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-rw-r--r--security/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c23
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm.h10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c50
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c19
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Kconfig59
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c16
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c68
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c57
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity_audit.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/dh.c2
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c6
-rw-r--r--security/security.c37
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c83
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlink.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netnode.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c5
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c45
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c51
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c16
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c91
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c71
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c5
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c22
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/Makefile2
37 files changed, 538 insertions, 286 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index afa91c6f06bb..27d8b2688f75 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -153,7 +153,6 @@ config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
config HARDENED_USERCOPY
bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
- select BUG
imply STRICT_DEVMEM
help
This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f4c33abd9959..2e489d6a3ac8 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
if (!dentry)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index ab6a029062a1..6dc075144508 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -115,3 +115,26 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
+
+/**
+ * integrity_kernel_module_request - prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests
+ * @kmod_name: kernel module name
+ *
+ * We have situation, when public_key_verify_signature() in case of RSA
+ * algorithm use alg_name to store internal information in order to
+ * construct an algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try
+ * to use alg_name in order to load kernel module with same name.
+ * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
+ * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup().
+ *
+ * In this way we prevent modprobe execution during digsig verification
+ * and avoid possible deadlock if modprobe and/or it's dependencies
+ * also signed with digsig.
+ */
+int integrity_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+{
+ if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
index d593346d0bba..60221852b26a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ config EVM
select ENCRYPTED_KEYS
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
default n
help
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
index 1257c3c24723..c3f437f5db10 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h
@@ -47,6 +47,11 @@ extern struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
/* List of EVM protected security xattrs */
extern struct list_head evm_config_xattrnames;
+struct evm_digest {
+ struct ima_digest_data hdr;
+ char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
int evm_init_key(void);
int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *req_xattr_name,
@@ -54,10 +59,11 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
size_t req_xattr_value_len);
int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest);
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len, struct evm_digest *data);
int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest);
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type,
+ struct evm_digest *data);
int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
char *hmac_val);
int evm_init_secfs(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index b60524310855..8a3905bb02c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "evm.h"
#define EVMKEY "evm-key"
@@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
static int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
-struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm;
+static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
@@ -38,7 +39,6 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
static char * const evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
-static char * const evm_hash = "sha1";
/**
* evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
@@ -74,10 +74,10 @@ busy:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
-static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
+static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
{
long rc;
- char *algo;
+ const char *algo;
struct crypto_shash **tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
@@ -89,15 +89,16 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type)
tfm = &hmac_tfm;
algo = evm_hmac;
} else {
- tfm = &hash_tfm;
- algo = evm_hash;
+ tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
+ algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
}
if (*tfm == NULL) {
mutex_lock(&mutex);
if (*tfm)
goto out;
- *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0,
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
if (IS_ERR(*tfm)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(*tfm);
pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo, rc);
@@ -186,10 +187,10 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
* each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
*/
static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *req_xattr_name,
- const char *req_xattr_value,
- size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char type, char *digest)
+ const char *req_xattr_name,
+ const char *req_xattr_value,
+ size_t req_xattr_value_len,
+ uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct xattr_list *xattr;
@@ -204,10 +205,12 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- desc = init_desc(type);
+ desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
if (IS_ERR(desc))
return PTR_ERR(desc);
+ data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
error = -ENODATA;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
bool is_ima = false;
@@ -239,7 +242,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
if (is_ima)
ima_present = true;
}
- hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest);
+ hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
/* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
@@ -252,18 +255,18 @@ out:
int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char *digest)
+ struct evm_digest *data)
{
return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest);
+ req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
}
int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
- char type, char *digest)
+ char type, struct evm_digest *data)
{
return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
- req_xattr_value_len, type, digest);
+ req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
}
static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
@@ -303,7 +306,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data;
+ struct evm_digest data;
int rc = 0;
/*
@@ -316,13 +319,14 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
if (rc)
return -EPERM;
+ data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest);
+ xattr_value_len, &data);
if (rc == 0) {
- xattr_data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
+ data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
- &xattr_data,
- sizeof(xattr_data), 0);
+ &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
}
@@ -334,7 +338,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
{
struct shash_desc *desc;
- desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC);
+ desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
return PTR_ERR(desc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index f9eff5041e4c..7f3f54d89a6e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/magic.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include "evm.h"
@@ -134,8 +135,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
{
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data calc;
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr;
enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
+ struct evm_digest digest;
struct inode *inode;
int rc, xattr_len;
@@ -171,25 +173,28 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+
+ digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, calc.digest);
+ xattr_value_len, &digest);
if (rc)
break;
- rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, calc.digest,
- sizeof(calc.digest));
+ rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest,
+ SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
break;
case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG:
case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG:
+ hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data;
+ digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo;
rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
- xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type,
- calc.digest);
+ xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest);
if (rc)
break;
rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM,
(const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len,
- calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest));
+ digest.digest, digest.hdr.length);
if (!rc) {
inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
index 637eb999e340..77de71b7794c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_xattrs(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -E2BIG;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_EVM_XATTR);
- if (IS_ERR(ab))
- return PTR_ERR(ab);
+ if (!ab)
+ return -ENOMEM;
xattr = kmalloc(sizeof(struct xattr_list), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!xattr) {
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 149faa81f6f0..5a6810041e5c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -219,10 +219,13 @@ static int __init integrity_fs_init(void)
{
integrity_dir = securityfs_create_dir("integrity", NULL);
if (IS_ERR(integrity_dir)) {
- pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %ld\n",
- PTR_ERR(integrity_dir));
+ int ret = PTR_ERR(integrity_dir);
+
+ if (ret != -ENODEV)
+ pr_err("Unable to create integrity sysfs dir: %d\n",
+ ret);
integrity_dir = NULL;
- return PTR_ERR(integrity_dir);
+ return ret;
}
return 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 6a8f67714c83..13b446328dda 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config IMA
select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
select TCG_IBMVTPM if TCG_TPM && PPC_PSERIES
+ select INTEGRITY_AUDIT if AUDIT
help
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
@@ -156,6 +157,64 @@ config IMA_APPRAISE
<http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net>
If unsure, say N.
+config IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ bool "IMA build time configured policy rules"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE && INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ default n
+ help
+ This option defines an IMA appraisal policy at build time, which
+ is enforced at run time without having to specify a builtin
+ policy name on the boot command line. The build time appraisal
+ policy rules persist after loading a custom policy.
+
+ Depending on the rules configured, this policy may require kernel
+ modules, firmware, the kexec kernel image, and/or the IMA policy
+ to be signed. Unsigned files might prevent the system from
+ booting or applications from working properly.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise firmware signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ This option defines a policy requiring all firmware to be signed,
+ including the regulatory.db. If both this option and
+ CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are enabled, then both signature
+ verification methods are necessary.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise kexec kernel image signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require all kexec'ed kernel images to
+ be signed and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA
+ keyring.
+
+ Kernel image signatures can not be verified by the original
+ kexec_load syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent its
+ usage.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise kernel modules signatures"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require all kernel modules to be signed
+ and verified by a public key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
+ Kernel module signatures can only be verified by IMA-appraisal,
+ via the finit_module syscall. Enabling this rule will prevent
+ the usage of the init_module syscall.
+
+config IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
+ bool "Appraise IMA policy signature"
+ depends on IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY
+ default n
+ help
+ Enabling this rule will require the IMA policy to be signed and
+ and verified by a key on the trusted IMA keyring.
+
config IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
bool "ima_appraise boot parameter"
depends on IMA_APPRAISE
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index e4c1a236976c..67db9d9454ca 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
extern int ima_policy_flag;
/* set during initialization */
-extern int ima_used_chip;
extern int ima_hash_algo;
extern int ima_appraise;
+extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
/* IMA event related data */
struct ima_event_data {
@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index 4e085a17124f..7e7e7e7c250a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -631,10 +631,10 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
{
- if (!ima_used_chip)
+ if (!ima_tpm_chip)
return;
- if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0)
+ if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 29b72cd2502e..faac9ecaa0ae 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
-int ima_used_chip;
+struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;
/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
* the PCR register.
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
- if (ima_used_chip) {
+ if (ima_tpm_chip) {
result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(&hash.hdr);
if (result < 0) {
audit_cause = "hashing_error";
@@ -106,17 +106,11 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
int __init ima_init(void)
{
- u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
int rc;
- ima_used_chip = 0;
- rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i);
- if (rc == 0)
- ima_used_chip = 1;
-
- if (!ima_used_chip)
- pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=%d)\n",
- rc);
+ ima_tpm_chip = tpm_default_chip();
+ if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+ pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA);
if (rc)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index b286f37712d5..2d31921fbda4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -429,16 +429,14 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*/
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
- bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
-
- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) {
- if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
- }
+ /*
+ * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
+ *
+ * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
+ * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
+ * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
+ * buffers?
+ */
return 0;
}
@@ -472,14 +470,13 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
return 0;
}
- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */
- return 0;
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -496,6 +493,49 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
MAY_READ, func);
}
+/**
+ * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ *
+ * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
+ * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file
+ * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
+ *
+ * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ bool sig_enforce;
+
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ break;
+ case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ break;
+ case LOADING_MODULE:
+ sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
+
+ if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int __init init_ima(void)
{
int error;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index cdcc9a7b4e24..8c9499867c91 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
int ima_policy_flag;
static int temp_ima_appraise;
+static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
@@ -162,6 +163,25 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
#endif
};
+static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS
+ {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
+#endif
+};
+
static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {
{.action = APPRAISE, .func = MODULE_CHECK,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
@@ -435,7 +455,7 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
}
- ima_appraise |= temp_ima_appraise;
+ ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
if (!ima_appraise)
ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
}
@@ -448,6 +468,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
return 0;
}
@@ -486,8 +508,8 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
}
/*
- * Insert the appraise rules requiring file signatures, prior to
- * any other appraise rules.
+ * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file
+ * signatures, prior to any other appraise rules.
*/
for (i = 0; i < secure_boot_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&secure_boot_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
@@ -495,6 +517,26 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
ima_appraise_flag(secure_boot_rules[i].func);
}
+ /*
+ * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures
+ * for both the initial and custom policies, prior to other appraise
+ * rules.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); i++) {
+ struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+
+ if (!secure_boot_entries)
+ list_add_tail(&build_appraise_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+
+ entry = kmemdup(&build_appraise_rules[i], sizeof(*entry),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (entry)
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
+ build_ima_appraise |=
+ ima_appraise_flag(build_appraise_rules[i].func);
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
@@ -615,14 +657,16 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
static void ima_log_string_op(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value,
bool (*rule_operator)(kuid_t, kuid_t))
{
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+
if (rule_operator == &uid_gt)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s>", key);
else if (rule_operator == &uid_lt)
audit_log_format(ab, "%s<", key);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
- audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", value);
}
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
{
@@ -637,7 +681,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
bool uid_token;
int result = 0;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+ ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE);
entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 418f35e38015..b186819bd5aa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
{
int result = 0;
- if (!ima_used_chip)
+ if (!ima_tpm_chip)
return result;
- result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash);
+ result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash);
if (result != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 0bb372eed62a..e60473b13a8d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/* iint action cache flags */
#define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001
@@ -199,6 +200,13 @@ static inline void evm_load_x509(void)
void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
const char *cause, int result, int info);
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+ return audit_log_start(ctx, gfp_mask, type);
+}
+
#else
static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
const unsigned char *fname,
@@ -206,4 +214,11 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
int result, int info)
{
}
+
+static inline struct audit_buffer *
+integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index ab10a25310a1..82c98f7d217e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -45,11 +45,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
- audit_log_string(ab, op);
- audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
- audit_log_string(ab, cause);
- audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s comm=", op, cause);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(name, current));
if (fname) {
audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
diff --git a/security/keys/dh.c b/security/keys/dh.c
index b203f7758f97..711e89d8c415 100644
--- a/security/keys/dh.c
+++ b/security/keys/dh.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ long __keyctl_dh_compute(struct keyctl_dh_params __user *params,
if (ret)
goto out3;
- tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp("dh", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(tfm);
goto out3;
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 5fa191252c8f..0716af28808a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -173,9 +173,15 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
return 0;
}
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
};
void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5dce67070cdf..736e78da1ab9 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -48,14 +48,17 @@ static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
{
int ret;
- initcall_t *call;
- call = __security_initcall_start;
+ initcall_t call;
+ initcall_entry_t *ce;
+
+ ce = __security_initcall_start;
trace_initcall_level("security");
- while (call < __security_initcall_end) {
- trace_initcall_start((*call));
- ret = (*call) ();
- trace_initcall_finish((*call), ret);
- call++;
+ while (ce < __security_initcall_end) {
+ call = initcall_from_entry(ce);
+ trace_initcall_start(call);
+ ret = call();
+ trace_initcall_finish(call, ret);
+ ce++;
}
}
@@ -118,6 +121,8 @@ static int lsm_append(char *new, char **result)
if (*result == NULL) {
*result = kstrdup(new, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*result == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
} else {
/* Check if it is the last registered name */
if (match_last_lsm(*result, new))
@@ -1030,7 +1035,12 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
}
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
@@ -1056,6 +1066,17 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_load_data(id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
+
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index f3aedf077509..635e5c1e3e48 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
if (is_insert) {
if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
+ pr_warn("SELinux: avc: seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
ret = -EAGAIN;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 18006be15713..ad9a9b8e9979 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
"xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
@@ -539,11 +539,11 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
"%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
else
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
"%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
sb->s_type->name, -rc);
goto out;
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
"before the security server is initialized\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
mount_options[i], &sid,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+ pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
"(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
goto out;
@@ -860,8 +860,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
*/
rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
+ pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
goto out;
}
@@ -947,7 +946,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
"invalid for this filesystem type\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -969,7 +968,7 @@ out:
return rc;
out_double_mount:
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
"security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
goto out;
}
@@ -998,7 +997,7 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
return 0;
mismatch:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
"different security settings for (dev %s, "
"type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
return -EBUSY;
@@ -1106,7 +1105,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
case Opt_context:
if (context || defcontext) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_err;
}
context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
@@ -1119,7 +1118,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
case Opt_fscontext:
if (fscontext) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_err;
}
fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
@@ -1132,7 +1131,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
case Opt_rootcontext:
if (rootcontext) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_err;
}
rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
@@ -1145,7 +1144,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
case Opt_defcontext:
if (context || defcontext) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_err;
}
defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
@@ -1158,7 +1157,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
+ pr_warn("SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
goto out_err;
}
@@ -1623,7 +1622,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
dput(dentry);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -ENODATA) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
-rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
kfree(context);
@@ -1643,11 +1642,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
if (rc == -EINVAL) {
if (printk_ratelimit())
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+ pr_notice("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
"context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
} else {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
"returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
__func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
}
@@ -1785,8 +1784,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
break;
default:
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
BUG();
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2029,7 +2027,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
av = DIR__RMDIR;
break;
default:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
+ pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
__func__, kind);
return 0;
}
@@ -2875,7 +2873,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
mount_options[i], &sid,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
+ pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
"(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
goto out_free_opts;
@@ -2914,7 +2912,7 @@ out_free_secdata:
free_secdata(secdata);
return rc;
out_bad_option:
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
+ pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
"during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
sb->s_type->name);
goto out_free_opts;
@@ -3357,7 +3355,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
&newsid);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
"for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
return;
@@ -4073,6 +4071,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
return rc;
}
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ switch (id) {
+ case LOADING_MODULE:
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
@@ -4420,7 +4432,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
}
parse_error:
- printk(KERN_WARNING
+ pr_warn(
"SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
" unable to parse packet\n");
return ret;
@@ -4463,7 +4475,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
if (unlikely(err)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
+ pr_warn(
"SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
" unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
return -EACCES;
@@ -6972,6 +6984,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
@@ -7126,11 +7139,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
}
if (!selinux_enabled) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
return 0;
}
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
+ pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
@@ -7166,9 +7179,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
else
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -7180,10 +7193,10 @@ static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
void selinux_complete_init(void)
{
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
/* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
}
@@ -7258,7 +7271,7 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
if (!selinux_enabled)
return 0;
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
if (err)
@@ -7271,7 +7284,7 @@ __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
{
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
}
@@ -7300,7 +7313,7 @@ int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
state->disabled = 1;
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
selinux_enabled = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index ac65f7417413..8c738c189942 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -145,9 +145,8 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
dev = dev_get_by_index(ns, ifindex);
if (unlikely(dev == NULL)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow(),"
- " invalid network interface (%d)\n", ifindex);
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), invalid network interface (%d)\n",
+ __func__, ifindex);
return -ENOENT;
}
@@ -177,10 +176,8 @@ out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netif_lock);
dev_put(dev);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in sel_netif_sid_slow(),"
- " unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
- ifindex);
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network interface label (%d)\n",
+ __func__, ifindex);
kfree(new);
}
return ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlink.c b/security/selinux/netlink.c
index 828fb6a4e941..8a8a72507437 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlink.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlink.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ out:
out_kfree_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
oom:
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__);
+ pr_err("SELinux: OOM in %s\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index 6dd89b89bc1f..afa0d432436b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -238,9 +238,8 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netnode_lock);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in sel_netnode_sid_slow(),"
- " unable to determine network node label\n");
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network node label\n",
+ __func__);
kfree(new);
}
return ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index 9ed4c5064a5e..7a141cadbffc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -173,9 +173,8 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&sel_netport_lock);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "SELinux: failure in sel_netport_sid_slow(),"
- " unable to determine network port label\n");
+ pr_warn("SELinux: failure in %s(), unable to determine network port label\n",
+ __func__);
kfree(new);
}
return ret;
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 7b7433a1a34c..74b951f55608 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
switch (sclass) {
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET:
/* RTM_MAX always point to RTM_SETxxxx, ie RTM_NEWxxx + 3 */
- BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT + 3));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWCHAIN + 3));
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
break;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 79d3709b0671..f3a5a138a096 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
-static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
+static ssize_t (*const write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
[SEL_ACCESS] = sel_write_access,
[SEL_CREATE] = sel_write_create,
[SEL_RELABEL] = sel_write_relabel,
@@ -950,7 +950,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
@@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
length = -ERANGE;
if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
"payload max\n", __func__, len);
goto out;
}
@@ -1365,13 +1365,18 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
goto out;
+ }
ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
- if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ if (len >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+ dput(dentry);
+ iput(inode);
goto out;
+ }
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
@@ -1586,8 +1591,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
@@ -1632,8 +1639,10 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
inode->i_fop = &sel_initcon_ops;
inode->i_ino = i|SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET;
@@ -1733,8 +1742,10 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
rc = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
goto out;
+ }
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
@@ -1763,8 +1774,10 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
inode->i_fop = &sel_class_ops;
inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
@@ -1838,8 +1851,10 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
return -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
- if (inode == NULL)
+ if (inode == NULL) {
+ dput(dentry);
return -ENOMEM;
+ }
inode->i_fop = &sel_policycap_ops;
inode->i_ino = iter | SEL_POLICYCAP_INO_OFFSET;
@@ -1932,8 +1947,10 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
ret = -ENOMEM;
inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
- if (!inode)
+ if (!inode) {
+ dput(dentry);
goto err;
+ }
inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
@@ -1984,7 +2001,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
goto err;
return 0;
err:
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
__func__);
selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
@@ -2034,7 +2051,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
selinux_null.mnt = selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
+ pr_err("selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index a2c9148b0662..c0417cf17fee 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
h->nel = 0;
h->nslot = nslot;
h->mask = mask;
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
h->nslot, nrules);
return 0;
}
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
}
}
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
"longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
chain2_len_sum);
@@ -407,18 +407,18 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
items = 0;
@@ -426,19 +426,19 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.source_type = (u16)val;
if (key.source_type != val) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_type = (u16)val;
if (key.target_type != val) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_class = (u16)val;
if (key.target_class != val) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -446,16 +446,16 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
(val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -470,7 +470,8 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
}
if (items != items2) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+ items2, items);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
@@ -478,7 +479,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -491,7 +492,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -501,13 +502,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
set++;
}
if (!set || set > 1) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
"support extended permissions rules and one "
"was specified\n", vers);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -515,17 +516,17 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
@@ -534,14 +535,14 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
} else {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
}
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -562,12 +563,12 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
goto bad;
}
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (!nel) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
@@ -580,9 +581,9 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -ENOMEM)
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
else if (rc == -EEXIST)
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
goto bad;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index c91543a617ac..f49e522e932d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
node->cur_state = new_state;
if (new_state == -1)
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
/* turn the rules on or off */
for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (new_state <= 0)
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
*/
if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
goto err;
}
/*
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
if (node_ptr) {
if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
goto err;
}
found = 0;
@@ -313,13 +313,13 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
}
}
if (!found) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
goto err;
}
}
} else {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
goto err;
}
}
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if (!node_ptr) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
@@ -387,12 +387,12 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
{
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
return 0;
}
if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
return 0;
}
return 1;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 5ae8c61b75bf..8f624f80055b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
"match my size %zd (high bit was %d)\n",
mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
goto bad;
@@ -383,19 +383,19 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
goto bad;
}
startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit);
if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
"not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
startbit, mapunit);
goto bad;
}
if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
"beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
goto bad;
@@ -405,8 +405,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp) {
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto bad;
}
@@ -418,7 +417,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
e->node = tmp;
n = tmp;
} else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
" comes after start bit %d\n",
startbit, n->startbit);
goto bad;
@@ -426,7 +425,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
if (rc < 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
goto bad;
}
map = le64_to_cpu(map);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 6e8c8056d7ad..e9394e7adc84 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
struct hashtab_info info;
hashtab_stat(h, &info);
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
"longest chain length %d\n", hash_name, h->nel,
info.slots_used, h->size, info.max_chain_len);
}
@@ -533,15 +533,17 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
{
int i, rc;
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools",
- p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim, p->p_bools.nprim);
if (p->mls_enabled)
- printk(KERN_CONT ", %d sens, %d cats", p->p_levels.nprim,
- p->p_cats.nprim);
- printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+ else
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim);
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n",
- p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n",
+ p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
@@ -897,7 +899,7 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
rc = sidtab_init(s);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -905,14 +907,14 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!c->context[0].user) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
c->u.name);
goto out;
}
rc = sidtab_insert(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
c->u.name);
goto out;
}
@@ -1005,13 +1007,13 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
goto out;
}
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -1023,19 +1025,19 @@ static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
goto out;
}
if (items > 1) {
rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
goto bad_high;
}
} else {
rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: out of memory\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: out of memory\n");
goto bad_high;
}
}
@@ -1060,7 +1062,7 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: context truncated\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n");
goto out;
}
c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
@@ -1069,14 +1071,14 @@ static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
goto out;
}
}
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: invalid security context\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid security context\n");
context_destroy(c);
goto out;
}
@@ -1352,7 +1354,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
cladatum->comdatum = hashtab_search(p->p_commons.table, cladatum->comkey);
if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unknown common %s\n", cladatum->comkey);
+ pr_err("SELinux: unknown common %s\n",
+ cladatum->comkey);
goto bad;
}
}
@@ -1444,7 +1447,7 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
OBJECT_R, role->value);
goto bad;
}
@@ -1522,14 +1525,14 @@ static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
return rc;
}
lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
return rc;
}
return 0;
@@ -1683,7 +1686,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
unsigned long bit;
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: user %s: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
"too deep or looped boundary",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1694,8 +1697,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
continue;
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
@@ -1720,7 +1722,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
unsigned long bit;
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: role %s: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
"too deep or looped bounds\n",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1731,8 +1733,7 @@ static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
continue;
- printk(KERN_ERR
- "SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
"role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
@@ -1754,7 +1755,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
upper = datum;
while (upper->bounds) {
if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
"too deep or looped boundary\n",
(char *) key);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1765,7 +1766,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
BUG_ON(!upper);
if (upper->attribute) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: type %s: "
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
"bounded by attribute %s",
(char *) key,
sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
@@ -1888,7 +1889,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
+ pr_warn("SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
goto out;
}
@@ -2023,7 +2024,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
newgenfs->fstype);
goto out;
}
@@ -2073,7 +2074,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
(!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
goto out;
}
@@ -2295,7 +2296,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
"not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
goto bad;
@@ -2304,7 +2305,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
"match expected length %zu\n",
len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
goto bad;
@@ -2313,14 +2314,14 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -ENOMEM;
policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!policydb_str) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
"string of length %d\n", len);
goto bad;
}
rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
kfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
}
@@ -2328,7 +2329,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
policydb_str[len] = '\0';
if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
"my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
kfree(policydb_str);
goto bad;
@@ -2346,7 +2347,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
"my version range %d-%d\n",
le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
goto bad;
@@ -2357,7 +2358,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+ pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
"(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
p->policyvers);
goto bad;
@@ -2381,7 +2382,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
"for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
goto bad;
}
@@ -2389,7 +2390,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
rc = -EINVAL;
if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
"not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
@@ -3417,7 +3418,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
* careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
*/
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+ pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
" Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
return -EINVAL;
@@ -3446,7 +3447,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
/* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+ pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
"version %d", p->policyvers);
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index dd2ceec06fef..f3def298a90e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -136,8 +136,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
if (!p_out->value) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
p_in->name);
if (pol->reject_unknown)
goto err;
@@ -156,8 +155,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
p_in->perms[k]);
if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
if (pol->reject_unknown)
goto err;
@@ -170,7 +168,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
}
if (print_unknown_handle)
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
out_map->size = i;
@@ -644,7 +642,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
if (printk_ratelimit())
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
return;
}
@@ -793,7 +791,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
if (!ocontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, oldsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -801,7 +799,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
if (!ncontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, newsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -809,7 +807,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tasksid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -883,7 +881,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
if (!old_context) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
__func__, old_sid);
goto out;
}
@@ -891,7 +889,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
if (!new_context) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
__func__, new_sid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1040,14 +1038,14 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
goto out;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1129,7 +1127,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1140,7 +1138,7 @@ void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1183,7 +1181,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1194,7 +1192,7 @@ void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
goto out;
}
@@ -1310,7 +1308,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
*scontext = scontextp;
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial "
"load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
@@ -1323,7 +1321,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
else
context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
if (!context) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, sid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1678,14 +1676,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
if (!scontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, ssid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
if (!tcontext) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, tsid);
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
@@ -1911,7 +1909,8 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
return -EINVAL;
if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+ s);
kfree(s);
}
return 0;
@@ -1962,7 +1961,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
kfree(s);
if (!rc) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
c->str);
/* Replace string with mapped representation. */
kfree(c->str);
@@ -1974,7 +1973,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
goto out;
} else {
/* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
c->str, -rc);
goto out;
}
@@ -2033,7 +2032,7 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
oc = oc->next;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!oc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up"
" the initial SIDs list\n");
goto bad;
}
@@ -2065,7 +2064,7 @@ bad:
context_destroy(c);
c->str = s;
c->len = len;
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
c->str);
rc = 0;
goto out;
@@ -2170,13 +2169,13 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
newpolicydb->len = len;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
- printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+ pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
goto out;
}
@@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
goto err;
}
@@ -2207,7 +2206,7 @@ int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
args.newp = newpolicydb;
rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
" representation of contexts in the new SID"
" table\n");
goto err;
@@ -2999,7 +2998,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
if (!context1) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, sid);
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -3007,7 +3006,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
if (!context2) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, mls_sid);
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -3104,14 +3103,14 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
if (!nlbl_ctx) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, nlbl_sid);
goto out;
}
rc = -EINVAL;
xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
if (!xfrm_ctx) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
__func__, xfrm_sid);
goto out;
}
@@ -3202,7 +3201,7 @@ int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
rc = -EINVAL;
match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
if (!match) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
__func__, class);
goto out;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 5be31b7af225..fd75a12fa8fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s,
}
sid = s->next_sid++;
if (context->len)
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
context->str);
ret = sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
if (ret)
@@ -253,7 +252,7 @@ void sidtab_hash_eval(struct sidtab *h, char *tag)
}
}
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
+ pr_debug("%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
"chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, SIDTAB_SIZE,
max_chain_len);
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 9ab8097dab7c..340fc30ad85d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/tcp.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
@@ -3896,6 +3897,7 @@ static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
sip->sin6_port = th->source;
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
if (uh != NULL)
sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
@@ -3924,15 +3926,19 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
struct lsm_network_audit net;
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
int proto;
+
+ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
- switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ switch (family) {
case PF_INET:
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
/*
@@ -3950,7 +3956,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
- rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0)
skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
else
@@ -3963,7 +3969,7 @@ access_check:
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->family = family;
ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
#endif
@@ -3977,12 +3983,13 @@ access_check:
rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
MAY_WRITE, rc);
if (rc != 0)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
- if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
+ if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
+ proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
break;
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
@@ -3993,7 +4000,7 @@ access_check:
skp = smack_net_ambient;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->family = family;
ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
@@ -4004,6 +4011,9 @@ access_check:
#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+ if (rc != 0)
+ icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
+ ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
}
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
index b7c6a7ffc058..cca5a3012fee 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile
+++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load
targets += builtin-policy.h
define do_policy
echo "static char tomoyo_builtin_$(1)[] __initdata ="; \
-$(objtree)/scripts/basic/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \
+$(objtree)/scripts/bin2c <$(firstword $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/$(1).conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/$(1).conf.default) /dev/null); \
echo ";"
endef
quiet_cmd_policy = POLICY $@