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When a zero-length message is hashed by algif_hash, and an error
is triggered, it tries to free an SG list that was never allocated
in the first place. Fix this by not freeing the SG list on the
zero-length error path.
Reported-by: Shigeru Yoshida <syoshida@redhat.com>
Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com>
Fixes: b6d972f68983 ("crypto: af_alg/hash: Fix recvmsg() after sendmsg(MSG_MORE)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reported-by: syzbot+3266db0c26d1fbbe3abb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The cbc template should not be applied on stream ciphers, especially
ones that have internal state. Enforce this by checking the state
size when the instance is created.
Reported-by: syzbot+050eeedd6c285d8c42f2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 47309ea13591 ("crypto: arc4 - Add internal state")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The req->dst buffer size should be checked before copying from the
scomp_scratch->dst to avoid req->dst buffer overflow problem.
Fixes: 1ab53a77b772 ("crypto: acomp - add driver-side scomp interface")
Reported-by: syzbot+3eff5e51bf1db122a16e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000000b05cd060d6b5511@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Chengming Zhou <zhouchengming@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When ecb is used to wrap an lskcipher, the statesize isn't set
correctly. Fix this by making the simple instance creator set
the statesize.
Reported-by: syzbot+8ffb0839a24e9c6bfa76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Fixes: 662ea18d089b ("crypto: skcipher - Make use of internal state")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Disallow registration of two algorithms with identical driver names.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch registers the deflate-iaa deflate compression algorithm and
hooks it up to the IAA hardware using the 'fixed' compression mode
introduced in the previous patch.
Because the IAA hardware has a 4k history-window limitation, only
buffers <= 4k, or that have been compressed using a <= 4k history
window, are technically compliant with the deflate spec, which allows
for a window of up to 32k. Because of this limitation, the IAA fixed
mode deflate algorithm is given its own algorithm name, 'deflate-iaa'.
With this change, the deflate-iaa crypto algorithm is registered and
operational, and compression and decompression operations are fully
enabled following the successful binding of the first IAA workqueue
to the iaa_crypto sub-driver.
when there are no IAA workqueues bound to the driver, the IAA crypto
algorithm can be unregistered by removing the module.
A new iaa_crypto 'verify_compress' driver attribute is also added,
allowing the user to toggle compression verification. If set, each
compress will be internally decompressed and the contents verified,
returning error codes if unsuccessful. This can be toggled with 0/1:
echo 0 > /sys/bus/dsa/drivers/crypto/verify_compress
The default setting is '1' - verify all compresses.
The verify_compress value setting at the time the algorithm is
registered is captured in the algorithm's crypto_ctx and used for all
compresses when using the algorithm.
[ Based on work originally by George Powley, Jing Lin and Kyung Min
Park ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Unlike algif_aead which is always issued in one go (thus limiting
the maximum size of the request), algif_skcipher has always allowed
unlimited input data by cutting them up as necessary and feeding
the fragments to the underlying algorithm one at a time.
However, because of deficiencies in the API, this has been broken
for most stream ciphers such as arc4 or chacha. This is because
they have an internal state in addition to the IV that must be
preserved in order to continue processing.
Fix this by using the new skcipher state API.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The arc4 algorithm has always had internal state. It's been buggy
from day one in that the state has been stored in the shared tfm
object. That means two users sharing the same tfm will end up
affecting each other's output, or worse, they may end up with the
same output.
Fix this by declaring an internal state and storing the state there
instead of within the tfm context.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds code to the skcipher/lskcipher API to make use
of the internal state if present. In particular, the skcipher
lskcipher wrapper will allocate a buffer for the IV/state and
feed that to the underlying lskcipher algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Unlike chaining modes such as CBC, stream ciphers other than CTR
usually hold an internal state that must be preserved if the
operation is to be done piecemeal. This has not been represented
in the API, resulting in the inability to split up stream cipher
operations.
This patch adds the basic representation of an internal state to
skcipher and lskcipher. In the interest of backwards compatibility,
the default has been set such that existing users are assumed to
be operating in one go as opposed to piecemeal.
With the new API, each lskcipher/skcipher algorithm has a new
attribute called statesize. For skcipher, this is the size of
the buffer that can be exported or imported similar to ahash.
For lskcipher, instead of providing a buffer of ivsize, the user
now has to provide a buffer of ivsize + statesize.
Each skcipher operation is assumed to be final as they are now,
but this may be overridden with a request flag. When the override
occurs, the user may then export the partial state and reimport
it later.
For lskcipher operations this is reversed. All operations are
not final and the state will be exported unless the FINAL bit is
set. However, the CONT bit still has to be set for the state
to be used.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove the unused algorithms CFB/OFB.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove test vectors for CFB/OFB.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove tests for CFB/OFB.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Having multiple in-flight AIO requests results in unpredictable
output because they all share the same IV. Fix this by only allowing
one request at a time.
Fixes: 83094e5e9e49 ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to algif_aead")
Fixes: a596999b7ddf ("crypto: algif - change algif_skcipher to be asynchronous")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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SP800-90C 3rd draft states that SHA-1 will be removed from all
specifications, including drbg by end of 2030. Given kernels built
today will be operating past that date, start complying with upcoming
requirements.
No functional change, as SHA-256 / SHA-512 based DRBG have always been
the preferred ones.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Update code comment, self test & healthcheck to use HMAC SHA512,
instead of HMAC SHA256. These changes are in dead-code, or FIPS
enabled code-paths only and have not effect on usual kernel builds.
On systems booting in FIPS mode that has the effect of switch sanity
selftest to HMAC sha512 based (which has been the default DRBG).
This patch updates code from 9b7b94683a ("crypto: DRBG - switch to
HMAC SHA512 DRBG as default DRBG"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When originally drbg was introduced FIPS self-checks for all types but
CTR were using the most preferred parameters for each type of
DRBG. Update CTR self-check to use aes256.
This patch updates code from 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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drbg supports multiple types of drbg, and multiple parameters of
each. Health check sanity only checks one drbg of a single type. One
can enable all three types of drbg. And instead of checking the most
preferred algorithm (last one wins), it is currently checking first
one instead.
Update ifdef to ensure that healthcheck prefers HMAC, over HASH, over
CTR, last one wins, like all other code and functions.
This patch updates code from 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A
Deterministic Random Bit Generator"), but is not interesting to
cherry-pick for stable updates, because it doesn't affect regular
builds, nor has any tangible effect on FIPS certifcation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Static checkers insist that the mpi_alloc() allocation can fail so add
a check to prevent a NULL dereference. Small allocations like this
can't actually fail in current kernels, but adding a check is very
simple and makes the static checkers happy.
Fixes: 6637e11e4ad2 ("crypto: rsa - allow only odd e and restrict value in FIPS mode")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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EINPROGRESS and EBUSY have special meaning for async operations.
However, shash is always synchronous, so these statuses have no special
meaning for shash and don't need to be excluded when handling errors.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
"This fixes a regression in ahash and hides the Kconfig sub-options for
the jitter RNG"
* tag 'v6.7-p2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
crypto: ahash - Set using_shash for cloned ahash wrapper over shash
crypto: jitterentropy - Hide esoteric Kconfig options under FIPS and EXPERT
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The cloned child of ahash that uses shash under the hood should use
shash helpers (like crypto_shash_setkey()).
The following panic may be observed on TCP-AO selftests:
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60
> Write of size 4 at addr 5d5be0ff5c415e14 by task connect_ipv4/1397
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 1397 Comm: connect_ipv4 Tainted: G W 6.6.0+ #47
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x70
> kasan_report+0xc3/0xf0
> kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190
> crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60
> crypto_spawn_alg+0x53/0x140
> crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x13/0x60
> hmac_init_tfm+0x25/0x60
> crypto_ahash_setkey+0x8b/0x100
> tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xe7a/0x1120
> do_tcp_setsockopt+0x5ed/0x12a0
> do_sock_setsockopt+0x82/0x100
> __sys_setsockopt+0xe9/0x160
> __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x60/0x70
> do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xe0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
> ==================================================================
> general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5d5be0ff5c415e14: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
> CPU: 0 PID: 1397 Comm: connect_ipv4 Tainted: G B W 6.6.0+ #47
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0
> ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x210
> ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
> ? add_taint+0x26/0x90
> ? crypto_mod_get+0x20/0x60
> ? crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60
> ? ahash_def_finup_done1+0x58/0x80
> crypto_spawn_alg+0x53/0x140
> crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x13/0x60
> hmac_init_tfm+0x25/0x60
> crypto_ahash_setkey+0x8b/0x100
> tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xe7a/0x1120
> do_tcp_setsockopt+0x5ed/0x12a0
> do_sock_setsockopt+0x82/0x100
> __sys_setsockopt+0xe9/0x160
> __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x60/0x70
> do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xe0
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e
> </TASK>
> RIP: 0010:crypto_mod_get+0x20/0x60
Make sure that the child/clone has using_shash set when parent is
an shash user.
Fixes: 2f1f34c1bf7b ("crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash")
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri05@gmail.com>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@arista.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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As JITTERENTROPY is selected by default if you enable the CRYPTO
API, any Kconfig options added there will show up for every single
user. Hide the esoteric options under EXPERT as well as FIPS so
that only distro makers will see them.
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface
- Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls
- Remove ahash alignmask attribute
Algorithms:
- Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc
- Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1)
- Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad
- Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum
- Remove zlib-deflate
Drivers:
- Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver
- Add STM32MP13x support in stm32
- Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng
- Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip"
* tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits)
crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping
crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place
Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date
module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3
crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support
crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA
x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures
crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash
crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type
crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c
crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init
crypto: ahash - improve file comment
crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv
crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask
crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash
crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash
net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Four integrity changes: two IMA-overlay updates, an integrity Kconfig
cleanup, and a secondary keyring update"
* tag 'integrity-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: detect changes to the backing overlay file
certs: Only allow certs signed by keys on the builtin keyring
integrity: fix indentation of config attributes
ima: annotate iint mutex to avoid lockdep false positive warnings
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Upon additional review, the new fast path in adiantum_finish() is
missing the call to flush_dcache_page() that scatterwalk_map_and_copy()
was doing. It's apparently debatable whether flush_dcache_page() is
actually needed, as per the discussion at
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YYP1lAq46NWzhOf0@casper.infradead.org/T/#u.
However, it appears that currently all the helper functions that write
to a page, such as scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), memcpy_to_page(), and
memzero_page(), do the dcache flush. So do it to be consistent.
Fixes: dadf5e56c967 ("crypto: adiantum - add fast path for single-page messages")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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alg_test_descs[] needs to be in sorted order, since it is used for
binary search. This fixes the following boot-time warning:
testmgr: alg_test_descs entries in wrong order: 'pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)' before 'pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-256)'
Fixes: ee62afb9d02d ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Originally the secondary trusted keyring provided a keyring to which extra
keys may be added, provided those keys were not blacklisted and were
vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already in the secondary
trusted keyring.
On systems with the machine keyring configured, additional keys may also
be vouched for by a key on the machine keyring.
Prevent loading additional certificates directly onto the secondary
keyring, vouched for by keys on the machine keyring, yet allow these
certificates to be loaded onto other trusted keyrings.
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash signature support in x509 certificates, pkcs7
signatures, and authenticode signatures. Supports hashes of size 256
and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Add support in rsa-pkcs1pad for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hashes, sizes 256 and
up. As 224 is too weak for any practical purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Register FIPS 202 SHA-3 hashes in hash info for IMA and other
users. Sizes 256 and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical
purposes.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The "ahash" API provides access to both CPU-based and hardware offload-
based implementations of hash algorithms. Typically the former are
implemented as "shash" algorithms under the hood, while the latter are
implemented as "ahash" algorithms. The "ahash" API provides access to
both. Various kernel subsystems use the ahash API because they want to
support hashing hardware offload without using a separate API for it.
Yet, the common case is that a crypto accelerator is not actually being
used, and ahash is just wrapping a CPU-based shash algorithm.
This patch optimizes the ahash API for that common case by eliminating
the extra indirect call for each ahash operation on top of shash.
It also fixes the double-counting of crypto stats in this scenario
(though CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS should *not* be enabled by anyone interested
in performance anyway...), and it eliminates redundant checking of
CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY. As a bonus, it also shrinks struct crypto_ahash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since the previous patch made crypto_shash_type visible to ahash.c,
change checks for '->cra_type != &crypto_ahash_type' to '->cra_type ==
&crypto_shash_type'. This makes more sense and avoids having to
forward-declare crypto_ahash_type. The result is still the same, since
the type is either shash or ahash here.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The functions that are involved in implementing the ahash API on top of
an shash algorithm belong better in ahash.c, not in shash.c where they
currently are. Move them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Improve the file comment for crypto/ahash.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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struct ahash_request_priv is unused, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify crypto_gcm_create_common() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify chachapoly_create() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify crypto_ccm_create_common() accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
crypto_ahash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask() in testmgr.
As a result of this change,
test_sg_division::offset_relative_to_alignmask and
testvec_config::key_offset_relative_to_alignmask no longer have any
effect on ahash (or shash) algorithms. Therefore, also stop setting
these flags in default_hash_testvec_configs[].
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify the code in authenc accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0,
simplify the code in authenc accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently, the ahash API checks the alignment of all key and result
buffers against the algorithm's declared alignmask, and for any
unaligned buffers it falls back to manually aligned temporary buffers.
This is virtually useless, however. First, since it does not apply to
the message, its effect is much more limited than e.g. is the case for
the alignmask for "skcipher". Second, the key and result buffers are
given as virtual addresses and cannot (in general) be DMA'ed into, so
drivers end up having to copy to/from them in software anyway. As a
result it's easy to use memcpy() or the unaligned access helpers.
The crypto_hash_walk_*() helper functions do use the alignmask to align
the message. But with one exception those are only used for shash
algorithms being exposed via the ahash API, not for native ahashes, and
aligning the message is not required in this case, especially now that
alignmask support has been removed from shash. The exception is the
n2_core driver, which doesn't set an alignmask.
In any case, no ahash algorithms actually set a nonzero alignmask
anymore. Therefore, remove support for it from ahash. The benefit is
that all the code to handle "misaligned" buffers in the ahash API goes
away, reducing the overhead of the ahash API.
This follows the same change that was made to shash.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Per section 4.c. of the IETF Trust Legal Provisions, "Code Components"
in IETF Documents are licensed on the terms of the BSD-3-Clause license:
https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/tlp-5/
The term "Code Components" specifically includes ASN.1 modules:
https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/code-components-list-3/
Add an SPDX identifier as well as a copyright notice pursuant to section
6.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions to all ASN.1 modules in the tree
which are derived from IETF Documents.
Section 4.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions requests that each Code
Component identify the RFC from which it is taken, so link that RFC
in every ASN.1 module.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The health test result in the current code is only given for the currently
processed raw time stamp. This implies to react on the health test error,
the result must be checked after each raw time stamp being processed. To
avoid this constant checking requirement, any health test error is recorded
and stored to be analyzed at a later time, if needed.
This change ensures that the power-up test catches any health test error.
Without that patch, the power-up health test result is not enforced.
The introduced changes are already in use with the user space version of
the Jitter RNG.
Fixes: 04597c8dd6c4 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs")
Reported-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another
value is a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another
value is a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in testmgr.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks,
crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In
preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in drbg.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently, the shash API checks the alignment of all message, key, and
digest buffers against the algorithm's declared alignmask, and for any
unaligned buffers it falls back to manually aligned temporary buffers.
This is virtually useless, however. In the case of the message buffer,
cryptographic hash functions internally operate on fixed-size blocks, so
implementations end up needing to deal with byte-aligned data anyway
because the length(s) passed to ->update might not be divisible by the
block size. Word-alignment of the message can theoretically be helpful
for CRCs, like what was being done in crc32c-sparc64. But in practice
it's better for the algorithms to use unaligned accesses or align the
message themselves. A similar argument applies to the key and digest.
In any case, no shash algorithms actually set a nonzero alignmask
anymore. Therefore, remove support for it from shash. The benefit is
that all the code to handle "misaligned" buffers in the shash API goes
away, reducing the overhead of the shash API.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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