(status)); + ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, child, NULL, 0)); + } + + /* Signals that the parent PTRACE_ATTACH test is done. */ + ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1)); + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) || + WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS) + _metadata->passed = 0; +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3f9ccbf52783 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/true.c @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +int main(void) +{ + return 0; +} -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From ba84b0bf5a164f0f523656c1e37568c30f3f3303 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:21 +0200 Subject: samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a basic sandbox tool to launch a command which can only access a list of file hierarchies in a read-only or read-write way. Cc: James Morris Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Jann Horn Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-12-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + samples/Kconfig | 7 ++ samples/Makefile | 1 + samples/landlock/.gitignore | 1 + samples/landlock/Makefile | 13 +++ samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 238 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 261 insertions(+) create mode 100644 samples/landlock/.gitignore create mode 100644 samples/landlock/Makefile create mode 100644 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 8cab5854844e..88175ed1f315 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10004,6 +10004,7 @@ S: Supported W: https://landlock.io T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +F: samples/landlock/ F: security/landlock/ F: tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ K: landlock diff --git a/samples/Kconfig b/samples/Kconfig index e76cdfc50e25..b5a1a7aa7e23 100644 --- a/samples/Kconfig +++ b/samples/Kconfig @@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ config SAMPLE_HIDRAW bool "hidraw sample" depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL +config SAMPLE_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock example" + depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL + help + Build a simple Landlock sandbox manager able to start a process + restricted by a user-defined filesystem access control policy. + config SAMPLE_PIDFD bool "pidfd sample" depends on CC_CAN_LINK && HEADERS_INSTALL diff --git a/samples/Makefile b/samples/Makefile index c3392a595e4b..087e0988ccc5 100644 --- a/samples/Makefile +++ b/samples/Makefile @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KDB) += kdb/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KFIFO) += kfifo/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KOBJECT) += kobject/ obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_KPROBES) += kprobes/ +subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LANDLOCK) += landlock obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_LIVEPATCH) += livepatch/ subdir-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_PIDFD) += pidfd obj-$(CONFIG_SAMPLE_QMI_CLIENT) += qmi/ diff --git a/samples/landlock/.gitignore b/samples/landlock/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..f43668b2d318 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +/sandboxer diff --git a/samples/landlock/Makefile b/samples/landlock/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5d601e51c2eb --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + +userprogs-always-y := sandboxer + +userccflags += -I usr/include + +.PHONY: all clean + +all: + $(MAKE) -C ../.. samples/landlock/ + +clean: + $(MAKE) -C ../.. M=samples/landlock/ clean diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7a15910d2171 --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause +/* + * Simple Landlock sandbox manager able to launch a process restricted by a + * user-defined filesystem access control policy. + * + * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün + * Copyright © 2020 ANSSI + */ + +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef landlock_create_ruleset +static inline int landlock_create_ruleset( + const struct landlock_ruleset_attr *const attr, + const size_t size, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_create_ruleset, attr, size, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_add_rule +static inline int landlock_add_rule(const int ruleset_fd, + const enum landlock_rule_type rule_type, + const void *const rule_attr, const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_add_rule, ruleset_fd, rule_type, + rule_attr, flags); +} +#endif + +#ifndef landlock_restrict_self +static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd, + const __u32 flags) +{ + return syscall(__NR_landlock_restrict_self, ruleset_fd, flags); +} +#endif + +#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO" +#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW" +#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":" + +static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list) +{ + int i, num_paths = 0; + + if (env_path) { + num_paths++; + for (i = 0; env_path[i]; i++) { + if (env_path[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0]) + num_paths++; + } + } + *path_list = malloc(num_paths * sizeof(**path_list)); + for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) + (*path_list)[i] = strsep(&env_path, ENV_PATH_TOKEN); + + return num_paths; +} + +#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + +static int populate_ruleset( + const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, + const __u64 allowed_access) +{ + int num_paths, i, ret = 1; + char *env_path_name; + const char **path_list = NULL; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { + .parent_fd = -1, + }; + + env_path_name = getenv(env_var); + if (!env_path_name) { + /* Prevents users to forget a setting. */ + fprintf(stderr, "Missing environment variable %s\n", env_var); + return 1; + } + env_path_name = strdup(env_path_name); + unsetenv(env_var); + num_paths = parse_path(env_path_name, &path_list); + if (num_paths == 1 && path_list[0][0] == '\0') { + /* + * Allows to not use all possible restrictions (e.g. use + * LL_FS_RO without LL_FS_RW). + */ + ret = 0; + goto out_free_name; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { + struct stat statbuf; + + path_beneath.parent_fd = open(path_list[i], O_PATH | + O_CLOEXEC); + if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], + strerror(errno)); + goto out_free_name; + } + if (fstat(path_beneath.parent_fd, &statbuf)) { + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + goto out_free_name; + } + path_beneath.allowed_access = allowed_access; + if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) + path_beneath.allowed_access &= ACCESS_FILE; + if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to update the ruleset with \"%s\": %s\n", + path_list[i], strerror(errno)); + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + goto out_free_name; + } + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + } + ret = 0; + +out_free_name: + free(env_path_name); + return ret; +} + +#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR) + +#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE ( \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM) + +int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) +{ + const char *cmd_path; + char *const *cmd_argv; + int ruleset_fd; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE, + }; + + if (argc < 2) { + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s [args]...\n\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]); + fprintf(stderr, "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, " + "each separated by a colon:\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n", + ENV_FS_RW_NAME); + fprintf(stderr, "\nexample:\n" + "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" " + "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" " + "%s bash -i\n", + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]); + return 1; + } + + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + if (ruleset_fd < 0) { + const int err = errno; + + perror("Failed to create a ruleset"); + switch (err) { + case ENOSYS: + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is not supported by the current kernel. " + "To support it, build the kernel with " + "CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y and prepend " + "\"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM.\n"); + break; + case EOPNOTSUPP: + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: Landlock is currently disabled. " + "It can be enabled in the kernel configuration by " + "prepending \"landlock,\" to the content of CONFIG_LSM, " + "or at boot time by setting the same content to the " + "\"lsm\" kernel parameter.\n"); + break; + } + return 1; + } + if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ)) { + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, + ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE)) { + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("Failed to restrict privileges"); + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) { + perror("Failed to enforce ruleset"); + goto err_close_ruleset; + } + close(ruleset_fd); + + cmd_path = argv[1]; + cmd_argv = argv + 1; + execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp); + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path, + strerror(errno)); + fprintf(stderr, "Hint: access to the binary, the interpreter or " + "shared libraries may be denied.\n"); + return 1; + +err_close_ruleset: + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; +} -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 5526b450834331d9196cae26acef0bfd5afd9fc4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mickaël Salaün Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2021 17:41:22 +0200 Subject: landlock: Add user and kernel documentation MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Add a first document describing userspace API: how to define and enforce a Landlock security policy. This is explained with a simple example. The Landlock system calls are described with their expected behavior and current limitations. Another document is dedicated to kernel developers, describing guiding principles and some important kernel structures. This documentation can be built with the Sphinx framework. Cc: James Morris Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Serge E. Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Reviewed-by: Vincent Dagonneau Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-13-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris --- Documentation/security/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/security/landlock.rst | 85 +++++++++ Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 311 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ MAINTAINERS | 2 + 5 files changed, 400 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/landlock.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/security/index.rst b/Documentation/security/index.rst index 8129405eb2cc..16335de04e8c 100644 --- a/Documentation/security/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/security/index.rst @@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ Security Documentation siphash tpm/index digsig + landlock diff --git a/Documentation/security/landlock.rst b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2e84925ae971 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/security/landlock.rst @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün +.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI + +================================== +Landlock LSM: kernel documentation +================================== + +:Author: Mickaël Salaün +:Date: March 2021 + +Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To +harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process, +including unprivileged ones. Because such process may be compromised or +backdoored (i.e. untrusted), Landlock's features must be safe to use from the +kernel and other processes point of view. Landlock's interface must therefore +expose a minimal attack surface. + +Landlock is designed to be usable by unprivileged processes while following the +system security policy enforced by other access control mechanisms (e.g. DAC, +LSM). Indeed, a Landlock rule shall not interfere with other access-controls +enforced on the system, only add more restrictions. + +Any user can enforce Landlock rulesets on their processes. They are merged and +evaluated according to the inherited ones in a way that ensures that only more +constraints can be added. + +User space documentation can be found here: :doc:`/userspace-api/landlock`. + +Guiding principles for safe access controls +=========================================== + +* A Landlock rule shall be focused on access control on kernel objects instead + of syscall filtering (i.e. syscall arguments), which is the purpose of + seccomp-bpf. +* To avoid multiple kinds of side-channel attacks (e.g. leak of security + policies, CPU-based attacks), Landlock rules shall not be able to + programmatically communicate with user space. +* Kernel access check shall not slow down access request from unsandboxed + processes. +* Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall + only impact the processes requesting them. + +Tests +===== + +Userspace tests for backward compatibility, ptrace restrictions and filesystem +support can be found here: `tools/testing/selftests/landlock/`_. + +Kernel structures +================= + +Object +------ + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/object.h + :identifiers: + +Filesystem +---------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/fs.h + :identifiers: + +Ruleset and domain +------------------ + +A domain is a read-only ruleset tied to a set of subjects (i.e. tasks' +credentials). Each time a ruleset is enforced on a task, the current domain is +duplicated and the ruleset is imported as a new layer of rules in the new +domain. Indeed, once in a domain, each rule is tied to a layer level. To +grant access to an object, at least one rule of each layer must allow the +requested action on the object. A task can then only transit to a new domain +that is the intersection of the constraints from the current domain and those +of a ruleset provided by the task. + +The definition of a subject is implicit for a task sandboxing itself, which +makes the reasoning much easier and helps avoid pitfalls. + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/ruleset.h + :identifiers: + +.. Links +.. _tools/testing/selftests/landlock/: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/ diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst index d29b020e5622..744c6491610c 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ place where this information is gathered. no_new_privs seccomp_filter + landlock unshare spec_ctrl accelerators/ocxl diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..62c9361a3c7f --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +.. Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün +.. Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI +.. Copyright © 2021 Microsoft Corporation + +===================================== +Landlock: unprivileged access control +===================================== + +:Author: Mickaël Salaün +:Date: March 2021 + +The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global +filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable +LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers +in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox +is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or +unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers +any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. + +Landlock rules +============== + +A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a +file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access +rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict +the thread enforcing it, and its future children. + +Defining and enforcing a security policy +---------------------------------------- + +We first need to create the ruleset that will contain our rules. For this +example, the ruleset will contain rules that only allow read actions, but write +actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of +actions. + +.. code-block:: c + + int ruleset_fd; + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { + .handled_access_fs = + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM, + }; + + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0); + if (ruleset_fd < 0) { + perror("Failed to create a ruleset"); + return 1; + } + +We can now add a new rule to this ruleset thanks to the returned file +descriptor referring to this ruleset. The rule will only allow reading the +file hierarchy ``/usr``. Without another rule, write actions would then be +denied by the ruleset. To add ``/usr`` to the ruleset, we open it with the +``O_PATH`` flag and fill the &struct landlock_path_beneath_attr with this file +descriptor. + +.. code-block:: c + + int err; + struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath = { + .allowed_access = + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, + }; + + path_beneath.parent_fd = open("/usr", O_PATH | O_CLOEXEC); + if (path_beneath.parent_fd < 0) { + perror("Failed to open file"); + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; + } + err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH, + &path_beneath, 0); + close(path_beneath.parent_fd); + if (err) { + perror("Failed to update ruleset"); + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; + } + +We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while +denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to +restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID +binary). + +.. code-block:: c + + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) { + perror("Failed to restrict privileges"); + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; + } + +The current thread is now ready to sandbox itself with the ruleset. + +.. code-block:: c + + if (landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0)) { + perror("Failed to enforce ruleset"); + close(ruleset_fd); + return 1; + } + close(ruleset_fd); + +If the `landlock_restrict_self` system call succeeds, the current thread is now +restricted and this policy will be enforced on all its subsequently created +children as well. Once a thread is landlocked, there is no way to remove its +security policy; only adding more restrictions is allowed. These threads are +now in a new Landlock domain, merge of their parent one (if any) with the new +ruleset. + +Full working code can be found in `samples/landlock/sandboxer.c`_. + +Layers of file path access rights +--------------------------------- + +Each time a thread enforces a ruleset on itself, it updates its Landlock domain +with a new layer of policy. Indeed, this complementary policy is stacked with +the potentially other rulesets already restricting this thread. A sandboxed +thread can then safely add more constraints to itself with a new enforced +ruleset. + +One policy layer grants access to a file path if at least one of its rules +encountered on the path grants the access. A sandboxed thread can only access +a file path if all its enforced policy layers grant the access as well as all +the other system access controls (e.g. filesystem DAC, other LSM policies, +etc.). + +Bind mounts and OverlayFS +------------------------- + +Landlock enables to restrict access to file hierarchies, which means that these +access rights can be propagated with bind mounts (cf. +:doc:`/filesystems/sharedsubtree`) but not with :doc:`/filesystems/overlayfs`. + +A bind mount mirrors a source file hierarchy to a destination. The destination +hierarchy is then composed of the exact same files, on which Landlock rules can +be tied, either via the source or the destination path. These rules restrict +access when they are encountered on a path, which means that they can restrict +access to multiple file hierarchies at the same time, whether these hierarchies +are the result of bind mounts or not. + +An OverlayFS mount point consists of upper and lower layers. These layers are +combined in a merge directory, result of the mount point. This merge hierarchy +may include files from the upper and lower layers, but modifications performed +on the merge hierarchy only reflects on the upper layer. From a Landlock +policy point of view, each OverlayFS layers and merge hierarchies are +standalone and contains their own set of files and directories, which is +different from bind mounts. A policy restricting an OverlayFS layer will not +restrict the resulted merged hierarchy, and vice versa. Landlock users should +then only think about file hierarchies they want to allow access to, regardless +of the underlying filesystem. + +Inheritance +----------- + +Every new thread resulting from a :manpage:`clone(2)` inherits Landlock domain +restrictions from its parent. This is similar to the seccomp inheritance (cf. +:doc:`/userspace-api/seccomp_filter`) or any other LSM dealing with task's +:manpage:`credentials(7)`. For instance, one process's thread may apply +Landlock rules to itself, but they will not be automatically applied to other +sibling threads (unlike POSIX thread credential changes, cf. +:manpage:`nptl(7)`). + +When a thread sandboxes itself, we have the guarantee that the related security +policy will stay enforced on all this thread's descendants. This allows +creating standalone and modular security policies per application, which will +automatically be composed between themselves according to their runtime parent +policies. + +Ptrace restrictions +------------------- + +A sandboxed process has less privileges than a non-sandboxed process and must +then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating another process. +To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target +process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, +which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. + +Kernel interface +================ + +Access rights +------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :identifiers: fs_access + +Creating a new ruleset +---------------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscalls.c + :identifiers: sys_landlock_create_ruleset + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :identifiers: landlock_ruleset_attr + +Extending a ruleset +------------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscalls.c + :identifiers: sys_landlock_add_rule + +.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h + :identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr + +Enforcing a ruleset +------------------- + +.. kernel-doc:: security/landlock/syscalls.c + :identifiers: sys_landlock_restrict_self + +Current limitations +=================== + +File renaming and linking +------------------------- + +Because Landlock targets unprivileged access controls, it is needed to properly +handle composition of rules. Such property also implies rules nesting. +Properly handling multiple layers of ruleset, each one of them able to restrict +access to files, also implies to inherit the ruleset restrictions from a parent +to its hierarchy. Because files are identified and restricted by their +hierarchy, moving or linking a file from one directory to another implies to +propagate the hierarchy constraints. To protect against privilege escalations +through renaming or linking, and for the sake of simplicity, Landlock currently +limits linking and renaming to the same directory. Future Landlock evolutions +will enable more flexibility for renaming and linking, with dedicated ruleset +flags. + +Filesystem topology modification +-------------------------------- + +As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its +filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or +:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`. However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied. + +Special filesystems +------------------- + +Access to regular files and directories can be restricted by Landlock, +according to the handled accesses of a ruleset. However, files that do not +come from a user-visible filesystem (e.g. pipe, socket), but can still be +accessed through ``/proc//fd/*``, cannot currently be explicitly +restricted. Likewise, some special kernel filesystems such as nsfs, which can +be accessed through ``/proc//ns/*``, cannot currently be explicitly +restricted. However, thanks to the `ptrace restrictions`_, access to such +sensitive ``/proc`` files are automatically restricted according to domain +hierarchies. Future Landlock evolutions could still enable to explicitly +restrict such paths with dedicated ruleset flags. + +Ruleset layers +-------------- + +There is a limit of 64 layers of stacked rulesets. This can be an issue for a +task willing to enforce a new ruleset in complement to its 64 inherited +rulesets. Once this limit is reached, sys_landlock_restrict_self() returns +E2BIG. It is then strongly suggested to carefully build rulesets once in the +life of a thread, especially for applications able to launch other applications +that may also want to sandbox themselves (e.g. shells, container managers, +etc.). + +Memory usage +------------ + +Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restricted +by the :doc:`/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory`. + +Questions and answers +===================== + +What about user space sandbox managers? +--------------------------------------- + +Using user space process to enforce restrictions on kernel resources can lead +to race conditions or inconsistent evaluations (i.e. `Incorrect mirroring of +the OS code and state +`_). + +What about namespaces and containers? +------------------------------------- + +Namespaces can help create sandboxes but they are not designed for +access-control and then miss useful features for such use case (e.g. no +fine-grained restrictions). Moreover, their complexity can lead to security +issues, especially when untrusted processes can manipulate them (cf. +`Controlling access to user namespaces `_). + +Additional documentation +======================== + +* :doc:`/security/landlock` +* https://landlock.io + +.. Links +.. _samples/landlock/sandboxer.c: + https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/tree/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 88175ed1f315..7b0c6de5946a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -10003,6 +10003,8 @@ L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org S: Supported W: https://landlock.io T: git https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux.git +F: Documentation/security/landlock.rst +F: Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst F: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h F: samples/landlock/ F: security/landlock/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 0739191b848136f733978eae9c37e34435c906af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianjun Wang Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2021 14:17:23 +0800 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add Jianjun Wang as MediaTek PCI co-maintainer Update entry for MediaTek PCIe controller, add Jianjun Wang as MediaTek PCI co-maintainer. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210420061723.989-8-jianjun.wang@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Jianjun Wang Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Acked-by: Ryder Lee --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..8050c14e6a7a 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -13919,6 +13919,7 @@ F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-histb.c PCIE DRIVER FOR MEDIATEK M: Ryder Lee +M: Jianjun Wang L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org L: linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org S: Supported -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 1c7600b7cfc6154f2fd361a74b1d4f25b8f02e48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2021 11:05:20 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: remove Wingman Kwok His email bounces with permanent error "550 Invalid recipient". His last email on the LKML was from 2015-10-22 on the LKML. Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 4796ccf9f871..784e05bc0cb9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -18216,7 +18216,6 @@ F: sound/soc/codecs/isabelle* F: sound/soc/codecs/lm49453* TI NETCP ETHERNET DRIVER -M: Wingman Kwok M: Murali Karicheri L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 57e1d8206e48ef78e1b25823fc131ebe60c76b61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Walle Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2021 11:05:21 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: move Murali Karicheri to credits His email bounces with permanent error "550 Invalid recipient". His last email was from 2020-09-09 on the LKML and he seems to have left TI. Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- CREDITS | 5 +++++ MAINTAINERS | 13 ------------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/CREDITS b/CREDITS index b06760f09c66..7ef7b136e71d 100644 --- a/CREDITS +++ b/CREDITS @@ -1874,6 +1874,11 @@ S: Krosenska' 543 S: 181 00 Praha 8 S: Czech Republic +N: Murali Karicheri +E: m-karicheri2@ti.com +D: Keystone NetCP driver +D: Keystone PCIe host controller driver + N: Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak E: kas@fi.muni.cz D: Author of the COSA/SRP sync serial board driver. diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 784e05bc0cb9..86c11ad3c502 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14010,13 +14010,6 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/ti-pci.txt F: drivers/pci/controller/cadence/pci-j721e.c F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-dra7xx.c -PCI DRIVER FOR TI KEYSTONE -M: Murali Karicheri -L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org -L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) -S: Maintained -F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-keystone.c - PCI DRIVER FOR V3 SEMICONDUCTOR V360EPC M: Linus Walleij L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org @@ -18215,12 +18208,6 @@ S: Maintained F: sound/soc/codecs/isabelle* F: sound/soc/codecs/lm49453* -TI NETCP ETHERNET DRIVER -M: Murali Karicheri -L: netdev@vger.kernel.org -S: Maintained -F: drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp* - TI PCM3060 ASoC CODEC DRIVER M: Kirill Marinushkin L: alsa-devel@alsa-project.org (moderated for non-subscribers) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From a3ddd79a17ee1ad43cf0200f158c30515da7b09c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2021 22:59:37 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: assign pagewalk.h to MEMORY MANAGEMENT Patch series "kernel-doc and MAINTAINERS clean-up". Roughly 900 warnings of about 21.000 kernel-doc warnings in the kernel tree warn with 'cannot understand function prototype:', i.e., the kernel-doc parser cannot parse the function's signature. The majority, about 600 cases of those, are just struct definitions following the kernel-doc description. Further, spot-check investigations suggest that the authors of the specific kernel-doc descriptions simply were not aware that the general format for a kernel-doc description for a structure requires to prefix the struct name with the keyword 'struct', as in 'struct struct_name - Brief description.'. Details on kernel-doc are at the Link below. Without the struct keyword, kernel-doc does not check if the kernel-doc description fits to the actual struct definition in the source code. Fortunately, in roughly a quarter of these cases, the kernel-doc description is actually complete wrt. its corresponding struct definition. So, the trivial change adding the struct keyword will allow us to keep the kernel-doc descriptions more consistent for future changes, by checking for new kernel-doc warnings. Also, some of the files in ./include/ are not assigned to a specific MAINTAINERS section and hence have no dedicated maintainer. So, if needed, the files in ./include/ are also assigned to the fitting MAINTAINERS section, as I need to identify whom to send the clean-up patch anyway. Here is the change from this kernel-doc janitorial work in the ./include/ directory for MEMORY MANAGEMENT. This patch (of 2): Commit a520110e4a15 ("mm: split out a new pagewalk.h header from mm.h") adds a new file in ./include/linux, but misses to update MAINTAINERS accordingly. Hence, ./scripts/get_maintainers.pl include/linux/pagewalk.h points only to lkml as general fallback for all files, whereas the original include/linux/mm.h clearly marks this file part of MEMORY MANAGEMENT. Assign include/linux/pagewalk.h to MEMORY MANAGEMENT. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210322122542.15072-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210322122542.15072-2-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Cc: Joe Perches Cc: Ralf Ramsauer Cc: Jonathan Corbet Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index b2c3af92d57c..591897e03525 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -11744,6 +11744,7 @@ F: include/linux/gfp.h F: include/linux/memory_hotplug.h F: include/linux/mm.h F: include/linux/mmzone.h +F: include/linux/pagewalk.h F: include/linux/vmalloc.h F: mm/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From c5197b4ec932f34934944859ca78086bd910edc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marc Dionne Date: Fri, 30 Apr 2021 14:50:09 -0300 Subject: afs, rxrpc: Add Marc Dionne as co-maintainer Add Marc Dionne as a co-maintainer for kafs and rxrpc. Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 86c11ad3c502..4a8ddad3c652 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ F: fs/affs/ AFS FILESYSTEM M: David Howells +M: Marc Dionne L: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org S: Supported W: https://www.infradead.org/~dhowells/kafs/ @@ -15792,6 +15793,7 @@ F: drivers/infiniband/ulp/rtrs/ RXRPC SOCKETS (AF_RXRPC) M: David Howells +M: Marc Dionne L: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org S: Supported W: https://www.infradead.org/~dhowells/kafs/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From c7ceee6958770c447b86a8917a603a20d646b608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 18:51:54 -0400 Subject: ktest: Add KTEST section to MAINTAINERS file As I wanted to add John Hawley as a co-maintainer for ktest, I found that there never was a KTEST section in the MAINTAINERS file. Add one! Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) --- MAINTAINERS | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..3539d76232de 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9976,6 +9976,12 @@ S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/leds/backlight/kinetic,ktd253.yaml F: drivers/video/backlight/ktd253-backlight.c +KTEST +M: Steven Rostedt +M: John Hawley +S: Maintained +F: tools/testing/ktest + L3MDEV M: David Ahern L: netdev@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 2da0dd5e30af22a125c38137ee980c5bce3da391 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greentime Hu Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 18:59:37 +0800 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add maintainers for SiFive FU740 PCIe driver Here add maintainer information for SiFive FU740 PCIe driver. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210504105940.100004-4-greentime.hu@sifive.com Signed-off-by: Greentime Hu Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi --- MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index d92f85ca831d..888171ead601 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -13692,6 +13692,14 @@ S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/fsl,imx6q-pcie.txt F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/*imx6* +PCI DRIVER FOR FU740 +M: Paul Walmsley +M: Greentime Hu +L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/sifive,fu740-pcie.yaml +F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-fu740.c + PCI DRIVER FOR INTEL VOLUME MANAGEMENT DEVICE (VMD) M: Jonathan Derrick L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From a5e7da1494e191c561ecce8829a6c19449585e3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 07:37:28 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: add io_uring tool to IO_URING The files in ./tools/io_uring/ are maintained by the IO_URING maintainers. Reflect that fact in MAINTAINERS. Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210505053728.3868-1-lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 5c90148f0369..b680192d18b9 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -9497,6 +9497,7 @@ F: fs/io-wq.h F: fs/io_uring.c F: include/linux/io_uring.h F: include/uapi/linux/io_uring.h +F: tools/io_uring/ IPMI SUBSYSTEM M: Corey Minyard -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 550eb38bde07fb71a1d877c2ab284f0cf926d327 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yury Norov Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 18:03:22 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: add entry for the bitmap API Add myself as maintainer for bitmap API and Andy and Rasmus as reviewers. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210401003153.97325-13-yury.norov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yury Norov Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko Acked-by: Rasmus Villemoes Cc: Alexey Klimov Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: David Sterba Cc: Dennis Zhou Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven Cc: Jianpeng Ma Cc: Joe Perches Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Rich Felker Cc: Stefano Brivio Cc: Wei Yang Cc: Wolfram Sang Cc: Yoshinori Sato Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- MAINTAINERS | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 591897e03525..2b4f29e2aebd 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -3205,6 +3205,22 @@ F: Documentation/filesystems/bfs.rst F: fs/bfs/ F: include/uapi/linux/bfs_fs.h +BITMAP API +M: Yury Norov +R: Andy Shevchenko +R: Rasmus Villemoes +S: Maintained +F: include/asm-generic/bitops/find.h +F: include/linux/bitmap.h +F: lib/bitmap.c +F: lib/find_bit.c +F: lib/find_bit_benchmark.c +F: lib/test_bitmap.c +F: tools/include/asm-generic/bitops/find.h +F: tools/include/linux/bitmap.h +F: tools/lib/bitmap.c +F: tools/lib/find_bit.c + BLINKM RGB LED DRIVER M: Jan-Simon Moeller S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From b577750e4157050ed6de5ca9083893027b8ece33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Mon, 3 May 2021 12:06:03 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add Matthew Bobrowski as a reviewer Matthew helps with fanotify already for some time and he'd like to do more so let's add him as a reviewer. CC: Matthew Bobrowski Signed-off-by: Jan Kara --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..e15e155ff10e 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -6938,6 +6938,7 @@ F: net/core/failover.c FANOTIFY M: Jan Kara R: Amir Goldstein +R: Matthew Bobrowski L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: fs/notify/fanotify/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From cc2520909c2df9ad51d642bf09b3da26a9f56393 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jernej Skrabec Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 19:33:35 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Update my e-mail Old e-mail address doesn't work anymore, update it to new one. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210505173335.1483575-1-jernej.skrabec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard --- .mailmap | 1 + MAINTAINERS | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/.mailmap b/.mailmap index 2d93232ed72b..ca235ef4755f 100644 --- a/.mailmap +++ b/.mailmap @@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ Jeff Layton Jeff Layton Jens Axboe Jens Osterkamp +Jernej Skrabec Jiri Slaby Jiri Slaby Jiri Slaby diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 7fdc513392f4..2e9063d018d0 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -1572,7 +1572,7 @@ F: drivers/clk/sunxi/ ARM/Allwinner sunXi SoC support M: Maxime Ripard M: Chen-Yu Tsai -R: Jernej Skrabec +R: Jernej Skrabec L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sunxi/linux.git @@ -5003,7 +5003,7 @@ S: Maintained F: drivers/net/fddi/defza.* DEINTERLACE DRIVERS FOR ALLWINNER H3 -M: Jernej Skrabec +M: Jernej Skrabec L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git @@ -5527,7 +5527,7 @@ F: include/linux/power/smartreflex.h DRM DRIVER FOR ALLWINNER DE2 AND DE3 ENGINE M: Maxime Ripard M: Chen-Yu Tsai -R: Jernej Skrabec +R: Jernej Skrabec L: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org S: Supported T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc @@ -5903,7 +5903,7 @@ M: Andrzej Hajda M: Neil Armstrong R: Laurent Pinchart R: Jonas Karlman -R: Jernej Skrabec +R: Jernej Skrabec S: Maintained T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/ @@ -15490,7 +15490,7 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/rose.h F: net/rose/ ROTATION DRIVER FOR ALLWINNER A83T -M: Jernej Skrabec +M: Jernej Skrabec L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained T: git git://linuxtv.org/media_tree.git -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 875d598db60ac81e768fdfd2c589f6209038488b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Vetter Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 18:34:13 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Update address for Emma Anholt Reviewed-by: Emma Anholt Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter --- MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..38a1e3bf5af0 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5639,7 +5639,7 @@ T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: drivers/gpu/drm/sun4i/sun8i* DRM DRIVER FOR ARM PL111 CLCD -M: Eric Anholt +M: Emma Anholt S: Supported T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: drivers/gpu/drm/pl111/ @@ -5719,7 +5719,7 @@ T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/gm12u320.c DRM DRIVER FOR HX8357D PANELS -M: Eric Anholt +M: Emma Anholt S: Maintained T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/himax,hx8357d.txt @@ -6177,7 +6177,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/ti/ F: drivers/gpu/drm/omapdrm/ DRM DRIVERS FOR V3D -M: Eric Anholt +M: Emma Anholt S: Supported T: git git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/gpu/brcm,bcm-v3d.yaml @@ -6185,7 +6185,7 @@ F: drivers/gpu/drm/v3d/ F: include/uapi/drm/v3d_drm.h DRM DRIVERS FOR VC4 -M: Eric Anholt +M: Emma Anholt M: Maxime Ripard S: Supported T: git git://github.com/anholt/linux -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 3dd4fe4b4dfa34e7487edfe159ef787ba397cfa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dan Williams Date: Wed, 21 Apr 2021 00:05:28 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Move nvdimm mailing list After seeing some users have subscription management trouble, more spam than other Linux development lists, and considering some of the benefits of kernel.org hosted lists, nvdimm and persistent memory development is moving to nvdimm@lists.linux.dev. The old list will remain up until v5.14-rc1 and shutdown thereafter. Cc: Ira Weiny Cc: Oliver O'Halloran Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Jan Kara Cc: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Dave Jiang Cc: Vishal Verma Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161898872871.3406469.4054282559340528393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax | 2 +- Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-bus-nfit | 2 +- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-nfit | 40 +++++++++++++-------------- Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-papr-pmem | 4 +-- Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/nvdimm.rst | 2 +- MAINTAINERS | 14 +++++----- 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax index 0faf1354cd05..5bcce27458e3 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax +++ b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ What: /sys/class/dax/ Date: May, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: Device DAX is the device-centric analogue of Filesystem DAX (CONFIG_FS_DAX). It allows memory ranges to be allocated and mapped without need of an intervening file diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-bus-nfit b/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-bus-nfit index ae8c1ca53828..277437005def 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-bus-nfit +++ b/Documentation/ABI/removed/sysfs-bus-nfit @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/regionX/nfit/ecc_unit_size Date: Aug, 2017 KernelVersion: v4.14 (Removed v4.18) -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Size of a write request to a DIMM that will not incur a read-modify-write cycle at the memory controller. diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-nfit b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-nfit index 63ef0b9ecce7..e7282d184a74 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-nfit +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-nfit @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Interface Table (NFIT)' section in the ACPI specification What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/serial Date: Jun, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Serial number of the NVDIMM (non-volatile dual in-line memory module), assigned by the module vendor. @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/handle Date: Apr, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) The address (given by the _ADR object) of the device on its parent bus of the NVDIMM device containing the NVDIMM region. @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/device Date: Apr, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.1 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Device id for the NVDIMM, assigned by the module vendor. @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/rev_id Date: Jun, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Revision of the NVDIMM, assigned by the module vendor. @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/phys_id Date: Apr, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Handle (i.e., instance number) for the SMBIOS (system management BIOS) Memory Device structure describing the NVDIMM @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/flags Date: Jun, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) The flags in the NFIT memory device sub-structure indicate the state of the data on the nvdimm relative to its energy @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/format1 What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/formats Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) The interface codes indicate support for persistent memory mapped directly into system physical address space and / or a @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/vendor Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Vendor id of the NVDIMM. @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/dsm_mask Date: May, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) The bitmask indicates the supported device specific control functions relative to the NVDIMM command family supported by the @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/family Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Displays the NVDIMM family command sets. Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 correspond to NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL, @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/id Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) ACPI specification 6.2 section 5.2.25.9, defines an identifier for an NVDIMM, which refelects the id attribute. @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/subsystem_vendor Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Sub-system vendor id of the NVDIMM non-volatile memory subsystem controller. @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/subsystem_rev_id Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Sub-system revision id of the NVDIMM non-volatile memory subsystem controller, assigned by the non-volatile memory subsystem @@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/nfit/subsystem_device Date: Apr, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.7 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) Sub-system device id for the NVDIMM non-volatile memory subsystem controller, assigned by the non-volatile memory @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/ndbusX/nfit/revision Date: Jun, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) ACPI NFIT table revision number. @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/ndbusX/nfit/scrub Date: Sep, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.9 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RW) This shows the number of full Address Range Scrubs (ARS) that have been completed since driver load time. Userspace can @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/ndbusX/nfit/hw_error_scrub Date: Sep, 2016 KernelVersion: v4.9 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RW) Provides a way to toggle the behavior between just adding the address (cache line) where the MCE happened to the poison @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/ndbusX/nfit/dsm_mask Date: Jun, 2017 KernelVersion: v4.13 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) The bitmask indicates the supported bus specific control functions. See the section named 'NVDIMM Root Device _DSMs' in @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/ndbusX/nfit/firmware_activate_noidle Date: Apr, 2020 KernelVersion: v5.8 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RW) The Intel platform implementation of firmware activate support exposes an option let the platform force idle devices in @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/regionX/nfit/range_index Date: Jun, 2015 KernelVersion: v4.2 -Contact: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +Contact: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Description: (RO) A unique number provided by the BIOS to identify an address range. Used by NVDIMM Region Mapping Structure to uniquely refer diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-papr-pmem b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-papr-pmem index 8316c33862a0..92e2db0e2d3d 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-papr-pmem +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-papr-pmem @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/papr/flags Date: Apr, 2020 KernelVersion: v5.8 -Contact: linuxppc-dev , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, +Contact: linuxppc-dev , nvdimm@lists.linux.dev, Description: (RO) Report flags indicating various states of a papr-pmem NVDIMM device. Each flag maps to a one or @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Description: What: /sys/bus/nd/devices/nmemX/papr/perf_stats Date: May, 2020 KernelVersion: v5.9 -Contact: linuxppc-dev , linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, +Contact: linuxppc-dev , nvdimm@lists.linux.dev, Description: (RO) Report various performance stats related to papr-scm NVDIMM device. Each stat is reported on a new line with each line diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/nvdimm.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/nvdimm.rst index ef6d59e0978e..1d8302b89bd4 100644 --- a/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/nvdimm.rst +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/nvdimm/nvdimm.rst @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ LIBNVDIMM: Non-Volatile Devices libnvdimm - kernel / libndctl - userspace helper library -linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +nvdimm@lists.linux.dev Version 13 diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..6b5d489022ea 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5237,7 +5237,7 @@ DEVICE DIRECT ACCESS (DAX) M: Dan Williams M: Vishal Verma M: Dave Jiang -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported F: drivers/dax/ @@ -7006,7 +7006,7 @@ M: Dan Williams R: Matthew Wilcox R: Jan Kara L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported F: fs/dax.c F: include/linux/dax.h @@ -10378,7 +10378,7 @@ LIBNVDIMM BLK: MMIO-APERTURE DRIVER M: Dan Williams M: Vishal Verma M: Dave Jiang -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/ P: Documentation/nvdimm/maintainer-entry-profile.rst @@ -10389,7 +10389,7 @@ LIBNVDIMM BTT: BLOCK TRANSLATION TABLE M: Vishal Verma M: Dan Williams M: Dave Jiang -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/ P: Documentation/nvdimm/maintainer-entry-profile.rst @@ -10399,7 +10399,7 @@ LIBNVDIMM PMEM: PERSISTENT MEMORY DRIVER M: Dan Williams M: Vishal Verma M: Dave Jiang -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/ P: Documentation/nvdimm/maintainer-entry-profile.rst @@ -10407,7 +10407,7 @@ F: drivers/nvdimm/pmem* LIBNVDIMM: DEVICETREE BINDINGS M: Oliver O'Halloran -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pmem/pmem-region.txt @@ -10418,7 +10418,7 @@ M: Dan Williams M: Vishal Verma M: Dave Jiang M: Ira Weiny -L: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org +L: nvdimm@lists.linux.dev S: Supported Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-nvdimm/list/ P: Documentation/nvdimm/maintainer-entry-profile.rst -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From ca14f9597f4fdb3679453aec7bb2807f0b8b7363 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 10:00:46 -0400 Subject: MAINTAINERS: nfc: drop Clément Perrochaud from NXP-NCI MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Emails to Clément Perrochaud bounce with permanent error "user does not exist", so remove Clément Perrochaud from NXP-NCI driver maintainers entry. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Acked-by: Mark Greer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..ec723b48769e 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -13205,7 +13205,6 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/tfa9879.txt F: sound/soc/codecs/tfa9879* NXP-NCI NFC DRIVER -M: Clément Perrochaud R: Charles Gorand L: linux-nfc@lists.01.org (moderated for non-subscribers) S: Supported -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 8aa5713d8b2ce1ea67bdf212eb61bfcff3c52202 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 10:43:18 -0400 Subject: MAINTAINERS: nfc: add Krzysztof Kozlowski as maintainer The NFC subsystem is orphaned. I am happy to spend some cycles to review the patches, send pull requests and in general keep the NFC subsystem running. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Acked-by: Mark Greer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index ec723b48769e..7020293a1347 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12896,8 +12896,9 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/nexthop.h F: net/ipv4/nexthop.c NFC SUBSYSTEM +M: Krzysztof Kozlowski L: netdev@vger.kernel.org -S: Orphan +S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/ F: drivers/nfc/ F: include/linux/platform_data/nfcmrvl.h -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 4a64541f2cebef54ea8d9f53ac5067328b8e02d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 10:43:19 -0400 Subject: MAINTAINERS: nfc: include linux-nfc mailing list Keep all NFC related patches in existing linux-nfc@lists.01.org mailing list. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Acked-by: Mark Greer Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 7020293a1347..1d834bebf469 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12897,6 +12897,7 @@ F: net/ipv4/nexthop.c NFC SUBSYSTEM M: Krzysztof Kozlowski +L: linux-nfc@lists.01.org (moderated for non-subscribers) L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/nfc/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From c547addba7096debac4f99cdfe869a32a81081e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Borisov Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 16:17:37 +0300 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add lib/percpu* as part of percpu entry Without this patch get_maintainers.pl on a patch which modified lib/percpu_refcount.c produces: Jens Axboe (commit_signer:2/5=40%) Ming Lei (commit_signer:2/5=40%,authored:2/5=40%,added_lines:99/114=87%,removed_lines:34/43=79%) "Paul E. McKenney" (commit_signer:1/5=20%,authored:1/5=20%,added_lines:9/114=8%,removed_lines:3/43=7%) Tejun Heo (commit_signer:1/5=20%) Andrew Morton (commit_signer:1/5=20%) Nikolay Borisov (authored:1/5=20%,removed_lines:3/43=7%) Joe Perches (authored:1/5=20%,removed_lines:3/43=7%) linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Whereas with the patch applied it now (properly) prints: Dennis Zhou (maintainer:PER-CPU MEMORY ALLOCATOR) Tejun Heo (maintainer:PER-CPU MEMORY ALLOCATOR) Christoph Lameter (maintainer:PER-CPU MEMORY ALLOCATOR) linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov [Dennis: updated list to linux-mm@kvack.org] Signed-off-by: Dennis Zhou --- MAINTAINERS | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..9599e313d7f7 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14317,10 +14317,12 @@ PER-CPU MEMORY ALLOCATOR M: Dennis Zhou M: Tejun Heo M: Christoph Lameter +L: linux-mm@kvack.org S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dennis/percpu.git F: arch/*/include/asm/percpu.h F: include/linux/percpu*.h +F: lib/percpu*.c F: mm/percpu*.c PER-TASK DELAY ACCOUNTING -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From b433d090ac63eae4d3182cfc274dbacb0c4ee0ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Hilman Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 12:00:54 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: ARM/Amlogic SoCs: add Neil as primary maintainer Add Neil as primary maintainer for the Amlogic family of Arm SoCs. I will now act as co-maintainer. Neil is already doing lots of the reviewing, testing and behind the scenes support for users of the upstream kernel on these SoCs, so this is just to formalize the current state of affairs. Thanks Neil for all of your efforts, and keep up the great work! Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman Acked-by: Neil Armstrong Acked-by: Martin Blumenstingl Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511190054.26300-1-khilman@baylibre.com' Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann --- MAINTAINERS | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 1162b0917630..a75eb1514957 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -1622,8 +1622,8 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/amlogic* F: sound/soc/meson/ ARM/Amlogic Meson SoC support +M: Neil Armstrong M: Kevin Hilman -R: Neil Armstrong R: Jerome Brunet R: Martin Blumenstingl L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers) -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 3c814519743a919f8b3c236c0565e24709806d66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Krzysztof Kozlowski Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 10:19:54 -0400 Subject: MAINTAINERS: net: remove stale website link The http://www.linuxfoundation.org/en/Net does not contain networking subsystem description ("Nothing found"). Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 1d834bebf469..c1cb2e38ae2e 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12709,7 +12709,6 @@ M: "David S. Miller" M: Jakub Kicinski L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -W: http://www.linuxfoundation.org/en/Net Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/ T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next.git @@ -12754,7 +12753,6 @@ M: "David S. Miller" M: Jakub Kicinski L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -W: http://www.linuxfoundation.org/en/Net Q: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/ B: mailto:netdev@vger.kernel.org T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From d7aed20d446d8c87f5e13adf73281056b0064a45 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alain Volmat Date: Wed, 12 May 2021 07:20:42 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add Alain Volmat as STM32 SPI maintainer Add Alain Volmat as STM32 SPI maintainer. Signed-off-by: Alain Volmat Reviewed-by: Amelie Delaunay Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1620796842-23546-1-git-send-email-alain.volmat@foss.st.com Signed-off-by: Mark Brown --- MAINTAINERS | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 1c9827207949..528068e31845 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -16954,6 +16954,12 @@ L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-stm32* +ST STM32 SPI DRIVER +M: Alain Volmat +L: linux-spi@vger.kernel.org +S: Maintained +F: drivers/spi/spi-stm32.c + ST VL53L0X ToF RANGER(I2C) IIO DRIVER M: Song Qiang L: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 773fe1d74404fcb6f0e7e69c3420cf04a6bb56b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maximilian Luz Date: Sat, 15 May 2021 00:19:54 +0200 Subject: platform/surface: aggregator: Add platform-drivers-x86 list to MAINTAINERS entry The Surface System Aggregator Module driver entry is currently missing a mailing list. Surface platform drivers are discussed on the platform-driver-x86 list and all other Surface platform drivers have a reference to that list in their entries. So let's add one here as well. Signed-off-by: Maximilian Luz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210514221954.5976-1-luzmaximilian@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index bd7aff0c120f..57467b6046f1 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12180,6 +12180,7 @@ F: drivers/platform/surface/surfacepro3_button.c MICROSOFT SURFACE SYSTEM AGGREGATOR SUBSYSTEM M: Maximilian Luz +L: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained W: https://github.com/linux-surface/surface-aggregator-module C: irc://chat.freenode.net/##linux-surface -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From e5bfaed7508fd34ae95a79d1eb76c38ecc82c947 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 15:28:56 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: s390/net: add netdev list Discussions for network-related code should include the netdev list. Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index c1cb2e38ae2e..88722efd94a1 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -15944,6 +15944,7 @@ S390 IUCV NETWORK LAYER M: Julian Wiedmann M: Karsten Graul L: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org +L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Supported W: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/ F: drivers/s390/net/*iucv* @@ -15954,6 +15955,7 @@ S390 NETWORK DRIVERS M: Julian Wiedmann M: Karsten Graul L: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org +L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Supported W: http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/linux390/ F: drivers/s390/net/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 29bf1993fdba17703a836cf098712cf15f96706d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ioana Ciornei Date: Sat, 22 May 2021 00:01:00 +0300 Subject: MAINTAINERS: remove Ioana Radulescu from dpaa2-eth Remove Ioana Radulescu from dpaa2-eth since she is no longer working on the DPAA2 set of drivers. Signed-off-by: Ioana Ciornei Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 88722efd94a1..251111e5da53 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -5569,7 +5569,6 @@ F: drivers/soc/fsl/dpio DPAA2 ETHERNET DRIVER M: Ioana Ciornei -M: Ioana Radulescu L: netdev@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: Documentation/networking/device_drivers/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/ethernet-driver.rst -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 43b2ec977ce33b53e2be30999824b584e2be248a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Dobriyan Date: Sat, 22 May 2021 17:42:05 -0700 Subject: proc: remove Alexey from MAINTAINERS People Cc me and I don't have time. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YKarMxHJBIhMHQIh@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index def1640cc294..81e1edeceae4 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -14735,7 +14735,6 @@ W: https://wireless.wiki.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers/p54 F: drivers/net/wireless/intersil/prism54/ PROC FILESYSTEM -R: Alexey Dobriyan L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org L: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 1e69abf98921fa27e2064970b614502d85230f9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Vinicius Costa Gomes Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 17:46:54 -0700 Subject: MAINTAINERS: Add entries for CBS, ETF and taprio qdiscs Add Vinicius Costa Gomes as maintainer for these qdiscs. These qdiscs are all TSN (Time Sensitive Networking) related. Signed-off-by: Vinicius Costa Gomes Acked-by: Cong Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 251111e5da53..2cc1cb72bc92 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -4138,6 +4138,14 @@ S: Odd Fixes F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cavium-thunder2.txt F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/cavium/thunder2-99xx* +CBS/ETF/TAPRIO QDISCS +M: Vinicius Costa Gomes +S: Maintained +L: netdev@vger.kernel.org +F: net/sched/sch_cbs.c +F: net/sched/sch_etf.c +F: net/sched/sch_taprio.c + CC2520 IEEE-802.15.4 RADIO DRIVER M: Varka Bhadram L: linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From bab09fe2f65200a67209a360988bc24f3de4b95d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Simon Horman Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 17:47:04 +0200 Subject: nfp: update maintainer and mailing list addresses Some of Netronome's activities and people have moved over to Corigine, including NFP driver maintenance and myself. Signed-off-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Louis Peens Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- MAINTAINERS | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2cc1cb72bc92..d34c0036bdcd 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12687,9 +12687,9 @@ F: drivers/rtc/rtc-ntxec.c F: include/linux/mfd/ntxec.h NETRONOME ETHERNET DRIVERS -M: Simon Horman +M: Simon Horman R: Jakub Kicinski -L: oss-drivers@netronome.com +L: oss-drivers@corigine.com S: Maintained F: drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/ -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 9f5815315e0b93146d7b0be4d96ee2d74eeabb98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Darrick J. Wong" Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 22:19:01 -0700 Subject: xfs: add new IRC channel to MAINTAINERS Add our new OFTC channel to the MAINTAINERS list so everyone will know where to go. Ignore the XFS wikis, we have no access to them. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong Reviewed-by: Brian Foster --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 008fcad7ac00..ceb146e9b506 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -19998,6 +19998,7 @@ F: arch/x86/xen/*swiotlb* F: drivers/xen/*swiotlb* XFS FILESYSTEM +C: irc://irc.oftc.net/xfs M: Darrick J. Wong M: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org L: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 From 8aa0ae439966364da86fc6437375e32f2890c4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lukas Bulwahn Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2021 08:18:09 +0200 Subject: MAINTAINERS: adjust to removing i2c designware platform data Commit 5a517b5bf687 ("i2c: designware: Get rid of legacy platform data") removes ./include/linux/platform_data/i2c-designware.h, but misses to adjust the SYNOPSYS DESIGNWARE I2C DRIVER section in MAINTAINERS. Hence, ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --self-test=patterns complains: warning: no file matches F: include/linux/platform_data/i2c-designware.h Remove the file entry to this removed file as well. Signed-off-by: Lukas Bulwahn Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang --- MAINTAINERS | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'MAINTAINERS') diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 81e1edeceae4..e686cf614262 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -17662,7 +17662,6 @@ R: Mika Westerberg L: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org S: Maintained F: drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-designware-* -F: include/linux/platform_data/i2c-designware.h SYNOPSYS DESIGNWARE MMC/SD/SDIO DRIVER M: Jaehoon Chung -- cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151