summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/lib
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r--lib/ashldi3.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/ashrdi3.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/asn1_decoder.c49
-rw-r--r--lib/cmpdi2.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/lshrdi3.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/muldi3.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/nlattr.c22
-rw-r--r--lib/oid_registry.c16
-rw-r--r--lib/test_printf.c108
-rw-r--r--lib/ucmpdi2.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/vsprintf.c194
11 files changed, 276 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/lib/ashldi3.c b/lib/ashldi3.c
index 1b6087db95a5..3ffc46e3bb6c 100644
--- a/lib/ashldi3.c
+++ b/lib/ashldi3.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
long long notrace __ashldi3(long long u, word_type b)
{
diff --git a/lib/ashrdi3.c b/lib/ashrdi3.c
index 2e67c97ac65a..ea054550f0e8 100644
--- a/lib/ashrdi3.c
+++ b/lib/ashrdi3.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
long long notrace __ashrdi3(long long u, word_type b)
{
diff --git a/lib/asn1_decoder.c b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
index 1ef0cec38d78..dc14beae2c9a 100644
--- a/lib/asn1_decoder.c
+++ b/lib/asn1_decoder.c
@@ -313,42 +313,47 @@ next_op:
/* Decide how to handle the operation */
switch (op) {
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- ret = actions[machine[pc + 1]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- goto skip_data;
-
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
- case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
- ret = actions[machine[pc + 2]](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
- goto skip_data;
-
case ASN1_OP_MATCH:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY:
case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_OR_SKIP:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ACT_OR_SKIP:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY:
case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_OR_SKIP:
- skip_data:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT:
+ case ASN1_OP_COND_MATCH_ANY_ACT_OR_SKIP:
+
if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS)) {
if (flags & FLAG_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
+ size_t tmp = dp;
+
ret = asn1_find_indefinite_length(
- data, datalen, &dp, &len, &errmsg);
+ data, datalen, &tmp, &len, &errmsg);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- } else {
- dp += len;
}
pr_debug("- LEAF: %zu\n", len);
}
+
+ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ACT) {
+ unsigned char act;
+
+ if (op & ASN1_OP_MATCH__ANY)
+ act = machine[pc + 1];
+ else
+ act = machine[pc + 2];
+ ret = actions[act](context, hdr, tag, data + dp, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!(flags & FLAG_CONS))
+ dp += len;
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
@@ -434,6 +439,8 @@ next_op:
else
act = machine[pc + 1];
ret = actions[act](context, hdr, 0, data + tdp, len);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
}
pc += asn1_op_lengths[op];
goto next_op;
diff --git a/lib/cmpdi2.c b/lib/cmpdi2.c
index 6d7ebf6c2b86..2250da7e503e 100644
--- a/lib/cmpdi2.c
+++ b/lib/cmpdi2.c
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
word_type notrace __cmpdi2(long long a, long long b)
{
diff --git a/lib/lshrdi3.c b/lib/lshrdi3.c
index 8e845f4bb65f..99cfa5721f2d 100644
--- a/lib/lshrdi3.c
+++ b/lib/lshrdi3.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
long long notrace __lshrdi3(long long u, word_type b)
{
diff --git a/lib/muldi3.c b/lib/muldi3.c
index 88938543e10a..54c8b3123376 100644
--- a/lib/muldi3.c
+++ b/lib/muldi3.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
#define W_TYPE_SIZE 32
diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
index 8bf78b4b78f0..dfa55c873c13 100644
--- a/lib/nlattr.c
+++ b/lib/nlattr.c
@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
-/* for these data types attribute length must be exactly given size */
+/* For these data types, attribute length should be exactly the given
+ * size. However, to maintain compatibility with broken commands, if the
+ * attribute length does not match the expected size a warning is emitted
+ * to the user that the command is sending invalid data and needs to be fixed.
+ */
static const u8 nla_attr_len[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = {
[NLA_U8] = sizeof(u8),
[NLA_U16] = sizeof(u16),
@@ -28,8 +32,16 @@ static const u8 nla_attr_len[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = {
};
static const u8 nla_attr_minlen[NLA_TYPE_MAX+1] = {
+ [NLA_U8] = sizeof(u8),
+ [NLA_U16] = sizeof(u16),
+ [NLA_U32] = sizeof(u32),
+ [NLA_U64] = sizeof(u64),
[NLA_MSECS] = sizeof(u64),
[NLA_NESTED] = NLA_HDRLEN,
+ [NLA_S8] = sizeof(s8),
+ [NLA_S16] = sizeof(s16),
+ [NLA_S32] = sizeof(s32),
+ [NLA_S64] = sizeof(s64),
};
static int validate_nla_bitfield32(const struct nlattr *nla,
@@ -69,11 +81,9 @@ static int validate_nla(const struct nlattr *nla, int maxtype,
BUG_ON(pt->type > NLA_TYPE_MAX);
- /* for data types NLA_U* and NLA_S* require exact length */
- if (nla_attr_len[pt->type]) {
- if (attrlen != nla_attr_len[pt->type])
- return -ERANGE;
- return 0;
+ if (nla_attr_len[pt->type] && attrlen != nla_attr_len[pt->type]) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("netlink: '%s': attribute type %d has an invalid length.\n",
+ current->comm, type);
}
switch (pt->type) {
diff --git a/lib/oid_registry.c b/lib/oid_registry.c
index 41b9e50711a7..0bcac6ccb1b2 100644
--- a/lib/oid_registry.c
+++ b/lib/oid_registry.c
@@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, char *buffer, size_t bufsize)
int count;
if (v >= end)
- return -EBADMSG;
+ goto bad;
n = *v++;
ret = count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, "%u.%u", n / 40, n % 40);
+ if (count >= bufsize)
+ return -ENOBUFS;
buffer += count;
bufsize -= count;
- if (bufsize == 0)
- return -ENOBUFS;
while (v < end) {
num = 0;
@@ -134,20 +134,24 @@ int sprint_oid(const void *data, size_t datasize, char *buffer, size_t bufsize)
num = n & 0x7f;
do {
if (v >= end)
- return -EBADMSG;
+ goto bad;
n = *v++;
num <<= 7;
num |= n & 0x7f;
} while (n & 0x80);
}
ret += count = snprintf(buffer, bufsize, ".%lu", num);
- buffer += count;
- if (bufsize <= count)
+ if (count >= bufsize)
return -ENOBUFS;
+ buffer += count;
bufsize -= count;
}
return ret;
+
+bad:
+ snprintf(buffer, bufsize, "(bad)");
+ return -EBADMSG;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sprint_oid);
diff --git a/lib/test_printf.c b/lib/test_printf.c
index 563f10e6876a..71ebfa43ad05 100644
--- a/lib/test_printf.c
+++ b/lib/test_printf.c
@@ -24,24 +24,6 @@
#define PAD_SIZE 16
#define FILL_CHAR '$'
-#define PTR1 ((void*)0x01234567)
-#define PTR2 ((void*)(long)(int)0xfedcba98)
-
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
-#define PTR1_ZEROES "000000000"
-#define PTR1_SPACES " "
-#define PTR1_STR "1234567"
-#define PTR2_STR "fffffffffedcba98"
-#define PTR_WIDTH 16
-#else
-#define PTR1_ZEROES "0"
-#define PTR1_SPACES " "
-#define PTR1_STR "1234567"
-#define PTR2_STR "fedcba98"
-#define PTR_WIDTH 8
-#endif
-#define PTR_WIDTH_STR stringify(PTR_WIDTH)
-
static unsigned total_tests __initdata;
static unsigned failed_tests __initdata;
static char *test_buffer __initdata;
@@ -217,30 +199,79 @@ test_string(void)
test("a | | ", "%-3.s|%-3.0s|%-3.*s", "a", "b", 0, "c");
}
+#define PLAIN_BUF_SIZE 64 /* leave some space so we don't oops */
+
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
+
+#define PTR_WIDTH 16
+#define PTR ((void *)0xffff0123456789ab)
+#define PTR_STR "ffff0123456789ab"
+#define ZEROS "00000000" /* hex 32 zero bits */
+
+static int __init
+plain_format(void)
+{
+ char buf[PLAIN_BUF_SIZE];
+ int nchars;
+
+ nchars = snprintf(buf, PLAIN_BUF_SIZE, "%p", PTR);
+
+ if (nchars != PTR_WIDTH || strncmp(buf, ZEROS, strlen(ZEROS)) != 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#define PTR_WIDTH 8
+#define PTR ((void *)0x456789ab)
+#define PTR_STR "456789ab"
+
+static int __init
+plain_format(void)
+{
+ /* Format is implicitly tested for 32 bit machines by plain_hash() */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* BITS_PER_LONG == 64 */
+
+static int __init
+plain_hash(void)
+{
+ char buf[PLAIN_BUF_SIZE];
+ int nchars;
+
+ nchars = snprintf(buf, PLAIN_BUF_SIZE, "%p", PTR);
+
+ if (nchars != PTR_WIDTH || strncmp(buf, PTR_STR, PTR_WIDTH) == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We can't use test() to test %p because we don't know what output to expect
+ * after an address is hashed.
+ */
static void __init
plain(void)
{
- test(PTR1_ZEROES PTR1_STR " " PTR2_STR, "%p %p", PTR1, PTR2);
- /*
- * The field width is overloaded for some %p extensions to
- * pass another piece of information. For plain pointers, the
- * behaviour is slightly odd: One cannot pass either the 0
- * flag nor a precision to %p without gcc complaining, and if
- * one explicitly gives a field width, the number is no longer
- * zero-padded.
- */
- test("|" PTR1_STR PTR1_SPACES " | " PTR1_SPACES PTR1_STR "|",
- "|%-*p|%*p|", PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR1, PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR1);
- test("|" PTR2_STR " | " PTR2_STR "|",
- "|%-*p|%*p|", PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR2, PTR_WIDTH+2, PTR2);
+ int err;
- /*
- * Unrecognized %p extensions are treated as plain %p, but the
- * alphanumeric suffix is ignored (that is, does not occur in
- * the output.)
- */
- test("|"PTR1_ZEROES PTR1_STR"|", "|%p0y|", PTR1);
- test("|"PTR2_STR"|", "|%p0y|", PTR2);
+ err = plain_hash();
+ if (err) {
+ pr_warn("plain 'p' does not appear to be hashed\n");
+ failed_tests++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ err = plain_format();
+ if (err) {
+ pr_warn("hashing plain 'p' has unexpected format\n");
+ failed_tests++;
+ }
}
static void __init
@@ -251,6 +282,7 @@ symbol_ptr(void)
static void __init
kernel_ptr(void)
{
+ /* We can't test this without access to kptr_restrict. */
}
static void __init
diff --git a/lib/ucmpdi2.c b/lib/ucmpdi2.c
index 49a53505c8e3..25ca2d4c1e19 100644
--- a/lib/ucmpdi2.c
+++ b/lib/ucmpdi2.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <lib/libgcc.h>
+#include <linux/libgcc.h>
word_type __ucmpdi2(unsigned long long a, unsigned long long b)
{
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 1746bae94d41..01c3957b2de6 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#endif
@@ -1343,6 +1345,59 @@ char *uuid_string(char *buf, char *end, const u8 *addr,
return string(buf, end, uuid, spec);
}
+int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+ struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ spec.base = 16;
+ spec.flags |= SMALL;
+ if (spec.field_width == -1) {
+ spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+ spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
+ }
+
+ switch (kptr_restrict) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Always print %pK values */
+ break;
+ case 1: {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ /*
+ * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+ * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+ */
+ if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi())
+ return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+
+ /*
+ * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+ * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+ * same credentials it started with. This is because
+ * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
+ * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+ * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+ * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+ */
+ cred = current_cred();
+ if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 2:
+ default:
+ /* Always print 0's for %pK */
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return number(buf, end, (unsigned long)ptr, spec);
+}
+
static noinline_for_stack
char *netdev_bits(char *buf, char *end, const void *addr, const char *fmt)
{
@@ -1591,7 +1646,86 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
-int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+static noinline_for_stack
+char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
+ struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ spec.base = 16;
+ spec.flags |= SMALL;
+ if (spec.field_width == -1) {
+ spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+ spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
+ }
+
+ return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec);
+}
+
+static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly;
+static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
+
+static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+{
+ get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
+ /*
+ * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
+ * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
+ * after get_random_bytes() returns.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+ WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
+}
+
+static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
+ .func = fill_random_ptr_key
+};
+
+static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
+{
+ int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+
+ if (!ret) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
+ fill_random_ptr_key(&random_ready);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+early_initcall(initialize_ptr_random);
+
+/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */
+static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ unsigned long hashval;
+ const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
+
+ if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
+ spec.field_width = default_width;
+ /* string length must be less than default_width */
+ return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
+ /*
+ * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have
+ * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID).
+ */
+ hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff;
+#else
+ hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key);
+#endif
+
+ spec.flags |= SMALL;
+ if (spec.field_width == -1) {
+ spec.field_width = default_width;
+ spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
+ }
+ spec.base = 16;
+
+ return number(buf, end, hashval, spec);
+}
/*
* Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
@@ -1698,11 +1832,16 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
* c major compatible string
* C full compatible string
*
+ * - 'x' For printing the address. Equivalent to "%lx".
+ *
* ** Please update also Documentation/printk-formats.txt when making changes **
*
* Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
* function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
* pointer to the real address.
+ *
+ * Note: The default behaviour (unadorned %p) is to hash the address,
+ * rendering it useful as a unique identifier.
*/
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
@@ -1792,47 +1931,9 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
return buf;
}
case 'K':
- switch (kptr_restrict) {
- case 0:
- /* Always print %pK values */
- break;
- case 1: {
- const struct cred *cred;
-
- /*
- * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
- * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
- */
- if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
- if (spec.field_width == -1)
- spec.field_width = default_width;
- return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
- }
-
- /*
- * Only print the real pointer value if the current
- * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
- * same credentials it started with. This is because
- * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
- * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
- * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
- * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
- */
- cred = current_cred();
- if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
- !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
- !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- case 2:
- default:
- /* Always print 0's for %pK */
- ptr = NULL;
+ if (!kptr_restrict)
break;
- }
- break;
-
+ return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
case 'N':
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
case 'a':
@@ -1857,15 +1958,12 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
case 'F':
return device_node_string(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt + 1);
}
+ case 'x':
+ return pointer_string(buf, end, ptr, spec);
}
- spec.flags |= SMALL;
- if (spec.field_width == -1) {
- spec.field_width = default_width;
- spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
- }
- spec.base = 16;
- return number(buf, end, (unsigned long) ptr, spec);
+ /* default is to _not_ leak addresses, hash before printing */
+ return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
}
/*
generated by cgit v1.2.3-58-ga151 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-29 21:00:57 +0000