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-rw-r--r--security/keys/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h39
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c24
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c323
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c14
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.h124
7 files changed, 414 insertions, 129 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index ef1581b337a3..9cef54064f60 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS) += persistent.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE) += keyctl_pkey.o
#
# Key types
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e87c89c0177c..9482df601dc3 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -141,6 +141,24 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, u32, option,
return keyctl_restrict_keyring(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3),
compat_ptr(arg4));
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+ if (arg3 != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return keyctl_pkey_query(arg2,
+ compat_ptr(arg4),
+ compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(option,
+ compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ return keyctl_pkey_verify(compat_ptr(arg2), compat_ptr(arg3),
+ compat_ptr(arg4), compat_ptr(arg5));
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9f8208dc0e55..74cb0ff42fed 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -298,6 +298,45 @@ static inline long compat_keyctl_dh_compute(
#endif
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+extern long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t,
+ const char __user *,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+ const char __user *,
+ const void __user *, const void __user *);
+
+extern long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *,
+ const char __user *,
+ const void __user *, void __user *);
+#else
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ const void __user *_in2)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ void __user *_out)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
/*
* Debugging key validation
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 1ffe60bb2845..18619690ce77 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1747,6 +1747,30 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
(const char __user *) arg3,
(const char __user *) arg4);
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY:
+ if (arg3 != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return keyctl_pkey_query((key_serial_t)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg4,
+ (struct keyctl_pkey_query *)arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ return keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(
+ option,
+ (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg3,
+ (const void __user *)arg4,
+ (void __user *)arg5);
+
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ return keyctl_pkey_verify(
+ (const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *)arg2,
+ (const char __user *)arg3,
+ (const void __user *)arg4,
+ (const void __user *)arg5);
+
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..783978842f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/* Public-key operation keyctls
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/keyctl.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void keyctl_pkey_params_free(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ kfree(params->info);
+ key_put(params->key);
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_enc, /* "enc=<encoding>" eg. "enc=oaep" */
+ Opt_hash, /* "hash=<digest-name>" eg. "hash=sha1" */
+};
+
+static const match_table_t param_keys = {
+ { Opt_enc, "enc=%s" },
+ { Opt_hash, "hash=%s" },
+ { Opt_err, NULL }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse the information string which consists of key=val pairs.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_parse(struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ unsigned long token_mask = 0;
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ char *c = params->info, *p, *q;
+ int token;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, param_keys, args);
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(token, &token_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ q = args[0].from;
+ if (!q[0])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_enc:
+ params->encoding = q;
+ break;
+
+ case Opt_hash:
+ params->hash_algo = q;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Interpret parameters. Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ key_ref_t key_ref;
+ void *p;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+ params->encoding = "raw";
+
+ p = strndup_user(_info, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (IS_ERR(p))
+ return PTR_ERR(p);
+ params->info = p;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_parse(params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
+ if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
+ return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+ params->key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+
+ if (!params->key->type->asym_query)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get parameters from userspace. Callers must always call the free function
+ * on params, even if an error is returned.
+ */
+static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ int op,
+ struct kernel_pkey_params *params)
+{
+ struct keyctl_pkey_params uparams;
+ struct kernel_pkey_query info;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
+ params->encoding = "raw";
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&uparams, _params, sizeof(uparams)) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(uparams.key_id, _info, params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
+ if (uparams.in_len > info.max_sig_size ||
+ uparams.out_len > info.max_data_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
+ params->out_len = uparams.out_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query information about an asymmetric key.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ struct keyctl_pkey_query __user *_res)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ struct kernel_pkey_query res;
+ long ret;
+
+ memset(&params, 0, sizeof(params));
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get(id, _info, &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_query(&params, &res);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(_res, &res, sizeof(res)) == 0 &&
+ clear_user(_res->__spare, sizeof(_res->__spare)) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+
+error:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt/decrypt/sign
+ *
+ * Encrypt data, decrypt data or sign data using a public key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format. For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ * "enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the encoding and hash= selects the OID to go in that
+ * particular encoding if required. If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed that
+ * the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, the amount of data written into the output buffer is
+ * returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
+ const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ void __user *_out)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ void *in, *out;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, op, &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ switch (op) {
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_decrypt;
+ break;
+ case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_sign;
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+ goto error_params;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ out = kmalloc(params.out_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!out)
+ goto error_in;
+
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(&params, in, out);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_out;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(_out, out, ret) != 0)
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+error_out:
+ kfree(out);
+error_in:
+ kfree(in);
+error_params:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature.
+ *
+ * Verify a public key signature using the given key, or if not given, search
+ * for a matching key.
+ *
+ * _info is a string of supplementary information in key=val format. For
+ * instance, it might contain:
+ *
+ * "enc=pkcs1 hash=sha256"
+ *
+ * where enc= specifies the signature blob encoding and hash= selects the OID
+ * to go in that particular encoding. If enc= isn't supplied, it's assumed
+ * that the caller is supplying raw values.
+ *
+ * If successful, 0 is returned.
+ */
+long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
+ const char __user *_info,
+ const void __user *_in,
+ const void __user *_in2)
+{
+ struct kernel_pkey_params params;
+ void *in, *in2;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
+ &params);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
+ goto error_params;
+
+ in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in);
+ goto error_params;
+ }
+
+ in2 = memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(in2)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(in2);
+ goto error_in;
+ }
+
+ params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
+ ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(&params, in, in2);
+
+ kfree(in2);
+error_in:
+ kfree(in);
+error_params:
+ keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index b69d3b1777c2..ff6789365a12 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/tpm.h>
#include <linux/tpm_command.h>
-#include "trusted.h"
+#include <keys/trusted.h>
static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ out:
/*
* calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM
*/
-static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
+int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int keylen, unsigned char *h1,
unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...)
{
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ out:
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_authhmac);
/*
* verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM
*/
-static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
+int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
const uint32_t command,
const unsigned char *ononce,
const unsigned char *key,
@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ out:
kzfree(sdesc);
return ret;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(TSS_checkhmac1);
/*
* verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM
@@ -355,7 +357,7 @@ out:
* For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our
* own TPM command packets using the drivers send function.
*/
-static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
+int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
{
int rc;
@@ -367,6 +369,7 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
rc = -EPERM;
return rc;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
/*
* Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR.
@@ -425,7 +428,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
/*
* Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session
*/
-static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
+int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{
int ret;
@@ -442,6 +445,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(oiap);
struct tpm_digests {
unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d5fe9eafb22..000000000000
--- a/security/keys/trusted.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-#define __TRUSTED_KEY_H
-
-/* implementation specific TPM constants */
-#define MAX_BUF_SIZE 512
-#define TPM_GETRANDOM_SIZE 14
-#define TPM_OSAP_SIZE 36
-#define TPM_OIAP_SIZE 10
-#define TPM_SEAL_SIZE 87
-#define TPM_UNSEAL_SIZE 104
-#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2
-#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6
-#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10
-
-#define LOAD32(buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-#define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])
-#define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset]))
-
-struct tpm_buf {
- int len;
- unsigned char data[MAX_BUF_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define INIT_BUF(tb) (tb->len = 0)
-
-struct osapsess {
- uint32_t handle;
- unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
- unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
-};
-
-/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */
-enum {
- SEAL_keytype = 1,
- SRK_keytype = 4
-};
-
-#define TPM_DEBUG 0
-
-#if TPM_DEBUG
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
- pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype);
- pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle);
- pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock);
- pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
- pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0);
- pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0);
- pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
- pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
- 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0);
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
- int len;
-
- pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n");
- len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET);
- print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0);
-}
-#else
-static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s)
-{
-}
-
-static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
-static inline void store8(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char value)
-{
- buf->data[buf->len++] = value;
-}
-
-static inline void store16(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint16_t value)
-{
- *(uint16_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htons(value);
- buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void store32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const uint32_t value)
-{
- *(uint32_t *) & buf->data[buf->len] = htonl(value);
- buf->len += sizeof value;
-}
-
-static inline void storebytes(struct tpm_buf *buf, const unsigned char *in,
- const int len)
-{
- memcpy(buf->data + buf->len, in, len);
- buf->len += len;
-}
-#endif