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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
- The slow_avc_audit() function is now non-blocking so we can remove
the AVC_NONBLOCKING tricks; this also includes the 'flags' variant of
avc_has_perm().
- Use kmemdup() instead of kcalloc()+copy when copying parts of the
SELinux policydb.
- The InfiniBand device name is now passed by reference when possible
in the SELinux code, removing a strncpy().
- Minor cleanups including: constification of avtab function args,
removal of useless LSM/XFRM function args, SELinux kdoc fixes, and
removal of redundant assignments.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210629' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()
selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blocking
selinux: Fix kernel-doc
selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC
lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by reference
selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rc
selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc comment
selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argument
selinux: constify some avtab function arguments
selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()
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In preparation for 'evm: Allow setxattr() and setattr() for unmodified
metadata', this patch passes mnt_userns to the inode set/remove xattr hooks
so that the GID of the inode on an idmapped mount is correctly determined
by posix_acl_update_mode().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So
remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and
security_xfrm_policy_lookup().
Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com>
[PM: reformat the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
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The sb_delete security hook is called when shutting down a superblock,
which may be useful to release kernel objects tied to the superblock's
lifetime (e.g. inodes).
This new hook is needed by Landlock to release (ephemerally) tagged
struct inodes. This comes from the unprivileged nature of Landlock
described in the next commit.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the security infrastructure.
Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is
allocated there.
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
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Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount
with new options and determines if new options confict with an
existing mount or not.
A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share
the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
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When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
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This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will
be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies
its creation and assigns a security context to the inode.
The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers
can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules
for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type.
This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the
newly created anon-inode's security_context.
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2020-12-12
Just one patch this time:
1) Redact the SA keys with kernel lockdown confidentiality.
If enabled, no secret keys are sent to uuserspace.
From Antony Antony.
* 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212085737.2101294-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.
However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
or dumpall sa.
Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time.
e.g. when enabled:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none integrity [confidentiality]
ip xfrm state
src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100
proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96
note: the aead secret is redacted.
Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
v1->v2
- add size checks before memset calls
v2->v3
- replace spaces with tabs for consistency
v3->v4
- use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting
v4->v5
- remove kconfig option
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do
not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi
struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol
specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers
to the address family independent flowi_common struct.
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr
and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's
expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for
this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby
falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up.
The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail"
call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out
on other values.
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID update from Micah Morton:
"Add additional LSM hooks for SafeSetID
SafeSetID is capable of making allow/deny decisions for set*uid calls
on a system, and we want to add similar functionality for set*gid
calls.
The work to do that is not yet complete, so probably won't make it in
for v5.8, but we are looking to get this simple patch in for v5.8
since we have it ready.
We are planning on the rest of the work for extending the SafeSetID
LSM being merged during the v5.9 merge window"
* tag 'LSM-add-setgid-hook-5.8-author-fix' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
security: Add LSM hooks to set*gid syscalls
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The SafeSetID LSM uses the security_task_fix_setuid hook to filter
set*uid() syscalls according to its configured security policy. In
preparation for adding analagous support in the LSM for set*gid()
syscalls, we add the requisite hook here. Tested by putting print
statements in the security_task_fix_setgid hook and seeing them get hit
during kernel boot.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
"Fixes:
- Resolve mount option conflicts consistently
- Sync before remount R/O
- Fix file handle encoding corner cases
- Fix metacopy related issues
- Fix an unintialized return value
- Add missing permission checks for underlying layers
Optimizations:
- Allow multipe whiteouts to share an inode
- Optimize small writes by inheriting SB_NOSEC from upper layer
- Do not call ->syncfs() multiple times for sync(2)
- Do not cache negative lookups on upper layer
- Make private internal mounts longterm"
* tag 'ovl-update-5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs: (27 commits)
ovl: remove unnecessary lock check
ovl: make oip->index bool
ovl: only pass ->ki_flags to ovl_iocb_to_rwf()
ovl: make private mounts longterm
ovl: get rid of redundant members in struct ovl_fs
ovl: add accessor for ofs->upper_mnt
ovl: initialize error in ovl_copy_xattr
ovl: drop negative dentry in upper layer
ovl: check permission to open real file
ovl: call secutiry hook in ovl_real_ioctl()
ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
ovl: switch to mounter creds in readdir
ovl: pass correct flags for opening real directory
ovl: fix redirect traversal on metacopy dentries
ovl: initialize OVL_UPPERDATA in ovl_lookup()
ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()
ovl: simplify setting of origin for index lookup
ovl: fix out of bounds access warning in ovl_check_fb_len()
ovl: return required buffer size for file handles
ovl: sync dirty data when remounting to ro mode
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The main changes are extending the TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank
specific file hashes, calculating the "boot_aggregate" based on other
TPM PCR banks, using the default IMA hash algorithm, instead of SHA1,
as the basis for the cache hash table key, and preventing the mprotect
syscall to circumvent an IMA mmap appraise policy rule.
- In preparation for extending TPM 2.0 PCR banks with bank specific
digests, commit 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of
tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()") modified
tpm_pcr_extend(). The original SHA1 file digests were
padded/truncated, before being extended into the other TPM PCR
banks. This pull request calculates and extends the TPM PCR banks
with bank specific file hashes completing the above change.
- The "boot_aggregate", the first IMA measurement list record, is the
"trusted boot" link between the pre-boot environment and the
running OS. With TPM 2.0, the "boot_aggregate" record is not
limited to being based on the SHA1 TPM PCR bank, but can be
calculated based on any enabled bank, assuming the hash algorithm
is also enabled in the kernel.
Other changes include the following and five other bug fixes/code
clean up:
- supporting both a SHA1 and a larger "boot_aggregate" digest in a
custom template format containing both the the SHA1 ('d') and
larger digests ('d-ng') fields.
- Initial hash table key fix, but additional changes would be good"
* tag 'integrity-v5.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Directly free *entry in ima_alloc_init_template() if digests is NULL
ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules
ima: verify mprotect change is consistent with mmap policy
evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()
ima: Set again build_ima_appraise variable
ima: Remove redundant policy rule set in add_rules()
ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation
ima: Use ima_hash_algo for collision detection in the measurement list
ima: Calculate and extend PCR with digests in ima_template_entry
ima: Allocate and initialize tfm for each PCR bank
ima: Switch to dynamically allocated buffer for template digests
ima: Store template digest directly in ima_template_entry
ima: Evaluate error in init_ima()
ima: Switch to ima_hash_algo for boot aggregate
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"Last cycle for the Nth time I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily be
fixed because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been digging
into exec and cleanup up what I can.
I don't think I have exec sorted out enough to fix the issues I
started with but I have made some headway this cycle with 4 sets of
changes.
- promised cleanups after introducing exec_update_mutex
- trivial cleanups for exec
- control flow simplifications
- remove the recomputation of bprm->cred
The net result is code that is a bit easier to understand and work
with and a decrease in the number of lines of code (if you don't count
the added tests)"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (24 commits)
exec: Compute file based creds only once
exec: Add a per bprm->file version of per_clear
binfmt_elf_fdpic: fix execfd build regression
selftests/exec: Add binfmt_script regression test
exec: Remove recursion from search_binary_handler
exec: Generic execfd support
exec/binfmt_script: Don't modify bprm->buf and then return -ENOEXEC
exec: Move the call of prepare_binprm into search_binary_handler
exec: Allow load_misc_binary to call prepare_binprm unconditionally
exec: Convert security_bprm_set_creds into security_bprm_repopulate_creds
exec: Factor security_bprm_creds_for_exec out of security_bprm_set_creds
exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gids
exec: Set the point of no return sooner
exec: Move handling of the point of no return to the top level
exec: Run sync_mm_rss before taking exec_update_mutex
exec: Fix spelling of search_binary_handler in a comment
exec: Move the comment from above de_thread to above unshare_sighand
exec: Rename flush_old_exec begin_new_exec
exec: Move most of setup_new_exec into flush_old_exec
exec: In setup_new_exec cache current in the local variable me
...
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Verify LSM permissions for underlying file, since vfs_ioctl() doesn't do
it.
[Stephen Rothwell] export security_file_ioctl
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
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Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec
so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code
reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made.
Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and
verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that
there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means
that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the
execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred.
A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that
needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file
bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds
will be computed from.
The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of
accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the
bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid.
A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the
work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already
heandled by prepare_exec_creds.
The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed
security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file
from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the
bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook
is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from
cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are
computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in
cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been
removed. A small comment to document that the work of
cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files
secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the
user had uid 0 has been added.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
IMA's mmap appraise policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
would be taken prior to i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
this point. Eliminate this integrity gap, by denying the mprotect
PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Rename bprm->cap_elevated to bprm->active_secureexec and initialize it
in prepare_binprm instead of in cap_bprm_set_creds. Initializing
bprm->active_secureexec in prepare_binprm allows multiple
implementations of security_bprm_repopulate_creds to play nicely with
each other.
Rename security_bprm_set_creds to security_bprm_reopulate_creds to
emphasize that this path recomputes part of bprm->cred. This
recomputation avoids the time of check vs time of use problems that
are inherent in unix #! interpreters.
In short two renames and a move in the location of initializing
bprm->active_secureexec.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87o8qkzrxp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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secid_to_secctx is not stackable, and since the BPF LSM registers this
hook by default, the call_int_hook logic is not suitable which
"bails-on-fail" and casues issues when other LSMs register this hook and
eventually breaks Audit.
In order to fix this, directly iterate over the security hooks instead
of using call_int_hook as suggested in:
https: //lore.kernel.org/bpf/9d0eb6c6-803a-ff3a-5603-9ad6d9edfc00@schaufler-ca.com/#t
Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Fixes: 625236ba3832 ("security: Fix the default value of secid_to_secctx hook")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200520125616.193765-1-kpsingh@chromium.org
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Today security_bprm_set_creds has several implementations:
apparmor_bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds,
smack_bprm_set_creds, and tomoyo_bprm_set_creds.
Except for cap_bprm_set_creds they all test bprm->called_set_creds and
return immediately if it is true. The function cap_bprm_set_creds
ignores bprm->calld_sed_creds entirely.
Create a new LSM hook security_bprm_creds_for_exec that is called just
before prepare_binprm in __do_execve_file, resulting in a LSM hook
that is called exactly once for the entire of exec. Modify the bits
of security_bprm_set_creds that only want to be called once per exec
into security_bprm_creds_for_exec, leaving only cap_bprm_set_creds
behind.
Remove bprm->called_set_creds all of it's former users have been moved
to security_bprm_creds_for_exec.
Add or upate comments a appropriate to bring them up to date and
to reflect this change.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v9kszrzh.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> # For the LSM and Smack bits
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
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Add security hooks that will allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch
may be set. More than one hook is required as the watches watch different
types of object.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
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Add a security hook that allows an LSM to rule on whether a notification
message is allowed to be inserted into a particular watch queue.
The hook is given the following information:
(1) The credentials of the triggerer (which may be init_cred for a system
notification, eg. a hardware error).
(2) The credentials of the whoever set the watch.
(3) The notification message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
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The information about the different types of LSM hooks is scattered
in two locations i.e. union security_list_options and
struct security_hook_heads. Rather than duplicating this information
even further for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM, define all the hooks with the
LSM_HOOK macro in lsm_hook_defs.h which is then used to generate all
the data structures required by the LSM framework.
The LSM hooks are defined as:
LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...)
with <default_value> acccessible in security.c as:
LSM_RET_DEFAULT(<hook_name>)
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200329004356.27286-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
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git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem update from James Morris:
"Just one minor fix this time"
* 'for-v5.6' of git://git.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: remove EARLY_LSM_COUNT which never used
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This macro is never used from it was introduced in commit e6b1db98cf4d5
("security: Support early LSMs"), better to remove it.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Implement a SELinux hook for lockdown. If the lockdown module is also
enabled, then a denial by the lockdown module will take precedence over
SELinux, so SELinux can only further restrict lockdown decisions.
The SELinux hook only distinguishes at the granularity of integrity
versus confidentiality similar to the lockdown module, but includes the
full lockdown reason as part of the audit record as a hint in diagnosing
what triggered the denial. To support this auditing, move the
lockdown_reasons[] string array from being private to the lockdown
module to the security framework so that it can be used by the lsm audit
code and so that it is always available even when the lockdown module
is disabled.
Note that the SELinux implementation allows the integrity and
confidentiality reasons to be controlled independently from one another.
Thus, in an SELinux policy, one could allow operations that specify
an integrity reason while blocking operations that specify a
confidentiality reason. The SELinux hook implementation is
stricter than the lockdown module in validating the provided reason value.
Sample AVC audit output from denials:
avc: denied { integrity } for pid=3402 comm="fwupd"
lockdown_reason="/dev/mem,kmem,port" scontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0
tcontext=system_u:system_r:fwupd_t:s0 tclass=lockdown permissive=0
avc: denied { confidentiality } for pid=4628 comm="cp"
lockdown_reason="/proc/kcore access"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:test_lockdown_integrity_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=lockdown permissive=0
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: some merge fuzz do the the perf hooks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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In current mainline, the degree of access to perf_event_open(2) system
call depends on the perf_event_paranoid sysctl. This has a number of
limitations:
1. The sysctl is only a single value. Many types of accesses are controlled
based on the single value thus making the control very limited and
coarse grained.
2. The sysctl is global, so if the sysctl is changed, then that means
all processes get access to perf_event_open(2) opening the door to
security issues.
This patch adds LSM and SELinux access checking which will be used in
Android to access perf_event_open(2) for the purposes of attaching BPF
programs to tracepoints, perf profiling and other operations from
userspace. These operations are intended for production systems.
5 new LSM hooks are added:
1. perf_event_open: This controls access during the perf_event_open(2)
syscall itself. The hook is called from all the places that the
perf_event_paranoid sysctl is checked to keep it consistent with the
systctl. The hook gets passed a 'type' argument which controls CPU,
kernel and tracepoint accesses (in this context, CPU, kernel and
tracepoint have the same semantics as the perf_event_paranoid sysctl).
Additionally, I added an 'open' type which is similar to
perf_event_paranoid sysctl == 3 patch carried in Android and several other
distros but was rejected in mainline [1] in 2016.
2. perf_event_alloc: This allocates a new security object for the event
which stores the current SID within the event. It will be useful when
the perf event's FD is passed through IPC to another process which may
try to read the FD. Appropriate security checks will limit access.
3. perf_event_free: Called when the event is closed.
4. perf_event_read: Called from the read(2) and mmap(2) syscalls for the event.
5. perf_event_write: Called from the ioctl(2) syscalls for the event.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/696240/
Since Peter had suggest LSM hooks in 2016 [1], I am adding his
Suggested-by tag below.
To use this patch, we set the perf_event_paranoid sysctl to -1 and then
apply selinux checking as appropriate (default deny everything, and then
add policy rules to give access to domains that need it). In the future
we can remove the perf_event_paranoid sysctl altogether.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: jeffv@google.com
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: primiano@google.com
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: rsavitski@google.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191014170308.70668-1-joel@joelfernandes.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris:
"This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from
Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others.
From the original description:
This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature,
intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel.
When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted.
Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the
kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be
enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand.
The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants
of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a
doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer
to not requiring external patches.
There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline:
- Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is
covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/
- Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM
module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven,
rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism.
The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a
policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow
tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be
permitted.
The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple
policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse
level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line:
lockdown={integrity|confidentiality}
Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features
that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to
confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract
confidential information from the kernel are also disabled.
This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and
overriden by kernel configuration.
New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the
lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in
include/linux/security.h for details.
The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review
across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some
weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way.
Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf
when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a
Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing
this under category (c) of the DCO"
* 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits)
kexec: Fix file verification on S390
security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM
lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages
efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down
tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down
debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down
kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode
bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode
lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore
x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module
lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport)
lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL
lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down
acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down
acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down
ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down
x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down
x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add LSM hooks, and SELinux access control hooks, for dnotify,
fanotify, and inotify watches. This has been discussed with both the
LSM and fs/notify folks and everybody is good with these new hooks.
- The LSM stacking changes missed a few calls to current_security() in
the SELinux code; we fix those and remove current_security() for
good.
- Improve our network object labeling cache so that we always return
the object's label, even when under memory pressure. Previously we
would return an error if we couldn't allocate a new cache entry, now
we always return the label even if we can't create a new cache entry
for it.
- Convert the sidtab atomic_t counter to a normal u32 with
READ/WRITE_ONCE() and memory barrier protection.
- A few patches to policydb.c to clean things up (remove forward
declarations, long lines, bad variable names, etc)
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190917' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm: remove current_security()
selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob
selinux: avoid atomic_t usage in sidtab
fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications
selinux: always return a secid from the network caches if we find one
selinux: policydb - rename type_val_to_struct_array
selinux: policydb - fix some checkpatch.pl warnings
selinux: shuffle around policydb.c to get rid of forward declarations
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Add a mechanism to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether
kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the
runtime state of the kernel should be permitted.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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The lockdown module is intended to allow for kernels to be locked down
early in boot - sufficiently early that we don't have the ability to
kmalloc() yet. Add support for early initialisation of some LSMs, and
then add them to the list of names when we do full initialisation later.
Early LSMs are initialised in link order and cannot be overridden via
boot parameters, and cannot make use of kmalloc() (since the allocator
isn't initialised yet).
(Fixed by Stephen Rothwell to include a stub to fix builds when
!CONFIG_SECURITY)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.
In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.
This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.
Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.
The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.
The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.
The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.
Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:
- IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
deletions.
- Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.
- The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).
- Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
list"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
IMA: Define a new template field buf
IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
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Atomic policy updaters are not very useful as they cannot
usually perform the policy updates on their own. Since it
seems that there is no strict need for the atomicity,
switch to the blocking variant. While doing so, rename
the functions accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull mount ABI updates from Al Viro:
"The syscalls themselves, finally.
That's not all there is to that stuff, but switching individual
filesystems to new methods is fortunately independent from everything
else, so e.g. NFS series can go through NFS tree, etc.
As those conversions get done, we'll be finally able to get rid of a
bunch of duplication in fs/super.c introduced in the beginning of the
entire thing. I expect that to be finished in the next window..."
* 'work.mount-syscalls' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
vfs: Add a sample program for the new mount API
vfs: syscall: Add fspick() to select a superblock for reconfiguration
vfs: syscall: Add fsmount() to create a mount for a superblock
vfs: syscall: Add fsconfig() for configuring and managing a context
vfs: Implement logging through fs_context
vfs: syscall: Add fsopen() to prepare for superblock creation
Make anon_inodes unconditional
teach move_mount(2) to work with OPEN_TREE_CLONE
vfs: syscall: Add move_mount(2) to move mounts around
vfs: syscall: Add open_tree(2) to reference or clone a mount
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This patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for
initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which
provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to
operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an
associated inode at the moment of creation).
The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of
the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of
security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic
for handling the creation of new nodes.
This patch also adds helper functions to <linux/kernfs.h> for
getting/setting security xattrs of a kernfs node so that LSMs hooks are
able to do their job. Other important attributes should be accessible
direcly in the kernfs_node fields (in case there is need for more, then
new helpers should be added to kernfs.h along with the patch that needs
them).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: more manual merge fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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