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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core fix from Greg KH:
"A single debugfs fix for 5.13-rc6, fixing a bug in
debugfs_read_file_str() that showed up in 5.13-rc1.
It has been in linux-next for a full week with no
reported problems"
* tag 'driver-core-5.13-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
debugfs: Fix debugfs_read_file_str()
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Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"Just an API change for the registration changes that went into this
release. Better to get it sorted out now than before it's too late"
* tag 'io_uring-5.13-2021-06-12' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: add feature flag for rsrc tags
io_uring: change registration/upd/rsrc tagging ABI
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Add IORING_FEAT_RSRC_TAGS indicating that io_uring supports a bunch of
new IORING_REGISTER operations, in particular
IORING_REGISTER_[FILES[,UPDATE]2,BUFFERS[2,UPDATE]] that support rsrc
tagging, and also indicating implemented dynamic fixed buffer updates.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9b995d4045b6c6b4ab7510ca124fd25ac2203af7.1623339162.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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There are ABI moments about recently added rsrc registration/update and
tagging that might become a nuisance in the future. First,
IORING_REGISTER_RSRC[_UPD] hide different types of resources under it,
so breaks fine control over them by restrictions. It works for now, but
once those are wanted under restrictions it would require a rework.
It was also inconvenient trying to fit a new resource not supporting
all the features (e.g. dynamic update) into the interface, so better
to return to IORING_REGISTER_* top level dispatching.
Second, register/update were considered to accept a type of resource,
however that's not a good idea because there might be several ways of
registration of a single resource type, e.g. we may want to add
non-contig buffers or anything more exquisite as dma mapped memory.
So, remove IORING_RSRC_[FILE,BUFFER] out of the ABI, and place them
internally for now to limit changes.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9b554897a7c17ad6e3becc48dfed2f7af9f423d5.1623339162.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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Olivier Langlois has been struggling with coredumps being incompletely written in
processes using io_uring.
Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com> writes:
> io_uring is a big user of task_work and any event that io_uring made a
> task waiting for that occurs during the core dump generation will
> generate a TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL.
>
> Here are the detailed steps of the problem:
> 1. io_uring calls vfs_poll() to install a task to a file wait queue
> with io_async_wake() as the wakeup function cb from io_arm_poll_handler()
> 2. wakeup function ends up calling task_work_add() with TWA_SIGNAL
> 3. task_work_add() sets the TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL bit by calling
> set_notify_signal()
The coredump code deliberately supports being interrupted by SIGKILL,
and depends upon prepare_signal to filter out all other signals. Now
that signal_pending includes wake ups for TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL this hack
in dump_emitted by the coredump code no longer works.
Make the coredump code more robust by explicitly testing for all of
the wakeup conditions the coredump code supports. This prevents
new wakeup conditions from breaking the coredump code, as well
as fixing the current issue.
The filesystem code that the coredump code uses already limits
itself to only aborting on fatal_signal_pending. So it should
not develop surprising wake-up reasons either.
v2: Don't remove the now unnecessary code in prepare_signal.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 12db8b690010 ("entry: Add support for TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL")
Reported-by: Olivier Langlois <olivier@trillion01.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"A few more fixes that people hit during testing.
Zoned mode fix:
- fix 32bit value wrapping when calculating superblock offsets
Error handling fixes:
- properly check filesystema and device uuids
- properly return errors when marking extents as written
- do not write supers if we have an fs error"
* tag 'for-5.13-rc5-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: promote debugging asserts to full-fledged checks in validate_super
btrfs: return value from btrfs_mark_extent_written() in case of error
btrfs: zoned: fix zone number to sector/physical calculation
btrfs: do not write supers if we have an fs error
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Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of
a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure
the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more
privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread
(during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener
and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files
already do, though for different reasons.)
Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi@canonical.com>
Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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In commit e87b03f5830e ("afs: Prepare for use of THPs"), the return
value for afs_write_back_from_locked_page was changed from a number
of pages to a length in bytes. The loop in afs_writepages_region uses
the return value to compute the index that will be used to find dirty
pages in the next iteration, but treats it as a number of pages and
wrongly multiplies it by PAGE_SIZE. This gives a very large index value,
potentially skipping any dirty data that was not covered in the first
pass, which is limited to 256M.
This causes fsync(), and indirectly close(), to only do a partial
writeback of a large file's dirty data. The rest is eventually written
back by background threads after dirty_expire_centisecs.
Fixes: e87b03f5830e ("afs: Prepare for use of THPs")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210604175504.4055-1-marc.c.dionne@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Miscellaneous ext4 bug fixes"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: Only advertise encrypted_casefold when encryption and unicode are enabled
ext4: fix no-key deletion for encrypt+casefold
ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_fill_super
ext4: fix fast commit alignment issues
ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed
ext4: fix accessing uninit percpu counter variable with fast_commit
ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_mb_init_backend on error path.
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Encrypted casefolding is only supported when both encryption and
casefolding are both enabled in the config.
Fixes: 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13+
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210603094849.314342-1-drosen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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commit 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption") is
missing a few checks for the encryption key which are needed to
support deleting enrypted casefolded files when the key is not
present.
This bug made it impossible to delete encrypted+casefolded directories
without the encryption key, due to errors like:
W : EXT4-fs warning (device vdc): __ext4fs_dirhash:270: inode #49202: comm Binder:378_4: Siphash requires key
Repro steps in kvm-xfstests test appliance:
mkfs.ext4 -F -E encoding=utf8 -O encrypt /dev/vdc
mount /vdc
mkdir /vdc/dir
chattr +F /vdc/dir
keyid=$(head -c 64 /dev/zero | xfs_io -c add_enckey /vdc | awk '{print $NF}')
xfs_io -c "set_encpolicy $keyid" /vdc/dir
for i in `seq 1 100`; do
mkdir /vdc/dir/$i
done
xfs_io -c "rm_enckey $keyid" /vdc
rm -rf /vdc/dir # fails with the bug
Fixes: 471fbbea7ff7 ("ext4: handle casefolding with encryption")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210522004132.2142563-1-drosen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Buffer head references must be released before calling kill_bdev();
otherwise the buffer head (and its page referenced by b_data) will not
be freed by kill_bdev, and subsequently that bh will be leaked.
If blocksizes differ, sb_set_blocksize() will kill current buffers and
page cache by using kill_bdev(). And then super block will be reread
again but using correct blocksize this time. sb_set_blocksize() didn't
fully free superblock page and buffer head, and being busy, they were
not freed and instead leaked.
This can easily be reproduced by calling an infinite loop of:
systemctl start <ext4_on_lvm>.mount, and
systemctl stop <ext4_on_lvm>.mount
... since systemd creates a cgroup for each slice which it mounts, and
the bh leak get amplified by a dying memory cgroup that also never
gets freed, and memory consumption is much more easily noticed.
Fixes: ce40733ce93d ("ext4: Check for return value from sb_set_blocksize")
Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("ext4: initial copy of files from ext3")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210521075533.95732-1-amakhalov@vmware.com
Signed-off-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
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Fast commit recovery data on disk may not be aligned. So, when the
recovery code reads it, this patch makes sure that fast commit info
found on-disk is first memcpy-ed into an aligned variable before
accessing it. As a consequence of it, we also remove some macros that
could resulted in unaligned accesses.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Signed-off-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210519215920.2037527-1-harshads@google.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault:
[130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762!
[130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP
......
[130747.334329] Call trace:
[130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4]
[130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4]
[130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4]
[130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4]
[130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4]
[130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4]
[130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4]
[130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8
[130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190
[130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4]
[130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188
[130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0
This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/
"I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying
to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably
go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC
and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a
HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and
don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping
extents)."
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506141042.3298679-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in
the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the
cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet
updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke
ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode
size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by
zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size.
Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted
coverted image file easily.
qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \
-O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv
The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out
of inode size, then extend the inode size.
fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0
v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210528210648.9124-1-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Read the entire size of the buffer, including the trailing new line
character.
Discovered while reading the sched domain names of CPU0:
before:
cat /sys/kernel/debug/sched/domains/cpu0/domain*/name
SMTMCDIE
after:
cat /sys/kernel/debug/sched/domains/cpu0/domain*/name
SMT
MC
DIE
Fixes: 9af0440ec86eb ("debugfs: Implement debugfs_create_str()")
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527091105.258457-1-dietmar.eggemann@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Syzbot managed to trigger this assert while performing its fuzzing.
Turns out it's better to have those asserts turned into full-fledged
checks so that in case buggy btrfs images are mounted the users gets
an error and mounting is stopped. Alternatively with CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT
disabled such image would have been erroneously allowed to be mounted.
Reported-by: syzbot+a6bf271c02e4fe66b4e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add uuids to the messages ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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We always return 0 even in case of an error in btrfs_mark_extent_written().
Fix it to return proper error value in case of a failure. All callers
handle it.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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In btrfs_get_dev_zone_info(), we have "u32 sb_zone" and calculate "sector_t
sector" by shifting it. But, this "sector" is calculated in 32bit, leading
it to be 0 for the 2nd superblock copy.
Since zone number is u32, shifting it to sector (sector_t) or physical
address (u64) can easily trigger a missing cast bug like this.
This commit introduces helpers to convert zone number to sector/LBA, so we
won't fall into the same pitfall again.
Reported-by: Dmitry Fomichev <Dmitry.Fomichev@wdc.com>
Fixes: 12659251ca5d ("btrfs: implement log-structured superblock for ZONED mode")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.11+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Error injection testing uncovered a pretty severe problem where we could
end up committing a super that pointed to the wrong tree roots,
resulting in transid mismatch errors.
The way we commit the transaction is we update the super copy with the
current generations and bytenrs of the important roots, and then copy
that into our super_for_commit. Then we allow transactions to continue
again, we write out the dirty pages for the transaction, and then we
write the super. If the write out fails we'll bail and skip writing the
supers.
However since we've allowed a new transaction to start, we can have a
log attempting to sync at this point, which would be blocked on
fs_info->tree_log_mutex. Once the commit fails we're allowed to do the
log tree commit, which uses super_for_commit, which now points at fs
tree's that were not written out.
Fix this by checking BTRFS_FS_STATE_ERROR once we acquire the
tree_log_mutex. This way if the transaction commit fails we're sure to
see this bit set and we can skip writing the super out. This patch
fixes this specific transid mismatch error I was seeing with this
particular error path.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.12+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Pull io_uring fix from Jens Axboe:
"Just a single one-liner fix for an accounting regression in this
release"
* tag 'io_uring-5.13-2021-06-03' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix misaccounting fix buf pinned pages
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"Error handling improvements, caught by error injection:
- handle errors during checksum deletion
- set error on mapping when ordered extent io cannot be finished
- inode link count fixup in tree-log
- missing return value checks for inode updates in tree-log
- abort transaction in rename exchange if adding second reference
fails
Fixes:
- fix fsync failure after writes to prealloc extents
- fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and low on available space
- fix compressed writes that cross stripe boundary"
* tag 'for-5.13-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
MAINTAINERS: add btrfs IRC link
btrfs: fix deadlock when cloning inline extents and low on available space
btrfs: fix fsync failure and transaction abort after writes to prealloc extents
btrfs: abort in rename_exchange if we fail to insert the second ref
btrfs: check error value from btrfs_update_inode in tree log
btrfs: fixup error handling in fixup_inode_link_counts
btrfs: mark ordered extent and inode with error if we fail to finish
btrfs: return errors from btrfs_del_csums in cleanup_ref_head
btrfs: fix error handling in btrfs_del_csums
btrfs: fix compressed writes that cross stripe boundary
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When running generic/527 with fast_commit configuration, the following
issue is seen on Power. With fast_commit, during ext4_fc_replay()
(which can be called from ext4_fill_super()), if inode eviction
happens then it can access an uninitialized percpu counter variable.
This patch adds the check before accessing the counters in
ext4_free_inode() path.
[ 321.165371] run fstests generic/527 at 2021-04-29 08:38:43
[ 323.027786] EXT4-fs (dm-0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: block_validity. Quota mode: none.
[ 323.618772] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x1fbd80000
[ 323.619767] Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000bae78c
cpu 0x1: Vector: 300 (Data Access) at [c000000010706ef0]
pc: c000000000bae78c: percpu_counter_add_batch+0x3c/0x100
lr: c0000000006d0bb0: ext4_free_inode+0x780/0xb90
pid = 5593, comm = mount
ext4_free_inode+0x780/0xb90
ext4_evict_inode+0xa8c/0xc60
evict+0xfc/0x1e0
ext4_fc_replay+0xc50/0x20f0
do_one_pass+0xfe0/0x1350
jbd2_journal_recover+0x184/0x2e0
jbd2_journal_load+0x1c0/0x4a0
ext4_fill_super+0x2458/0x4200
mount_bdev+0x1dc/0x290
ext4_mount+0x28/0x40
legacy_get_tree+0x4c/0xa0
vfs_get_tree+0x4c/0x120
path_mount+0xcf8/0xd70
do_mount+0x80/0xd0
sys_mount+0x3fc/0x490
system_call_exception+0x384/0x3d0
system_call_common+0xec/0x278
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshad Shirwadkar <harshadshirwadkar@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6cceb9a75c54bef8fa9696c1b08c8df5ff6169e2.1619692410.git.riteshh@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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This reverts commit b7f55d928e75557295c1ac280c291b738905b6fb.
As explained by Linus in [*], write faults on a mmap region are reads
from a filesysten point of view, so taking the inode glock exclusively
on write faults is incorrect.
Instead, when a page is marked writable, the .page_mkwrite vm operation
will be called, which is where the exclusive lock taking needs to
happen. I got this wrong because of a broken test case that made me
believe .page_mkwrite isn't getting called when it actually is.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wj8EWr_D65i4oRSj2FTbrc6RdNydNNCGxeabRnwtoU=3Q@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gfs2/linux-gfs2
Pull gfs2 fixes from Andreas Gruenbacher:
"Various gfs2 fixes"
* tag 'gfs2-v5.13-rc2-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gfs2/linux-gfs2:
gfs2: Fix use-after-free in gfs2_glock_shrink_scan
gfs2: Fix mmap locking for write faults
gfs2: Clean up revokes on normal withdraws
gfs2: fix a deadlock on withdraw-during-mount
gfs2: fix scheduling while atomic bug in glocks
gfs2: Fix I_NEW check in gfs2_dinode_in
gfs2: Prevent direct-I/O write fallback errors from getting lost
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify fixes from Jan Kara:
"A fix for permission checking with fanotify unpriviledged groups.
Also there's a small update in MAINTAINERS file for fanotify"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v5.13-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fanotify: fix permission model of unprivileged group
MAINTAINERS: Add Matthew Bobrowski as a reviewer
|
|
The GLF_LRU flag is checked under lru_lock in gfs2_glock_remove_from_lru() to
remove the glock from the lru list in __gfs2_glock_put().
On the shrink scan path, the same flag is cleared under lru_lock but because
of cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) in gfs2_dispose_glock_lru(), progress on the
put side can be made without deleting the glock from the lru list.
Keep GLF_LRU across the race window opened by cond_resched_lock(&lru_lock) to
ensure correct behavior on both sides - clear GLF_LRU after list_del under
lru_lock.
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+34ba7ddbf3021981a228@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
|
|
Pull xfs fixes from Darrick Wong:
"This week's pile mitigates some decades-old problems in how extent
size hints interact with realtime volumes, fixes some failures in
online shrink, and fixes a problem where directory and symlink
shrinking on extremely fragmented filesystems could fail.
The most user-notable change here is to point users at our (new) IRC
channel on OFTC. Freedom isn't free, it costs folks like you and me;
and if you don't kowtow, they'll expel everyone and take over your
channel. (Ok, ok, that didn't fit the song lyrics...)
Summary:
- Fix a bug where unmapping operations end earlier than expected,
which can cause chaos on multi-block directory and symlink shrink
operations.
- Fix an erroneous assert that can trigger if we try to transition a
bmap structure from btree format to extents format with zero
extents. This was exposed by xfs/538"
* tag 'xfs-5.13-fixes-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfs-linux:
xfs: bunmapi has unnecessary AG lock ordering issues
xfs: btree format inode forks can have zero extents
xfs: add new IRC channel to MAINTAINERS
xfs: validate extsz hints against rt extent size when rtinherit is set
xfs: standardize extent size hint validation
xfs: check free AG space when making per-AG reservations
|
|
As Andres reports "... io_sqe_buffer_register() doesn't initialize imu.
io_buffer_account_pin() does imu->acct_pages++, before calling
io_account_mem(ctx, imu->acct_pages).", leading to evevntual -ENOMEM.
Initialise the field.
Reported-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de>
Fixes: 41edf1a5ec967 ("io_uring: keep table of pointers to ubufs")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/438a6f46739ae5e05d9c75a0c8fa235320ff367c.1622285901.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are three small driver core / debugfs fixes for 5.13-rc4:
- debugfs fix for incorrect "lockdown" mode for selinux accesses
- two device link changes, one bugfix and one cleanup
All of these have been in linux-next for over a week with no reported
problems"
* tag 'driver-core-5.13-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
drivers: base: Reduce device link removal code duplication
drivers: base: Fix device link removal
debugfs: fix security_locked_down() call for SELinux
|
|
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A few minor fixes:
- Fix an issue with hashed wait removal on exit (Zqiang, Pavel)
- Fix a recent data race introduced in this series (Marco)"
* tag 'io_uring-5.13-2021-05-28' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
io_uring: fix data race to avoid potential NULL-deref
io-wq: Fix UAF when wakeup wqe in hash waitqueue
io_uring/io-wq: close io-wq full-stop gap
|
|
Pull cifs fixes from Steve French:
"Three SMB3 fixes.
Two for stable, and the other fixes a problem pointed out with a
recently added ioctl"
* tag '5.13-rc4-smb3' of git://git.samba.org/sfrench/cifs-2.6:
cifs: change format of CIFS_FULL_KEY_DUMP ioctl
cifs: fix string declarations and assignments in tracepoints
cifs: set server->cipher_type to AES-128-CCM for SMB3.0
|
|
Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
"Stable fixes:
- Fix v4.0/v4.1 SEEK_DATA return -ENOTSUPP when set NFS_V4_2 config
- Fix Oops in xs_tcp_send_request() when transport is disconnected
- Fix a NULL pointer dereference in pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return()
Bugfixes:
- Fix instances where signal_pending() should be fatal_signal_pending()
- fix an incorrect limit in filelayout_decode_layout()
- Fixes for the SUNRPC backlogged RPC queue
- Don't corrupt the value of pg_bytes_written in nfs_do_recoalesce()
- Revert commit 586a0787ce35 ("Clean up rpcrdma_prepare_readch()")"
* tag 'nfs-for-5.13-2' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
nfs: Remove trailing semicolon in macros
xprtrdma: Revert 586a0787ce35
NFSv4: Fix v4.0/v4.1 SEEK_DATA return -ENOTSUPP when set NFS_V4_2 config
NFS: Clean up reset of the mirror accounting variables
NFS: Don't corrupt the value of pg_bytes_written in nfs_do_recoalesce()
NFS: Fix an Oopsable condition in __nfs_pageio_add_request()
SUNRPC: More fixes for backlog congestion
SUNRPC: Fix Oops in xs_tcp_send_request() when transport is disconnected
NFSv4: Fix a NULL pointer dereference in pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return()
SUNRPC in case of backlog, hand free slots directly to waiting task
pNFS/NFSv4: Remove redundant initialization of 'rd_size'
NFS: fix an incorrect limit in filelayout_decode_layout()
fs/nfs: Use fatal_signal_pending instead of signal_pending
|
|
There are a few cases where cloning an inline extent requires copying data
into a page of the destination inode. For these cases we are allocating
the required data and metadata space while holding a leaf locked. This can
result in a deadlock when we are low on available space because allocating
the space may flush delalloc and two deadlock scenarios can happen:
1) When starting writeback for an inode with a very small dirty range that
fits in an inline extent, we deadlock during the writeback when trying
to insert the inline extent, at cow_file_range_inline(), if the extent
is going to be located in the leaf for which we are already holding a
read lock;
2) After successfully starting writeback, for non-inline extent cases,
the async reclaim thread will hang waiting for an ordered extent to
complete if the ordered extent completion needs to modify the leaf
for which the clone task is holding a read lock (for adding or
replacing file extent items). So the cloning task will wait forever
on the async reclaim thread to make progress, which in turn is
waiting for the ordered extent completion which in turn is waiting
to acquire a write lock on the same leaf.
So fix this by making sure we release the path (and therefore the leaf)
every time we need to copy the inline extent's data into a page of the
destination inode, as by that time we do not need to have the leaf locked.
Fixes: 05a5a7621ce66c ("Btrfs: implement full reflink support for inline extents")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
When doing a series of partial writes to different ranges of preallocated
extents with transaction commits and fsyncs in between, we can end up with
a checksum items in a log tree. This causes an fsync to fail with -EIO and
abort the transaction, turning the filesystem to RO mode, when syncing the
log.
For this to happen, we need to have a full fsync of a file following one
or more fast fsyncs.
The following example reproduces the problem and explains how it happens:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc
$ mount /dev/sdc /mnt
# Create our test file with 2 preallocated extents. Leave a 1M hole
# between them to ensure that we get two file extent items that will
# never be merged into a single one. The extents are contiguous on disk,
# which will later result in the checksums for their data to be merged
# into a single checksum item in the csums btree.
#
$ xfs_io -f \
-c "falloc 0 1M" \
-c "falloc 3M 3M" \
/mnt/foobar
# Now write to the second extent and leave only 1M of it as unwritten,
# which corresponds to the file range [4M, 5M[.
#
# Then fsync the file to flush delalloc and to clear full sync flag from
# the inode, so that a future fsync will use the fast code path.
#
# After the writeback triggered by the fsync we have 3 file extent items
# that point to the second extent we previously allocated:
#
# 1) One file extent item of type BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG that covers the
# file range [3M, 4M[
#
# 2) One file extent item of type BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_PREALLOC that covers
# the file range [4M, 5M[
#
# 3) One file extent item of type BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG that covers the
# file range [5M, 6M[
#
# All these file extent items have a generation of 6, which is the ID of
# the transaction where they were created. The split of the original file
# extent item is done at btrfs_mark_extent_written() when ordered extents
# complete for the file ranges [3M, 4M[ and [5M, 6M[.
#
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xab 3M 1M" \
-c "pwrite -S 0xef 5M 1M" \
-c "fsync" \
/mnt/foobar
# Commit the current transaction. This wipes out the log tree created by
# the previous fsync.
sync
# Now write to the unwritten range of the second extent we allocated,
# corresponding to the file range [4M, 5M[, and fsync the file, which
# triggers the fast fsync code path.
#
# The fast fsync code path sees that there is a new extent map covering
# the file range [4M, 5M[ and therefore it will log a checksum item
# covering the range [1M, 2M[ of the second extent we allocated.
#
# Also, after the fsync finishes we no longer have the 3 file extent
# items that pointed to 3 sections of the second extent we allocated.
# Instead we end up with a single file extent item pointing to the whole
# extent, with a type of BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG and a generation of 7 (the
# current transaction ID). This is due to the file extent item merging we
# do when completing ordered extents into ranges that point to unwritten
# (preallocated) extents. This merging is done at
# btrfs_mark_extent_written().
#
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 4M 1M" \
-c "fsync" \
/mnt/foobar
# Now do some write to our file outside the range of the second extent
# that we allocated with fallocate() and truncate the file size from 6M
# down to 5M.
#
# The truncate operation sets the full sync runtime flag on the inode,
# forcing the next fsync to use the slow code path. It also changes the
# length of the second file extent item so that it represents the file
# range [3M, 5M[ and not the range [3M, 6M[ anymore.
#
# Finally fsync the file. Since this is a fsync that triggers the slow
# code path, it will remove all items associated to the inode from the
# log tree and then it will scan for file extent items in the
# fs/subvolume tree that have a generation matching the current
# transaction ID, which is 7. This means it will log 2 file extent
# items:
#
# 1) One for the first extent we allocated, covering the file range
# [0, 1M[
#
# 2) Another for the first 2M of the second extent we allocated,
# covering the file range [3M, 5M[
#
# When logging the first file extent item we log a single checksum item
# that has all the checksums for the entire extent.
#
# When logging the second file extent item, we also lookup for the
# checksums that are associated with the range [0, 2M[ of the second
# extent we allocated (file range [3M, 5M[), and then we log them with
# btrfs_csum_file_blocks(). However that results in ending up with a log
# that has two checksum items with ranges that overlap:
#
# 1) One for the range [1M, 2M[ of the second extent we allocated,
# corresponding to the file range [4M, 5M[, which we logged in the
# previous fsync that used the fast code path;
#
# 2) One for the ranges [0, 1M[ and [0, 2M[ of the first and second
# extents, respectively, corresponding to the files ranges [0, 1M[
# and [3M, 5M[. This one was added during this last fsync that uses
# the slow code path and overlaps with the previous one logged by
# the previous fast fsync.
#
# This happens because when logging the checksums for the second
# extent, we notice they start at an offset that matches the end of the
# checksums item that we logged for the first extent, and because both
# extents are contiguous on disk, btrfs_csum_file_blocks() decides to
# extend that existing checksums item and append the checksums for the
# second extent to this item. The end result is we end up with two
# checksum items in the log tree that have overlapping ranges, as
# listed before, resulting in the fsync to fail with -EIO and aborting
# the transaction, turning the filesystem into RO mode.
#
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 1M" \
-c "truncate 5M" \
-c "fsync" \
/mnt/foobar
fsync: Input/output error
After running the example, dmesg/syslog shows the tree checker complained
about the checksum items with overlapping ranges and we aborted the
transaction:
$ dmesg
(...)
[756289.557487] BTRFS critical (device sdc): corrupt leaf: root=18446744073709551610 block=30720000 slot=5, csum end range (16777216) goes beyond the start range (15728640) of the next csum item
[756289.560583] BTRFS info (device sdc): leaf 30720000 gen 7 total ptrs 7 free space 11677 owner 18446744073709551610
[756289.562435] BTRFS info (device sdc): refs 2 lock_owner 0 current 2303929
[756289.563654] item 0 key (257 1 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
[756289.564649] inode generation 6 size 5242880 mode 100600
[756289.565636] item 1 key (257 12 256) itemoff 16107 itemsize 16
[756289.566694] item 2 key (257 108 0) itemoff 16054 itemsize 53
[756289.567725] extent data disk bytenr 13631488 nr 1048576
[756289.568697] extent data offset 0 nr 1048576 ram 1048576
[756289.569689] item 3 key (257 108 1048576) itemoff 16001 itemsize 53
[756289.570682] extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0
[756289.571363] extent data offset 0 nr 2097152 ram 2097152
[756289.572213] item 4 key (257 108 3145728) itemoff 15948 itemsize 53
[756289.573246] extent data disk bytenr 14680064 nr 3145728
[756289.574121] extent data offset 0 nr 2097152 ram 3145728
[756289.574993] item 5 key (18446744073709551606 128 13631488) itemoff 12876 itemsize 3072
[756289.576113] item 6 key (18446744073709551606 128 15728640) itemoff 11852 itemsize 1024
[756289.577286] BTRFS error (device sdc): block=30720000 write time tree block corruption detected
[756289.578644] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[756289.579376] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2303929 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:465 csum_one_extent_buffer+0xed/0x100 [btrfs]
[756289.580857] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero dm_dust loop dm_snapshot (...)
[756289.591534] CPU: 0 PID: 2303929 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G W 5.12.0-rc8-btrfs-next-87 #1
[756289.592580] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[756289.594161] RIP: 0010:csum_one_extent_buffer+0xed/0x100 [btrfs]
[756289.595122] Code: 5d c3 e8 76 60 (...)
[756289.597509] RSP: 0018:ffffb51b416cb898 EFLAGS: 00010282
[756289.598142] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: fffff02b8a365bc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[756289.598970] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffa9112421 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[756289.599798] RBP: ffffa06500880000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[756289.600619] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[756289.601456] R13: ffffa0652b1d8980 R14: ffffa06500880000 R15: 0000000000000000
[756289.602278] FS: 00007f08b23c9800(0000) GS:ffffa0682be00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[756289.603217] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[756289.603892] CR2: 00005652f32d0138 CR3: 000000025d616003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0
[756289.604725] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[756289.605563] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[756289.606400] Call Trace:
[756289.606704] btree_csum_one_bio+0x244/0x2b0 [btrfs]
[756289.607313] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0xb7/0x100 [btrfs]
[756289.608040] submit_one_bio+0x61/0x70 [btrfs]
[756289.608587] btree_write_cache_pages+0x587/0x610 [btrfs]
[756289.609258] ? free_debug_processing+0x1d5/0x240
[756289.609812] ? __module_address+0x28/0xf0
[756289.610298] ? lock_acquire+0x1a0/0x3e0
[756289.610754] ? lock_acquired+0x19f/0x430
[756289.611220] ? lock_acquire+0x1a0/0x3e0
[756289.611675] do_writepages+0x43/0xf0
[756289.612101] ? __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa4/0x100
[756289.612800] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xc5/0x100
[756289.613393] btrfs_write_marked_extents+0x68/0x160 [btrfs]
[756289.614085] btrfs_sync_log+0x21c/0xf20 [btrfs]
[756289.614661] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90
[756289.615096] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0
[756289.615661] ? btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x3c9/0xdc0 [btrfs]
[756289.616338] ? lock_acquire+0x1a0/0x3e0
[756289.616801] ? lock_acquired+0x19f/0x430
[756289.617284] ? lock_acquire+0x1a0/0x3e0
[756289.617750] ? lock_release+0x214/0x470
[756289.618221] ? lock_acquired+0x19f/0x430
[756289.618704] ? dput+0x20/0x4a0
[756289.619079] ? dput+0x20/0x4a0
[756289.619452] ? lockref_put_or_lock+0x9/0x30
[756289.619969] ? lock_release+0x214/0x470
[756289.620445] ? lock_release+0x214/0x470
[756289.620924] ? lock_release+0x214/0x470
[756289.621415] btrfs_sync_file+0x46a/0x5b0 [btrfs]
[756289.621982] do_fsync+0x38/0x70
[756289.622395] __x64_sys_fsync+0x10/0x20
[756289.622907] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80
[756289.623438] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[756289.624063] RIP: 0033:0x7f08b27fbb7b
[756289.624588] Code: 0f 05 48 3d 00 (...)
[756289.626760] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2583f940 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
[756289.627639] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005652f32cd0f0 RCX: 00007f08b27fbb7b
[756289.628464] RDX: 00005652f32cbca0 RSI: 00005652f32cd110 RDI: 0000000000000003
[756289.629323] RBP: 00005652f32cd110 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f08b28c4be0
[756289.630172] R10: fffffffffffff39a R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000001
[756289.631007] R13: 00005652f32cd0f0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00005652f32cc480
[756289.631819] irq event stamp: 0
[756289.632188] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[756289.632911] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffa7e97c29>] copy_process+0x879/0x1cc0
[756289.633893] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffa7e97c29>] copy_process+0x879/0x1cc0
[756289.634871] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[756289.635606] ---[ end trace 0a039fdc16ff3fef ]---
[756289.636179] BTRFS: error (device sdc) in btrfs_sync_log:3136: errno=-5 IO failure
[756289.637082] BTRFS info (device sdc): forced readonly
Having checksum items covering ranges that overlap is dangerous as in some
cases it can lead to having extent ranges for which we miss checksums
after log replay or getting the wrong checksum item. There were some fixes
in the past for bugs that resulted in this problem, and were explained and
fixed by the following commits:
27b9a8122ff71a ("Btrfs: fix csum tree corruption, duplicate and outdated checksums")
b84b8390d6009c ("Btrfs: fix file read corruption after extent cloning and fsync")
40e046acbd2f36 ("Btrfs: fix missing data checksums after replaying a log tree")
e289f03ea79bbc ("btrfs: fix corrupt log due to concurrent fsync of inodes with shared extents")
Fix the issue by making btrfs_csum_file_blocks() taking into account the
start offset of the next checksum item when it decides to extend an
existing checksum item, so that it never extends the checksum to end at a
range that goes beyond the start range of the next checksum item.
When we can not access the next checksum item without releasing the path,
simply drop the optimization of extending the previous checksum item and
fallback to inserting a new checksum item - this happens rarely and the
optimization is not significant enough for a log tree in order to justify
the extra complexity, as it would only save a few bytes (the size of a
struct btrfs_item) of leaf space.
This behaviour is only needed when inserting into a log tree because
for the regular checksums tree we never have a case where we try to
insert a range of checksums that overlap with a range that was previously
inserted.
A test case for fstests will follow soon.
Reported-by: Philipp Fent <fent@in.tum.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/93c4600e-5263-5cba-adf0-6f47526e7561@in.tum.de/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Tested-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Error injection stress uncovered a problem where we'd leave a dangling
inode ref if we failed during a rename_exchange. This happens because
we insert the inode ref for one side of the rename, and then for the
other side. If this second inode ref insert fails we'll leave the first
one dangling and leave a corrupt file system behind. Fix this by
aborting if we did the insert for the first inode ref.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Error injection testing uncovered a case where we ended up with invalid
link counts on an inode. This happened because we failed to notice an
error when updating the inode while replaying the tree log, and
committed the transaction with an invalid file system.
Fix this by checking the return value of btrfs_update_inode. This
resolved the link count errors I was seeing, and we already properly
handle passing up the error values in these paths.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
This function has the following pattern
while (1) {
ret = whatever();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = 0
out:
return ret;
However several places in this while loop we simply break; when there's
a problem, thus clearing the return value, and in one case we do a
return -EIO, and leak the memory for the path.
Fix this by re-arranging the loop to deal with ret == 1 coming from
btrfs_search_slot, and then simply delete the
ret = 0;
out:
bit so everybody can break if there is an error, which will allow for
proper error handling to occur.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
While doing error injection testing I saw that sometimes we'd get an
abort that wouldn't stop the current transaction commit from completing.
This abort was coming from finish ordered IO, but at this point in the
transaction commit we should have gotten an error and stopped.
It turns out the abort came from finish ordered io while trying to write
out the free space cache. It occurred to me that any failure inside of
finish_ordered_io isn't actually raised to the person doing the writing,
so we could have any number of failures in this path and think the
ordered extent completed successfully and the inode was fine.
Fix this by marking the ordered extent with BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, and
marking the mapping of the inode with mapping_set_error, so any callers
that simply call fdatawait will also get the error.
With this we're seeing the IO error on the free space inode when we fail
to do the finish_ordered_io.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
We are unconditionally returning 0 in cleanup_ref_head, despite the fact
that btrfs_del_csums could fail. We need to return the error so the
transaction gets aborted properly, fix this by returning ret from
btrfs_del_csums in cleanup_ref_head.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Error injection stress would sometimes fail with checksums on disk that
did not have a corresponding extent. This occurred because the pattern
in btrfs_del_csums was
while (1) {
ret = btrfs_search_slot();
if (ret < 0)
break;
}
ret = 0;
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
If we got an error from btrfs_search_slot we'd clear the error because
we were breaking instead of goto out. Instead of using goto out, simply
handle the cases where we may leave a random value in ret, and get rid
of the
ret = 0;
out:
pattern and simply allow break to have the proper error reporting. With
this fix we properly abort the transaction and do not commit thinking we
successfully deleted the csum.
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
[BUG]
When running btrfs/027 with "-o compress" mount option, it always
crashes with the following call trace:
BTRFS critical (device dm-4): mapping failed logical 298901504 bio len 12288 len 8192
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:6651!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 31089 Comm: kworker/u24:10 Tainted: G OE 5.13.0-rc2-custom+ #26
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
RIP: 0010:btrfs_map_bio.cold+0x58/0x5a [btrfs]
Call Trace:
btrfs_submit_compressed_write+0x2d7/0x470 [btrfs]
submit_compressed_extents+0x3b0/0x470 [btrfs]
? mark_held_locks+0x49/0x70
btrfs_work_helper+0x131/0x3e0 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0
worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
? process_one_work+0x5d0/0x5d0
kthread+0x141/0x160
? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
---[ end trace 63113a3a91f34e68 ]---
[CAUSE]
The critical message before the crash means we have a bio at logical
bytenr 298901504 length 12288, but only 8192 bytes can fit into one
stripe, the remaining 4096 bytes go to another stripe.
In btrfs, all bios are properly split to avoid cross stripe boundary,
but commit 764c7c9a464b ("btrfs: zoned: fix parallel compressed writes")
changed the behavior for compressed writes.
Previously if we find our new page can't be fitted into current stripe,
ie. "submit == 1" case, we submit current bio without adding current
page.
submit = btrfs_bio_fits_in_stripe(page, PAGE_SIZE, bio, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
if (submit || bio_add_page(bio, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0) <
PAGE_SIZE) {
But after the modification, we will add the page no matter if it crosses
stripe boundary, leading to the above crash.
submit = btrfs_bio_fits_in_stripe(page, PAGE_SIZE, bio, 0);
if (pg_index == 0 && use_append)
len = bio_add_zone_append_page(bio, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
else
len = bio_add_page(bio, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
if (submit || len < PAGE_SIZE) {
[FIX]
It's no longer possible to revert to the original code style as we have
two different bio_add_*_page() calls now.
The new fix is to skip the bio_add_*_page() call if @submit is true.
Also to avoid @len to be uninitialized, always initialize it to zero.
If @submit is true, @len will not be checked.
If @submit is not true, @len will be the return value of
bio_add_*_page() call.
Either way, the behavior is still the same as the old code.
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Fixes: 764c7c9a464b ("btrfs: zoned: fix parallel compressed writes")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
|
|
Make CIFS_FULL_KEY_DUMP ioctl able to return variable-length keys.
* userspace needs to pass the struct size along with optional
session_id and some space at the end to store keys
* if there is enough space kernel returns keys in the extra space and
sets the length of each key via xyz_key_length fields
This also fixes the build error for get_user() on ARM.
Sample program:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
struct smb3_full_key_debug_info {
uint32_t in_size;
uint64_t session_id;
uint16_t cipher_type;
uint8_t session_key_length;
uint8_t server_in_key_length;
uint8_t server_out_key_length;
uint8_t data[];
/*
* return this struct with the keys appended at the end:
* uint8_t session_key[session_key_length];
* uint8_t server_in_key[server_in_key_length];
* uint8_t server_out_key[server_out_key_length];
*/
} __attribute__((packed));
#define CIFS_IOCTL_MAGIC 0xCF
#define CIFS_DUMP_FULL_KEY _IOWR(CIFS_IOCTL_MAGIC, 10, struct smb3_full_key_debug_info)
void dump(const void *p, size_t len) {
const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
const uint8_t *b = p;
for (int i = 0; i < len; i++)
printf("%c%c ", hex[(b[i]>>4)&0xf], hex[b[i]&0xf]);
putchar('\n');
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct smb3_full_key_debug_info *keys;
uint8_t buf[sizeof(*keys)+1024] = {0};
size_t off = 0;
int fd, rc;
keys = (struct smb3_full_key_debug_info *)&buf;
keys->in_size = sizeof(buf);
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
perror("open"), exit(1);
rc = ioctl(fd, CIFS_DUMP_FULL_KEY, keys);
if (rc < 0)
perror("ioctl"), exit(1);
printf("SessionId ");
dump(&keys->session_id, 8);
printf("Cipher %04x\n", keys->cipher_type);
printf("SessionKey ");
dump(keys->data+off, keys->session_key_length);
off += keys->session_key_length;
printf("ServerIn Key ");
dump(keys->data+off, keys->server_in_key_length);
off += keys->server_in_key_length;
printf("ServerOut Key ");
dump(keys->data+off, keys->server_out_key_length);
return 0;
}
Usage:
$ gcc -o dumpkeys dumpkeys.c
Against Windows Server 2020 preview (with AES-256-GCM support):
# mount.cifs //$ip/test /mnt -o "username=administrator,password=foo,vers=3.0,seal"
# ./dumpkeys /mnt/somefile
SessionId 0D 00 00 00 00 0C 00 00
Cipher 0002
SessionKey AB CD CC 0D E4 15 05 0C 6F 3C 92 90 19 F3 0D 25
ServerIn Key 73 C6 6A C8 6B 08 CF A2 CB 8E A5 7D 10 D1 5B DC
ServerOut Key 6D 7E 2B A1 71 9D D7 2B 94 7B BA C4 F0 A5 A4 F8
# umount /mnt
With 256 bit keys:
# echo 1 > /sys/module/cifs/parameters/require_gcm_256
# mount.cifs //$ip/test /mnt -o "username=administrator,password=foo,vers=3.11,seal"
# ./dumpkeys /mnt/somefile
SessionId 09 00 00 00 00 0C 00 00
Cipher 0004
SessionKey 93 F5 82 3B 2F B7 2A 50 0B B9 BA 26 FB 8C 8B 03
ServerIn Key 6C 6A 89 B2 CB 7B 78 E8 04 93 37 DA 22 53 47 DF B3 2C 5F 02 26 70 43 DB 8D 33 7B DC 66 D3 75 A9
ServerOut Key 04 11 AA D7 52 C7 A8 0F ED E3 93 3A 65 FE 03 AD 3F 63 03 01 2B C0 1B D7 D7 E5 52 19 7F CC 46 B4
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
We missed using the variable length string macros in several
tracepoints. Fixed them in this change.
There's probably more useful macros that we can use to print
others like flags etc. But I'll submit sepawrate patches for
those at a future date.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.12
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
SMB3.0 doesn't have encryption negotiate context but simply uses
the SMB2_GLOBAL_CAP_ENCRYPTION flag.
When that flag is present in the neg response cifs.ko uses AES-128-CCM
which is the only cipher available in this context.
cipher_type was set to the server cipher only when parsing encryption
negotiate context (SMB3.1.1).
For SMB3.0 it was set to 0. This means cipher_type value can be 0 or 1
for AES-128-CCM.
Fix this by checking for SMB3.0 and encryption capability and setting
cipher_type appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
|
Fix rename of one directory over another such that the nlink on the deleted
directory is cleared to 0 rather than being decremented to 1.
This was causing the generic/035 xfstest to fail.
Fixes: e49c7b2f6de7 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/162194384460.3999479.7605572278074191079.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
large directory block size operations are assert failing because
xfs_bunmapi() is not completely removing fragmented directory blocks
like so:
XFS: Assertion failed: done, file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_dir2.c, line: 677
....
Call Trace:
xfs_dir2_shrink_inode+0x1a8/0x210
xfs_dir2_block_to_sf+0x2ae/0x410
xfs_dir2_block_removename+0x21a/0x280
xfs_dir_removename+0x195/0x1d0
xfs_rename+0xb79/0xc50
? avc_has_perm+0x8d/0x1a0
? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x9a/0x120
xfs_vn_rename+0xdb/0x150
vfs_rename+0x719/0xb50
? __lookup_hash+0x6a/0xa0
do_renameat2+0x413/0x5e0
__x64_sys_rename+0x45/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
We are aborting the bunmapi() pass because of this specific chunk of
code:
/*
* Make sure we don't touch multiple AGF headers out of order
* in a single transaction, as that could cause AB-BA deadlocks.
*/
if (!wasdel && !isrt) {
agno = XFS_FSB_TO_AGNO(mp, del.br_startblock);
if (prev_agno != NULLAGNUMBER && prev_agno > agno)
break;
prev_agno = agno;
}
This is designed to prevent deadlocks in AGF locking when freeing
multiple extents by ensuring that we only ever lock in increasing
AG number order. Unfortunately, this also violates the "bunmapi will
always succeed" semantic that some high level callers depend on,
such as xfs_dir2_shrink_inode(), xfs_da_shrink_inode() and
xfs_inactive_symlink_rmt().
This AG lock ordering was introduced back in 2017 to fix deadlocks
triggered by generic/299 as reported here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-xfs/800468eb-3ded-9166-20a4-047de8018582@gmail.com/
This codebase is old enough that it was before we were defering all
AG based extent freeing from within xfs_bunmapi(). THat is, we never
actually lock AGs in xfs_bunmapi() any more - every non-rt based
extent free is added to the defer ops list, as is all BMBT block
freeing. And RT extents are not RT based, so there's no lock
ordering issues associated with them.
Hence this AGF lock ordering code is both broken and dead. Let's
just remove it so that the large directory block code works reliably
again.
Tested against xfs/538 and generic/299 which is the original test
that exposed the deadlocks that this code fixed.
Fixes: 5b094d6dac04 ("xfs: fix multi-AG deadlock in xfs_bunmapi")
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
|
|
xfs/538 is assert failing with this trace when testing with
directory block sizes of 64kB:
XFS: Assertion failed: !xfs_need_iread_extents(ifp), file: fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_bmap.c, line: 608
....
Call Trace:
xfs_bmap_btree_to_extents+0x2a9/0x470
? kmem_cache_alloc+0xe7/0x220
__xfs_bunmapi+0x4ca/0xdf0
xfs_bunmapi+0x1a/0x30
xfs_dir2_shrink_inode+0x71/0x210
xfs_dir2_block_to_sf+0x2ae/0x410
xfs_dir2_block_removename+0x21a/0x280
xfs_dir_removename+0x195/0x1d0
xfs_remove+0x244/0x460
xfs_vn_unlink+0x53/0xa0
? selinux_inode_unlink+0x13/0x20
vfs_unlink+0x117/0x220
do_unlinkat+0x1a2/0x2d0
__x64_sys_unlink+0x42/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
This is a check to ensure that the extents have been read into
memory before we are doing a ifork btree manipulation. This assert
is bogus in the above case.
We have a fragmented directory block that has more extents in it
than can fit in extent format, so the inode data fork is in btree
format. xfs_dir2_shrink_inode() asks to remove all remaining 16
filesystem blocks from the inode so it can convert to short form,
and __xfs_bunmapi() removes all the extents. We now have a data fork
in btree format but have zero extents in the fork. This incorrectly
trips the xfs_need_iread_extents() assert because it assumes that an
empty extent btree means the extent tree has not been read into
memory yet. This is clearly not the case with xfs_bunmapi(), as it
has an explicit call to xfs_iread_extents() in it to pull the
extents into memory before it starts unmapping.
Also, the assert directly after this bogus one is:
ASSERT(ifp->if_format == XFS_DINODE_FMT_BTREE);
Which covers the context in which it is legal to call
xfs_bmap_btree_to_extents just fine. Hence we should just remove the
bogus assert as it is clearly wrong and causes a regression.
The returns the test behaviour to the pre-existing assert failure in
xfs_dir2_shrink_inode() that indicates xfs_bunmapi() has failed to
remove all the extents in the range it was asked to unmap.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
|
|
Commit ba5ef6dc8a82 ("io_uring: fortify tctx/io_wq cleanup") introduced
setting tctx->io_wq to NULL a bit earlier. This has caused KCSAN to
detect a data race between accesses to tctx->io_wq:
write to 0xffff88811d8df330 of 8 bytes by task 3709 on cpu 1:
io_uring_clean_tctx fs/io_uring.c:9042 [inline]
__io_uring_cancel fs/io_uring.c:9136
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:16 [inline]
do_exit kernel/exit.c:781
do_group_exit kernel/exit.c:923
get_signal kernel/signal.c:2835
arch_do_signal_or_restart arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:789
handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:147 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline]
...
read to 0xffff88811d8df330 of 8 bytes by task 6412 on cpu 0:
io_uring_try_cancel_iowq fs/io_uring.c:8911 [inline]
io_uring_try_cancel_requests fs/io_uring.c:8933
io_ring_exit_work fs/io_uring.c:8736
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:2276
...
With the config used, KCSAN only reports data races with value changes:
this implies that in the case here we also know that tctx->io_wq was
non-NULL. Therefore, depending on interleaving, we may end up with:
[CPU 0] | [CPU 1]
io_uring_try_cancel_iowq() | io_uring_clean_tctx()
if (!tctx->io_wq) // false | ...
... | tctx->io_wq = NULL
io_wq_cancel_cb(tctx->io_wq, ...) | ...
-> NULL-deref |
Note: It is likely that thus far we've gotten lucky and the compiler
optimizes the double-read into a single read into a register -- but this
is never guaranteed, and can easily change with a different config!
Fix the data race by restoring the previous behaviour, where both
setting io_wq to NULL and put of the wq are _serialized_ after
concurrent io_uring_try_cancel_iowq() via acquisition of the uring_lock
and removal of the node in io_uring_del_task_file().
Fixes: ba5ef6dc8a82 ("io_uring: fortify tctx/io_wq cleanup")
Suggested-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+bf2b3d0435b9b728946c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210527092547.2656514-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
|
Macros should not use a trailing semicolon.
Signed-off-by: Huilong Deng <denghuilong@cdjrlc.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
|