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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl
Pull sysctl updates from Joel Granados:
- Remove sentinel elements from ctl_table structs in kernel/*
Removing sentinels in ctl_table arrays reduces the build time size
and runtime memory consumed by ~64 bytes per array. Removals for
net/, io_uring/, mm/, ipc/ and security/ are set to go into mainline
through their respective subsystems making the next release the most
likely place where the final series that removes the check for
proc_name == NULL will land.
This adds to removals already in arch/, drivers/ and fs/.
- Adjust ctl_table definitions and references to allow constification
- Remove unused ctl_table function arguments
- Move non-const elements from ctl_table to ctl_table_header
- Make ctl_table pointers const in ctl_table_root structure
Making the static ctl_table structs const will increase safety by
keeping the pointers to proc_handler functions in .rodata. Though no
ctl_tables where made const in this PR, the ground work for making
that possible has started with these changes sent by Thomas
Weißschuh.
* tag 'sysctl-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl:
sysctl: drop now unnecessary out-of-bounds check
sysctl: move sysctl type to ctl_table_header
sysctl: drop sysctl_is_perm_empty_ctl_table
sysctl: treewide: constify argument ctl_table_root::permissions(table)
sysctl: treewide: drop unused argument ctl_table_root::set_ownership(table)
bpf: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
delayacct: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
kprobes: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
printk: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
scheduler: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
seccomp: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
timekeeping: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
ftrace: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
umh: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
kernel misc: Remove the now superfluous sentinel elements from ctl_table array
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The read_actions_logged() and write_actions_logged() helpers called by the
sysctl proc handler seccomp_actions_logged_handler() are already expecting
their sysctl table argument to be read-only. Actually mark the argument
as const in preparation[1] for global constification of the sysctl tables.
Suggested-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240423-sysctl-const-handler-v3-11-e0beccb836e2@weissschuh.net/ [1]
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508171337.work.861-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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This commit comes at the tail end of a greater effort to remove the
empty elements at the end of the ctl_table arrays (sentinels) which
will reduce the overall build time size of the kernel and run time
memory bloat by ~64 bytes per sentinel (further information Link :
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZO5Yx5JFogGi%2FcBo@bombadil.infradead.org/)
Remove sentinel element from seccomp_sysctl_table.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <j.granados@samsung.com>
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Honestly, there's little value in having a helper with and without that
int __user *ufd argument. It's just messy and doesn't really give us
anything. Just expose receive_fd() with that argument and get rid of
that helper.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130-vfs-files-fixes-v1-5-e73ca6f4ea83@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The kerndoc for some struct member and function arguments were missing.
Add them.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202308171742.AncabIG1-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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seccomp_unotify allows more privileged processes do actions on behalf
of less privileged processes.
In many cases, the workflow is fully synchronous. It means a target
process triggers a system call and passes controls to a supervisor
process that handles the system call and returns controls to the target
process. In this context, "synchronous" means that only one process is
running and another one is waiting.
There is the WF_CURRENT_CPU flag that is used to advise the scheduler to
move the wakee to the current CPU. For such synchronous workflows, it
makes context switches a few times faster.
Right now, each interaction takes 12µs. With this patch, it takes about
3µs.
This change introduce the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FD_SYNC_WAKE_UP flag that
it used to enable the sync mode.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>
Acked-by: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308073201.3102738-5-avagin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The main reason is to use new wake_up helpers that will be added in the
following patches. But here are a few other reasons:
* if we use two different ways, we always need to call them both. This
patch fixes seccomp_notify_recv where we forgot to call wake_up_poll
in the error path.
* If we use one primitive, we can control how many waiters are woken up
for each request. Our goal is to wake up just one that will handle a
request. Right now, wake_up_poll can wake up one waiter and
up(&match->notif->request) can wake up one more.
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@google.com>
Acked-by: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230308073201.3102738-2-avagin@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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register_sysctl_paths() is only needed if you have childs (directories)
with entries. Just use register_sysctl_init() as it also does the
kmemleak check for you.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
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Move the ACTION_ONLY() macro so that it is not between the kernel-doc
notation and the function definition for seccomp_run_filters(),
eliminating a kernel-doc warning:
kernel/seccomp.c:400: warning: expecting prototype for seccomp_run_filters(). Prototype was for ACTION_ONLY() instead
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230108021228.15975-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
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This introduces a per-filter flag (SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV)
that makes it so that when notifications are received by the supervisor the
notifying process will transition to wait killable semantics. Although wait
killable isn't a set of semantics formally exposed to userspace, the
concept is searchable. If the notifying process is signaled prior to the
notification being received by the userspace agent, it will be handled as
normal.
One quirk about how this is handled is that the notifying process
only switches to TASK_KILLABLE if it receives a wakeup from either
an addfd or a signal. This is to avoid an unnecessary wakeup of
the notifying task.
The reasons behind switching into wait_killable only after userspace
receives the notification are:
* Avoiding unncessary work - Often, workloads will perform work that they
may abort (request racing comes to mind). This allows for syscalls to be
aborted safely prior to the notification being received by the
supervisor. In this, the supervisor doesn't end up doing work that the
workload does not want to complete anyways.
* Avoiding side effects - We don't want the syscall to be interruptible
once the supervisor starts doing work because it may not be trivial
to reverse the operation. For example, unmounting a file system may
take a long time, and it's hard to rollback, or treat that as
reentrant.
* Avoid breaking runtimes - Various runtimes do not GC when they are
during a syscall (or while running native code that subsequently
calls a syscall). If many notifications are blocked, and not picked
up by the supervisor, this can get the application into a bad state.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503080958.20220-2-sargun@sargun.me
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Previously, the seccomp notifier used LIFO semantics, where each
notification would be added on top of the stack, and notifications
were popped off the top of the stack. This could result one process
that generates a large number of notifications preventing other
notifications from being handled. This patch moves from LIFO (stack)
semantics to FIFO (queue semantics).
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220428015447.13661-1-sargun@sargun.me
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull ptrace cleanups from Eric Biederman:
"This set of changes removes tracehook.h, moves modification of all of
the ptrace fields inside of siglock to remove races, adds a missing
permission check to ptrace.c
The removal of tracehook.h is quite significant as it has been a major
source of confusion in recent years. Much of that confusion was around
task_work and TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (which I have now decoupled making the
semantics clearer).
For people who don't know tracehook.h is a vestiage of an attempt to
implement uprobes like functionality that was never fully merged, and
was later superseeded by uprobes when uprobes was merged. For many
years now we have been removing what tracehook functionaly a little
bit at a time. To the point where anything left in tracehook.h was
some weird strange thing that was difficult to understand"
* tag 'ptrace-cleanups-for-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ptrace: Remove duplicated include in ptrace.c
ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE
ptrace: Return the signal to continue with from ptrace_stop
ptrace: Move setting/clearing ptrace_message into ptrace_stop
tracehook: Remove tracehook.h
resume_user_mode: Move to resume_user_mode.h
resume_user_mode: Remove #ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME in set_notify_resume
signal: Move set_notify_signal and clear_notify_signal into sched/signal.h
task_work: Decouple TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL and task_work
task_work: Call tracehook_notify_signal from get_signal on all architectures
task_work: Introduce task_work_pending
task_work: Remove unnecessary include from posix_timers.h
ptrace: Remove tracehook_signal_handler
ptrace: Remove arch_syscall_{enter,exit}_tracehook
ptrace: Create ptrace_report_syscall_{entry,exit} in ptrace.h
ptrace/arm: Rename tracehook_report_syscall report_syscall
ptrace: Move ptrace_report_syscall into ptrace.h
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Now that all of the definitions have moved out of tracehook.h into
ptrace.h, sched/signal.h, resume_user_mode.h there is nothing left in
tracehook.h so remove it.
Update the few files that were depending upon tracehook.h to bring in
definitions to use the headers they need directly.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220309162454.123006-13-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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If seccomp tries to kill a process, it should never see that process
again. To enforce this proactively, switch the mode to something
impossible. If encountered: WARN, reject all syscalls, and attempt to
kill the process again even harder.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Fixes: 8112c4f140fa ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull exit cleanups from Eric Biederman:
"In preparation of doing something about PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT I have
started cleaning up various pieces of code related to do_exit. Most of
that code I did not manage to get tested and reviewed before the merge
window opened but a handful of very useful cleanups are ready to be
merged.
The first change is simply the removal of the bdflush system call. The
code has now been disabled long enough that even the oldest userspace
working userspace setups anyone can find to test are fine with the
bdflush system call being removed.
Changing m68k fsp040_die to use force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) instead of
calling do_exit directly is interesting only in that it is nearly the
most difficult of the incorrect uses of do_exit to remove.
The change to the seccomp code to simply send a signal instead of
calling do_coredump directly is a very nice little cleanup made
possible by realizing the existing signal sending helpers were missing
a little bit of functionality that is easy to provide"
* 'exit-cleanups-for-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
signal/seccomp: Dump core when there is only one live thread
signal/seccomp: Refactor seccomp signal and coredump generation
signal/m68k: Use force_sigsegv(SIGSEGV) in fpsp040_die
exit/bdflush: Remove the deprecated bdflush system call
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Replace get_nr_threads with atomic_read(¤t->signal->live) as
that is a more accurate number that is decremented sooner.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87lf6z6qbd.fsf_-_@disp2133
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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Factor out force_sig_seccomp from the seccomp signal generation and
place it in kernel/signal.c. The function force_sig_seccomp takes a
parameter force_coredump to indicate that the sigaction field should
be reset to SIGDFL so that a coredump will be generated when the
signal is delivered.
force_sig_seccomp is then used to replace both seccomp_send_sigsys
and seccomp_init_siginfo.
force_sig_info_to_task gains an extra parameter to force using
the default signal action.
With this change seccomp is no longer a special case and there
becomes exactly one place do_coredump is called from.
Further it no longer becomes necessary for __seccomp_filter
to call do_group_exit.
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87r1gr6qc4.fsf_-_@disp2133
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The desired behavior is to set the caller's filter count to thread's.
This value is reported via /proc, so this fixes the inaccurate count
exposed to userspace; it is not used for reference counting, etc.
Signed-off-by: Hsuan-Chi Kuo <hsuanchikuo@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304233708.420597-1-hsuanchikuo@gmail.com
Co-developed-by: Wiktor Garbacz <wiktorg@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wiktor Garbacz <wiktorg@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210810125158.329849-1-wiktorg@google.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c818c03b661c ("seccomp: Report number of loaded filters in /proc/$pid/status")
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Alban Crequy reported a race condition userspace faces when we want to
add some fds and make the syscall return them[1] using seccomp notify.
The problem is that currently two different ioctl() calls are needed by
the process handling the syscalls (agent) for another userspace process
(target): SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD to allocate the fd and
SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND to return that value. Therefore, it is possible
for the agent to do the first ioctl to add a file descriptor but the
target is interrupted (EINTR) before the agent does the second ioctl()
call.
This patch adds a flag to the ADDFD ioctl() so it adds the fd and
returns that value atomically to the target program, as suggested by
Kees Cook[2]. This is done by simply allowing
seccomp_do_user_notification() to add the fd and return it in this case.
Therefore, in this case the target wakes up from the wait in
seccomp_do_user_notification() either to interrupt the syscall or to add
the fd and return it.
This "allocate an fd and return" functionality is useful for syscalls
that return a file descriptor only, like connect(2). Other syscalls that
return a file descriptor but not as return value (or return more than
one fd), like socketpair(), pipe(), recvmsg with SCM_RIGHTs, will not
work with this flag.
This effectively combines SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD and
SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND into an atomic opteration. The notification's
return value, nor error can be set by the user. Upon successful invocation
of the SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD ioctl with the SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND
flag, the notifying process's errno will be 0, and the return value will
be the file descriptor number that was installed.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CADZs7q4sw71iNHmV8EOOXhUKJMORPzF7thraxZYddTZsxta-KQ@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202012011322.26DCBC64F2@keescook/
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigo@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517193908.3113-4-sargun@sargun.me
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This refactors the user notification code to have a do / while loop around
the completion condition. This has a small change in semantic, in that
previously we ignored addfd calls upon wakeup if the notification had been
responded to, but instead with the new change we check for an outstanding
addfd calls prior to returning to userspace.
Rodrigo Campos also identified a bug that can result in addfd causing
an early return, when the supervisor didn't actually handle the
syscall [1].
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210413160151.3301-1-rodrigo@kinvolk.io/
Fixes: 7cf97b125455 ("seccomp: Introduce addfd ioctl to seccomp user notifier")
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Rodrigo Campos <rodrigo@kinvolk.io>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517193908.3113-3-sargun@sargun.me
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull receive_fd update from Al Viro:
"Cleanup of receive_fd mess"
* 'work.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: split receive_fd_replace from __receive_fd
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receive_fd_replace shares almost no code with the general case, so split
it out. Also remove the "Bump the sock usage counts" comment from
both copies, as that is now what __receive_sock actually does.
[AV: ... and make the only user of receive_fd_replace() choose between
it and receive_fd() according to what userland had passed to it in
flags]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Do a trivial typo fix: s/cachable/cacheable/
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210331030724.84419-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com
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According to Kees's suggest, we started with the patch that just replaces
rmb() with smp_rmb() and did a performance test with UnixBench. The
results showed the overhead about 2.53% in rmb() test compared to the
smp_rmb() one, in a x86-64 kernel with CONFIG_SMP enabled running inside a
qemu-kvm vm. The test is a "syscall" testcase in UnixBench, which executes
5 syscalls in a loop during a certain timeout (100 second in our test) and
counts the total number of executions of this 5-syscall sequence. We set
a seccomp filter with all allow rule for all used syscalls in this test
(which will go bitmap path) to make sure the rmb() will be executed. The
details for the test:
with rmb():
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|35861159|1|lps
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|35545501|1|lps
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|35664495|1|lps
with smp_rmb():
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|36552771|1|lps
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|36491247|1|lps
/txm # ./syscall_allow_min 100
COUNT|36504746|1|lps
For a x86-64 kernel with CONFIG_SMP enabled, the smp_rmb() is just a
compiler barrier() which have no impact in runtime, while rmb() is a
lfence which will prevent all memory access operations (not just load
according the recently claim by Intel) behind itself. We can also figure
it out in disassembly:
with rmb():
0000000000001430 <__seccomp_filter>:
1430: 41 57 push %r15
1432: 41 56 push %r14
1434: 41 55 push %r13
1436: 41 54 push %r12
1438: 55 push %rbp
1439: 53 push %rbx
143a: 48 81 ec 90 00 00 00 sub $0x90,%rsp
1441: 89 7c 24 10 mov %edi,0x10(%rsp)
1445: 89 54 24 14 mov %edx,0x14(%rsp)
1449: 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 mov %gs:0x28,%rax
1450: 00 00
1452: 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 mov %rax,0x88(%rsp)
1459: 00
145a: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
* 145c: 0f ae e8 lfence
145f: 48 85 f6 test %rsi,%rsi
1462: 49 89 f4 mov %rsi,%r12
1465: 0f 84 42 03 00 00 je 17ad <__seccomp_filter+0x37d>
146b: 65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
1472: 00 00
1474: 48 8b 98 80 07 00 00 mov 0x780(%rax),%rbx
147b: 48 85 db test %rbx,%rbx
with smp_rmb();
0000000000001430 <__seccomp_filter>:
1430: 41 57 push %r15
1432: 41 56 push %r14
1434: 41 55 push %r13
1436: 41 54 push %r12
1438: 55 push %rbp
1439: 53 push %rbx
143a: 48 81 ec 90 00 00 00 sub $0x90,%rsp
1441: 89 7c 24 10 mov %edi,0x10(%rsp)
1445: 89 54 24 14 mov %edx,0x14(%rsp)
1449: 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 mov %gs:0x28,%rax
1450: 00 00
1452: 48 89 84 24 88 00 00 mov %rax,0x88(%rsp)
1459: 00
145a: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax
145c: 48 85 f6 test %rsi,%rsi
145f: 49 89 f4 mov %rsi,%r12
1462: 0f 84 42 03 00 00 je 17aa <__seccomp_filter+0x37a>
1468: 65 48 8b 04 25 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rax
146f: 00 00
1471: 48 8b 98 80 07 00 00 mov 0x780(%rax),%rbx
1478: 48 85 db test %rbx,%rbx
Signed-off-by: wanghongzhe <wanghongzhe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1612496049-32507-1-git-send-email-wanghongzhe@huawei.com
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We don't actually care about the value, since the kernel will panic
before that; but a value should nonetheless be returned, otherwise the
compiler will complain.
Fixes: 8112c4f140fa ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+
Signed-off-by: Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210111172839.640914-1-paul@crapouillou.net
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull seccomp updates from Kees Cook:
"The major change here is finally gaining seccomp constant-action
bitmaps, which internally reduces the seccomp overhead for many
real-world syscall filters to O(1), as discussed at Plumbers this
year.
- Improve seccomp performance via constant-action bitmaps (YiFei Zhu
& Kees Cook)
- Fix bogus __user annotations (Jann Horn)
- Add missed CONFIG for improved selftest coverage (Mickaël Salaün)"
* tag 'seccomp-v5.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
selftests/seccomp: Update kernel config
seccomp: Remove bogus __user annotations
seccomp/cache: Report cache data through /proc/pid/seccomp_cache
xtensa: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
sh: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
s390: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
riscv: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
powerpc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
parisc: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
csky: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
arm: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
arm64: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
selftests/seccomp: Compare bitmap vs filter overhead
x86: Enable seccomp architecture tracking
seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow
seccomp/cache: Lookup syscall allowlist bitmap for fast path
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core entry/exit updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A set of updates for entry/exit handling:
- More generalization of entry/exit functionality
- The consolidation work to reclaim TIF flags on x86 and also for
non-x86 specific TIF flags which are solely relevant for syscall
related work and have been moved into their own storage space. The
x86 specific part had to be merged in to avoid a major conflict.
- The TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL work which replaces the inefficient signal
delivery mode of task work and results in an impressive performance
improvement for io_uring. The non-x86 consolidation of this is
going to come seperate via Jens.
- The selective syscall redirection facility which provides a clean
and efficient way to support the non-Linux syscalls of WINE by
catching them at syscall entry and redirecting them to the user
space emulation. This can be utilized for other purposes as well
and has been designed carefully to avoid overhead for the regular
fastpath. This includes the core changes and the x86 support code.
- Simplification of the context tracking entry/exit handling for the
users of the generic entry code which guarantee the proper ordering
and protection.
- Preparatory changes to make the generic entry code accomodate S390
specific requirements which are mostly related to their syscall
restart mechanism"
* tag 'core-entry-2020-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (36 commits)
entry: Add syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work()
entry: Add exit_to_user_mode() wrapper
entry_Add_enter_from_user_mode_wrapper
entry: Rename exit_to_user_mode()
entry: Rename enter_from_user_mode()
docs: Document Syscall User Dispatch
selftests: Add benchmark for syscall user dispatch
selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch
entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch on common syscall entry
kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection
signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type
x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for common entry code
entry: Fix boot for !CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY
x86: Support HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
context_tracking: Only define schedule_user() on !HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK archs
sched: Detect call to schedule from critical entry code
context_tracking: Don't implement exception_enter/exit() on CONFIG_HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
context_tracking: Introduce HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING_OFFSTACK
x86: Reclaim unused x86 TI flags
...
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Buffers that are passed to read_actions_logged() and write_actions_logged()
are in kernel memory; the sysctl core takes care of copying from/to
userspace.
Fixes: 32927393dc1c ("sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler")
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201120170545.1419332-1-jannh@google.com
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Currently the kernel does not provide an infrastructure to translate
architecture numbers to a human-readable name. Translating syscall
numbers to syscall names is possible through FTRACE_SYSCALL
infrastructure but it does not provide support for compat syscalls.
This will create a file for each PID as /proc/pid/seccomp_cache.
The file will be empty when no seccomp filters are loaded, or be
in the format of:
<arch name> <decimal syscall number> <ALLOW | FILTER>
where ALLOW means the cache is guaranteed to allow the syscall,
and filter means the cache will pass the syscall to the BPF filter.
For the docker default profile on x86_64 it looks like:
x86_64 0 ALLOW
x86_64 1 ALLOW
x86_64 2 ALLOW
x86_64 3 ALLOW
[...]
x86_64 132 ALLOW
x86_64 133 ALLOW
x86_64 134 FILTER
x86_64 135 FILTER
x86_64 136 FILTER
x86_64 137 ALLOW
x86_64 138 ALLOW
x86_64 139 FILTER
x86_64 140 ALLOW
x86_64 141 ALLOW
[...]
This file is guarded by CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG with a default
of N because I think certain users of seccomp might not want the
application to know which syscalls are definitely usable. For
the same reason, it is also guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3Ofqp4crXGksLmZY6=fGrF_tWyUCg7PBkAetvbbOPeOA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/94e663fa53136f5a11f432c661794d1ee7060779.1605101222.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
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SECCOMP_CACHE will only operate on syscalls that do not access
any syscall arguments or instruction pointer. To facilitate
this we need a static analyser to know whether a filter will
return allow regardless of syscall arguments for a given
architecture number / syscall number pair. This is implemented
here with a pseudo-emulator, and stored in a per-filter bitmap.
In order to build this bitmap at filter attach time, each filter is
emulated for every syscall (under each possible architecture), and
checked for any accesses of struct seccomp_data that are not the "arch"
nor "nr" (syscall) members. If only "arch" and "nr" are examined, and
the program returns allow, then we can be sure that the filter must
return allow independent from syscall arguments.
Nearly all seccomp filters are built from these cBPF instructions:
BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS
BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K
BPF_JMP | BPF_JA
BPF_RET | BPF_K
BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K
Each of these instructions are emulated. Any weirdness or loading
from a syscall argument will cause the emulator to bail.
The emulation is also halted if it reaches a return. In that case,
if it returns an SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the syscall is marked as good.
Emulator structure and comments are from Kees [1] and Jann [2].
Emulation is done at attach time. If a filter depends on more
filters, and if the dependee does not guarantee to allow the
syscall, then we skip the emulation of this syscall.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200923232923.3142503-5-keescook@chromium.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1p=dR_2ikKq=xVxkoGg0fYpTBpkhJSv1w-6BG=76PAvw@mail.gmail.com/
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/71c7be2db5ee08905f41c3be5c1ad6e2601ce88f.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
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The overhead of running Seccomp filters has been part of some past
discussions [1][2][3]. Oftentimes, the filters have a large number
of instructions that check syscall numbers one by one and jump based
on that. Some users chain BPF filters which further enlarge the
overhead. A recent work [6] comprehensively measures the Seccomp
overhead and shows that the overhead is non-negligible and has a
non-trivial impact on application performance.
We observed some common filters, such as docker's [4] or
systemd's [5], will make most decisions based only on the syscall
numbers, and as past discussions considered, a bitmap where each bit
represents a syscall makes most sense for these filters.
The fast (common) path for seccomp should be that the filter permits
the syscall to pass through, and failing seccomp is expected to be
an exceptional case; it is not expected for userspace to call a
denylisted syscall over and over.
When it can be concluded that an allow must occur for the given
architecture and syscall pair (this determination is introduced in
the next commit), seccomp will immediately allow the syscall,
bypassing further BPF execution.
Each architecture number has its own bitmap. The architecture
number in seccomp_data is checked against the defined architecture
number constant before proceeding to test the bit against the
bitmap with the syscall number as the index of the bit in the
bitmap, and if the bit is set, seccomp returns allow. The bitmaps
are all clear in this patch and will be initialized in the next
commit.
When only one architecture exists, the check against architecture
number is skipped, suggested by Kees Cook [7].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/c22a6c3cefc2412cad00ae14c1371711@huawei.com/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202005181120.971232B7B@keescook/T/
[3] https://github.com/seccomp/libseccomp/issues/116
[4] https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/ae0ef82b90356ac613f329a8ef5ee42ca923417d/profiles/seccomp/default.json
[5] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/6743a1caf4037f03dc51a1277855018e4ab61957/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L270
[6] Draco: Architectural and Operating System Support for System Call Security
https://tianyin.github.io/pub/draco.pdf, MICRO-53, Oct. 2020
[7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202010091614.8BB0EB64@keescook/
Co-developed-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dimitrios Skarlatos <dskarlat@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: YiFei Zhu <yifeifz2@illinois.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/10f91a367ec4fcdea7fc3f086de3f5f13a4a7436.1602431034.git.yifeifz2@illinois.edu
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Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's
use it!
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net
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On architectures using the generic syscall entry code the architecture
independent syscall work is moved to flags in thread_info::syscall_work.
This removes architecture dependencies and frees up TIF bits.
Define SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP, use it in the generic entry code and convert
the code which uses the TIF specific helper functions to use the new
*_syscall_work() helpers which either resolve to the new mode for users of
the generic entry code or to the TIF based functions for the other
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201116174206.2639648-5-krisman@collabora.com
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Currently, init_listener() tries to prevent adding a filter with
SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER if one of the existing filters already
has a listener. However, this check happens without holding any lock that
would prevent another thread from concurrently installing a new filter
(potentially with a listener) on top of the ones we already have.
Theoretically, this is also a data race: The plain load from
current->seccomp.filter can race with concurrent writes to the same
location.
Fix it by moving the check into the region that holds the siglock to guard
against concurrent TSYNC.
(The "Fixes" tag points to the commit that introduced the theoretical
data race; concurrent installation of another filter with TSYNC only
became possible later, in commit 51891498f2da ("seccomp: allow TSYNC and
USER_NOTIF together").)
Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace")
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005014401.490175-1-jannh@google.com
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As described in commit a3460a59747c ("new helper: current_pt_regs()"):
- arch versions are "optimized versions".
- some architectures have task_pt_regs() working only for traced tasks
blocked on signal delivery. current_pt_regs() needs to work for *all*
processes.
In preparation for adding a coccinelle rule for using current_*(), instead
of raw accesses to current members, modify seccomp_do_user_notification(),
__seccomp_filter(), __secure_computing() to use current_pt_regs().
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200824125921.488311-1-efremov@linux.com
[kees: Reworded commit log, add comment to populate_seccomp_data()]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Asynchronous termination of a thread outside of the userspace thread
library's knowledge is an unsafe operation that leaves the process in
an inconsistent, corrupt, and possibly unrecoverable state. In order
to make new actions that may be added in the future safe on kernels
not aware of them, change the default action from
SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS.
Signed-off-by: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200829015609.GA32566@brightrain.aerifal.cx
[kees: Fixed up coredump selection logic to match]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Christian and Kees both pointed out that this is a bit sloppy to open-code
both places, and Christian points out that we leave a dangling pointer to
->notif if file allocation fails. Since we check ->notif for null in order
to determine if it's ok to install a filter, this means people won't be
able to install a filter if the file allocation fails for some reason, even
if they subsequently should be able to.
To fix this, let's hoist this free+null into its own little helper and use
it.
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902140953.1201956-1-tycho@tycho.pizza
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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In seccomp_set_mode_filter() with TSYNC | NEW_LISTENER, we first initialize
the listener fd, then check to see if we can actually use it later in
seccomp_may_assign_mode(), which can fail if anyone else in our thread
group has installed a filter and caused some divergence. If we can't, we
partially clean up the newly allocated file: we put the fd, put the file,
but don't actually clean up the *memory* that was allocated at
filter->notif. Let's clean that up too.
To accomplish this, let's hoist the actual "detach a notifier from a
filter" code to its own helper out of seccomp_notify_release(), so that in
case anyone adds stuff to init_listener(), they only have to add the
cleanup code in one spot. This does a bit of extra locking and such on the
failure path when the filter is not attached, but it's a slow failure path
anyway.
Fixes: 51891498f2da ("seccomp: allow TSYNC and USER_NOTIF together")
Reported-by: syzbot+3ad9614a12f80994c32e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200902014017.934315-1-tycho@tycho.pizza
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The current SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF API allows for syscall supervision over
an fd. It is often used in settings where a supervising task emulates
syscalls on behalf of a supervised task in userspace, either to further
restrict the supervisee's syscall abilities or to circumvent kernel
enforced restrictions the supervisor deems safe to lift (e.g. actually
performing a mount(2) for an unprivileged container).
While SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF allows for the interception of any syscall,
only a certain subset of syscalls could be correctly emulated. Over the
last few development cycles, the set of syscalls which can't be emulated
has been reduced due to the addition of pidfd_getfd(2). With this we are
now able to, for example, intercept syscalls that require the supervisor
to operate on file descriptors of the supervisee such as connect(2).
However, syscalls that cause new file descriptors to be installed can not
currently be correctly emulated since there is no way for the supervisor
to inject file descriptors into the supervisee. This patch adds a
new addfd ioctl to remove this restriction by allowing the supervisor to
install file descriptors into the intercepted task. By implementing this
feature via seccomp the supervisor effectively instructs the supervisee
to install a set of file descriptors into its own file descriptor table
during the intercepted syscall. This way it is possible to intercept
syscalls such as open() or accept(), and install (or replace, like
dup2(2)) the supervisor's resulting fd into the supervisee. One
replacement use-case would be to redirect the stdout and stderr of a
supervisee into log file descriptors opened by the supervisor.
The ioctl handling is based on the discussions[1] of how Extensible
Arguments should interact with ioctls. Instead of building size into
the addfd structure, make it a function of the ioctl command (which
is how sizes are normally passed to ioctls). To support forward and
backward compatibility, just mask out the direction and size, and match
everything. The size (and any future direction) checks are done along
with copy_struct_from_user() logic.
As a note, the seccomp_notif_addfd structure is laid out based on 8-byte
alignment without requiring packing as there have been packing issues
with uapi highlighted before[2][3]. Although we could overload the
newfd field and use -1 to indicate that it is not to be used, doing
so requires changing the size of the fd field, and introduces struct
packing complexity.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87o8w9bcaf.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/a328b91d-fd8f-4f27-b3c2-91a9c45f18c0@rasmusvillemoes.dk/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200612104629.GA15814@ircssh-2.c.rugged-nimbus-611.internal
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200603011044.7972-4-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reviewed-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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The terminator for the mode 1 syscalls list was a 0, but that could be
a valid syscall number (e.g. x86_64 __NR_read). By luck, __NR_read was
listed first and the loop construct would not test it, so there was no
bug. However, this is fragile. Replace the terminator with -1 instead,
and make the variable name for mode 1 syscall lists more descriptive.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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When SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID was first introduced it had the wrong
direction flag set. While this isn't a big deal as nothing currently
enforces these bits in the kernel, it should be defined correctly. Fix
the define and provide support for the old command until it is no longer
needed for backward compatibility.
Fixes: 6a21cc50f0c7 ("seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Avoid open-coding "seccomp: " prefixes for pr_*() calls.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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We've been making heavy use of the seccomp notifier to intercept and
handle certain syscalls for containers. This patch allows a syscall
supervisor listening on a given notifier to be notified when a seccomp
filter has become unused.
A container is often managed by a singleton supervisor process the
so-called "monitor". This monitor process has an event loop which has
various event handlers registered. If the user specified a seccomp
profile that included a notifier for various syscalls then we also
register a seccomp notify even handler. For any container using a
separate pid namespace the lifecycle of the seccomp notifier is bound to
the init process of the pid namespace, i.e. when the init process exits
the filter must be unused.
If a new process attaches to a container we force it to assume a seccomp
profile. This can either be the same seccomp profile as the container
was started with or a modified one. If the attaching process makes use
of the seccomp notifier we will register a new seccomp notifier handler
in the monitor's event loop. However, when the attaching process exits
we can't simply delete the handler since other child processes could've
been created (daemons spawned etc.) that have inherited the seccomp
filter and so we need to keep the seccomp notifier fd alive in the event
loop. But this is problematic since we don't get a notification when the
seccomp filter has become unused and so we currently never remove the
seccomp notifier fd from the event loop and just keep accumulating fds
in the event loop. We've had this issue for a while but it has recently
become more pressing as more and larger users make use of this.
To fix this, we introduce a new "users" reference counter that tracks any
tasks and dependent filters making use of a filter. When a notifier is
registered waiting tasks will be notified that the filter is now empty
by receiving a (E)POLLHUP event.
The concept in this patch introduces is the same as for signal_struct,
i.e. reference counting for life-cycle management is decoupled from
reference counting taks using the object. There's probably some trickery
possible but the second counter is just the correct way of doing this
IMHO and has precedence.
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200531115031.391515-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Lift the wait_queue from struct notification into struct seccomp_filter.
This is cleaner overall and lets us avoid having to take the notifier
mutex in the future for EPOLLHUP notifications since we need to neither
read nor modify the notifier specific aspects of the seccomp filter. In
the exit path I'd very much like to avoid having to take the notifier mutex
for each filter in the task's filter hierarchy.
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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|
The seccomp filter used to be released in free_task() which is called
asynchronously via call_rcu() and assorted mechanisms. Since we need
to inform tasks waiting on the seccomp notifier when a filter goes empty
we will notify them as soon as a task has been marked fully dead in
release_task(). To not split seccomp cleanup into two parts, move
filter release out of free_task() and into release_task() after we've
unhashed struct task from struct pid, exited signals, and unlinked it
from the threadgroups' thread list. We'll put the empty filter
notification infrastructure into it in a follow up patch.
This also renames put_seccomp_filter() to seccomp_filter_release() which
is a more descriptive name of what we're doing here especially once
we've added the empty filter notification mechanism in there.
We're also NULL-ing the task's filter tree entrypoint which seems
cleaner than leaving a dangling pointer in there. Note that this shouldn't
need any memory barriers since we're calling this when the task is in
release_task() which means it's EXIT_DEAD. So it can't modify its seccomp
filters anymore. You can also see this from the point where we're calling
seccomp_filter_release(). It's after __exit_signal() and at this point,
tsk->sighand will already have been NULLed which is required for
thread-sync and filter installation alike.
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200531115031.391515-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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Naming the lifetime counter of a seccomp filter "usage" suggests a
little too strongly that its about tasks that are using this filter
while it also tracks other references such as the user notifier or
ptrace. This also updates the documentation to note this fact.
We'll be introducing an actual usage counter in a follow-up patch.
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200531115031.391515-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
This adds a helper which can iterate through a seccomp_filter to
find a notification matching an ID. It removes several replicated
chunks of code.
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Matt Denton <mpdenton@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Cc: Robert Sesek <rsesek@google.com>,
Cc: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200601112532.150158-1-sargun@sargun.me
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
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|
A common question asked when debugging seccomp filters is "how many
filters are attached to your process?" Provide a way to easily answer
this question through /proc/$pid/status with a "Seccomp_filters" line.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
Instead of having all the sysctl handlers deal with user pointers, which
is rather hairy in terms of the BPF interaction, copy the input to and
from userspace in common code. This also means that the strings are
always NUL-terminated by the common code, making the API a little bit
safer.
As most handler just pass through the data to one of the common handlers
a lot of the changes are mechnical.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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