| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
On __ptrace_detach(), called from do_exit()->exit_notify()->
forget_original_parent()->exit_ptrace(), the TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE in
thread->flags of the tracee is not cleared up. This results in the
tracehook_report_syscall_* being called (though there's no longer a tracer
listening to that) upon its further syscalls.
Example scenario - attach "strace" to a running process and kill it (the
strace) with SIGKILL. You'll see that the syscall trace hooks are still
being called.
The clearing of this flag should be moved from ptrace_detach() to
__ptrace_detach().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472759493-20554-1-git-send-email-alnovak@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ales Novak <alnovak@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The use of config_enabled() against config options is ambiguous. In
practical terms, config_enabled() is equivalent to IS_BUILTIN(), but the
author might have used it for the meaning of IS_ENABLED(). Using
IS_ENABLED(), IS_BUILTIN(), IS_MODULE() etc. makes the intention
clearer.
This commit replaces config_enabled() with IS_ENABLED() where possible.
This commit is only touching bool config options.
I noticed two cases where config_enabled() is used against a tristate
option:
- config_enabled(CONFIG_HWMON)
[ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/thermal.c ]
- config_enabled(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE)
[ drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/opregion.c ]
I did not touch them because they should be converted to IS_BUILTIN()
in order to keep the logic, but I was not sure it was the authors'
intention.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465215656-20569-1-git-send-email-yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>
Cc: Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@imgtec.com>
Cc: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com>
Cc: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: yu-cheng yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Nikolay Martynov <mar.kolya@gmail.com>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Leonid Yegoshin <Leonid.Yegoshin@imgtec.com>
Cc: Rafal Milecki <zajec5@gmail.com>
Cc: James Cowgill <James.Cowgill@imgtec.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Alex Smith <alex.smith@imgtec.com>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Qais Yousef <qais.yousef@imgtec.com>
Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com>
Cc: Hidehiro Kawai <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com>
Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: Tony Wu <tung7970@gmail.com>
Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Jason Cooper <jason@lakedaemon.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Gelmini <andrea.gelmini@gelma.net>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@imgtec.com>
Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This test-case (simplified version of generated by syzkaller)
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
void test(void)
{
for (;;) {
if (fork()) {
wait(NULL);
continue;
}
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, getppid(), 0, 0);
ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, getppid(), 0, 0);
_exit(0);
}
}
int main(void)
{
int np;
for (np = 0; np < 8; ++np)
if (!fork())
test();
while (wait(NULL) > 0)
;
return 0;
}
triggers the 2nd WARN_ON_ONCE(!signr) warning in do_jobctl_trap(). The
problem is that __ptrace_unlink() clears task->jobctl under siglock but
task->ptrace is cleared without this lock held; this fools the "else"
branch which assumes that !PT_SEIZED means PT_PTRACED.
Note also that most of other PTRACE_SEIZE checks can race with detach
from the exiting tracer too. Say, the callers of ptrace_trap_notify()
assume that SEIZED can't go away after it was checked.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Users of the 32-bit ptrace() ABI expect the full 32-bit ABI. siginfo
translation should check ptrace() ABI, not caller task ABI.
This is an ABI change on SPARC. Let's hope that no one relied on the
old buggy ABI.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
By checking the effective credentials instead of the real UID / permitted
capabilities, ensure that the calling process actually intended to use its
credentials.
To ensure that all ptrace checks use the correct caller credentials (e.g.
in case out-of-tree code or newly added code omits the PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS
flag), use two new flags and require one of them to be set.
The problem was that when a privileged task had temporarily dropped its
privileges, e.g. by calling setreuid(0, user_uid), with the intent to
perform following syscalls with the credentials of a user, it still passed
ptrace access checks that the user would not be able to pass.
While an attacker should not be able to convince the privileged task to
perform a ptrace() syscall, this is a problem because the ptrace access
check is reused for things in procfs.
In particular, the following somewhat interesting procfs entries only rely
on ptrace access checks:
/proc/$pid/stat - uses the check for determining whether pointers
should be visible, useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/maps - also useful for bypassing ASLR
/proc/$pid/cwd - useful for gaining access to restricted
directories that contain files with lax permissions, e.g. in
this scenario:
lrwxrwxrwx root root /proc/13020/cwd -> /root/foobar
drwx------ root root /root
drwxr-xr-x root root /root/foobar
-rw-r--r-- root root /root/foobar/secret
Therefore, on a system where a root-owned mode 6755 binary changes its
effective credentials as described and then dumps a user-specified file,
this could be used by an attacker to reveal the memory layout of root's
processes or reveal the contents of files he is not allowed to access
(through /proc/$pid/cwd).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warning]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ptrace_attach() can hang waiting for STOPPED -> TRACED transition if the
tracee gets frozen in between, change wait_on_bit() to use TASK_KILLABLE.
This doesn't really solve the problem(s) and we probably need to fix the
freezer. In particular, note that this means that pm freezer will fail if
it races attach-to-stopped-task.
And otoh perhaps we can just remove JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT altogether, it is
not clear if we really need to hide this transition from debugger, WNOHANG
after PTRACE_ATTACH can fail anyway if it races with SIGCONT.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch adds support for dumping a process' (classic BPF) seccomp
filters via ptrace.
PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER allows the tracer to dump the user's classic BPF
seccomp filters. addr should be an integer which represents the ith seccomp
filter (0 is the most recently installed filter). data should be a struct
sock_filter * with enough room for the ith filter, or NULL, in which case
the filter is not saved. The return value for this command is the number of
BPF instructions the program represents, or negative in the case of errors.
Command specific errors are ENOENT: which indicates that there is no ith
filter in this seccomp tree, and EMEDIUMTYPE, which indicates that the ith
filter was not installed as a classic BPF filter.
A caveat with this approach is that there is no way to get explicitly at
the heirarchy of seccomp filters, and users need to memcmp() filters to
decide which are inherited. This means that a task which installs two of
the same filter can potentially confuse users of this interface.
v2: * make save_orig const
* check that the orig_prog exists (not necessary right now, but when
grows eBPF support it will be)
* s/n/filter_off and make it an unsigned long to match ptrace
* count "down" the tree instead of "up" when passing a filter offset
v3: * don't take the current task's lock for inspecting its seccomp mode
* use a 0x42** constant for the ptrace command value
v4: * don't copy to userspace while holding spinlocks
v5: * add another condition to WARN_ON
v6: * rebase on net-next
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
This patch is the first step in enabling checkpoint/restore of processes
with seccomp enabled.
One of the things CRIU does while dumping tasks is inject code into them
via ptrace to collect information that is only available to the process
itself. However, if we are in a seccomp mode where these processes are
prohibited from making these syscalls, then what CRIU does kills the task.
This patch adds a new ptrace option, PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP, that enables
a task from the init user namespace which has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and no seccomp
filters to disable (and re-enable) seccomp filters for another task so that
they can be successfully dumped (and restored). We restrict the set of
processes that can disable seccomp through ptrace because although today
ptrace can be used to bypass seccomp, there is some discussion of closing
this loophole in the future and we would like this patch to not depend on
that behavior and be future proofed for when it is removed.
Note that seccomp can be suspended before any filters are actually
installed; this behavior is useful on criu restore, so that we can suspend
seccomp, restore the filters, unmap our restore code from the restored
process' address space, and then resume the task by detaching and have the
filters resumed as well.
v2 changes:
* require that the tracer have no seccomp filters installed
* drop TIF_NOTSC manipulation from the patch
* change from ptrace command to a ptrace option and use this ptrace option
as the flag to check. This means that as soon as the tracer
detaches/dies, seccomp is re-enabled and as a corrollary that one can not
disable seccomp across PTRACE_ATTACHs.
v3 changes:
* get rid of various #ifdefs everywhere
* report more sensible errors when PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is incorrectly
used
v4 changes:
* get rid of may_suspend_seccomp() in favor of a capable() check in ptrace
directly
v5 changes:
* check that seccomp is not enabled (or suspended) on the tracer
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
CC: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
CC: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
[kees: access seccomp.mode through seccomp_mode() instead]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
|
|
ptrace_detach() re-checks ->ptrace under tasklist lock and calls
release_task() if __ptrace_detach() returns true. This was needed because
the __TASK_TRACED tracee could be killed/untraced, and it could even pass
exit_notify() before we take tasklist_lock.
But this is no longer possible after 9899d11f6544 "ptrace: ensure
arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL". We can turn
these checks into WARN_ON() and remove release_task().
While at it, document the setting of child->exit_code.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
ptrace_resume() is called when the tracee is still __TASK_TRACED. We set
tracee->exit_code and then wake_up_state() changes tracee->state. If the
tracer's sub-thread does wait() in between, task_stopped_code(ptrace => T)
wrongly looks like another report from tracee.
This confuses debugger, and since wait_task_stopped() clears ->exit_code
the tracee can miss a signal.
Test-case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <assert.h>
int pid;
void *waiter(void *arg)
{
int stat;
for (;;) {
assert(pid == wait(&stat));
assert(WIFSTOPPED(stat));
if (WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGHUP)
continue;
assert(WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGCONT);
printf("ERR! extra/wrong report:%x\n", stat);
}
}
int main(void)
{
pthread_t thread;
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0);
for (;;)
kill(getpid(), SIGHUP);
}
assert(pthread_create(&thread, NULL, waiter, NULL) == 0);
for (;;)
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, SIGCONT);
return 0;
}
Note for stable: the bug is very old, but without 9899d11f6544 "ptrace:
ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL" the fix
should use lock_task_sighand(child).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Tested-by: Pavel Labath <labath@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Commit 84c751bd4aeb ("ptrace: add ability to retrieve signals without
removing from a queue (v4)") includes <linux/compat.h> globally in
ptrace.c
This patch removes inclusion under if defined CONFIG_COMPAT.
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
forget_original_parent()
Now that forget_original_parent() uses ->ptrace_entry for EXIT_DEAD tasks,
we can simply pass "dead_children" list to exit_ptrace() and remove
another release_task() loop. Plus this way we do not need to drop and
reacquire tasklist_lock.
Also shift the list_empty(ptraced) check, if we want this optimization it
makes sense to eliminate the function call altogether.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Cc: Sterling Alexander <stalexan@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The current "wait_on_bit" interface requires an 'action'
function to be provided which does the actual waiting.
There are over 20 such functions, many of them identical.
Most cases can be satisfied by one of just two functions, one
which uses io_schedule() and one which just uses schedule().
So:
Rename wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock to
wait_on_bit_action and wait_on_bit_lock_action
to make it explicit that they need an action function.
Introduce new wait_on_bit{,_lock} and wait_on_bit{,_lock}_io
which are *not* given an action function but implicitly use
a standard one.
The decision to error-out if a signal is pending is now made
based on the 'mode' argument rather than being encoded in the action
function.
All instances of the old wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock which
can use the new version have been changed accordingly and their
action functions have been discarded.
wait_on_bit{_lock} does not return any specific error code in the
event of a signal so the caller must check for non-zero and
interpolate their own error code as appropriate.
The wait_on_bit() call in __fscache_wait_on_invalidate() was
ambiguous as it specified TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE but used
fscache_wait_bit_interruptible as an action function.
David Howells confirms this should be uniformly
"uninterruptible"
The main remaining user of wait_on_bit{,_lock}_action is NFS
which needs to use a freezer-aware schedule() call.
A comment in fs/gfs2/glock.c notes that having multiple 'action'
functions is useful as they display differently in the 'wchan'
field of 'ps'. (and /proc/$PID/wchan).
As the new bit_wait{,_io} functions are tagged "__sched", they
will not show up at all, but something higher in the stack. So
the distinction will still be visible, only with different
function names (gds2_glock_wait versus gfs2_glock_dq_wait in the
gfs2/glock.c case).
Since first version of this patch (against 3.15) two new action
functions appeared, on in NFS and one in CIFS. CIFS also now
uses an action function that makes the same freezer aware
schedule call as NFS.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (fscache, keys)
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> (gfs2)
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140707051603.28027.72349.stgit@notabene.brown
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
|
Convert all compat system call functions where all parameter types
have a size of four or less than four bytes, or are pointer types
to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE.
The implicit casts within COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE will perform proper
zero and sign extension to 64 bit of all parameters if needed.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
|
|
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
__ptrace_may_access() checks get_dumpable/ptrace_has_cap/etc if task !=
current, this can can lead to surprising results.
For example, a sub-thread can't readlink("/proc/self/exe") if the
executable is not readable. setup_new_exec()->would_dump() notices that
inode_permission(MAY_READ) fails and then it does
set_dumpable(suid_dumpable). After that get_dumpable() fails.
(It is not clear why proc_pid_readlink() checks get_dumpable(), perhaps we
could add PTRACE_MODE_NODUMPABLE)
Change __ptrace_may_access() to use same_thread_group() instead of "task
== current". Any security check is pointless when the tasks share the
same ->mm.
Signed-off-by: Mark Grondona <mgrondona@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Ben Woodard <woodard@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This reverts commit fab840fc2d542fabcab903db8e03589a6702ba5f.
This commit even has the test-case to prove that the tracee
can be killed by SIGTRAP if the debugger does not remove the
breakpoints before PTRACE_DETACH.
However, this is exactly what wineserver deliberately does,
set_thread_context() calls PTRACE_ATTACH + PTRACE_DETACH just
for PTRACE_POKEUSER(DR*) in between.
So we should revert this fix and document that PTRACE_DETACH
should keep the breakpoints.
Reported-by: Felipe Contreras <felipe.contreras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Change ptrace_detach() to call flush_ptrace_hw_breakpoint(child). This
frees the slots for non-ptrace PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT users, and this
ensures that the tracee won't be killed by SIGTRAP triggered by the
active breakpoints.
Test-case:
unsigned long encode_dr7(int drnum, int enable, unsigned int type, unsigned int len)
{
unsigned long dr7;
dr7 = ((len | type) & 0xf)
<< (DR_CONTROL_SHIFT + drnum * DR_CONTROL_SIZE);
if (enable)
dr7 |= (DR_GLOBAL_ENABLE << (drnum * DR_ENABLE_SIZE));
return dr7;
}
int write_dr(int pid, int dr, unsigned long val)
{
return ptrace(PTRACE_POKEUSER, pid,
offsetof (struct user, u_debugreg[dr]),
val);
}
void func(void)
{
}
int main(void)
{
int pid, stat;
unsigned long dr7;
pid = fork();
if (!pid) {
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0,0,0) == 0);
kill(getpid(), SIGHUP);
func();
return 0x13;
}
assert(pid == waitpid(-1, &stat, 0));
assert(WSTOPSIG(stat) == SIGHUP);
assert(write_dr(pid, 0, (long)func) == 0);
dr7 = encode_dr7(0, 1, DR_RW_EXECUTE, DR_LEN_1);
assert(write_dr(pid, 7, dr7) == 0);
assert(ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0,0) == 0);
assert(pid == waitpid(-1, &stat, 0));
assert(stat == 0x1300);
return 0;
}
Before this patch the child is killed after PTRACE_DETACH.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This reverts commit bf26c018490c ("Prepare to fix racy accesses on task
breakpoints").
The patch was fine but we can no longer race with SIGKILL after commit
9899d11f6544 ("ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race
with SIGKILL"), the __TASK_TRACED tracee can't be woken up and
->ptrace_bps[] can't go away.
Now that ptrace_get_breakpoints/ptrace_put_breakpoints have no callers,
we can kill them and remove task->ptrace_bp_refcnt.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Prasad <prasad@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
crtools uses a parasite code for dumping processes. The parasite code is
injected into a process with help PTRACE_SEIZE.
Currently crtools blocks signals from a parasite code. If a process has
pending signals, crtools wait while a process handles these signals.
This method is not suitable for stopped tasks. A stopped task can have a
few pending signals, when we will try to execute a parasite code, we will
need to drop SIGSTOP, but all other signals must remain pending, because a
state of processes must not be changed during checkpointing.
This patch adds two ptrace commands to set/get signal-blocked mask.
I think gdb can use this commands too.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: be consistent with brace layout]
Signed-off-by: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This __put_user() could be used by unprivileged processes to write into
kernel memory. The issue here is that even if copy_siginfo_to_user()
fails, the error code is not checked before __put_user() is executed.
Luckily, ptrace_peek_siginfo() has been added within the 3.10-rc cycle,
so it has not hit a stable release yet.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Faster kernel compiles by way of fewer unnecessary includes.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fallout]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <koverstreet@google.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zab@redhat.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Asai Thambi S P <asamymuthupa@micron.com>
Cc: Selvan Mani <smani@micron.com>
Cc: Sam Bradshaw <sbradshaw@micron.com>
Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Reviewed-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch adds a new ptrace request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO.
This request is used to retrieve information about pending signals
starting with the specified sequence number. Siginfo_t structures are
copied from the child into the buffer starting at "data".
The argument "addr" is a pointer to struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args.
struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args {
u64 off; /* from which siginfo to start */
u32 flags;
s32 nr; /* how may siginfos to take */
};
"nr" has type "s32", because ptrace() returns "long", which has 32 bits on
i386 and a negative values is used for errors.
Currently here is only one flag PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED for dumping
signals from process-wide queue. If this flag is not set, signals are
read from a per-thread queue.
The request PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO returns a number of dumped signals. If a
signal with the specified sequence number doesn't exist, ptrace returns
zero. The request returns an error, if no signal has been dumped.
Errors:
EINVAL - one or more specified flags are not supported or nr is negative
EFAULT - buf or addr is outside your accessible address space.
A result siginfo contains a kernel part of si_code which usually striped,
but it's required for queuing the same siginfo back during restore of
pending signals.
This functionality is required for checkpointing pending signals. Pedro
Alves suggested using it in "gdb" to peek at pending signals. gdb already
uses PTRACE_GETSIGINFO to get the siginfo for the signal which was already
dequeued. This functionality allows gdb to look at the pending signals
which were not reported yet.
The prototype of this code was developed by Oleg Nesterov.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The original pull message for uprobes (commit 654443e2) noted:
This tree includes uprobes support in 'perf probe' - but SystemTap
(and other tools) can take advantage of user probe points as well.
In order to actually be usable in module-based tools like SystemTap, the
interface needs to be exported. This patch first adds the obvious
exports for uprobe_register and uprobe_unregister. Then it also adds
one for task_user_regset_view, which is necessary to get the correct
state of userspace registers.
Signed-off-by: Josh Stone <jistone@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
|
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Cleanup and preparation for the next change.
signal_wake_up(resume => true) is overused. None of ptrace/jctl callers
actually want to wakeup a TASK_WAKEKILL task, but they can't specify the
necessary mask.
Turn signal_wake_up() into signal_wake_up_state(state), reintroduce
signal_wake_up() as a trivial helper, and add ptrace_signal_wake_up()
which adds __TASK_TRACED.
This way ptrace_signal_wake_up() can work "inside" ptrace_request()
even if the tracee doesn't have the TASK_WAKEKILL bit set.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The ia64 function "thread_matches()" has no users since commit
e868a55c2a8c ("[IA64] remove find_thread_for_addr()"). Remove it.
This allows us to make ptrace_check_attach() static to kernel/ptrace.c,
which is good since we'll need to change the semantics of it and fix up
all the callers.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Merge misc patches from Andrew Morton:
"Incoming:
- lots of misc stuff
- backlight tree updates
- lib/ updates
- Oleg's percpu-rwsem changes
- checkpatch
- rtc
- aoe
- more checkpoint/restart support
I still have a pile of MM stuff pending - Pekka should be merging
later today after which that is good to go. A number of other things
are twiddling thumbs awaiting maintainer merges."
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (180 commits)
scatterlist: don't BUG when we can trivially return a proper error.
docs: update documentation about /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> fanotify output
fs, fanotify: add @mflags field to fanotify output
docs: add documentation about /proc/<pid>/fdinfo/<fd> output
fs, notify: add procfs fdinfo helper
fs, exportfs: add exportfs_encode_inode_fh() helper
fs, exportfs: escape nil dereference if no s_export_op present
fs, epoll: add procfs fdinfo helper
fs, eventfd: add procfs fdinfo helper
procfs: add ability to plug in auxiliary fdinfo providers
tools/testing/selftests/kcmp/kcmp_test.c: print reason for failure in kcmp_test
breakpoint selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
kcmp selftests: print fail status instead of cause make error
kcmp selftests: make run_tests fix
mem-hotplug selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
cpu-hotplug selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
mqueue selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
vm selftests: print failure status instead of cause make error
ubifs: use prandom_bytes
mtd: nandsim: use prandom_bytes
...
|
|
Ptrace jailers want to be sure that the tracee can never escape
from the control. However if the tracer dies unexpectedly the
tracee continues to run in potentially unsafe mode.
Add the new ptrace option PTRACE_O_EXITKILL. If the tracer exits
it sends SIGKILL to every tracee which has this bit set.
Note that the new option is not equal to the last-option << 1. Because
currently all options have an event, and the new one starts the eventless
group. It uses the random 20 bit, so we have the room for 12 more events,
but we can also add the new eventless options below this one.
Suggested by Amnon Shiloh.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Amnon Shiloh <u3557@miso.sublimeip.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Chris Evans <scarybeasts@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The task_user_ns function hides the fact that it is getting the user
namespace from struct cred on the task. struct cred may go away as
soon as the rcu lock is released. This leads to a race where we
can dereference a stale user namespace pointer.
To make it obvious a struct cred is involved kill task_user_ns.
To kill the race modify the users of task_user_ns to only
reference the user namespace while the rcu lock is held.
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
__ptrace_may_access() is used within only kernel/ptrace.c.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
|
|
kuids and kgids
Update the permission checks to use the new uid_eq and gid_eq helpers
and remove the now unnecessary user_ns equality comparison.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
Optimize performance and prepare for the removal of the user_ns reference
from user_struct. Remove the slow long walk through cred->user->user_ns and
instead go straight to cred->user_ns.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
|
PTRACE_SEIZE code is tested and ready for production use, remove the
code which requires special bit in data argument to make PTRACE_SEIZE
work.
Strace team prepares for a new release of strace, and we would like to
ship the code which uses PTRACE_SEIZE, preferably after this change goes
into released kernel.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This can be used to close a few corner cases in strace where we get
unwanted racy behavior after attach, but before we have a chance to set
options (the notorious post-execve SIGTRAP comes to mind), and removes
the need to track "did we set opts for this task" state in strace
internals.
While we are at it:
Make it possible to extend SEIZE in the future with more functionality
by passing non-zero 'addr' parameter. To that end, error out if 'addr'
is non-zero. PTRACE_ATTACH did not (and still does not) have such
check, and users (strace) do pass garbage there... let's avoid
repeating this mistake with SEIZE.
Set all task->ptrace bits in one operation - before this change, we were
adding PT_SEIZED and PT_PTRACE_CAP with task->ptrace |= BIT ops. This
was probably ok (not a bug), but let's be on a safer side.
Changes since v2: use (unsigned long) casts instead of (long) ones, move
PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL-related code to separate lines of code.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
Exchange PT_TRACESYSGOOD and PT_PTRACE_CAP bit positions, which makes
PT_option bits contiguous and therefore makes code in
ptrace_setoptions() much simpler.
Every PTRACE_O_TRACEevent is defined to (1 << PTRACE_EVENT_event)
instead of using explicit numeric constants, to ensure we don't mess up
relationship between bit positions and event ids.
PT_EVENT_FLAG_SHIFT was not particularly useful, PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT with
value of PT_EVENT_FLAG_SHIFT-1 is easier to use.
PT_TRACE_MASK constant is nuked, the only its use is replaced by
(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT).
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
On ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, <opts>), we used to set those
option bits which are known, and then fail with -EINVAL if there are
some unknown bits in <opts>.
This is inconsistent with typical error handling, which does not change
any state if input is invalid.
This patch changes PTRACE_SETOPTIONS behavior so that in this case, we
return -EINVAL and don't change any bits in task->ptrace.
It's very unlikely that there is userspace code in the wild which will
be affected by this change: it should have the form
ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, 0, PTRACE_O_BOGUSOPT)
where PTRACE_O_BOGUSOPT is a constant unknown to the kernel. But kernel
headers, naturally, don't contain any PTRACE_O_BOGUSOPTs, thus the only
way userspace can use one if it defines one itself. I can't see why
anyone would do such a thing deliberately.
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()
Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():
- the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")
- a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
userspace configuration API")
causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
|
|
Reading /proc/pid/stat of another process checks if one has ptrace permissions
on that process. If one does have permissions it outputs some data about the
process which might have security and attack implications. If the current
task does not have ptrace permissions the read still works, but those fields
are filled with inocuous (0) values. Since this check and a subsequent denial
is not a violation of the security policy we should not audit such denials.
This can be quite useful to removing ptrace broadly across a system without
flooding the logs when ps is run or something which harmlessly walks proc.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
|
|
task_ in the front of a function, in the security subsystem anyway, means
to me at least, that we are operating with that task as the subject of the
security decision. In this case what it means is that we are using current as
the subject but we use the task to get the right namespace. Who in the world
would ever realize that's what task_ns_capability means just by the name? This
patch eliminates the task_ns functions entirely and uses the has_ns_capability
function instead. This means we explicitly open code the ns in question in
the caller. I think it makes the caller a LOT more clear what is going on.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
|
|
This is the temporary simple fix for 3.2, we need more changes in this
area.
1. do_signal_stop() assumes that the running untraced thread in the
stopped thread group is not possible. This was our goal but it is
not yet achieved: a stopped-but-resumed tracee can clone the running
thread which can initiate another group-stop.
Remove WARN_ON_ONCE(!current->ptrace).
2. A new thread always starts with ->jobctl = 0. If it is auto-attached
and this group is stopped, __ptrace_unlink() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING
but JOBCTL_STOP_SIGMASK part is zero, this triggers WANR_ON(!signr)
in do_jobctl_trap() if another debugger attaches.
Change __ptrace_unlink() to set the artificial SIGSTOP for report.
Alternatively we could change ptrace_init_task() to copy signr from
current, but this means we can copy it for no reason and hide the
possible similar problems.
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [3.1]
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
|
|
If PTRACE_LISTEN fails after lock_task_sighand() it doesn't drop ->siglock.
Reported-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This change adds a procfs connector event, which is emitted on every
successful process tracer attach or detach.
If some process connects to other one, kernelspace connector reports
process id and thread group id of both these involved processes. On
disconnection null process id is returned.
Such an event allows to create a simple automated userspace mechanism
to be aware about processes connecting to others, therefore predefined
process policies can be applied to them if needed.
Note, a detach signal is emitted only in case, if a tracer process
explicitly executes PTRACE_DETACH request. In other cases like tracee
or tracer exit detach event from proc connector is not reported.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vzapolskiy@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
|
__ptrace_detach() and do_notify_parent() set task->exit_signal = -1
to mark the task dead. This is no longer needed, nobody checks
exit_signal to detect the EXIT_DEAD task.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
__ptrace_detach() relies on the current obscure behaviour of
do_notify_parent(tsk) which changes tsk->exit_signal if this child
should be silently reaped. That is why we check task_detached(), it
is true if the task is sub-thread, or it is the group_leader but
its exit_signal was changed by do_notify_parent().
This is confusing, change the code to rely on !thread_group_leader()
or the value returned by do_notify_parent().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
|
|
The previous patch implemented async notification for ptrace but it
only worked while trace is running. This patch introduces
PTRACE_LISTEN which is suggested by Oleg Nestrov.
It's allowed iff tracee is in STOP trap and puts tracee into
quasi-running state - tracee never really runs but wait(2) and
ptrace(2) consider it to be running. While ptracer is listening,
tracee is allowed to re-enter STOP to notify an async event.
Listening state is cleared on the first notification. Ptracer can
also clear it by issuing INTERRUPT - tracee will re-trap into STOP
with listening state cleared.
This allows ptracer to monitor group stop state without running tracee
- use INTERRUPT to put tracee into STOP trap, issue LISTEN and then
wait(2) to wait for the next group stop event. When it happens,
PTRACE_GETSIGINFO provides information to determine the current state.
Test program follows.
#define PTRACE_SEIZE 0x4206
#define PTRACE_INTERRUPT 0x4207
#define PTRACE_LISTEN 0x4208
#define PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL 0x80000000
static const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 };
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t tracee, tracer;
int i;
tracee = fork();
if (!tracee)
while (1)
pause();
tracer = fork();
if (!tracer) {
siginfo_t si;
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL);
ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
repeat:
waitid(P_PID, tracee, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETSIGINFO, tracee, NULL, &si);
if (!si.si_code) {
printf("tracer: SIG %d\n", si.si_signo);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)si.si_signo);
goto repeat;
}
printf("tracer: stopped=%d signo=%d\n",
si.si_signo != SIGTRAP, si.si_signo);
if (si.si_signo != SIGTRAP)
ptrace(PTRACE_LISTEN, tracee, NULL, NULL);
else
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
goto repeat;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
printf("mother: SIGSTOP\n");
kill(tracee, SIGSTOP);
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
printf("mother: SIGCONT\n");
kill(tracee, SIGCONT);
}
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
kill(tracer, SIGKILL);
kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
return 0;
}
This is identical to the program to test TRAP_NOTIFY except that
tracee is PTRACE_LISTEN'd instead of PTRACE_CONT'd when group stopped.
This allows ptracer to monitor when group stop ends without running
tracee.
# ./test-listen
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
mother: SIGSTOP
tracer: SIG 19
tracer: stopped=1 signo=19
mother: SIGCONT
tracer: stopped=0 signo=5
tracer: SIG 18
-v2: Moved JOBCTL_LISTENING check in wait_task_stopped() into
task_stopped_code() as suggested by Oleg.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
|
Currently, there's no way to trap a running ptracee short of sending a
signal which has various side effects. This patch implements
PTRACE_INTERRUPT which traps ptracee without any signal or job control
related side effect.
The implementation is almost trivial. It uses the group stop trap -
SIGTRAP | PTRACE_EVENT_STOP << 8. A new trap flag
JOBCTL_TRAP_INTERRUPT is added, which is set on PTRACE_INTERRUPT and
cleared when any trap happens. As INTERRUPT should be useable
regardless of the current state of tracee, task_is_traced() test in
ptrace_check_attach() is skipped for INTERRUPT.
PTRACE_INTERRUPT is available iff tracee is attached with
PTRACE_SEIZE.
Test program follows.
#define PTRACE_SEIZE 0x4206
#define PTRACE_INTERRUPT 0x4207
#define PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL 0x80000000
static const struct timespec ts100ms = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 };
static const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 };
static const struct timespec ts3s = { .tv_sec = 3 };
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t tracee;
tracee = fork();
if (tracee == 0) {
nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL);
while (1) {
printf("tracee: alive pid=%d\n", getpid());
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
}
}
if (argc > 1)
kill(tracee, SIGSTOP);
nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL);
if (argc > 1) {
waitid(P_PID, tracee, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
}
nanosleep(&ts3s, NULL);
printf("tracer: INTERRUPT and DETACH\n");
ptrace(PTRACE_INTERRUPT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
waitid(P_PID, tracee, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, tracee, NULL, NULL);
nanosleep(&ts3s, NULL);
printf("tracer: exiting\n");
kill(tracee, SIGKILL);
return 0;
}
When called without argument, tracee is seized from running state,
interrupted and then detached back to running state.
# ./test-interrupt
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracer: INTERRUPT and DETACH
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracee: alive pid=4546
tracer: exiting
When called with argument, tracee is seized from stopped state,
continued, interrupted and then detached back to stopped state.
# ./test-interrupt 1
tracee: alive pid=4548
tracee: alive pid=4548
tracee: alive pid=4548
tracer: INTERRUPT and DETACH
tracer: exiting
Before PTRACE_INTERRUPT, once the tracee was running, there was no way
to trap tracee and do PTRACE_DETACH without causing side effect.
-v2: Updated to use task_set_jobctl_pending() so that it doesn't end
up scheduling TRAP_STOP if child is dying which may make the
child unkillable. Spotted by Oleg.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
|
PTRACE_ATTACH implicitly issues SIGSTOP on attach which has side
effects on tracee signal and job control states. This patch
implements a new ptrace request PTRACE_SEIZE which attaches a tracee
without trapping it or affecting its signal and job control states.
The usage is the same with PTRACE_ATTACH but it takes PTRACE_SEIZE_*
flags in @data. Currently, the only defined flag is
PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL which is a temporary flag to enable PTRACE_SEIZE.
PTRACE_SEIZE will change ptrace behaviors outside of attach itself.
The changes will be implemented gradually and the DEVEL flag is to
prevent programs which expect full SEIZE behavior from using it before
all the behavior modifications are complete while allowing unit
testing. The flag will be removed once SEIZE behaviors are completely
implemented.
* PTRACE_SEIZE, unlike ATTACH, doesn't force tracee to trap. After
attaching tracee continues to run unless a trap condition occurs.
* PTRACE_SEIZE doesn't affect signal or group stop state.
* If PTRACE_SEIZE'd, group stop uses PTRACE_EVENT_STOP trap which uses
exit_code of (signr | PTRACE_EVENT_STOP << 8) where signr is one of
the stopping signals if group stop is in effect or SIGTRAP
otherwise, and returns usual trap siginfo on PTRACE_GETSIGINFO
instead of NULL.
Seizing sets PT_SEIZED in ->ptrace of the tracee. This flag will be
used to determine whether new SEIZE behaviors should be enabled.
Test program follows.
#define PTRACE_SEIZE 0x4206
#define PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL 0x80000000
static const struct timespec ts100ms = { .tv_nsec = 100000000 };
static const struct timespec ts1s = { .tv_sec = 1 };
static const struct timespec ts3s = { .tv_sec = 3 };
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
pid_t tracee;
tracee = fork();
if (tracee == 0) {
nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL);
while (1) {
printf("tracee: alive\n");
nanosleep(&ts1s, NULL);
}
}
if (argc > 1)
kill(tracee, SIGSTOP);
nanosleep(&ts100ms, NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_SEIZE, tracee, NULL,
(void *)(unsigned long)PTRACE_SEIZE_DEVEL);
if (argc > 1) {
waitid(P_PID, tracee, NULL, WSTOPPED);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, tracee, NULL, NULL);
}
nanosleep(&ts3s, NULL);
printf("tracer: exiting\n");
return 0;
}
When the above program is called w/o argument, tracee is seized while
running and remains running. When tracer exits, tracee continues to
run and print out messages.
# ./test-seize-simple
tracee: alive
tracee: alive
tracee: alive
tracer: exiting
tracee: alive
tracee: alive
When called with an argument, tracee is seized from stopped state and
continued, and returns to stopped state when tracer exits.
# ./test-seize
tracee: alive
tracee: alive
tracee: alive
tracer: exiting
# ps -el|grep test-seize
1 T 0 4720 1 0 80 0 - 941 signal ttyS0 00:00:00 test-seize
-v2: SEIZE doesn't schedule TRAP_STOP and leaves tracee running as Jan
suggested.
-v3: PTRACE_EVENT_STOP traps now report group stop state by signr. If
group stop is in effect the stop signal number is returned as
part of exit_code; otherwise, SIGTRAP. This was suggested by
Denys and Oleg.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kratochvil <jan.kratochvil@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <vda.linux@googlemail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
|
do_signal_stop() implemented both normal group stop and trap for group
stop while ptraced. This approach has been enough but scheduled
changes require trap mechanism which can be used in more generic
manner and using group stop trap for generic trap site simplifies both
userland visible interface and implementation.
This patch adds a new jobctl flag - JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP. When set, it
triggers a trap site, which behaves like group stop trap, in
get_signal_to_deliver() after checking for pending signals. While
ptraced, do_signal_stop() doesn't stop itself. It initiates group
stop if requested and schedules JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and returns. The
caller - get_signal_to_deliver() - is responsible for checking whether
TRAP_STOP is pending afterwards and handling it.
ptrace_attach() is updated to use JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP instead of
JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and __ptrace_unlink() to clear all pending trap
bits and TRAPPING so that TRAP_STOP and future trap bits don't linger
after detach.
While at it, add proper function comment to do_signal_stop() and make
it return bool.
-v2: __ptrace_unlink() updated to clear JOBCTL_TRAP_MASK and TRAPPING
instead of JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK. This avoids accidentally
clearing JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME. Spotted by Oleg.
-v3: do_signal_stop() updated to return %false without dropping
siglock while ptraced and TRAP_STOP check moved inside for(;;)
loop after group stop participation. This avoids unnecessary
relocking and also will help avoiding unnecessary traps by
consuming group stop before handling pending traps.
-v4: Jobctl trap handling moved into a separate function -
do_jobctl_trap().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
|
