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The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new
type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some
unusual properties, which require some core mm changes to function
properly.
One of the properties is that the shadow stack pointer (SSP), which is a
CPU register that points to the shadow stack like the stack pointer points
to the stack, can't be pointing outside of the 32 bit address space when
the CPU is executing in 32 bit mode. It is desirable to prevent executing
in 32 bit mode when shadow stack is enabled because the kernel can't easily
support 32 bit signals.
On x86 it is possible to transition to 32 bit mode without any special
interaction with the kernel, by doing a "far call" to a 32 bit segment.
So the shadow stack implementation can use this address space behavior
as a feature, by enforcing that shadow stack memory is always mapped
outside of the 32 bit address space. This way userspace will trigger a
general protection fault which will in turn trigger a segfault if it
tries to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled.
This provides a clean error generating border for the user if they try
attempt to do 32 bit mode shadow stack, rather than leave the kernel in a
half working state for userspace to be surprised by.
So to allow future shadow stack enabling patches to map shadow stacks
out of the 32 bit address space, introduce MAP_ABOVE4G. The behavior
is pretty much like MAP_32BIT, except that it has the opposite address
range. The are a few differences though.
If both MAP_32BIT and MAP_ABOVE4G are provided, the kernel will use the
MAP_ABOVE4G behavior. Like MAP_32BIT, MAP_ABOVE4G is ignored in a 32 bit
syscall.
Since the default search behavior is top down, the normal kaslr base can
be used for MAP_ABOVE4G. This is unlike MAP_32BIT which has to add its
own randomization in the bottom up case.
For MAP_32BIT, only the bottom up search path is used. For MAP_ABOVE4G
both are potentially valid, so both are used. In the bottomup search
path, the default behavior is already consistent with MAP_ABOVE4G since
mmap base should be above 4GB.
Without MAP_ABOVE4G, the shadow stack will already normally be above 4GB.
So without introducing MAP_ABOVE4G, trying to transition to 32 bit mode
with shadow stack enabled would usually segfault anyway. This is already
pretty decent guard rails. But the addition of MAP_ABOVE4G is some small
complexity spent to make it make it more complete.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-21-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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Patch series "mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE)",
v2.
The background to this is that systemd has a configuration option called
MemoryDenyWriteExecute [2], implemented as a SECCOMP BPF filter. Its aim
is to prevent a user task from inadvertently creating an executable
mapping that is (or was) writeable. Since such BPF filter is stateless,
it cannot detect mappings that were previously writeable but subsequently
changed to read-only. Therefore the filter simply rejects any
mprotect(PROT_EXEC). The side-effect is that on arm64 with BTI support
(Branch Target Identification), the dynamic loader cannot change an ELF
section from PROT_EXEC to PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI using mprotect(). For
libraries, it can resort to unmapping and re-mapping but for the main
executable it does not have a file descriptor. The original bug report in
the Red Hat bugzilla - [3] - and subsequent glibc workaround for libraries
- [4].
This series adds in-kernel support for this feature as a prctl
PR_SET_MDWE, that is inherited on fork(). The prctl denies PROT_WRITE |
PROT_EXEC mappings. Like the systemd BPF filter it also denies adding
PROT_EXEC to mappings. However unlike the BPF filter it only denies it if
the mapping didn't previous have PROT_EXEC. This allows to PROT_EXEC ->
PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI with mprotect(), which is a problem with the BPF
filter.
This patch (of 2):
The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from creating an
executable mapping that is also writeable.
An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled:
mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC);
The BPF filter that systemd MDWE uses is stateless, and disallows
mprotect() with PROT_EXEC completely. This new prctl allows PROT_EXEC to
be enabled if it was already PROT_EXEC, which allows the following case:
addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0);
mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI);
where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-1-joey.gouly@arm.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119160344.54358-2-joey.gouly@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Co-developed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: nd <nd@arm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>
Cc: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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There are no platforms left which use arch_vm_get_page_prot(). Just drop
generic arch_vm_get_page_prot().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220414062125.609297-8-anshuman.khandual@arm.com
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Let's also remove masking off MAP_DENYWRITE from ksys_mmap_pgoff():
the last in-tree occurrence of MAP_DENYWRITE is now in LEGACY_MAP_MASK,
which accepts the flag e.g., for MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE; however, the flag
is ignored throughout the kernel now.
Add a comment to LEGACY_MAP_MASK stating that MAP_DENYWRITE is ignored.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
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All in-tree users of MAP_DENYWRITE are gone. MAP_DENYWRITE cannot be
set from user space, so all users are gone; let's remove it.
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
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Let's also remove masking off MAP_EXECUTABLE from ksys_mmap_pgoff(): the
last in-tree occurrence of MAP_EXECUTABLE is now in LEGACY_MAP_MASK, which
accepts the flag e.g., for MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE; however, the flag is
ignored throughout the kernel now.
Add a comment to LEGACY_MAP_MASK stating that MAP_EXECUTABLE is ignored.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210421093453.6904-4-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Similarly to arch_validate_prot() called from do_mprotect_pkey(), an
architecture may need to sanity-check the new vm_flags.
Define a dummy function always returning true. In addition to
do_mprotect_pkey(), also invoke it from mmap_region() prior to updating
vma->vm_page_prot to allow the architecture code to veto potentially
inconsistent vm_flags.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Similarly to arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(), introduce a dummy
arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() invoked from calc_vm_flag_bits(). This macro
can be overridden by architectures to insert specific VM_* flags derived
from the mmap() MAP_* flags.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When checking a performance change for will-it-scale scalability mmap test
[1], we found very high lock contention for spinlock of percpu counter
'vm_committed_as':
94.14% 0.35% [kernel.kallsyms] [k] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave
48.21% _raw_spin_lock_irqsave;percpu_counter_add_batch;__vm_enough_memory;mmap_region;do_mmap;
45.91% _raw_spin_lock_irqsave;percpu_counter_add_batch;__do_munmap;
Actually this heavy lock contention is not always necessary. The
'vm_committed_as' needs to be very precise when the strict
OVERCOMMIT_NEVER policy is set, which requires a rather small batch number
for the percpu counter.
So keep 'batch' number unchanged for strict OVERCOMMIT_NEVER policy, and
lift it to 64X for OVERCOMMIT_ALWAYS and OVERCOMMIT_GUESS policies. Also
add a sysctl handler to adjust it when the policy is reconfigured.
Benchmark with the same testcase in [1] shows 53% improvement on a 8C/16T
desktop, and 2097%(20X) on a 4S/72C/144T server. We tested with test
platforms in 0day (server, desktop and laptop), and 80%+ platforms shows
improvements with that test. And whether it shows improvements depends on
if the test mmap size is bigger than the batch number computed.
And if the lift is 16X, 1/3 of the platforms will show improvements,
though it should help the mmap/unmap usage generally, as Michal Hocko
mentioned:
: I believe that there are non-synthetic worklaods which would benefit from
: a larger batch. E.g. large in memory databases which do large mmaps
: during startups from multiple threads.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200305062138.GI5972@shao2-debian/
Signed-off-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi.kleen@intel.com>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Cc: "K. Y. Srinivasan" <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1589611660-89854-4-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1592725000-73486-4-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1594389708-60781-5-git-send-email-feng.tang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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A protection flag may not be valid across entire address space and
hence arch_validate_prot() might need the address a protection bit is
being set on to ensure it is a valid protection flag. For example, sparc
processors support memory corruption detection (as part of ADI feature)
flag on memory addresses mapped on to physical RAM but not on PFN mapped
pages or addresses mapped on to devices. This patch adds address to the
parameters being passed to arch_validate_prot() so protection bits can
be validated in the relevant context.
Signed-off-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>
Cc: Khalid Aziz <khalid@gonehiking.org>
Reviewed-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm and dax updates from Dan Williams:
"Save for a few late fixes, all of these commits have shipped in -next
releases since before the merge window opened, and 0day has given a
build success notification.
The ext4 touches came from Jan, and the xfs touches have Darrick's
reviewed-by. An xfstest for the MAP_SYNC feature has been through
a few round of reviews and is on track to be merged.
- Introduce MAP_SYNC and MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE, a mechanism to enable
'userspace flush' of persistent memory updates via filesystem-dax
mappings. It arranges for any filesystem metadata updates that may
be required to satisfy a write fault to also be flushed ("on disk")
before the kernel returns to userspace from the fault handler.
Effectively every write-fault that dirties metadata completes an
fsync() before returning from the fault handler. The new
MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE mapping type guarantees that the MAP_SYNC flag
is validated as supported by the filesystem's ->mmap() file
operation.
- Add support for the standard ACPI 6.2 label access methods that
replace the NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL (vendor specific) label methods.
This enables interoperability with environments that only implement
the standardized methods.
- Add support for the ACPI 6.2 NVDIMM media error injection methods.
- Add support for the NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL v1.6 DIMM commands for
latch last shutdown status, firmware update, SMART error injection,
and SMART alarm threshold control.
- Cleanup physical address information disclosures to be root-only.
- Fix revalidation of the DIMM "locked label area" status to support
dynamic unlock of the label area.
- Expand unit test infrastructure to mock the ACPI 6.2 Translate SPA
(system-physical-address) command and error injection commands.
Acknowledgements that came after the commits were pushed to -next:
- 957ac8c421ad ("dax: fix PMD faults on zero-length files"):
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
- a39e596baa07 ("xfs: support for synchronous DAX faults") and
7b565c9f965b ("xfs: Implement xfs_filemap_pfn_mkwrite() using __xfs_filemap_fault()")
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (49 commits)
acpi, nfit: add 'Enable Latch System Shutdown Status' command support
dax: fix general protection fault in dax_alloc_inode
dax: fix PMD faults on zero-length files
dax: stop requiring a live device for dax_flush()
brd: remove dax support
dax: quiet bdev_dax_supported()
fs, dax: unify IOMAP_F_DIRTY read vs write handling policy in the dax core
tools/testing/nvdimm: unit test clear-error commands
acpi, nfit: validate commands against the device type
tools/testing/nvdimm: stricter bounds checking for error injection commands
xfs: support for synchronous DAX faults
xfs: Implement xfs_filemap_pfn_mkwrite() using __xfs_filemap_fault()
ext4: Support for synchronous DAX faults
ext4: Simplify error handling in ext4_dax_huge_fault()
dax: Implement dax_finish_sync_fault()
dax, iomap: Add support for synchronous faults
mm: Define MAP_SYNC and VM_SYNC flags
dax: Allow tuning whether dax_insert_mapping_entry() dirties entry
dax: Allow dax_iomap_fault() to return pfn
dax: Fix comment describing dax_iomap_fault()
...
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Define new MAP_SYNC flag and corresponding VMA VM_SYNC flag. As the
MAP_SYNC flag is not part of LEGACY_MAP_MASK, currently it will be
refused by all MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE map attempts and silently ignored for
everything else.
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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The mmap(2) syscall suffers from the ABI anti-pattern of not validating
unknown flags. However, proposals like MAP_SYNC need a mechanism to
define new behavior that is known to fail on older kernels without the
support. Define a new MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE flag pattern that is
guaranteed to fail on all legacy mmap implementations.
It is worth noting that the original proposal was for a standalone
MAP_VALIDATE flag. However, when that could not be supported by all
archs Linus observed:
I see why you *think* you want a bitmap. You think you want
a bitmap because you want to make MAP_VALIDATE be part of MAP_SYNC
etc, so that people can do
ret = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED
| MAP_SYNC, fd, 0);
and "know" that MAP_SYNC actually takes.
And I'm saying that whole wish is bogus. You're fundamentally
depending on special semantics, just make it explicit. It's already
not portable, so don't try to make it so.
Rename that MAP_VALIDATE as MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE, make it have a value
of 0x3, and make people do
ret = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE
| MAP_SYNC, fd, 0);
and then the kernel side is easier too (none of that random garbage
playing games with looking at the "MAP_VALIDATE bit", but just another
case statement in that map type thing.
Boom. Done.
Similar to ->fallocate() we also want the ability to validate the
support for new flags on a per ->mmap() 'struct file_operations'
instance basis. Towards that end arrange for flags to be generically
validated against a mmap_supported_flags exported by 'struct
file_operations'. By default all existing flags are implicitly
supported, but new flags require MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE and
per-instance-opt-in.
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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_calc_vm_trans() does not handle the situation when some of the passed
flags are 0 (which can happen if these VM flags do not make sense for
the architecture). Improve the _calc_vm_trans() macro to return 0 in
such situation. Since all passed flags are constant, this does not add
any runtime overhead.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Currently, percpu_counter_add is a wrapper around __percpu_counter_add
which is preempt safe due to explicit calls to preempt_disable. Given
how __ prefix is used in percpu related interfaces, the naming
unfortunately creates the false sense that __percpu_counter_add is
less safe than percpu_counter_add. In terms of context-safety,
they're equivalent. The only difference is that the __ version takes
a batch parameter.
Make this a bit more explicit by just renaming __percpu_counter_add to
percpu_counter_add_batch.
This patch doesn't cause any functional changes.
tj: Minor updates to patch description for clarity. Cosmetic
indentation updates.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
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arch_validate_prot
For pure bool function's return value, bool is a little better more or
less than int.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1469331815-2026-1-git-send-email-chengang@emindsoft.com.cn
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This plumbs a protection key through calc_vm_flag_bits(). We
could have done this in calc_vm_prot_bits(), but I did not feel
super strongly which way to go. It was pretty arbitrary which
one to use.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@android.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Gang <gang.chen.5i5j@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Geliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@leon.nu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Riley Andrews <riandrews@android.com>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160212210231.E6F1F0D6@viggo.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Some applications that run on HPC clusters are designed around the
availability of RAM and the overcommit ratio is fine tuned to get the
maximum usage of memory without swapping. With growing memory, the
1%-of-all-RAM grain provided by overcommit_ratio has become too coarse
for these workload (on a 2TB machine it represents no less than 20GB).
This patch adds the new overcommit_kbytes sysctl variable that allow a
much finer grain.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix nommu build]
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The same calculation is currently done in three differents places.
Factor that code so future changes has to be made at only one place.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: uninline vm_commit_limit()]
Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Currently the per cpu counter's batch size for memory accounting is
configured as twice the number of cpus in the system. However, for
system with very large memory, it is more appropriate to make it
proportional to the memory size per cpu in the system.
For example, for a x86_64 system with 64 cpus and 128 GB of memory, the
batch size is only 2*64 pages (0.5 MB). So any memory accounting
changes of more than 0.5MB will overflow the per cpu counter into the
global counter. Instead, for the new scheme, the batch size is
configured to be 0.4% of the memory/cpu = 8MB (128 GB/64 /256), which is
more inline with the memory size.
I've done a repeated brk test of 800KB (from will-it-scale test suite)
with 80 concurrent processes on a 4 socket Westmere machine with a total
of 40 cores. Without the patch, about 80% of cpu is spent on spin-lock
contention within the vm_committed_as counter. With the patch, there's
a 73x speedup on the benchmark and the lock contention drops off almost
entirely.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix section mismatch]
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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programs"
This reverts commit 186930500985 ("mm: introduce VM_POPULATE flag to
better deal with racy userspace programs").
VM_POPULATE only has any effect when userspace plays racy games with
vmas by trying to unmap and remap memory regions that mmap or mlock are
operating on.
Also, the only effect of VM_POPULATE when userspace plays such games is
that it avoids populating new memory regions that get remapped into the
address range that was being operated on by the original mmap or mlock
calls.
Let's remove VM_POPULATE as there isn't any strong argument to mandate a
new vm_flag.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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The vm_populate() code populates user mappings without constantly
holding the mmap_sem. This makes it susceptible to racy userspace
programs: the user mappings may change while vm_populate() is running,
and in this case vm_populate() may end up populating the new mapping
instead of the old one.
In order to reduce the possibility of userspace getting surprised by
this behavior, this change introduces the VM_POPULATE vma flag which
gets set on vmas we want vm_populate() to work on. This way
vm_populate() may still end up populating the new mapping after such a
race, but only if the new mapping is also one that the user has
requested (using MAP_SHARED, MAP_LOCKED or mlock) to be populated.
Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gregungerer@westnet.com.au>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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It will be useful to be able to access global memory commitment from
device drivers. On the Hyper-V platform, the host has a policy engine to
balance the available physical memory amongst all competing virtual
machines hosted on a given node. This policy engine is driven by a number
of metrics including the memory commitment reported by the guests. The
balloon driver for Linux on Hyper-V will use this function to retrieve
guest memory commitment. This function is also used in Xen self
ballooning code.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style tweak]
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
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|
Currently the kernel sets mm->exe_file during sys_execve() and then tracks
number of vmas with VM_EXECUTABLE flag in mm->num_exe_file_vmas, as soon
as this counter drops to zero kernel resets mm->exe_file to NULL. Plus it
resets mm->exe_file at last mmput() when mm->mm_users drops to zero.
VMA with VM_EXECUTABLE flag appears after mapping file with flag
MAP_EXECUTABLE, such vmas can appears only at sys_execve() or after vma
splitting, because sys_mmap ignores this flag. Usually binfmt module sets
mm->exe_file and mmaps executable vmas with this file, they hold
mm->exe_file while task is running.
comment from v2.6.25-6245-g925d1c4 ("procfs task exe symlink"),
where all this stuff was introduced:
> The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from
> the first executable VMA. Then the path to the file is reconstructed and
> reported as the result.
>
> Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems.
> This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems. Instead of
> walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a
> reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct.
>
> That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file
> from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs. So we track the number
> of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is
> unmapped. This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem.
exe_file's vma accounting is hooked into every file mmap/unmmap and vma
split/merge just to fix some hypothetical pinning fs from umounting by mm,
which already unmapped all its executable files, but still alive.
Seems like currently nobody depends on this behaviour. We can try to
remove this logic and keep mm->exe_file until final mmput().
mm->exe_file is still protected with mm->mmap_sem, because we want to
change it via new sys_prctl(PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE). Also via this syscall
task can change its mm->exe_file and unpin mountpoint explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@tilera.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Robert Richter <robert.richter@amd.com>
Cc: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: Venkatesh Pallipadi <venki@google.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
The Committed_AS field can underflow in certain situations:
> # while true; do cat /proc/meminfo | grep _AS; sleep 1; done | uniq -c
> 1 Committed_AS: 18446744073709323392 kB
> 11 Committed_AS: 18446744073709455488 kB
> 6 Committed_AS: 35136 kB
> 5 Committed_AS: 18446744073709454400 kB
> 7 Committed_AS: 35904 kB
> 3 Committed_AS: 18446744073709453248 kB
> 2 Committed_AS: 34752 kB
> 9 Committed_AS: 18446744073709453248 kB
> 8 Committed_AS: 34752 kB
> 3 Committed_AS: 18446744073709320960 kB
> 7 Committed_AS: 18446744073709454080 kB
> 3 Committed_AS: 18446744073709320960 kB
> 5 Committed_AS: 18446744073709454080 kB
> 6 Committed_AS: 18446744073709320960 kB
Because NR_CPUS can be greater than 1000 and meminfo_proc_show() does
not check for underflow.
But NR_CPUS proportional isn't good calculation. In general,
possibility of lock contention is proportional to the number of online
cpus, not theorical maximum cpus (NR_CPUS).
The current kernel has generic percpu-counter stuff. using it is right
way. it makes code simplify and percpu_counter_read_positive() don't
make underflow issue.
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Eric B Munson <ebmunson@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [All kernel versions]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
This patch allows architectures to define functions to deal with
additional protections bits for mmap() and mprotect().
arch_calc_vm_prot_bits() maps additonal protection bits to vm_flags
arch_vm_get_page_prot() maps additional vm_flags to the vma's vm_page_prot
arch_validate_prot() checks for valid values of the protection bits
Note: vm_get_page_prot() is now pretty ugly, but the generated code
should be identical for architectures that don't define additional
protection bits.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
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|
The atomic_t type is 32bit but a 64bit system can have more than 2^32
pages of virtual address space available. Without this we overflow on
ludicrously large mappings
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
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Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
|
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It only really needs to define a few constants and include <asm/mman.h>
when it's used by userspace. Move the rest within #ifdef __KERNEL__
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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