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This patch adds vlan rtm definitions:
- NEWVLAN: to be used for creating vlans, setting options and
notifications
- DELVLAN: to be used for deleting vlans
- GETVLAN: used for dumping vlan information
Dumping vlans which can span multiple messages is added now with basic
information (vid and flags). We use nlmsg_parse() to validate the header
length in order to be able to extend the message with filtering
attributes later.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground
Pull y2038 cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"y2038 syscall implementation cleanups
This is a series of cleanups for the y2038 work, mostly intended for
namespace cleaning: the kernel defines the traditional time_t, timeval
and timespec types that often lead to y2038-unsafe code. Even though
the unsafe usage is mostly gone from the kernel, having the types and
associated functions around means that we can still grow new users,
and that we may be missing conversions to safe types that actually
matter.
There are still a number of driver specific patches needed to get the
last users of these types removed, those have been submitted to the
respective maintainers"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191108210236.1296047-1-arnd@arndb.de/
* tag 'y2038-cleanups-5.5' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/playground: (26 commits)
y2038: alarm: fix half-second cut-off
y2038: ipc: fix x32 ABI breakage
y2038: fix typo in powerpc vdso "LOPART"
y2038: allow disabling time32 system calls
y2038: itimer: change implementation to timespec64
y2038: move itimer reset into itimer.c
y2038: use compat_{get,set}_itimer on alpha
y2038: itimer: compat handling to itimer.c
y2038: time: avoid timespec usage in settimeofday()
y2038: timerfd: Use timespec64 internally
y2038: elfcore: Use __kernel_old_timeval for process times
y2038: make ns_to_compat_timeval use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: socket: use __kernel_old_timespec instead of timespec
y2038: socket: remove timespec reference in timestamping
y2038: syscalls: change remaining timeval to __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: rusage: use __kernel_old_timeval
y2038: uapi: change __kernel_time_t to __kernel_old_time_t
y2038: stat: avoid 'time_t' in 'struct stat'
y2038: ipc: remove __kernel_time_t reference from headers
y2038: vdso: powerpc: avoid timespec references
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Only three SELinux patches for v5.5:
- Remove the size limit on SELinux policies, the limitation was a
lingering vestige and no longer necessary.
- Allow file labeling before the policy is loaded. This should ease
some of the burden when the policy is initially loaded (no need to
relabel files), but it should also help enable some new system
concepts which dynamically create the root filesystem in the
initrd.
- Add support for the "greatest lower bound" policy construct which
is defined as the intersection of the MLS range of two SELinux
labels"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: default_range glblub implementation
selinux: allow labeling before policy is loaded
selinux: remove load size limit
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Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"This is mostly to fix the iwlwifi regression:
1) Flush GRO state properly in iwlwifi driver, from Alexander Lobakin.
2) Validate TIPC link name with properly length macro, from John
Rutherford.
3) Fix completion init and device query timeouts in ibmvnic, from
Thomas Falcon.
4) Fix SKB size calculation for netlink messages in psample, from
Nikolay Aleksandrov.
5) Similar kind of fix for OVS flow dumps, from Paolo Abeni.
6) Handle queue allocation failure unwind properly in gve driver, we
could try to release pages we didn't allocate. From Jeroen de
Borst.
7) Serialize TX queue SKB list accesses properly in mscc ocelot
driver. From Yangbo Lu"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net:
net: usb: aqc111: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: phy: Use the correct style for SPDX License Identifier
net: wireless: intel: iwlwifi: fix GRO_NORMAL packet stalling
net: mscc: ocelot: use skb queue instead of skbs list
net: mscc: ocelot: avoid incorrect consuming in skbs list
gve: Fix the queue page list allocated pages count
net: inet_is_local_reserved_port() port arg should be unsigned short
openvswitch: fix flow command message size
net: phy: dp83869: Fix return paths to return proper values
net: psample: fix skb_over_panic
net: usbnet: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: hso: Fix -Wcast-function-type
net: port < inet_prot_sock(net) --> inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, port)
ibmvnic: Serialize device queries
ibmvnic: Bound waits for device queries
ibmvnic: Terminate waiting device threads after loss of service
ibmvnic: Fix completion structure initialization
net-sctp: replace some sock_net(sk) with just 'net'
net: Fix a documentation bug wrt. ip_unprivileged_port_start
tipc: fix link name length check
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main kernel side changes in this cycle were:
- Various Intel-PT updates and optimizations (Alexander Shishkin)
- Prohibit kprobes on Xen/KVM emulate prefixes (Masami Hiramatsu)
- Add support for LSM and SELinux checks to control access to the
perf syscall (Joel Fernandes)
- Misc other changes, optimizations, fixes and cleanups - see the
shortlog for details.
There were numerous tooling changes as well - 254 non-merge commits.
Here are the main changes - too many to list in detail:
- Enhancements to core tooling infrastructure, perf.data, libperf,
libtraceevent, event parsing, vendor events, Intel PT, callchains,
BPF support and instruction decoding.
- There were updates to the following tools:
perf annotate
perf diff
perf inject
perf kvm
perf list
perf maps
perf parse
perf probe
perf record
perf report
perf script
perf stat
perf test
perf trace
- And a lot of other changes: please see the shortlog and Git log for
more details"
* 'perf-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (279 commits)
perf parse: Fix potential memory leak when handling tracepoint errors
perf probe: Fix spelling mistake "addrees" -> "address"
libtraceevent: Fix memory leakage in copy_filter_type
libtraceevent: Fix header installation
perf intel-bts: Does not support AUX area sampling
perf intel-pt: Add support for decoding AUX area samples
perf intel-pt: Add support for recording AUX area samples
perf pmu: When using default config, record which bits of config were changed by the user
perf auxtrace: Add support for queuing AUX area samples
perf session: Add facility to peek at all events
perf auxtrace: Add support for dumping AUX area samples
perf inject: Cut AUX area samples
perf record: Add aux-sample-size config term
perf record: Add support for AUX area sampling
perf auxtrace: Add support for AUX area sample recording
perf auxtrace: Move perf_evsel__find_pmu()
perf record: Add a function to test for kernel support for AUX area sampling
perf tools: Add kernel AUX area sampling definitions
perf/core: Make the mlock accounting simple again
perf report: Jump to symbol source view from total cycles view
...
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Note that the sysctl write accessor functions guarantee that:
net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock <= net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0]
invariant is maintained, and as such the max() in selinux hooks is actually spurious.
ie. even though
if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) || snum > high) {
per logic is the same as
if ((snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) && snum < low) || snum > high) {
it is actually functionally equivalent to:
if (snum < low || snum > high) {
which is equivalent to:
if (snum < inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)) || snum < low || snum > high) {
even though the first clause is spurious.
But we want to hold on to it in case we ever want to change what what
inet_port_requires_bind_service() means (for example by changing
it from a, by default, [0..1024) range to some sort of set).
Test: builds, git 'grep inet_prot_sock' finds no other references
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Preparing for a change to the itimer internals, stop using the
do_setitimer() symbol and instead use a new higher-level interface.
The do_getitimer()/do_setitimer functions can now be made static,
allowing the compiler to potentially produce better object code.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Several cases of overlapping changes which were for the most
part trivially resolvable.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinuxfix from Paul Moore:
"One patch to ensure we don't copy bad memory up into userspace"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20191007' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix context string corruption in convert_context()
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A policy developer can now specify glblub as a default_range default and
the computed transition will be the intersection of the mls range of
the two contexts.
The glb (greatest lower bound) lub (lowest upper bound) of a range is calculated
as the greater of the low sensitivities and the lower of the high sensitivities
and the and of each category bitmap.
This can be used by MLS solution developers to compute a context that satisfies,
for example, the range of a network interface and the range of a user logging in.
Some examples are:
User Permitted Range | Network Device Label | Computed Label
---------------------|----------------------|----------------
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0 | s0
s0-s1:c0.c12 | s0-s1:c0.c1023 | s0-s1:c0.c12
s0-s4:c0.c512 | s1-s1:c0.c1023 | s1-s1:c0.c512
s0-s15:c0,c2 | s4-s6:c0.c128 | s4-s6:c0,c2
s0-s4 | s2-s6 | s2-s4
s0-s4 | s5-s8 | INVALID
s5-s8 | s0-s4 | INVALID
Signed-off-by: Joshua Brindle <joshua.brindle@crunchydata.com>
[PM: subject lines and checkpatch.pl fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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string_to_context_struct() may garble the context string, so we need to
copy back the contents again from the old context struct to avoid
storing the corrupted context.
Since string_to_context_struct() tokenizes (and therefore truncates) the
context string and we are later potentially copying it with kstrdup(),
this may eventually cause pieces of uninitialized kernel memory to be
disclosed to userspace (when copying to userspace based on the stored
length and not the null character).
How to reproduce on Fedora and similar:
# dnf install -y memcached
# systemctl start memcached
# semodule -d memcached
# load_policy
# load_policy
# systemctl stop memcached
# ausearch -m AVC
type=AVC msg=audit(1570090572.648:313): avc: denied { signal } for pid=1 comm="systemd" scontext=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 tclass=process permissive=0 trawcon=73797374656D5F75007400000000000070BE6E847296FFFF726F6D000096FFFF76
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Milos Malik <mmalik@redhat.com>
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add two commands to add and delete list of link properties. Implement
the first property type along - alternative ifnames.
Each net device can have multiple alternative names.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Currently, the SELinux LSM prevents one from setting the
`security.selinux` xattr on an inode without a policy first being
loaded. However, this restriction is problematic: it makes it impossible
to have newly created files with the correct label before actually
loading the policy.
This is relevant in distributions like Fedora, where the policy is
loaded by systemd shortly after pivoting out of the initrd. In such
instances, all files created prior to pivoting will be unlabeled. One
then has to relabel them after pivoting, an operation which inherently
races with other processes trying to access those same files.
Going further, there are use cases for creating the entire root
filesystem on first boot from the initrd (e.g. Container Linux supports
this today[1], and we'd like to support it in Fedora CoreOS as well[2]).
One can imagine doing this in two ways: at the block device level (e.g.
laying down a disk image), or at the filesystem level. In the former,
labeling can simply be part of the image. But even in the latter
scenario, one still really wants to be able to set the right labels when
populating the new filesystem.
This patch enables this by changing behaviour in the following two ways:
1. allow `setxattr` if we're not initialized
2. don't try to set the in-core inode SID if we're not initialized;
instead leave it as `LABEL_INVALID` so that revalidation may be
attempted at a later time
Note the first hunk of this patch is mostly the same as a previously
discussed one[3], though it was part of a larger series which wasn't
accepted.
[1] https://coreos.com/os/docs/latest/root-filesystem-placement.html
[2] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
[3] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-initramfs/msg04593.html
Co-developed-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Load size was limited to 64MB, this was legacy limitation due to vmalloc()
which was removed a while ago.
Signed-off-by: zhanglin <zhang.lin16@zte.com.cn>
[PM: removed comments in the description about 'real world use cases']
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
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We need to use selinux_cred() to fetch the SELinux cred blob instead
of directly using current->security or current_security(). There
were a couple of lingering uses of current_security() in the SELinux code
that were apparently missed during the earlier conversions. IIUC, this
would only manifest as a bug if multiple security modules including
SELinux are enabled and SELinux is not first in the lsm order. After
this change, there appear to be no other users of current_security()
in-tree; perhaps we should remove it altogether.
Fixes: bbd3662a8348 ("Infrastructure management of the cred security blob")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As noted in Documentation/atomic_t.txt, if we don't need the RMW atomic
operations, we should only use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() +
smp_rmb()/smp_wmb() where necessary (or the combined variants
smp_load_acquire()/smp_store_release()).
This patch converts the sidtab code to use regular u32 for the counter
and reverse lookup cache and use the appropriate operations instead of
atomic_get()/atomic_set(). Note that when reading/updating the reverse
lookup cache we don't need memory barriers as it doesn't need to be
consistent or accurate. We can now also replace some atomic ops with
regular loads (when under spinlock) and stores (for conversion target
fields that are always accessed under the master table's spinlock).
We can now also bump SIDTAB_MAX to U32_MAX as we can use the full u32
range again.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.
In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.
This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.
Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.
The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.
The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.
The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.
Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Previously if we couldn't find an entry in the cache and we failed to
allocate memory for a new cache entry we would fail the network object
label lookup; this is obviously not ideal. This patch fixes this so
that we return the object label even if we can't cache the object at
this point in time due to memory pressure.
The GitHub issue tracker is below:
* https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/3
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
The name is overly long and inconsistent with the other *_val_to_struct
members. Dropping the "_array" prefix makes the code easier to read and
gets rid of one line over 80 characters warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Fix most of the code style warnings discovered when moving code around.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
No code changes, but move a lot of the policydb destructors higher up
so we can get rid of a forward declaration.
This patch does expose a few old checkpatch.pl errors, but those will
be dealt with in a separate (set of) patches.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more small fix for a potential memory leak in an error path"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190801' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()
|
|
Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to add some proper bounds/overflow checking
when adding a new sid/secid"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190726' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: check sidtab limit before adding a new entry
|
|
We need to error out when trying to add an entry above SIDTAB_MAX in
sidtab_reverse_lookup() to avoid overflow on the odd chance that this
happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro:
"The first part of mount updates.
Convert filesystems to use the new mount API"
* 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally
constify ksys_mount() string arguments
don't bother with registering rootfs
init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs()
vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API
vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API
convenience helper: get_tree_single()
convenience helper get_tree_nodev()
vfs: Kill sget_userns()
...
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Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Some highlights from this development cycle:
1) Big refactoring of ipv6 route and neigh handling to support
nexthop objects configurable as units from userspace. From David
Ahern.
2) Convert explored_states in BPF verifier into a hash table,
significantly decreased state held for programs with bpf2bpf
calls, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Implement bpf_send_signal() helper, from Yonghong Song.
4) Various classifier enhancements to mvpp2 driver, from Maxime
Chevallier.
5) Add aRFS support to hns3 driver, from Jian Shen.
6) Fix use after free in inet frags by allocating fqdirs dynamically
and reworking how rhashtable dismantle occurs, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add act_ctinfo packet classifier action, from Kevin
Darbyshire-Bryant.
8) Add TFO key backup infrastructure, from Jason Baron.
9) Remove several old and unused ISDN drivers, from Arnd Bergmann.
10) Add devlink notifications for flash update status to mlxsw driver,
from Jiri Pirko.
11) Lots of kTLS offload infrastructure fixes, from Jakub Kicinski.
12) Add support for mv88e6250 DSA chips, from Rasmus Villemoes.
13) Various enhancements to ipv6 flow label handling, from Eric
Dumazet and Willem de Bruijn.
14) Support TLS offload in nfp driver, from Jakub Kicinski, Dirk van
der Merwe, and others.
15) Various improvements to axienet driver including converting it to
phylink, from Robert Hancock.
16) Add PTP support to sja1105 DSA driver, from Vladimir Oltean.
17) Add mqprio qdisc offload support to dpaa2-eth, from Ioana
Radulescu.
18) Add devlink health reporting to mlx5, from Moshe Shemesh.
19) Convert stmmac over to phylink, from Jose Abreu.
20) Add PTP PHC (Physical Hardware Clock) support to mlxsw, from
Shalom Toledo.
21) Add nftables SYNPROXY support, from Fernando Fernandez Mancera.
22) Convert tcp_fastopen over to use SipHash, from Ard Biesheuvel.
23) Track spill/fill of constants in BPF verifier, from Alexei
Starovoitov.
24) Support bounded loops in BPF, from Alexei Starovoitov.
25) Various page_pool API fixes and improvements, from Jesper Dangaard
Brouer.
26) Just like ipv4, support ref-countless ipv6 route handling. From
Wei Wang.
27) Support VLAN offloading in aquantia driver, from Igor Russkikh.
28) Add AF_XDP zero-copy support to mlx5, from Maxim Mikityanskiy.
29) Add flower GRE encap/decap support to nfp driver, from Pieter
Jansen van Vuuren.
30) Protect against stack overflow when using act_mirred, from John
Hurley.
31) Allow devmap map lookups from eBPF, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
32) Use page_pool API in netsec driver, Ilias Apalodimas.
33) Add Google gve network driver, from Catherine Sullivan.
34) More indirect call avoidance, from Paolo Abeni.
35) Add kTLS TX HW offload support to mlx5, from Tariq Toukan.
36) Add XDP_REDIRECT support to bnxt_en, from Andy Gospodarek.
37) Add MPLS manipulation actions to TC, from John Hurley.
38) Add sending a packet to connection tracking from TC actions, and
then allow flower classifier matching on conntrack state. From
Paul Blakey.
39) Netfilter hw offload support, from Pablo Neira Ayuso"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (2080 commits)
net/mlx5e: Return in default case statement in tx_post_resync_params
mlx5: Return -EINVAL when WARN_ON_ONCE triggers in mlx5e_tls_resync().
net: dsa: add support for BRIDGE_MROUTER attribute
pkt_sched: Include const.h
net: netsec: remove static declaration for netsec_set_tx_de()
net: netsec: remove superfluous if statement
netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware offload support
net: flow_offload: rename tc_cls_flower_offload to flow_cls_offload
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_is_busy() and use it
net: sched: remove tcf block API
drivers: net: use flow block API
net: sched: use flow block API
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_{priv, incref, decref}()
net: flow_offload: add list handling functions
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_alloc() and flow_block_cb_free()
net: flow_offload: rename TCF_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_* to FLOW_BLOCK_BINDER_TYPE_*
net: flow_offload: rename TC_BLOCK_{UN}BIND to FLOW_BLOCK_{UN}BIND
net: flow_offload: add flow_block_cb_setup_simple()
net: hisilicon: Add an tx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
net: hisilicon: Add an rx_desc to adapt HI13X1_GMAC
...
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus
effectively commits
7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")
that the merge brought in).
It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].
The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells:
"This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be
based on an internal ACL by the following means:
- Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a
list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask.
Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings.
ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified
on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add
additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain
tags/namespaces.
Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples
include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes
permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke
a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability
to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby
stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus
acquiring use of possessor permits.
- Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more
permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not
granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed"
* tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION
keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Like the audit pull request this is a little early due to some
upcoming vacation plans and uncertain network access while I'm away.
Also like the audit PR, the list of patches here is pretty minor, the
highlights include:
- Explicitly use __le variables to make sure "sparse" can verify
proper byte endian handling.
- Remove some BUG_ON()s that are no longer needed.
- Allow zero-byte writes to the "keycreate" procfs attribute without
requiring key:create to make it easier for userspace to reset the
keycreate label.
- Consistently log the "invalid_context" field as an untrusted string
in the AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR audit records"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190702' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: format all invalid context as untrusted
selinux: fix empty write to keycreate file
selinux: remove some no-op BUG_ONs
selinux: provide __le variables explicitly
|
|
Convert the selinuxfs filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old
one will be obsoleted and removed. This allows greater flexibility in
communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the
filesystem.
See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
The userspace tools expect all fields of the same name to be logged
consistently with the same encoding. Since the invalid_context fields
contain untrusted strings in selinux_inode_setxattr()
and selinux_setprocattr(), encode all instances of this field the same
way as though they were untrusted even though
compute_sid_handle_invalid_context() and security_sid_mls_copy() are
trusted.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/57
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.
============
WHY DO THIS?
============
The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.
For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:
(1) Changing a key's ownership.
(2) Changing a key's security information.
(3) Setting a keyring's restriction.
And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:
(4) Setting an expiry time.
(5) Revoking a key.
and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:
(6) Invalidating a key.
Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.
Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.
As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:
(1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.
(2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.
(3) Invalidation.
But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.
Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.
===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============
The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:
(1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.
(2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.
The SEARCH permission is split to create:
(1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.
(2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.
(3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.
The WRITE permission is also split to create:
(1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
added, removed and replaced in a keyring.
(2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is
split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.
(3) REVOKE - see above.
Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as:
(*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
(*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
(*) Group - permitted to the key group
(*) Everyone - permitted to everyone
Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.
Further subjects may be made available by later patches.
The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now:
VIEW Can view the key metadata
READ Can read the key content
WRITE Can update/modify the key content
SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting
LINK Can make a link to the key
SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry
INVAL Can invalidate
REVOKE Can revoke
JOIN Can join this keyring
CLEAR Can clear this keyring
The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.
The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.
The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.
The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.
The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.
The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.
======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================
To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.
It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.
SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.
The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.
It will make the following mappings:
(1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH
(2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR
(3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set
(4) CLEAR -> WRITE
Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.
=======
TESTING
=======
This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:
(1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the
key.
(2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
Minor SPDX change conflict.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Based on 2 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as
published by the free software foundation #
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
Honestly all the conflicts were simple overlapping changes,
nothing really interesting to report.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot
usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it
seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity,
switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename
the functions accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three patches for v5.2.
One fixes a problem where we weren't correctly logging raw SELinux
labels, the other two fix problems where we weren't properly checking
calls to kmemdup()"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190612' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )
selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings
|
|
When sid == 0 (we are resetting keycreate_sid to the default value), we
should skip the KEY__CREATE check.
Before this patch, doing a zero-sized write to /proc/self/keycreate
would check if the current task can create unlabeled keys (which would
usually fail with -EACCESS and generate an AVC). Now it skips the check
and correctly sets the task's keycreate_sid to 0.
Bug report: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1719067
Tested using the reproducer from the report above.
Fixes: 4eb582cf1fbd ("[PATCH] keys: add a way to store the appropriate context for newly-created keys")
Reported-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kir@sacred.ru>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
In selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), 'arg' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It
returns NULL when fails. So 'arg' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts'
should be freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 99dbbb593fe6 ("selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
In selinux_add_mnt_opt(), 'val' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns
NULL when fails. So 'val' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be
freed when error.
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <blackgod016574@gmail.com>
Fixes: 757cbe597fe8 ("LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[PM: fixed some indenting problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
These strings may come from untrusted sources (e.g. file xattrs) so they
need to be properly escaped.
Reproducer:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/test
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v 'kuřecí řízek' /tmp/test
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/test
(look at the generated AVCs)
Actual result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=kuřecí řízek
Expected result:
type=AVC [...] trawcon=6B75C5996563C3AD20C599C3AD7A656B
Fixes: fede148324c3 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
|
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation version 2
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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New UAPI for nexthops as standalone objects:
- defines netlink ancillary header, struct nhmsg
- RTM commands for nexthop objects, RTM_*NEXTHOP,
- RTNLGRP for nexthop notifications, RTNLGRP_NEXTHOP,
- Attributes for creating nexthops, NHA_*
- Attribute for route specs to specify a nexthop by id, RTA_NH_ID.
The nexthop attributes and semantics follow the route and RTA ones for
device, gateway and lwt encap. Unique to nexthop objects are a blackhole
and a group which contains references to other nexthop objects. With the
exception of blackhole and group, nexthop objects MUST contain a device.
Gateway and encap are optional. Nexthop groups can only reference other
pre-existing nexthops by id. If the NHA_ID attribute is present that id
is used for the nexthop. If not specified, one is auto assigned.
Dump requests can include attributes:
- NHA_GROUPS to return only nexthop groups,
- NHA_MASTER to limit dumps to nexthops with devices enslaved to the
given master (e.g., VRF)
- NHA_OIF to limit dumps to nexthops using given device
nlmsg_route_perms in selinux code is updated for the new RTM comands.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Since acdf52d97f82 ("selinux: convert to kvmalloc"), these check whether
an address-of value is NULL, which is pointless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to fix a problem when disconnecting a SCTP
socket with connect(AF_UNSPEC)"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190521' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: do not report error on connect(AF_UNSPEC)
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