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The `tpm_get_ops` call at the beginning of the function is not paired
with a `tpm_put_ops` on this return path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td,
causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return
path that securely kfree's td.
Fixes clang scan-build warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential
memory leak [unix.Malloc]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Pull tpm fixes from James Bottomley:
"Fix a regression in the TPM trusted keys caused by the generic rework
to add ARM TEE based trusted keys.
Without this fix, the TPM trusted key subsystem fails to add or load
any keys"
* tag 'queue' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: fix TPM trusted keys for generic framework
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- ARM TEE backend for kernel trusted keys to complete the existing
TPM backend
- ASN.1 format for TPM2 trusted keys to make them interact with the
user space stack, such as OpenConnect VPN
Other than that, a bunch of bug fixes"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Fix missing null return from kzalloc call
char: tpm: fix error return code in tpm_cr50_i2c_tis_recv()
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable
security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs
security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations
oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys
lib: Add ASN.1 encoder
tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device
tpm: acpi: Check eventlog signature before using it
tpm: efi: Use local variable for calculating final log size
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The generic framework patch broke the current TPM trusted keys because
it doesn't correctly remove the values consumed by the generic parser
before passing them on to the implementation specific parser. Fix
this by having the generic parser return the string minus the consumed
tokens.
Additionally, there may be no tokens left for the implementation
specific parser, so make it handle the NULL case correctly and finally
fix a TPM 1.2 specific check for no keyhandle.
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Tested-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
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The original patch 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal
and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/
But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in
tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost. This causes an imbalanced put of the
TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware.
This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops()
Fixes: 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations")
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
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The kzalloc call can return null with the GFP_KERNEL flag so
add a null check and exit via a new error exit label. Use the
same exit error label for another error path too.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value")
Fixes: 830027e2cb55 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key.
Refer to Documentation/staging/tee.rst for detailed information about TEE.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Current trusted keys framework is tightly coupled to use TPM device as
an underlying implementation which makes it difficult for implementations
like Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) etc. to provide trusted keys
support in case platform doesn't posses a TPM device.
Add a generic trusted keys framework where underlying implementations
can be easily plugged in. Create struct trusted_key_ops to achieve this,
which contains necessary functions of a backend.
Also, define a module parameter in order to select a particular trust
source in case a platform support multiple trust sources. In case its
not specified then implementation itetrates through trust sources list
starting with TPM and assign the first trust source as a backend which
has initiazed successfully during iteration.
Note that current implementation only supports a single trust source at
runtime which is either selectable at compile time or during boot via
aforementioned module parameter.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a
key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using
party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other
consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the
key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to
migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only
sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound
to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't
load.
Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're
loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from
the last byte of old format keys.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the
ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior
trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities
representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the
export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format.
The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the
exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine,
openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy
specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy
handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you
don't have to keep passing it in each time.
This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so
keys with passwords but no policy.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.
so before
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u
after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:
keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u
Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.
Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.
Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the
return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would
only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read
counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
Fixes: 41ab999c80f1 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Reviewing use of memset in keyctl_pkey.c
keyctl_pkey_params_get prologue code to set params up
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
params->encoding = "raw";
keyctl_pkey_query has the same prologue
and calls keyctl_pkey_params_get.
So remove the prologue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
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Drop repeated words in comments.
{to, will, the}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
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Use kvfree_sensitive() instead of open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
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The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on
pipes, so let the documentation reflect that.
Fixes: f7e47677e39a ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
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When the semantics of the ->read() handlers were changed such that "buffer"
is a kernel pointer, some __user annotations survived.
Since they're wrong now, get rid of them.
Fixes: d3ec10aa9581 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
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In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer
softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy
poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the
adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or
unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller
messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use
bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined
in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver
internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej
Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also
allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a
central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support"
* tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits)
net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true
net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls
nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon
af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags
af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path
vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values
vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag
vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure
net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled
tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit
net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router
mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index
mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register
...
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Provide the proposed description (add key) or the original description
(update/instantiate key) when preparsing a key so that the key type can
validate it against the data.
This is important for rxrpc server keys as we need to check that they have
the right amount of key material present - and it's better to do that when
the key is loaded rather than deep in trying to process a response packet.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
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Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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A previous commit changed the notification mode from true/false to an
int, allowing notify-no, notify-yes, or signal-notify. This was
backwards compatible in the sense that any existing true/false user
would translate to either 0 (on notification sent) or 1, the latter
which mapped to TWA_RESUME. TWA_SIGNAL was assigned a value of 2.
Clean this up properly, and define a proper enum for the notification
mode. Now we have:
- TWA_NONE. This is 0, same as before the original change, meaning no
notification requested.
- TWA_RESUME. This is 1, same as before the original change, meaning
that we use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.
- TWA_SIGNAL. This uses TIF_SIGPENDING/JOBCTL_TASK_WORK for the
notification.
Clean up all the callers, switching their 0/1/false/true to using the
appropriate TWA_* mode for notifications.
Fixes: e91b48162332 ("task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof"
* 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov
mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev}
fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice
fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls
fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers
iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec
iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec
iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c
compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h>
|
|
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native version of
keyctl_instantiate_key_iov can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Use in compat_syscall to import either native or the compat iovecs, and
remove the now superflous compat_import_iovec.
This removes the need for special compat logic in most callers, and
the remaining ones can still be simplified by using __import_iovec
with a bool compat parameter.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
|
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"
* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
|
|
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull notification queue from David Howells:
"This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
changing their attributes.
Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47
Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.
[ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
this one works first ]
LSM hooks are included:
- A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
"watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]
- A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]
I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
hooks.
WHY
===
Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
cache changes.
However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
need to poll.
DESIGN DECISIONS
================
- The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
the pipe.
[?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new
O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
instead?
The pipe is then configured::
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().
- It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
auditing.
- sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.
- The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
to update the queue pointers.
- Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
they can be of varying size.
This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
sources.
- Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.
- Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
- and only those that are watching for it.
- When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
message at an appropriate point later.
- The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
to it, using one of:
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);
where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
a tag between 0 and 255.
- Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.
Things I want to avoid:
- Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).
- Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
inaccessible inside a container.
- Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.
TESTING AND MANPAGES
====================
- The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
the main manpages repository instead.
If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
all be checked off to make sure they happened.
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch
- A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"
* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
pipe: Add notification lossage handling
pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
Add sample notification program
watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
pipe: Add general notification queue support
pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
uapi: General notification queue definitions
|
|
Convert comments that reference mmap_sem to reference mmap_lock instead.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/lockaphore/lock/, per Vlastimil]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next fixups, per Michel]
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-13-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Merge yet more updates from Andrew Morton:
- More MM work. 100ish more to go. Mike Rapoport's "mm: remove
__ARCH_HAS_5LEVEL_HACK" series should fix the current ppc issue
- Various other little subsystems
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (127 commits)
lib/ubsan.c: fix gcc-10 warnings
tools/testing/selftests/vm: remove duplicate headers
selftests: vm: pkeys: fix multilib builds for x86
selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct page size on powerpc
selftests/vm/pkeys: override access right definitions on powerpc
selftests/vm/pkeys: test correct behaviour of pkey-0
selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce a sub-page allocator
selftests/vm/pkeys: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page
selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation
selftests/vm/pkeys: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
selftests/vm/pkeys: improve checks to determine pkey support
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix number of reserved powerpc pkeys
selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce powerpc support
selftests/vm/pkeys: introduce generic pkey abstractions
selftests: vm: pkeys: use the correct huge page size
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix assertion in pkey_disable_set/clear()
selftests/vm/pkeys: fix pkey_disable_clear()
selftests: vm: pkeys: add helpers for pkey bits
...
|
|
For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like
cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared
before freeing it. Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not
provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away. To be sure, the
special memzero_explicit() has to be used.
This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive
data objects allocated by kvmalloc(). The relevant places where
kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it.
Fixes: 4f0882491a14 ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
- Fix a documentation warning.
- Replace a zero-length array with a flexible one
- Make the big_key key type use ChaCha20Poly1305 and use the crypto
algorithm directly rather than going through the crypto layer.
- Implement the update op for the big_key type.
* tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Implement update for the big_key type
security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
|
|
Implement the ->update op for the big_key type.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
|
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A while back, I noticed that the crypto and crypto API usage in big_keys
were entirely broken in multiple ways, so I rewrote it. Now, I'm
rewriting it again, but this time using the simpler ChaCha20Poly1305
library function. This makes the file considerably more simple; the
diffstat alone should justify this commit. It also should be faster,
since it no longer requires a mutex around the "aead api object" (nor
allocations), allowing us to encrypt multiple items in parallel. We also
benefit from being able to pass any type of pointer, so we can get rid
of the ridiculously complex custom page allocator that big_key really
doesn't need.
[DH: Change the select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305 to a depends on as
select doesn't propagate and the build can end up with an =y dependending
on some =m pieces.
The depends on CRYPTO also had to be removed otherwise the configurator
complains about a recursive dependency.]
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Introduce crypto_shash_tfm_digest() and use it wherever possible.
- Fix use-after-free and race in crypto_spawn_alg.
- Add support for parallel and batch requests to crypto_engine.
Algorithms:
- Update jitter RNG for SP800-90B compliance.
- Always use jitter RNG as seed in drbg.
Drivers:
- Add Arm CryptoCell driver cctrng.
- Add support for SEV-ES to the PSP driver in ccp"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (114 commits)
crypto: hisilicon - fix driver compatibility issue with different versions of devices
crypto: engine - do not requeue in case of fatal error
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix a typo in a comment
crypto: hisilicon/qm - change debugfs file name from qm_regs to regs
crypto: hisilicon/qm - add DebugFS for xQC and xQE dump
crypto: hisilicon/zip - add debugfs for Hisilicon ZIP
crypto: hisilicon/hpre - add debugfs for Hisilicon HPRE
crypto: hisilicon/sec2 - add debugfs for Hisilicon SEC
crypto: hisilicon/qm - add debugfs to the QM state machine
crypto: hisilicon/qm - add debugfs for QM
crypto: stm32/crc32 - protect from concurrent accesses
crypto: stm32/crc32 - don't sleep in runtime pm
crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix multi-instance
crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix run-time self test issue.
crypto: stm32/crc32 - fix ext4 chksum BUG_ON()
crypto: hisilicon/zip - Use temporary sqe when doing work
crypto: hisilicon - add device error report through abnormal irq
crypto: hisilicon - remove codes of directly report device errors through MSI
crypto: hisilicon - QM memory management optimization
crypto: hisilicon - unify initial value assignment into QM
...
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Since the meaning of combining the KEY_NEED_* constants is undefined, make
it so that you can't do that by turning them into an enum.
The enum is also given some extra values to represent special
circumstances, such as:
(1) The '0' value is reserved and causes a warning to trap the parameter
being unset.
(2) The key is to be unlinked and we require no permissions on it, only
the keyring, (this replaces the KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK flag).
(3) An override due to CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
(4) An override due to an instantiation token being present.
(5) The permissions check is being deferred to later key_permission()
calls.
The extra values give the opportunity for LSMs to audit these situations.
[Note: This really needs overhauling so that lookup_user_key() tells
key_task_permission() and the LSM what operation is being done and leaves
it to those functions to decide how to map that onto the available
permits. However, I don't really want to make these change in the middle
of the notifications patchset.]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
|
|
Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about
changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received.
Firstly, an event queue needs to be created:
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256);
then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue:
struct watch_notification_filter filter = {
.nr_filters = 1,
.filters = {
[0] = {
.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
.subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX,
},
},
};
ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in
which keys are changed in some way. Records are of the following format:
struct key_notification {
struct watch_notification watch;
__u32 key_id;
__u32 aux;
} *n;
Where:
n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY.
n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as
NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the
record.
n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to
keyctl_watch_key(), shifted.
n->key will be the ID of the affected key.
n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key
being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of
NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED.
Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length -
or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype. Note also that
the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
|
|
Instead of manually allocating a 'struct shash_desc' on the stack and
calling crypto_shash_digest(), switch to using the new helper function
crypto_shash_tfm_digest() which does this for us.
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
|
|
If seq_file .next function does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1 # full usual output
0f6bfdf5 I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 4af2f79ab8848d0a: 740
1fb91b32 I--Q--- 3 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid.1000: 2
27589480 I--Q--- 1 perm 0b0b0000 0 0 user invocation_id: 16
2f33ab67 I--Q--- 152 perm 3f030000 0 0 keyring _ses: 2
33f1d8fa I--Q--- 4 perm 3f030000 1000 1000 keyring _ses: 1
3d427fda I--Q--- 2 perm 3f010000 1000 1000 user 69ec44aec7678e5a: 740
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
521+0 records in
521+0 records out
521 bytes copied, 0,00123769 s, 421 kB/s
But a read after lseek in middle of last line results in the partial
last line and then a repeat of the final line:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=500 skip=1
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
g _uid_ses.1000: 1
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
97 bytes copied, 0,000135035 s, 718 kB/s
and a read after lseek beyond end of file results in the last line being
shown:
$ dd if=/proc/keys bs=1000 skip=1 # read after lseek beyond end of file
dd: /proc/keys: cannot skip to specified offset
3ead4096 I--Q--- 1 perm 1f3f0000 1000 65534 keyring _uid_ses.1000: 1
0+1 records in
0+1 records out
76 bytes copied, 0,000119981 s, 633 kB/s
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Fixes: 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code ...")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyrings fixes from David Howells:
"Here's a couple of patches that fix a circular dependency between
holding key->sem and mm->mmap_sem when reading data from a key.
One potential issue is that a filesystem looking to use a key inside,
say, ->readpages() could deadlock if the key being read is the key
that's required and the buffer the key is being read into is on a page
that needs to be fetched.
The case actually detected is a bit more involved - with a filesystem
calling request_key() and locking the target keyring for write - which
could be being read"
* tag 'keys-fixes-20200329' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read
KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore
|
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By allocating a kernel buffer with a user-supplied buffer length, it
is possible that a false positive ENOMEM error may be returned because
the user-supplied length is just too large even if the system do have
enough memory to hold the actual key data.
Moreover, if the buffer length is larger than the maximum amount of
memory that can be returned by kmalloc() (2^(MAX_ORDER-1) number of
pages), a warning message will also be printed.
To reduce this possibility, we set a threshold (PAGE_SIZE) over which we
do check the actual key length first before allocating a buffer of the
right size to hold it. The threshold is arbitrary, it is just used to
trigger a buffer length check. It does not limit the actual key length
as long as there is enough memory to satisfy the memory request.
To further avoid large buffer allocation failure due to page
fragmentation, kvmalloc() is used to allocate the buffer so that vmapped
pages can be used when there is not a large enough contiguous set of
pages available for allocation.
In the extremely unlikely scenario that the key keeps on being changed
and made longer (still <= buflen) in between 2 __keyctl_read_key()
calls, the __keyctl_read_key() calling loop in keyctl_read_key() may
have to be iterated a large number of times, but definitely not infinite.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1
[12538.572654] ---- ----
[12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.
That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,
1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
3) All the fault handling code is removed.
Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.
Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Currently, when we add a new user key, the calltrace as below:
add_key()
key_create_or_update()
key_alloc()
__key_instantiate_and_link
generic_key_instantiate
key_payload_reserve
......
Since commit a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly"),
we can reach max bytes/keys in key_alloc, but we forget to remove this
limit when we reserver space for payload in key_payload_reserve. So we
can only reach max keys but not max bytes when having delta between plen
and type->def_datalen. Remove this limit when instantiating the key, so we
can keep consistent with key_alloc.
Also, fix the similar problem in keyctl_chown_key().
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb45c ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Fixes: a08bf91ce28e ("KEYS: allow reaching the keys quotas exactly")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0.x
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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