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I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.
Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The refcounter of underlying algorithm should be incremented, otherwise
it'll be destroyed with the cloned cipher, wrecking the original cipher.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Use it straight away in crypto_clone_cipher(), as that is not meant to
sleep.
Fixes: 51d8d6d0f4be ("crypto: cipher - Add crypto_clone_cipher")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Allow simple ciphers to be cloned, if they don't have a cra_init
function. This basically rules out those ciphers that require a
fallback.
In future simple ciphers will be eliminated, and replaced with a
linear skcipher interface. When that happens this restriction will
disappear.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The cipher routines in the crypto API are mostly intended for templates
implementing skcipher modes generically in software, and shouldn't be
used outside of the crypto subsystem. So move the prototypes and all
related definitions to a new header file under include/crypto/internal.
Also, let's use the new module namespace feature to move the symbol
exports into a new namespace CRYPTO_INTERNAL.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the
->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. But these
flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they
weren't being set correctly anyway. So they've now been removed.
Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing
->setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded
for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return
values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that
propagates these flags around.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Of the three fields in crt_u.cipher (struct cipher_tfm), ->cit_setkey()
is pointless because it always points to setkey() in crypto/cipher.c.
->cit_decrypt_one() and ->cit_encrypt_one() are slightly less pointless,
since if the algorithm doesn't have an alignmask, they are set directly
to ->cia_encrypt() and ->cia_decrypt(). However, this "optimization"
isn't worthwhile because:
- The "cipher" algorithm type is the only algorithm still using crt_u,
so it's bloating every struct crypto_tfm for every algorithm type.
- If the algorithm has an alignmask, this "optimization" actually makes
things slower, as it causes 2 indirect calls per block rather than 1.
- It adds extra code complexity.
- Some templates already call ->cia_encrypt()/->cia_decrypt() directly
instead of going through ->cit_encrypt_one()/->cit_decrypt_one().
- The "cipher" algorithm type never gives optimal performance anyway.
For that, a higher-level type such as skcipher needs to be used.
Therefore, just remove the extra indirection, and make
crypto_cipher_setkey(), crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(), and
crypto_cipher_decrypt_one() be direct calls into crypto/cipher.c.
Also remove the unused function crypto_cipher_cast().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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We avoid various VLAs[1] by using constant expressions for block size
and alignment mask.
[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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crypto_exit_cipher_ops() and crypto_exit_compress_ops() are no-ops and
have been for a long time, so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Signed-off-by: Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch ensures that kernel.h and slab.h are included for
the setkey_unaligned function. It also breaks a couple of
long lines.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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setkey_unaligned() commited in ca7c39385ce1a7b44894a4b225a4608624e90730
overwrites unallocated memory in the following memset() because
I used the wrong buffer length.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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setkey() in {cipher,blkcipher,ablkcipher,hash}.c does not respect the
requested alignment by the algorithm. This patch fixes it. The extra
memory is allocated by kmalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC flag.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Siewior <linux-crypto@ml.breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch removes the old cipher interface and related code.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Mark the parts of the cipher interface that have been replaced by
block ciphers as deprecated. Thanks to Andrew Morton for suggesting
doing this before removing them completely.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch prepares the scatterwalk code for use by the new block cipher
type.
Firstly it halves the size of scatter_walk on 32-bit platforms. This
is important as we allocate at least two of these objects on the stack
for each block cipher operation.
It also exports the symbols since the block cipher code can be built as
a module.
Finally there is a hack in scatterwalk_unmap that relies on progress
being made. Unfortunately, for hardware crypto we can't guarantee
progress to be made since the hardware can fail.
So this also gets rid of the hack by not advancing the address returned
by scatterwalk_map.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch adds two new operations for the simple cipher that encrypts or
decrypts a single block at a time. This will be the main interface after
the existing block operations have moved over to the new block ciphers.
It also adds the crypto_cipher type which is currently only used on the
new operations but will be extended to setkey as well once existing users
have been converted to use block ciphers where applicable.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The sleeping flag used to determine whether crypto_yield can actually
yield is really a per-operation flag rather than a per-tfm flag. This
patch changes crypto_yield to take a flag directly so that we can start
using a per-operation flag instead the tfm flag.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This patch makes IV operations on ECB fail through nocrypt_iv rather than
calling BUG(). This is needed to generalise CBC/ECB using the template
mechanism.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the tfm is passed directly to setkey instead of the ctx, we no
longer need to pass the &tfm->crt_flags pointer.
This patch also gets rid of a few unnecessary checks on the key length
for ciphers as the cipher layer guarantees that the key length is within
the bounds specified by the algorithm.
Rather than testing dia_setkey every time, this patch does it only once
during crypto_alloc_tfm. The redundant check from crypto_digest_setkey
is also removed.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Up until now algorithms have been happy to get a context pointer since
they know everything that's in the tfm already (e.g., alignment, block
size).
However, once we have parameterised algorithms, such information will
be specific to each tfm. So the algorithm API needs to be changed to
pass the tfm structure instead of the context pointer.
This patch is basically a text substitution. The only tricky bit is
the assembly routines that need to get the context pointer offset
through asm-offsets.h.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since the temporary buffer is used as an argument to cia_decrypt, it must be
aligned by cra_alignmask. This bug was found by linux@horizon.com.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The boundary check in the standard multi-block cipher processors are
broken when nbytes is not a multiple of bsize. In those cases it will
always process an extra block.
This patch corrects the check so that it processes at most nbytes of
data.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The crypto layer currently uses in_atomic() to determine whether it is
allowed to sleep. This is incorrect since spin locks don't always cause
in_atomic() to return true.
Instead of that, this patch returns to an earlier idea of a per-tfm flag
which determines whether sleeping is allowed. Unlike the earlier version,
the default is to not allow sleeping. This ensures that no existing code
can break.
As usual, this flag may either be set through crypto_alloc_tfm(), or
just before a specific crypto operation.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Noticed by Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Even though cit_iv is now always aligned, the user can still supply an
unaligned iv through crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv/crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv.
This patch will check the alignment of the user-supplied iv and copy
it if necessary.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch ensures that cit_iv is aligned according to cra_alignmask
by allocating it as part of the tfm structure. As a side effect the
crypto layer will also guarantee that the tfm ctx area has enough space
to be aligned by cra_alignmask. This allows us to remove the extra
space reservation from the Padlock driver.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The VIA Padlock device requires the input and output buffers to
be aligned on 16-byte boundaries. This patch adds the alignmask
attribute for low-level cipher implementations to indicate their
alignment requirements.
The mid-level crypt() function will copy the input/output buffers
if they are not aligned correctly before they are passed to the
low-level implementation.
Strictly speaking, some of the software implementations require
the buffers to be aligned on 4-byte boundaries as they do 32-bit
loads. However, it is not clear whether it is better to copy
the buffers or pay the penalty for unaligned loads/stores.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This patch adds hooks for cipher algorithms to implement multi-block
ECB/CBC operations directly. This is expected to provide significant
performance boots to the VIA Padlock.
It could also be used for improving software implementations such as
AES where operating on multiple blocks at a time may enable certain
optimisations.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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The VIA Padlock device is able to perform much better when multiple
blocks are fed to it at once. As this device offers an exceptional
throughput rate it is worthwhile to optimise the infrastructure
specifically for it.
We shift the existing page-sized fast path down to the CBC/ECB functions.
We can then replace the CBC/ECB functions with functions provided by the
underlying algorithm that performs the multi-block operations.
As a side-effect this improves the performance of large cipher operations
for all existing algorithm implementations. I've measured the gain to be
around 5% for 3DES and 15% for AES.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Checking a pointer for NULL before calling kfree() on it is redundant.
This patch removes such checks from crypto/
Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.
Let it rip!
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