diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/Kconfig | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/enable.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 48 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/init.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/open.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/signature.c | 157 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/verify.c | 6 |
8 files changed, 269 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/Kconfig b/fs/verity/Kconfig index c2bca0b01ecf..88fb25119899 100644 --- a/fs/verity/Kconfig +++ b/fs/verity/Kconfig @@ -36,3 +36,20 @@ config FS_VERITY_DEBUG Enable debugging messages related to fs-verity by default. Say N unless you are an fs-verity developer. + +config FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES + bool "FS Verity builtin signature support" + depends on FS_VERITY + select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + Support verifying signatures of verity files against the X.509 + certificates that have been loaded into the ".fs-verity" + kernel keyring. + + This is meant as a relatively simple mechanism that can be + used to provide an authenticity guarantee for verity files, as + an alternative to IMA appraisal. Userspace programs still + need to check that the verity bit is set in order to get an + authenticity guarantee. + + If unsure, say N. diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile index 6f7675ae0a31..570e9136334d 100644 --- a/fs/verity/Makefile +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile @@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ measure.o \ open.o \ verify.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.o diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c index df5dab03f0c2..eabc6ac19906 100644 --- a/fs/verity/enable.c +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; struct merkle_tree_params params = { }; struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; - size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc); + size_t desc_size = sizeof(*desc) + arg->sig_size; struct fsverity_info *vi; int err; @@ -183,6 +183,16 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, } desc->salt_size = arg->salt_size; + /* Get the signature if the user provided one */ + if (arg->sig_size && + copy_from_user(desc->signature, + (const u8 __user *)(uintptr_t)arg->sig_ptr, + arg->sig_size)) { + err = -EFAULT; + goto out; + } + desc->sig_size = cpu_to_le32(arg->sig_size); + desc->data_size = cpu_to_le64(inode->i_size); /* Prepare the Merkle tree parameters */ @@ -238,6 +248,10 @@ static int enable_verity(struct file *filp, goto rollback; } + if (arg->sig_size) + pr_debug("Storing a %u-byte PKCS#7 signature alongside the file\n", + arg->sig_size); + /* * Tell the filesystem to finish enabling verity on the file. * Serialized with ->begin_enable_verity() by the inode lock. @@ -304,8 +318,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) if (arg.salt_size > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct fsverity_descriptor, salt)) return -EMSGSIZE; - if (arg.sig_size) - return -EINVAL; + if (arg.sig_size > FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE) + return -EMSGSIZE; /* * Require a regular file with write access. But the actual fd must diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h index 02a547f0667c..e74c79b64d88 100644 --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h @@ -75,23 +75,41 @@ struct fsverity_info { }; /* - * Merkle tree properties. The file measurement is the hash of this structure. + * Merkle tree properties. The file measurement is the hash of this structure + * excluding the signature and with the sig_size field set to 0. */ struct fsverity_descriptor { __u8 version; /* must be 1 */ __u8 hash_algorithm; /* Merkle tree hash algorithm */ __u8 log_blocksize; /* log2 of size of data and tree blocks */ __u8 salt_size; /* size of salt in bytes; 0 if none */ - __le32 sig_size; /* reserved, must be 0 */ + __le32 sig_size; /* size of signature in bytes; 0 if none */ __le64 data_size; /* size of file the Merkle tree is built over */ __u8 root_hash[64]; /* Merkle tree root hash */ __u8 salt[32]; /* salt prepended to each hashed block */ __u8 __reserved[144]; /* must be 0's */ + __u8 signature[]; /* optional PKCS#7 signature */ }; /* Arbitrary limit to bound the kmalloc() size. Can be changed. */ #define FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 16384 +#define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE (FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \ + sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor)) + +/* + * Format in which verity file measurements are signed. This is the same as + * 'struct fsverity_digest', except here some magic bytes are prepended to + * provide some context about what is being signed in case the same key is used + * for non-fsverity purposes, and here the fields have fixed endianness. + */ +struct fsverity_signed_digest { + char magic[8]; /* must be "FSVerity" */ + __le16 digest_algorithm; + __le16 digest_size; + __u8 digest[]; +}; + /* hash_algs.c */ extern struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[]; @@ -127,7 +145,7 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size); struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, - const void *desc, size_t desc_size); + void *desc, size_t desc_size); void fsverity_set_info(struct inode *inode, struct fsverity_info *vi); @@ -136,8 +154,32 @@ void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi); int __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void); void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void); +/* signature.c */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES +int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + size_t desc_size); + +int __init fsverity_init_signature(void); +#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */ +static inline int +fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + size_t desc_size) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int fsverity_init_signature(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */ + /* verify.c */ int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void); +void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void); #endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */ diff --git a/fs/verity/init.c b/fs/verity/init.c index b593805aafcc..94c104e00861 100644 --- a/fs/verity/init.c +++ b/fs/verity/init.c @@ -45,9 +45,15 @@ static int __init fsverity_init(void) if (err) goto err_exit_info_cache; + err = fsverity_init_signature(); + if (err) + goto err_exit_workqueue; + pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n"); return 0; +err_exit_workqueue: + fsverity_exit_workqueue(); err_exit_info_cache: fsverity_exit_info_cache(); return err; diff --git a/fs/verity/open.c b/fs/verity/open.c index 3636a1ed8e2c..63d1004b688c 100644 --- a/fs/verity/open.c +++ b/fs/verity/open.c @@ -122,22 +122,32 @@ out_err: return err; } -/* Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor. */ +/* + * Compute the file measurement by hashing the fsverity_descriptor excluding the + * signature and with the sig_size field set to 0. + */ static int compute_file_measurement(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg, - const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, u8 *measurement) { - return fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), measurement); + __le32 sig_size = desc->sig_size; + int err; + + desc->sig_size = 0; + err = fsverity_hash_buffer(hash_alg, desc, sizeof(*desc), measurement); + desc->sig_size = sig_size; + + return err; } /* * Validate the given fsverity_descriptor and create a new fsverity_info from - * it. + * it. The signature (if present) is also checked. */ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, - const void *_desc, size_t desc_size) + void *_desc, size_t desc_size) { - const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc; + struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc; struct fsverity_info *vi; int err; @@ -153,8 +163,7 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } - if (desc->sig_size || - memchr_inv(desc->__reserved, 0, sizeof(desc->__reserved))) { + if (memchr_inv(desc->__reserved, 0, sizeof(desc->__reserved))) { fsverity_err(inode, "Reserved bits set in descriptor"); return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } @@ -198,6 +207,8 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, pr_debug("Computed file measurement: %s:%*phN\n", vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->measurement); + + err = fsverity_verify_signature(vi, desc, desc_size); out: if (err) { fsverity_free_info(vi); diff --git a/fs/verity/signature.c b/fs/verity/signature.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c8b255232de5 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/verity/signature.c @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * fs/verity/signature.c: verification of builtin signatures + * + * Copyright 2019 Google LLC + */ + +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> + +/* + * /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures + * If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature. + */ +static int fsverity_require_signatures; + +/* + * Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates. + * + * Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use + * keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions. + */ +static struct key *fsverity_keyring; + +/** + * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature + * + * If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file + * measurement, verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. + * + * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure + */ +int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, + const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, + size_t desc_size) +{ + const struct inode *inode = vi->inode; + const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; + const u32 sig_size = le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size); + struct fsverity_signed_digest *d; + int err; + + if (sig_size == 0) { + if (fsverity_require_signatures) { + fsverity_err(inode, + "require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!"); + return -EPERM; + } + return 0; + } + + if (sig_size > desc_size - sizeof(*desc)) { + fsverity_err(inode, "Signature overflows verity descriptor"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!d) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8); + d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs); + d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size); + memcpy(d->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size); + + err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, + desc->signature, sig_size, + fsverity_keyring, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + NULL, NULL); + kfree(d); + + if (err) { + if (err == -ENOKEY) + fsverity_err(inode, + "File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring"); + else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED) + fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature"); + else if (err == -EBADMSG) + fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature"); + else + fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature", + err); + return err; + } + + pr_debug("Valid signature for file measurement %s:%*phN\n", + hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->measurement); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table_header *fsverity_sysctl_header; + +static const struct ctl_path fsverity_sysctl_path[] = { + { .procname = "fs", }, + { .procname = "verity", }, + { } +}; + +static struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "require_signatures", + .data = &fsverity_require_signatures, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, + { } +}; + +static int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void) +{ + fsverity_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_paths(fsverity_sysctl_path, + fsverity_sysctl_table); + if (!fsverity_sysctl_header) { + pr_err("sysctl registration failed!\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + return 0; +} +#else /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +static inline int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +int __init fsverity_init_signature(void) +{ + struct key *ring; + int err; + + ring = keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), + current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | + KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(ring)) + return PTR_ERR(ring); + + err = fsverity_sysctl_init(); + if (err) + goto err_put_ring; + + fsverity_keyring = ring; + return 0; + +err_put_ring: + key_put(ring); + return err; +} diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c index 62ab8f6a8ea1..3e8f2de44667 100644 --- a/fs/verity/verify.c +++ b/fs/verity/verify.c @@ -273,3 +273,9 @@ int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void) return -ENOMEM; return 0; } + +void __init fsverity_exit_workqueue(void) +{ + destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue); + fsverity_read_workqueue = NULL; +} |