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-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c17
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c110
-rw-r--r--security/security.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c7
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c12
6 files changed, 112 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 9a65eeaf7dfa..77bdfa7f8428 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -717,16 +717,23 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
}
static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
int error;
- if (secid)
- /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
- * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
+ if (cred) {
+ /*
+ * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
*/
- return 0;
+ cl = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
+ tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
+ error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
+ aa_put_label(cl);
+ aa_put_label(tl);
+ return error;
+ }
+
cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 6f9e4ce568cd..9bb0a7f2863e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 929e14978c42..fa728f662a6f 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
+struct big_key_buf {
+ unsigned int nr_pages;
+ void *virt;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct page *pages[];
+};
+
/*
* Layout of key payload words.
*/
@@ -91,10 +98,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock);
/*
* Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
*/
-static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
+static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
{
int ret;
- struct scatterlist sgio;
struct aead_request *aead_req;
/* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is
* because we're using a different randomly generated key for every
@@ -109,8 +115,7 @@ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
return -ENOMEM;
memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
- sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen + (op == BIG_KEY_ENC ? ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE : 0));
- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, zero_nonce);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
@@ -130,21 +135,81 @@ error:
}
/*
+ * Free up the buffer.
+ */
+static void big_key_free_buffer(struct big_key_buf *buf)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (buf->virt) {
+ memset(buf->virt, 0, buf->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
+ vunmap(buf->virt);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++)
+ if (buf->pages[i])
+ __free_page(buf->pages[i]);
+
+ kfree(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a buffer consisting of a set of pages with a virtual mapping
+ * applied over them.
+ */
+static void *big_key_alloc_buffer(size_t len)
+{
+ struct big_key_buf *buf;
+ unsigned int npg = (len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned int i, l;
+
+ buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct big_key_buf) +
+ sizeof(struct page) * npg +
+ sizeof(struct scatterlist) * npg,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+
+ buf->nr_pages = npg;
+ buf->sg = (void *)(buf->pages + npg);
+ sg_init_table(buf->sg, npg);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++) {
+ buf->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf->pages[i])
+ goto nomem;
+
+ l = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE);
+ sg_set_page(&buf->sg[i], buf->pages[i], l, 0);
+ len -= l;
+ }
+
+ buf->virt = vmap(buf->pages, buf->nr_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf->virt)
+ goto nomem;
+
+ return buf;
+
+nomem:
+ big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
* Preparse a big key
*/
int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ struct big_key_buf *buf;
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *enckey;
- u8 *data = NULL;
ssize_t written;
- size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen, enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
int ret;
- ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
- goto error;
+ return -EINVAL;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
@@ -157,13 +222,12 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*
* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
*/
- size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
loff_t pos = 0;
- data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
+ buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+ if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
- memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
+ memcpy(buf->virt, prep->data, datalen);
/* generate random key */
enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -176,7 +240,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto err_enckey;
/* encrypt aligned data */
- ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, datalen, enckey);
+ ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, buf, datalen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
@@ -187,7 +251,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto err_enckey;
}
- written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, &pos);
+ written = kernel_write(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
@@ -202,7 +266,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fput(file);
- kzfree(data);
+ big_key_free_buffer(buf);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -220,7 +284,7 @@ err_fput:
err_enckey:
kzfree(enckey);
error:
- kzfree(data);
+ big_key_free_buffer(buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -298,15 +362,15 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
return datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ struct big_key_buf *buf;
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
- u8 *data;
u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
loff_t pos = 0;
- data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
+ buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+ if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
@@ -316,26 +380,26 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
}
/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
- ret = kernel_read(file, data, enclen, &pos);
+ ret = kernel_read(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
ret = -EIO;
goto err_fput;
}
- ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, data, enclen, enckey);
+ ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, buf, enclen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_fput;
ret = datalen;
/* copy decrypted data to user */
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, data, datalen) != 0)
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
err_fput:
fput(file);
error:
- kzfree(data);
+ big_key_free_buffer(buf);
} else {
ret = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1cd8526cb0b7..14c291910d25 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1114,9 +1114,9 @@ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
}
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
- return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred);
}
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8644d864e3c1..8abd542c6b7c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4036,16 +4036,19 @@ static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
}
static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
+ u32 secid;
u32 perm;
if (!sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
- if (!secid)
+ if (!cred)
secid = current_sid();
+ else
+ secid = cred_sid(cred);
return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 5d77ed04422c..432e5ca4251c 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2228,15 +2228,13 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
* @p: the task object
* @info: unused
* @sig: unused
- * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
*
* Return 0 if write access is permitted
*
- * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
- * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
*/
static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
+ int sig, const struct cred *cred)
{
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct smack_known *skp;
@@ -2252,17 +2250,17 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* Sending a signal requires that the sender
* can write the receiver.
*/
- if (secid == 0) {
+ if (cred == NULL) {
rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
- * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+ * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
* specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
- skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
generated by cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-12-18 01:02:38 +0000