diff options
| author | Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> | 2018-03-01 18:48:02 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> | 2018-03-01 18:48:02 -0500 |
| commit | aa8e712cee93d520e96a2ca8e3a20f807c937e3f (patch) | |
| tree | 5e2bdce92022ebb334bfa68b6a731b71ef86974d /security | |
| parent | 2572f5b4245abf2b4e5a86cabf65a50efda09aac (diff) | |
selinux: wrap global selinux state
Define a selinux state structure (struct selinux_state) for
global SELinux state and pass it explicitly to all security server
functions. The public portion of the structure contains state
that is used throughout the SELinux code, such as the enforcing mode.
The structure also contains a pointer to a selinux_ss structure whose
definition is private to the security server and contains security
server specific state such as the policy database and SID table.
This change should have no effect on SELinux behavior or APIs
(userspace or LSM). It merely wraps SELinux state and passes it
explicitly as needed.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: minor fixups needed due to collisions with the SCTP patches]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
25 files changed, 1155 insertions, 797 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 2380b8d72cec..36124f48a5ff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla char *scontext; u32 scontext_len; - rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ssid, + &scontext, &scontext_len); if (rc) audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid); else { @@ -157,7 +158,8 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla kfree(scontext); } - rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, tsid, + &scontext, &scontext_len); if (rc) audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid); else { @@ -969,7 +971,8 @@ static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, { rcu_read_unlock(); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head); - security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp); + security_compute_av(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + avd, &xp_node->xp); rcu_read_lock(); return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node); } @@ -982,7 +985,8 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, if (flags & AVC_STRICT) return -EACCES; - if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) + if (is_enforcing(&selinux_state) && + !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) return -EACCES; avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid, @@ -1043,8 +1047,8 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, goto decision; } rcu_read_unlock(); - security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver, - &local_xpd); + security_compute_xperms_decision(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, + tclass, driver, &local_xpd); rcu_read_lock(); avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0); diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 28a5c4ee0705..d78f9e2f6df0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -100,20 +100,24 @@ #include "audit.h" #include "avc_ss.h" +struct selinux_state selinux_state; + /* SECMARK reference count */ static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP -int selinux_enforcing; +static int selinux_enforcing_boot; static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) { unsigned long enforcing; if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) - selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; + selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0; return 1; } __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); +#else +#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1 #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM @@ -131,6 +135,19 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); int selinux_enabled = 1; #endif +static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot = + CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; + +static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) +{ + unsigned long checkreqprot; + + if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) + selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; + return 1; +} +__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); + static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache; @@ -147,7 +164,8 @@ static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache; */ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) { - return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); + return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || + atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); } /** @@ -162,7 +180,8 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) */ static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) { - return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); + return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() || + netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); } static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) @@ -266,7 +285,8 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, might_sleep_if(may_sleep); - if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { + if (selinux_state.initialized && + isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; @@ -488,7 +508,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || - (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel && + (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); } @@ -588,7 +608,7 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return -EINVAL; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!selinux_state.initialized) return -EINVAL; /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */ @@ -619,21 +639,25 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, i = 0; if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { - rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid, + &context, &len); if (rc) goto out_free; opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; } if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { - rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, + sbsec->mntpoint_sid, + &context, &len); if (rc) goto out_free; opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; } if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { - rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid, + &context, &len); if (rc) goto out_free; opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; @@ -643,7 +667,8 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root; struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root); - rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, + &context, &len); if (rc) goto out_free; opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; @@ -706,7 +731,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); - if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!selinux_state.initialized) { if (!num_opts) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security @@ -752,7 +777,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, + mount_options[i], &sid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -828,7 +855,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this * filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(sb); + rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", @@ -853,7 +880,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; - rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(), + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, + current_sid(), + current_sid(), SECCLASS_FILE, NULL, &sbsec->mntpoint_sid); if (rc) @@ -989,7 +1018,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later */ - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!selinux_state.initialized) return 0; /* @@ -1016,7 +1045,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) { - rc = security_fs_use(newsb); + rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb); if (rc) goto out; } @@ -1299,7 +1328,7 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) { - int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass; + int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass(); switch (family) { case PF_UNIX: @@ -1473,7 +1502,8 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, path++; } } - rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); + rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, + path, tclass, sid); } free_page((unsigned long)buffer); return rc; @@ -1591,7 +1621,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent sid = sbsec->def_sid; rc = 0; } else { - rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, + rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, + context, rc, &sid, sbsec->def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { @@ -1624,7 +1655,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent sid = sbsec->sid; /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ - rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid); + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid, + sclass, NULL, &sid); if (rc) goto out; break; @@ -1885,7 +1917,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid; } else { const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir); - return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass, + return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + dsec->sid, tclass, name, _new_isid); } @@ -2108,7 +2141,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) u32 av = file_to_av(file); struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && + inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) av |= FILE__OPEN; return av; @@ -2353,7 +2387,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * policy allows the corresponding permission between * the old and new contexts. */ - if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) { + if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) { av = 0; if (nnp) av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION; @@ -2370,7 +2404,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset * of the permissions of the current SID. */ - rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); + rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, + new_tsec->sid); if (!rc) return 0; @@ -2422,8 +2457,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return rc; } else { /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ - rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, - SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, + isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, &new_tsec->sid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2781,7 +2816,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) continue; - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, + mount_options[i], &sid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", @@ -2906,7 +2943,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, if (rc) return rc; - return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); + return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx, + ctxlen); } static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, @@ -2960,14 +2998,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; } - if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) + if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; if (value && len) { - rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); if (rc) return rc; *value = context; @@ -3128,7 +3167,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - if (selinux_policycap_openperm && + if (selinux_policycap_openperm() && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE)) @@ -3190,7 +3229,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc == -EINVAL) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -3215,7 +3255,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return rc; } - rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, + size, &newsid); } if (rc) return rc; @@ -3225,8 +3266,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (rc) return rc; - rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, - isec->sclass); + rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid, + sid, isec->sclass); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3251,7 +3292,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return; } - rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); + rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size, + &newsid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", @@ -3326,10 +3368,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void */ isec = inode_security(inode); if (has_cap_mac_admin(false)) - error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, + error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, + isec->sid, &context, &size); else - error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); + error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid, + &context, &size); if (error) return error; error = size; @@ -3355,7 +3399,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, if (!value || !size) return -EACCES; - rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3617,7 +3662,7 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, return rc; } - if (selinux_checkreqprot) + if (selinux_state.checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, @@ -3631,7 +3676,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); - if (selinux_checkreqprot) + if (selinux_state.checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; if (default_noexec && @@ -4319,7 +4364,8 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) if (unlikely(err)) return -EACCES; - err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); + err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid, + nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); if (unlikely(err)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," @@ -4347,7 +4393,8 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) int err = 0; if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) - err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); + err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid, + conn_sid); else *conn_sid = sk_sid; @@ -4364,8 +4411,8 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, return 0; } - return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, - socksid); + return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid, + secclass, NULL, socksid); } static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) @@ -4741,8 +4788,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, /* server child socket */ sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; - err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, - &sksec_new->sid); + err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid, + sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid); if (err) return err; @@ -4847,7 +4894,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ - if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) + if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); @@ -4909,7 +4956,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) return -ENOPROTOOPT; - err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); + err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext, + &scontext_len); if (err) return err; @@ -5032,7 +5080,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, u32 conn_sid; int err = 0; - if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass) + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); @@ -5101,7 +5149,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *addr; struct socket *sock; - if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass) + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ @@ -5173,7 +5221,7 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk, /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. */ - if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass) + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); newsksec->sid = ep->secid; @@ -5359,7 +5407,8 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name, task_pid_nr(current), current->comm); - if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) + if (!is_enforcing(&selinux_state) || + security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state)) err = 0; } @@ -5389,7 +5438,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; - if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) + if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return NF_ACCEPT; secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); @@ -5558,7 +5607,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function * as fast and as clean as possible. */ - if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) + if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer()) return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); @@ -5864,8 +5913,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, * Compute new sid based on current process and * message queue this message will be stored in */ - rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, - NULL, &msec->sid); + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid, + SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid); if (rc) return rc; } @@ -6174,7 +6223,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, if (!sid) return 0; - error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); + error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len); if (error) return error; return len; @@ -6221,7 +6270,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) str[size-1] = 0; size--; } - error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, + &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) { struct audit_buffer *ab; @@ -6240,8 +6290,9 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) return error; } - error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, - &sid); + error = security_context_to_sid_force( + &selinux_state, + value, size, &sid); } if (error) return error; @@ -6278,7 +6329,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size) /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ error = -EPERM; if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { - error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); + error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, + tsec->sid, sid); if (error) goto abort_change; } @@ -6320,12 +6372,14 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { - return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); + return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, + secdata, seclen); } static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { - return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); + return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen, + secid, GFP_KERNEL); } static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) @@ -6427,7 +6481,8 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) unsigned len; int rc; - rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid, + &context, &len); if (!rc) rc = len; *_buffer = context; @@ -6466,7 +6521,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec; struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport; - err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid); + err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num, + &sid); if (err) return err; @@ -6880,6 +6936,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); + memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state)); + set_enforcing(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot); + selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot; + selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss); + /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); @@ -6893,6 +6954,12 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); avc_init(); + avtab_cache_init(); + + ebitmap_cache_init(); + + hashtab_cache_init(); + security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux"); if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) @@ -6901,7 +6968,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n"); - if (selinux_enforcing) + if (selinux_enforcing_boot) printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); else printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); @@ -7022,23 +7089,22 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE -static int selinux_disabled; - -int selinux_disable(void) +int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state) { - if (ss_initialized) { + if (state->initialized) { /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ return -EINVAL; } - if (selinux_disabled) { + if (state->disabled) { /* Only do this once. */ return -EINVAL; } + state->disabled = 1; + printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); - selinux_disabled = 1; selinux_enabled = 0; security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c index e3614ee5f1c0..0a4b89d48297 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c +++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c @@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid) return 0; } - ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid); + ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(&selinux_state, subnet_prefix, pkey_num, + sid); if (ret) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 57d61cf36500..de33dc9034b8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -20,12 +20,6 @@ #include "av_permissions.h" #include "security.h" -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP -extern int selinux_enforcing; -#else -#define selinux_enforcing 1 -#endif - /* * An entry in the AVC. */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index 3bcc72769b87..4e2a44d0ae66 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -19,11 +19,5 @@ struct security_class_mapping { extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[]; -/* - * The security server must be initialized before - * any labeling or access decisions can be provided. - */ -extern int ss_initialized; - #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h index ff4fddca9050..0e30eca02c48 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h @@ -13,10 +13,15 @@ #ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_ #define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_ -int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values); +#include "security.h" -int security_set_bools(int len, int *values); +int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, + int *len, char ***names, int **values); -int security_get_bool_value(int index); +int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, + int len, int *values); + +int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state, + int index); #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index dabf02888a95..cc5e26b0161b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -158,6 +158,4 @@ struct bpf_security_struct { u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ }; -extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; - #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 02f0412d42f2..c3a1ef10e710 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/magic.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> +#include <linux/workqueue.h> #include "flask.h" #define SECSID_NULL 0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */ @@ -81,13 +83,6 @@ enum { extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX]; -extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; -extern int selinux_policycap_openperm; -extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass; -extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; -extern int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel; -extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition; - /* * type_datum properties * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY @@ -98,13 +93,95 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition; /* limitation of boundary depth */ #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH 4 -int security_mls_enabled(void); +struct selinux_ss; + +struct selinux_state { + bool disabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP + bool enforcing; +#endif + bool checkreqprot; + bool initialized; + bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX]; + struct selinux_ss *ss; +}; + +void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss); + +extern struct selinux_state selinux_state; + +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP +static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state) +{ + return state->enforcing; +} + +static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value) +{ + state->enforcing = value; +} +#else +static inline bool is_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state) +{ + return true; +} + +static inline void set_enforcing(struct selinux_state *state, bool value) +{ +} +#endif + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER]; +} + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM]; +} -int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len); -int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len); -size_t security_policydb_len(void); +static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS]; +} -int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap); +static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK]; +} + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL]; +} + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]; +} + +int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state); +int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void *data, size_t len); +int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len); +size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state); + +int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, + unsigned int req_cap); #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32 struct av_decision { @@ -141,76 +218,100 @@ struct extended_perms { /* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 -void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, +void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms); -void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd); +void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + u8 driver, + struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd); -void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd); +void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd); -int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid); -int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const char *objname, u32 *out_sid); -int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); +int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); -int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); +int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, + u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid); -int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, - u32 *scontext_len); +int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, + char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); -int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); +int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); -int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); -int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); +int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp); -int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags); -int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid); -int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username, +int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 callsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel); -int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid); +int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid); -int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid); +int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid); -int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid); +int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid); -int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid); +int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + char *name, u32 *if_sid); -int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, - u32 *out_sid); +int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen, + u32 *out_sid); -int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, +int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass); -int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, +int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass); -int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid); +int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid); -int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); +int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid); -int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, +int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, u32 xfrm_sid, u32 *peer_sid); -int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses); -int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms); -int security_get_reject_unknown(void); -int security_get_allow_unknown(void); +int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, + char ***classes, int *nclasses); +int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, + char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms); +int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state); +int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state); #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */ @@ -221,27 +322,31 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void); #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE 7 /* use native label support */ #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX 7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */ -int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb); +int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb); -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, - u32 *sid); +int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, + u32 *sid); #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL -int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, +int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid); -int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, +int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr); #else -static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid( +static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid) { return -EIDRM; } -static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, - struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) +static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { return -ENOENT; } @@ -252,7 +357,7 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid); /* * status notifier using mmap interface */ -extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void); +extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state); #define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION 1 struct selinux_kernel_status { @@ -266,10 +371,12 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status { */ } __packed; -extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing); -extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno); +extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state, + int enforcing); +extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state, + int seqno); extern void selinux_complete_init(void); -extern int selinux_disable(void); +extern int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state); extern void exit_sel_fs(void); extern struct path selinux_null; extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; @@ -277,5 +384,8 @@ extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val); extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); -#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */ +extern void avtab_cache_init(void); +extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); +extern void hashtab_cache_init(void); +#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c index e607b4473ef6..ac65f7417413 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netif.c +++ b/security/selinux/netif.c @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid) ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } - ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid); + ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid); if (ret != 0) goto out; new->nsec.ns = ns; diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 8730be427390..28010f741cfe 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, { int rc; - rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid); + rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid); if (rc == 0 && (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) && (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)) @@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); if (secattr == NULL) return NULL; - rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid, + secattr); if (rc != 0) { netlbl_secattr_free(secattr); return NULL; @@ -257,7 +258,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, if (secattr == NULL) { secattr = &secattr_storage; netlbl_secattr_init(secattr); - rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid, + secattr); if (rc != 0) goto skbuff_setsid_return; } @@ -297,7 +299,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, return 0; netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(ep->secid, &secattr); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, + ep->secid, &secattr); if (rc != 0) goto assoc_request_return; @@ -345,7 +348,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family) return 0; netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr); - rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid, + &secattr); if (rc != 0) goto inet_conn_request_return; rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr); diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index da923f89d2a9..6dd89b89bc1f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid) goto out; switch (family) { case PF_INET: - ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET, + ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET, addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid); new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr; break; case PF_INET6: - ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6, + ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6, addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid); new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr; break; diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 3311cc393cb4..9ed4c5064a5e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid) new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); if (new == NULL) goto out; - ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid); + ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid); if (ret != 0) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 00eed842c491..98492755adbf 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -41,17 +41,6 @@ #include "objsec.h" #include "conditional.h" -unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; - -static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str) -{ - unsigned long checkreqprot; - if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) - selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0; - return 1; -} -__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup); - static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex); /* global data for booleans */ @@ -108,7 +97,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing); + length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", + is_enforcing(&selinux_state)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); } @@ -119,7 +109,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { char *page = NULL; ssize_t length; - int new_value; + int old_value, new_value; if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) return -ENOMEM; @@ -138,7 +128,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, new_value = !!new_value; - if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) { + old_value = is_enforcing(&selinux_state); + + if (new_value != old_value) { length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY, SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE, NULL); @@ -146,15 +138,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u", - new_value, selinux_enforcing, + new_value, old_value, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); - selinux_enforcing = new_value; - if (selinux_enforcing) + set_enforcing(&selinux_state, new_value); + if (new_value) avc_ss_reset(0); - selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing); - selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing); - if (!selinux_enforcing) + selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value); + selinux_status_update_setenforce(&selinux_state, + new_value); + if (!new_value) call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL); } length = count; @@ -179,7 +172,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, ssize_t length; ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino; int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ? - security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown(); + security_get_reject_unknown(&selinux_state) : + !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state); length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); @@ -192,7 +186,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = { static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { - struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(); + struct page *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(&selinux_state); if (!status) return -ENOMEM; @@ -268,7 +262,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out; if (new_value) { - length = selinux_disable(); + length = selinux_disable(&selinux_state); if (length) goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS, @@ -322,7 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, ssize_t length; length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", - security_mls_enabled()); + security_mls_enabled(&selinux_state)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); } @@ -359,13 +353,13 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) if (!plm) goto err; - if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) { + if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(&selinux_state)) { inode_lock(inode); - i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len()); + i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(&selinux_state)); inode_unlock(inode); } - rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len); + rc = security_read_policy(&selinux_state, &plm->data, &plm->len); if (rc) goto err; @@ -500,7 +494,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) goto out; - length = security_load_policy(data, count); + length = security_load_policy(&selinux_state, data, count); if (length) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n"); goto out; @@ -553,11 +547,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, buf, size, + &sid, GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len); + length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &canon, &len); if (length) goto out; @@ -581,7 +576,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t length; - length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot); + length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_state.checkreqprot); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); } @@ -613,7 +608,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1) goto out; - selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; + selinux_state.checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0; length = count; out: kfree(page); @@ -673,19 +668,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file, if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4) goto out; - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, oldcon, &osid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) goto out; - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, newcon, &nsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) goto out; - rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, taskcon, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (rc) goto out; - rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass); + rc = security_validate_transition_user(&selinux_state, osid, nsid, + tsid, tclass); if (!rc) rc = count; out: @@ -780,15 +779,17 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd); + security_compute_av_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd); length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT, "%x %x %x %x %u %x", @@ -868,20 +869,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) objname = namebuf; } - length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, - objname, &newsid); + length = security_transition_sid_user(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, + tclass, objname, &newsid); if (length) goto out; - length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len); + length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon, + &len); if (length) goto out; @@ -931,19 +935,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid); + length = security_change_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + &newsid); if (length) goto out; - length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len); + length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon, + &len); if (length) goto out; @@ -989,18 +997,21 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, con, &sid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids); + length = security_get_user_sids(&selinux_state, sid, user, &sids, + &nsids); if (length) goto out; length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1; ptr = buf + length; for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) { - rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sids[i], + &newcon, &len); if (rc) { length = rc; goto out; @@ -1051,19 +1062,23 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, scon, &ssid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL); + length = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, tcon, &tsid, + GFP_KERNEL); if (length) goto out; - length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid); + length = security_member_sid(&selinux_state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + &newsid); if (length) goto out; - length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len); + length = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, &newcon, + &len); if (length) goto out; @@ -1115,7 +1130,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, if (!page) goto out; - cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index); + cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(&selinux_state, index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; goto out; @@ -1226,7 +1241,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep, length = 0; if (new_value && bool_pending_values) - length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values); + length = security_set_bools(&selinux_state, bool_num, + bool_pending_values); if (!length) length = count; @@ -1279,7 +1295,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) if (!page) goto out; - ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values); + ret = security_get_bools(&selinux_state, &num, &names, &values); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1300,7 +1316,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void) goto out; isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security; - ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid); + ret = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, "selinuxfs", page, + SECCLASS_FILE, &sid); if (ret) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n", page); @@ -1524,7 +1541,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ssize_t ret; sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK; - ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len); + ret = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, &con, &len); if (ret) return ret; @@ -1617,7 +1634,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf, ssize_t length; unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino; - value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK); + value = security_policycap_supported(&selinux_state, + i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK); length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length); @@ -1634,7 +1652,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, int i, rc, nperms; char **perms; - rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms); + rc = security_get_permissions(&selinux_state, objclass, &perms, + &nperms); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1701,7 +1720,7 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void) /* delete any existing entries */ sel_remove_entries(class_dir); - rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses); + rc = security_get_classes(&selinux_state, &classes, &nclasses); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 2c3c7d010d8a..a2c9148b0662 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -655,7 +655,8 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp) return rc; } -void avtab_cache_init(void) + +void __init avtab_cache_init(void) { avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node", sizeof(struct avtab_node), @@ -664,9 +665,3 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void) sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); } - -void avtab_cache_destroy(void) -{ - kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep); - kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep); -} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h index 725853cadc42..0d652fad5319 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h @@ -114,9 +114,6 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key); struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified); -void avtab_cache_init(void); -void avtab_cache_destroy(void); - #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index b6a78b09235c..5ae8c61b75bf 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -523,14 +523,9 @@ int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) return 0; } -void ebitmap_cache_init(void) +void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void) { ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node", sizeof(struct ebitmap_node), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); } - -void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void) -{ - kmem_cache_destroy(ebitmap_node_cachep); -} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index edf4fa39c60a..6aa7cf6a2197 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e); int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp); int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp); -void ebitmap_cache_init(void); -void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void); - #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap, struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index fe25b3fb2154..ebfdaa31ee32 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -169,14 +169,10 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info) info->slots_used = slots_used; info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len; } -void hashtab_cache_init(void) + +void __init hashtab_cache_init(void) { hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node", sizeof(struct hashtab_node), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); } - -void hashtab_cache_destroy(void) -{ - kmem_cache_destroy(hashtab_node_cachep); -} diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h index 6183ee2a2e7a..3e3e42bfd150 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h @@ -85,8 +85,4 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h, /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info); -/* Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node */ -void hashtab_cache_init(void); -void hashtab_cache_destroy(void); - #endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */ diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index ad982ce8bfa4..39475fb455bc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -33,20 +33,20 @@ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the * security context string representation of `context'. */ -int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context) +int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context) { int i, l, len, head, prev; char *nm; struct ebitmap *e; struct ebitmap_node *node; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return 0; len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens; - len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1)); + len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1)); /* categories */ head = -2; @@ -56,17 +56,17 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context) if (i - prev > 1) { /* one or more negative bits are skipped */ if (head != prev) { - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev); len += strlen(nm) + 1; } - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i); len += strlen(nm) + 1; head = i; } prev = i; } if (prev != head) { - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev); len += strlen(nm) + 1; } if (l == 0) { @@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context) * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'. * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields. */ -void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, +void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, char **scontext) { char *scontextp, *nm; @@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, struct ebitmap *e; struct ebitmap_node *node; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return; scontextp = *scontext; @@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, scontextp++; for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { - strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, + strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, context->range.level[l].sens - 1)); scontextp += strlen(scontextp); @@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, *scontextp++ = '.'; else *scontextp++ = ','; - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev); strcpy(scontextp, nm); scontextp += strlen(nm); } @@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, *scontextp++ = ':'; else *scontextp++ = ','; - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i); strcpy(scontextp, nm); scontextp += strlen(nm); head = i; @@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, *scontextp++ = '.'; else *scontextp++ = ','; - nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev); + nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev); strcpy(scontextp, nm); scontextp += strlen(nm); } @@ -375,12 +376,13 @@ out: * the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the * given constraints of gfp_mask. */ -int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) +int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context, + gfp_t gfp_mask) { char *tmpstr, *freestr; int rc; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return -EINVAL; /* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change @@ -389,7 +391,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) if (!tmpstr) { rc = -ENOMEM; } else { - rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context, + rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context, NULL, SECSID_NULL); kfree(freestr); } @@ -417,10 +419,11 @@ int mls_range_set(struct context *context, return rc; } -int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, +int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, + struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon) { - if (policydb.mls_enabled) { + if (p->mls_enabled) { struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]); struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]); struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]); @@ -470,7 +473,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct ebitmap_node *node; int l, i; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled) return 0; for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) { @@ -503,7 +506,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, return 0; } -int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, +int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, + struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified, @@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, struct class_datum *cladatum; int default_range = 0; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return 0; switch (specified) { @@ -524,12 +528,12 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, rtr.source_type = scontext->type; rtr.target_type = tcontext->type; rtr.target_class = tclass; - r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr); + r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr); if (r) return mls_range_set(newcontext, r); - if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) { - cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) { + cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; if (cladatum) default_range = cladatum->default_range; } @@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, /* Fallthrough */ case AVTAB_CHANGE: - if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) + if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true)) /* Use the process MLS attributes. */ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext); else @@ -577,10 +581,11 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field. * */ -void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return; secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1; @@ -597,10 +602,11 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context. * */ -void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return; context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1; @@ -617,12 +623,13 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, * MLS category field. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ -int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { int rc; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return 0; rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat, @@ -645,12 +652,13 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, * negative values on failure. * */ -int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { int rc; - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + if (!p->mls_enabled) return 0; rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat, diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 131d76266ea5..9a3ff7af70ad 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -25,8 +25,9 @@ #include "context.h" #include "policydb.h" -int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context); -void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext); +int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context); +void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context, + char **scontext); int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c); int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r); int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l); @@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s, u32 def_sid); -int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask); +int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context, + gfp_t gfp_mask); int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range); @@ -46,42 +48,52 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp, struct policydb *newp, struct context *context); -int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext, +int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p, + struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 specified, struct context *newcontext, bool sock); -int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, +int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p, + struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user, struct context *usercon); #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL -void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr); -void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr); -int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr); -int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr); #else -static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { return; } -static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context, +static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { return; } -static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { return -ENOMEM; } -static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context, +static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 8900ea5cbabf..3698352213d7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -80,53 +80,32 @@ char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { "nnp_nosuid_transition" }; -int selinux_policycap_netpeer; -int selinux_policycap_openperm; -int selinux_policycap_extsockclass; -int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork; -int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel; -int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition; +static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss; -static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock); - -static struct sidtab sidtab; -struct policydb policydb; -int ss_initialized; - -/* - * The largest sequence number that has been used when - * providing an access decision to the access vector cache. - * The sequence number only changes when a policy change - * occurs. - */ -static u32 latest_granting; +void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss) +{ + rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock); + mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock); + *ss = &selinux_ss; +} /* Forward declaration. */ -static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, +static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *context, + char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len); -static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, - struct context *tcontext, - u16 tclass, - struct av_decision *avd, - struct extended_perms *xperms); - -struct selinux_mapping { - u16 value; /* policy value */ - unsigned num_perms; - u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; -}; - -static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping; -static u16 current_mapping_size; +static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *scontext, + struct context *tcontext, + u16 tclass, + struct av_decision *avd, + struct extended_perms *xperms); static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, struct security_class_mapping *map, - struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p, - u16 *out_map_size) + struct selinux_map *out_map) { - struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL; - size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping); u16 i, j; unsigned k; bool print_unknown_handle = false; @@ -139,15 +118,15 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, i++; /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */ - out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!out_map) + out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!out_map->mapping) return -ENOMEM; /* Store the raw class and permission values */ j = 0; while (map[j].name) { struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++); - struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j; + struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j; /* An empty class string skips ahead */ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) { @@ -194,11 +173,11 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n", pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied"); - *out_map_p = out_map; - *out_map_size = i; + out_map->size = i; return 0; err: - kfree(out_map); + kfree(out_map->mapping); + out_map->mapping = NULL; return -EINVAL; } @@ -206,10 +185,10 @@ err: * Get real, policy values from mapped values */ -static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass) +static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass) { - if (tclass < current_mapping_size) - return current_mapping[tclass].value; + if (tclass < map->size) + return map->mapping[tclass].value; return tclass; } @@ -217,42 +196,44 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass) /* * Get kernel value for class from its policy value */ -static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value) +static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value) { u16 i; - for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) { - if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value) + for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) { + if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value) return i; } return SECCLASS_NULL; } -static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, +static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map, + u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, int allow_unknown) { - if (tclass < current_mapping_size) { - unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; + if (tclass < map->size) { + struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass]; + unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms; u32 result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { - if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; - if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; } avd->allowed = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) - if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; avd->auditallow = result; for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) { - if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; - if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i]) + if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i]) result |= 1<<i; } /* @@ -266,9 +247,11 @@ static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd, } } -int security_mls_enabled(void) +int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state) { - return policydb.mls_enabled; + struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; + + return p->mls_enabled; } /* @@ -282,7 +265,8 @@ int security_mls_enabled(void) * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext. */ -static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext, +static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, struct context *xcontext, struct constraint_expr *cexpr) @@ -326,8 +310,8 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext, case CEXPR_ROLE: val1 = scontext->role; val2 = tcontext->role; - r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1]; - r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1]; + r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1]; + r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1]; switch (e->op) { case CEXPR_DOM: s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates, @@ -472,7 +456,8 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args) return 0; } -static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext, +static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, u32 permissions, @@ -492,8 +477,8 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext, if (!permissions) return; - tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1); - tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1); + tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum; /* init permission_names */ @@ -507,11 +492,11 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext, goto out; /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */ - if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, + if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &scontext_name, &length) < 0) goto out; - if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, + if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &tcontext_name, &length) < 0) goto out; @@ -550,7 +535,8 @@ out: * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions * on boundary constraint. */ -static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, +static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) @@ -562,14 +548,14 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, struct type_datum *target; u32 masked = 0; - source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array, + source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array, scontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!source); if (!source->bounds) return; - target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array, + target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array, tcontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!target); @@ -584,7 +570,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, tcontextp = &lo_tcontext; } - context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext, + context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext, tcontextp, tclass, &lo_avd, @@ -599,7 +585,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, avd->allowed &= ~masked; /* audit masked permissions */ - security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext, + security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, masked, "bounds"); } @@ -632,11 +618,12 @@ void services_compute_xperms_drivers( * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class. */ -static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, - struct context *tcontext, - u16 tclass, - struct av_decision *avd, - struct extended_perms *xperms) +static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *scontext, + struct context *tcontext, + u16 tclass, + struct av_decision *avd, + struct extended_perms *xperms) { struct constraint_node *constraint; struct role_allow *ra; @@ -655,13 +642,13 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, xperms->len = 0; } - if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) { if (printk_ratelimit()) printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); return; } - tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; /* * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for @@ -669,15 +656,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, */ avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS; - sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1); + sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array, + scontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!sattr); - tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1); + tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array, + tcontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!tattr); ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) { ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) { avkey.source_type = i + 1; avkey.target_type = j + 1; - for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey); + for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, + &avkey); node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) { if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED) @@ -691,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, } /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */ - cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, + cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd, xperms); } @@ -704,7 +694,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, constraint = tclass_datum->constraints; while (constraint) { if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) && - !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL, + !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL, constraint->expr)) { avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions); } @@ -716,16 +706,16 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role) * pair. */ - if (tclass == policydb.process_class && - (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) && + if (tclass == policydb->process_class && + (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) && scontext->role != tcontext->role) { - for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) { + for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) { if (scontext->role == ra->role && tcontext->role == ra->new_role) break; } if (!ra) - avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms; + avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms; } /* @@ -733,41 +723,46 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated * permission and notice it to userspace via audit. */ - type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext, + type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd); } -static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext, +static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state, + struct context *ocontext, struct context *ncontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass) { + struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL; u32 olen, nlen, tlen; - if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen)) goto out; - if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen)) goto out; - if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied" " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s", - o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); + o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); out: kfree(o); kfree(n); kfree(t); - if (!selinux_enforcing) + if (!is_enforcing(state)) return 0; return -EPERM; } -static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, +static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 orig_tclass, bool user) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *ocontext; struct context *ncontext; struct context *tcontext; @@ -776,23 +771,27 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 tclass; int rc = 0; - if (!ss_initialized) + + if (!state->initialized) return 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; if (!user) - tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); else tclass = orig_tclass; - if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) { + if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; - ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid); + ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid); if (!ocontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, oldsid); @@ -800,7 +799,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, goto out; } - ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid); + ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid); if (!ncontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, newsid); @@ -808,7 +807,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, goto out; } - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid); + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid); if (!tcontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tasksid); @@ -818,12 +817,13 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans; while (constraint) { - if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext, - constraint->expr)) { + if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext, + tcontext, constraint->expr)) { if (user) rc = -EPERM; else - rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, + rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state, + ocontext, ncontext, tcontext, tclass); @@ -833,22 +833,24 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } -int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, - u16 tclass) +int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, + u16 tclass) { - return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid, - tclass, true); + return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid, + tclass, true); } -int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, +int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, u16 orig_tclass) { - return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid, - orig_tclass, false); + return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid, + orig_tclass, false); } /* @@ -860,20 +862,26 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid, * @oldsid : current security identifier * @newsid : destinated security identifier */ -int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) +int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *old_context, *new_context; struct type_datum *type; int index; int rc; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) return 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; rc = -EINVAL; - old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid); + old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid); if (!old_context) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, old_sid); @@ -881,7 +889,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) } rc = -EINVAL; - new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid); + new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid); if (!new_context) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n", __func__, new_sid); @@ -895,7 +903,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) index = new_context->type; while (true) { - type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array, + type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array, index - 1); BUG_ON(!type); @@ -917,9 +925,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) char *new_name = NULL; u32 length; - if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context, + if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context, &old_name, &length) && - !context_struct_to_string(new_context, + !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context, &new_name, &length)) { audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, @@ -932,17 +940,17 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) kfree(old_name); } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } -static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd) +static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd) { avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; - avd->seqno = latest_granting; + avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting; avd->flags = 0; } @@ -1000,12 +1008,15 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd, } } -void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, - u32 tsid, - u16 orig_tclass, - u8 driver, - struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd) +void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 orig_tclass, + u8 driver, + struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; u16 tclass; struct context *scontext, *tcontext; struct avtab_key avkey; @@ -1020,60 +1031,64 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p)); memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p)); - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - if (!ss_initialized) + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + if (!state->initialized) goto allow; - scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); goto out; } - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } - tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { - if (policydb.allow_unknown) + if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } - if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) { pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); goto out; } avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS; - sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, + sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!sattr); - tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, + tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1); BUG_ON(!tattr); ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) { ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) { avkey.source_type = i + 1; avkey.target_type = j + 1; - for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey); + for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, + &avkey); node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node); - cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, + cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey, xpermd); } } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return; allow: memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p)); @@ -1091,22 +1106,28 @@ allow: * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. */ -void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, +void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; u16 tclass; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - avd_init(avd); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + avd_init(state, avd); xperms->len = 0; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) goto allow; - scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); @@ -1114,45 +1135,53 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, } /* permissive domain? */ - if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) + if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); goto out; } - tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { - if (policydb.allow_unknown) + if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms); - map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); + context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, + xperms); + map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd, + policydb->allow_unknown); out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; goto out; } -void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, +void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - avd_init(avd); - if (!ss_initialized) + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + avd_init(state, avd); + if (!state->initialized) goto allow; - scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); @@ -1160,10 +1189,10 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, } /* permissive domain? */ - if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) + if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type)) avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE; - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); @@ -1171,14 +1200,15 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, } if (unlikely(!tclass)) { - if (policydb.allow_unknown) + if (policydb->allow_unknown) goto allow; goto out; } - context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL); + context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, + NULL); out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; @@ -1192,7 +1222,9 @@ allow: * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to * the length of the string. */ -static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) +static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p, + struct context *context, + char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { char *scontextp; @@ -1211,10 +1243,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 } /* Compute the size of the context. */ - *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1; - *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1; - *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1; - *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context); + *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1; + *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1; + *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1; + *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context); if (!scontext) return 0; @@ -1229,11 +1261,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context. */ scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s", - sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1), - sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1), - sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); + sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1), + sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1), + sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)); - mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp); + mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp); *scontextp = 0; @@ -1249,9 +1281,12 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid) return initial_sid_to_string[sid]; } -static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, +static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len, int force) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *context; int rc = 0; @@ -1259,7 +1294,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, *scontext = NULL; *scontext_len = 0; - if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!state->initialized) { if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) { char *scontextp; @@ -1280,20 +1315,23 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext, rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; if (force) - context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid); + context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid); else - context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } - rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len); + rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext, + scontext_len); out_unlock: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); out: return rc; @@ -1309,14 +1347,18 @@ out: * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string. */ -int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) +int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { - return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0); + return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext, + scontext_len, 0); } -int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) +int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid, + char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len) { - return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1); + return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext, + scontext_len, 1); } /* @@ -1404,10 +1446,13 @@ out: return rc; } -static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags, int force) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; char *scontext2, *str = NULL; struct context context; int rc = 0; @@ -1421,7 +1466,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, if (!scontext2) return -ENOMEM; - if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!state->initialized) { int i; for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) { @@ -1442,9 +1487,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, if (!str) goto out; } - - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2, + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2, scontext_len, &context, def_sid); if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { context.str = str; @@ -1452,10 +1498,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, str = NULL; } else if (rc) goto out_unlock; - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid); context_destroy(&context); out_unlock: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); out: kfree(scontext2); kfree(str); @@ -1474,16 +1520,19 @@ out: * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, +int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) { - return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, + return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0); } -int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) +int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) { - return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp); + return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext), + sid, gfp); } /** @@ -1504,51 +1553,56 @@ int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp) * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient * memory is available, or 0 on success. */ -int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags) { - return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, + return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1); } -int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, +int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid) { - return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len, + return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len, sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1); } static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context( + struct selinux_state *state, struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, struct context *newcontext) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL; u32 slen, tlen, nlen; - if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen)) goto out; - if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen)) goto out; - if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen)) + if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen)) goto out; audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s" " scontext=%s" " tcontext=%s" " tclass=%s", - n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); + n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1)); out: kfree(s); kfree(t); kfree(n); - if (!selinux_enforcing) + if (!is_enforcing(state)) return 0; return -EACCES; } -static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext, +static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb, + struct context *newcontext, u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass, const char *objname) { @@ -1560,7 +1614,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches * if the ttype does not contain any rules. */ - if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype)) + if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype)) return; ft.stype = stype; @@ -1568,12 +1622,13 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext ft.tclass = tclass; ft.name = objname; - otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft); + otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft); if (otype) newcontext->type = otype->otype; } -static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, +static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 orig_tclass, u32 specified, @@ -1581,6 +1636,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, u32 *out_sid, bool kern) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL; struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext; struct role_trans *roletr = NULL; @@ -1591,7 +1648,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, int rc = 0; bool sock; - if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!state->initialized) { switch (orig_tclass) { case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */ *out_sid = ssid; @@ -1605,24 +1662,28 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, context_init(&newcontext); - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (kern) { - tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); + tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass); sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass); } else { tclass = orig_tclass; - sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass)); + sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map, + tclass)); } - scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, ssid); rc = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } - tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid); + tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid); if (!tcontext) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, tsid); @@ -1630,8 +1691,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, goto out_unlock; } - if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) - cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; + if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim) + cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; /* Set the user identity. */ switch (specified) { @@ -1657,7 +1718,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.role = tcontext->role; } else { - if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) + if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) newcontext.role = scontext->role; else newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; @@ -1669,7 +1730,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { newcontext.type = tcontext->type; } else { - if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) { + if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) { /* Use the type of process. */ newcontext.type = scontext->type; } else { @@ -1683,11 +1744,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, avkey.target_type = tcontext->type; avkey.target_class = tclass; avkey.specified = specified; - avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey); + avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey); /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */ if (!avdatum) { - node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey); + node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey); for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) { if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) { avdatum = &node->datum; @@ -1703,13 +1764,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */ if (objname) - filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type, + filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type, tcontext->type, tclass, objname); /* Check for class-specific changes. */ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) { /* Look for a role transition rule. */ - for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) { + for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr; + roletr = roletr->next) { if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) && (roletr->type == tcontext->type) && (roletr->tclass == tclass)) { @@ -1722,14 +1784,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, /* Set the MLS attributes. This is done last because it may allocate memory. */ - rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, + rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified, &newcontext, sock); if (rc) goto out_unlock; /* Check the validity of the context. */ - if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) { - rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext, + if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) { + rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext, tcontext, tclass, &newcontext); @@ -1737,9 +1799,9 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid, goto out_unlock; } /* Obtain the sid for the context. */ - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid); out_unlock: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); context_destroy(&newcontext); out: return rc; @@ -1758,17 +1820,21 @@ out: * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was * computed successfully. */ -int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, + return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + AVTAB_TRANSITION, qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true); } -int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, +int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, const char *objname, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION, + return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + AVTAB_TRANSITION, objname, out_sid, false); } @@ -1785,12 +1851,14 @@ int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was * computed successfully. */ -int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, +int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL, + return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, + AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL, out_sid, false); } @@ -1807,12 +1875,14 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was * computed successfully. */ -int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, +int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid) { - return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL, + return security_compute_sid(state, + ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL, out_sid, false); } @@ -1829,15 +1899,18 @@ static int clone_sid(u32 sid, return 0; } -static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context) +static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context( + struct selinux_state *state, + struct context *context) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; char *s; u32 len; - if (selinux_enforcing) + if (is_enforcing(state)) return -EINVAL; - if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) { + if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) { printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s); kfree(s); } @@ -1845,6 +1918,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context } struct convert_context_args { + struct selinux_state *state; struct policydb *oldp; struct policydb *newp; }; @@ -1971,7 +2045,8 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key, /* Check the validity of the new context. */ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) { - rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc); + rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state, + &oldc); if (rc) goto bad; } @@ -1983,7 +2058,7 @@ out: return rc; bad: /* Map old representation to string and save it. */ - rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len); + rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len); if (rc) return rc; context_destroy(&oldc); @@ -1996,39 +2071,29 @@ bad: goto out; } -static void security_load_policycaps(void) +static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state) { + struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; unsigned int i; struct ebitmap_node *node; - selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER); - selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM); - selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS); - selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK); - selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel = - ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL); - selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition = - ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++) + state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++) pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n", selinux_policycap_names[i], - ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i)); + ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i)); - ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) { + ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) { if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names)) pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n", i); } } -static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); +static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, + struct policydb *newpolicydb); /** * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration. @@ -2040,14 +2105,16 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p); * This function will flush the access vector cache after * loading the new policy. */ -int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) +int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb; struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab; - struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL; + struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping; + struct selinux_map newmap; struct convert_context_args args; u32 seqno; - u16 map_size; int rc = 0; struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file; @@ -2058,53 +2125,42 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) } newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1; - if (!ss_initialized) { - avtab_cache_init(); - ebitmap_cache_init(); - hashtab_cache_init(); - rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp); - if (rc) { - avtab_cache_destroy(); - ebitmap_cache_destroy(); - hashtab_cache_destroy(); + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + if (!state->initialized) { + rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp); + if (rc) goto out; - } - policydb.len = len; - rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map, - ¤t_mapping, - ¤t_mapping_size); + policydb->len = len; + rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map, + &state->ss->map); if (rc) { - policydb_destroy(&policydb); - avtab_cache_destroy(); - ebitmap_cache_destroy(); - hashtab_cache_destroy(); + policydb_destroy(policydb); goto out; } - rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab); + rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab); if (rc) { - policydb_destroy(&policydb); - avtab_cache_destroy(); - ebitmap_cache_destroy(); - hashtab_cache_destroy(); + policydb_destroy(policydb); goto out; } - security_load_policycaps(); - ss_initialized = 1; - seqno = ++latest_granting; + security_load_policycaps(state); + state->initialized = 1; + seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; selinux_complete_init(); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); - selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno); + selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); goto out; } #if 0 - sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids"); + sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids"); #endif rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp); @@ -2113,9 +2169,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) newpolicydb->len = len; /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */ - if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) + if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n"); - else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) + else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled) printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n"); rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab); @@ -2125,20 +2181,20 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) goto out; } - rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size); + rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap); if (rc) goto err; - rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb); + rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb); if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n"); goto err; } /* Clone the SID table. */ - sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab); + sidtab_shutdown(sidtab); - rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab); + rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab); if (rc) goto err; @@ -2146,7 +2202,8 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) * Convert the internal representations of contexts * in the new SID table. */ - args.oldp = &policydb; + args.state = state; + args.oldp = policydb; args.newp = newpolicydb; rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args); if (rc) { @@ -2157,28 +2214,28 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) } /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */ - memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb)); - sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab); + memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb)); + sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab); /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */ - write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); - memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb)); - sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab); - security_load_policycaps(); - oldmap = current_mapping; - current_mapping = map; - current_mapping_size = map_size; - seqno = ++latest_granting; - write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); + write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb)); + sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab); + security_load_policycaps(state); + oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping; + state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping; + state->ss->map.size = newmap.size; + seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; + write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */ policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb); sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab); - kfree(oldmap); + kfree(oldmapping); avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); - selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno); + selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); @@ -2186,7 +2243,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len) goto out; err: - kfree(map); + kfree(newmap.mapping); sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab); policydb_destroy(newpolicydb); @@ -2195,13 +2252,14 @@ out: return rc; } -size_t security_policydb_len(void) +size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state) { + struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb; size_t len; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - len = policydb.len; - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + len = p->len; + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return len; } @@ -2212,14 +2270,20 @@ size_t security_policydb_len(void) * @port: port number * @out_sid: security identifier */ -int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) +int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; while (c) { if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol && c->u.port.low_port <= port && @@ -2230,7 +2294,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) if (c) { if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) @@ -2242,7 +2306,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid) } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2252,14 +2316,20 @@ out: * @pkey_num: pkey number * @out_sid: security identifier */ -int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid) +int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY]; while (c) { if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num && c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num && @@ -2271,7 +2341,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid) if (c) { if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) @@ -2282,7 +2352,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid) *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2292,14 +2362,20 @@ out: * @port: port number * @out_sid: security identifier */ -int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid) +int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct ocontext *c; int rc = 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT]; + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; + + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT]; while (c) { if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num && !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, @@ -2312,7 +2388,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid) if (c) { if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) @@ -2323,7 +2399,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid) *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2332,14 +2408,20 @@ out: * @name: interface name * @if_sid: interface SID */ -int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) +int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + char *name, u32 *if_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF]; while (c) { if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0) break; @@ -2348,12 +2430,12 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) if (c) { if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) goto out; - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[1], &c->sid[1]); if (rc) @@ -2364,7 +2446,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid) *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2388,15 +2470,21 @@ static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask) * @addrlen: address length in bytes * @out_sid: security identifier */ -int security_node_sid(u16 domain, +int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + u16 domain, void *addrp, u32 addrlen, u32 *out_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc; struct ocontext *c; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; switch (domain) { case AF_INET: { @@ -2408,7 +2496,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, addr = *((u32 *)addrp); - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE]; while (c) { if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask)) break; @@ -2421,7 +2509,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, rc = -EINVAL; if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2) goto out; - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6]; while (c) { if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr, c->u.node6.mask)) @@ -2438,7 +2526,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, if (c) { if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) @@ -2451,7 +2539,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain, rc = 0; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -2471,11 +2559,14 @@ out: * number of elements in the array. */ -int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, +int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 fromsid, char *username, u32 **sids, u32 *nel) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; struct context *fromcon, usercon; u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid; u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL; @@ -2487,20 +2578,23 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, *sids = NULL; *nel = 0; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) goto out; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; context_init(&usercon); rc = -EINVAL; - fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid); + fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid); if (!fromcon) goto out_unlock; rc = -EINVAL; - user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username); + user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username); if (!user) goto out_unlock; @@ -2512,15 +2606,16 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, goto out_unlock; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) { - role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i]; + role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i]; usercon.role = i + 1; ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) { usercon.type = j + 1; - if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon)) + if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user, + &usercon)) continue; - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid); if (rc) goto out_unlock; if (mynel < maxnel) { @@ -2540,7 +2635,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid, } rc = 0; out_unlock: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (rc || !mynel) { kfree(mysids); goto out; @@ -2583,11 +2678,14 @@ out: * * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function. */ -static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, +static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; int len; u16 sclass; struct genfs *genfs; @@ -2597,10 +2695,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/') path++; - sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass); + sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass); *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { + for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) { cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype); if (cmp <= 0) break; @@ -2622,7 +2720,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, goto out; if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) goto out; } @@ -2643,16 +2741,17 @@ out: * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release * it afterward. */ -int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, +int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + const char *fstype, char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { int retval; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return retval; } @@ -2660,16 +2759,21 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem. * @sb: superblock in question */ -int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) +int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb) { + struct policydb *policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab; int rc = 0; struct ocontext *c; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; - c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; + c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE]; while (c) { if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0) break; @@ -2679,14 +2783,14 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) if (c) { sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior; if (!c->sid[0]) { - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]); if (rc) goto out; } sbsec->sid = c->sid[0]; } else { - rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, + rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid); if (rc) { sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE; @@ -2697,20 +2801,25 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb) } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } -int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) +int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state, + int *len, char ***names, int **values) { + struct policydb *policydb; int i, rc; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + *names = NULL; *values = NULL; rc = 0; - *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim; + *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim; if (!*len) goto out; @@ -2725,16 +2834,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values) goto err; for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) { - (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; + (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state; rc = -ENOMEM; - (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC); + (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!(*names)[i]) goto err; } rc = 0; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; err: if (*names) { @@ -2746,90 +2856,98 @@ err: } -int security_set_bools(int len, int *values) +int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values) { + struct policydb *policydb; int i, rc; int lenp, seqno = 0; struct cond_node *cur; - write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock); + write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; rc = -EFAULT; - lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim; + lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim; if (len != lenp) goto out; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { - if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) { + if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) { audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE, "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u", - sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), + sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), !!values[i], - policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, + policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); } if (values[i]) - policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1; + policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1; else - policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0; + policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0; } - for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) { - rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur); + for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) { + rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur); if (rc) goto out; } - seqno = ++latest_granting; + seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting; rc = 0; out: - write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock); + write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (!rc) { avc_ss_reset(seqno); selnl_notify_policyload(seqno); - selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno); + selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno); selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(); } return rc; } -int security_get_bool_value(int index) +int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state, + int index) { + struct policydb *policydb; int rc; int len; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + + policydb = &state->ss->policydb; rc = -EFAULT; - len = policydb.p_bools.nprim; + len = policydb->p_bools.nprim; if (index >= len) goto out; - rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state; + rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } -static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p) +static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state, + struct policydb *policydb) { int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i; char **bnames = NULL; struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum; struct cond_node *cur; - rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues); + rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues); if (rc) goto out; for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) { - booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]); + booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]); if (booldatum) booldatum->state = bvalues[i]; } - for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) { - rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur); + for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) { + rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur); if (rc) goto out; } @@ -2848,8 +2966,11 @@ out: * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid. */ -int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) +int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; struct context *context1; struct context *context2; struct context newcon; @@ -2858,17 +2979,17 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) int rc; rc = 0; - if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) { + if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) { *new_sid = sid; goto out; } context_init(&newcon); - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); rc = -EINVAL; - context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid); if (!context1) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, sid); @@ -2876,7 +2997,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) } rc = -EINVAL; - context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid); + context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid); if (!context2) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, mls_sid); @@ -2891,10 +3012,11 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) goto out_unlock; /* Check the validity of the new context. */ - if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) { - rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon); + if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) { + rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon); if (rc) { - if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) { + if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s, + &len)) { audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR, "op=security_sid_mls_copy " @@ -2905,9 +3027,9 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid) } } - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid); out_unlock: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); context_destroy(&newcon); out: return rc; @@ -2933,10 +3055,13 @@ out: * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL * */ -int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, +int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, u32 xfrm_sid, u32 *peer_sid) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; int rc; struct context *nlbl_ctx; struct context *xfrm_ctx; @@ -2958,23 +3083,25 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, return 0; } - /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both + /* + * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the - * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */ - if (!policydb.mls_enabled) + * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true. + */ + if (!policydb->mls_enabled) return 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); rc = -EINVAL; - nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid); + nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid); if (!nlbl_ctx) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, nlbl_sid); goto out; } rc = -EINVAL; - xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid); + xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid); if (!xfrm_ctx) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n", __func__, xfrm_sid); @@ -2991,7 +3118,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type, * expressive */ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -3008,19 +3135,21 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) return 0; } -int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses) +int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state, + char ***classes, int *nclasses) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); rc = -ENOMEM; - *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim; + *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim; *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!*classes) goto out; - rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, + rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback, *classes); if (rc) { int i; @@ -3030,7 +3159,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses) } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -3047,15 +3176,17 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args) return 0; } -int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) +int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state, + char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc, i; struct class_datum *match; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); rc = -EINVAL; - match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class); + match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class); if (!match) { printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n", __func__, class); @@ -3081,25 +3212,25 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms) goto err; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; err: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++) kfree((*perms)[i]); kfree(*perms); return rc; } -int security_get_reject_unknown(void) +int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { - return policydb.reject_unknown; + return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown; } -int security_get_allow_unknown(void) +int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state) { - return policydb.allow_unknown; + return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown; } /** @@ -3112,13 +3243,15 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void) * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported. * */ -int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap) +int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state, + unsigned int req_cap) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap); - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -3140,6 +3273,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) { + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; struct role_datum *roledatum; struct type_datum *typedatum; @@ -3149,7 +3284,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) *rule = NULL; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) return -EOPNOTSUPP; switch (field) { @@ -3182,15 +3317,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting; + tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting; switch (field) { case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: rc = -EINVAL; - userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr); + userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr); if (!userdatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; @@ -3198,7 +3333,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: rc = -EINVAL; - roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr); + roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr); if (!roledatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; @@ -3206,7 +3341,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: rc = -EINVAL; - typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr); + typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr); if (!typedatum) goto out; tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value; @@ -3215,14 +3350,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); + rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, + GFP_ATOMIC); if (rc) goto out; break; } rc = 0; out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (rc) { selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule); @@ -3262,6 +3398,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx) { + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct context *ctxt; struct mls_level *level; struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; @@ -3272,14 +3409,14 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, return -ENOENT; } - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); - if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) { + if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) { match = -ESTALE; goto out; } - ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid); if (unlikely(!ctxt)) { WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n", sid); @@ -3363,7 +3500,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, } out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return match; } @@ -3437,19 +3574,22 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, * failure. * */ -int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, +int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state, + struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, u32 *sid) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; + struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab; int rc; struct context *ctx; struct context ctx_new; - if (!ss_initialized) { + if (!state->initialized) { *sid = SECSID_NULL; return 0; } - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data; @@ -3457,7 +3597,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, *sid = secattr->attr.secid; else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) { rc = -EIDRM; - ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG); + ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; @@ -3465,17 +3605,17 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, ctx_new.user = ctx->user; ctx_new.role = ctx->role; ctx_new.type = ctx->type; - mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr); + mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr); if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) { - rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr); + rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr); if (rc) goto out; } rc = -EIDRM; - if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new)) + if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) goto out_free; - rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); + rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid); if (rc) goto out_free; @@ -3485,12 +3625,12 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr, } else *sid = SECSID_NULL; - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return 0; out_free: ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat); out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } @@ -3504,33 +3644,35 @@ out: * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. * */ -int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) +int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, + u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; struct context *ctx; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) return 0; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); rc = -ENOENT; - ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid); + ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid); if (ctx == NULL) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; - secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1), + secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1), GFP_ATOMIC); if (secattr->domain == NULL) goto out; secattr->attr.secid = sid; secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID; - mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr); - rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr); + mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr); + rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr); out: - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); return rc; } #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ @@ -3541,15 +3683,17 @@ out: * @len: length of data in bytes * */ -int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len) +int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, + void **data, size_t *len) { + struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb; int rc; struct policy_file fp; - if (!ss_initialized) + if (!state->initialized) return -EINVAL; - *len = security_policydb_len(); + *len = security_policydb_len(state); *data = vmalloc_user(*len); if (!*data) @@ -3558,9 +3702,9 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len) fp.data = *data; fp.len = *len; - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp); - read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); + read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); + rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp); + read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock); if (rc) return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index 356bdd36cf6d..24c7bdcc8075 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -10,7 +10,28 @@ #include "policydb.h" #include "sidtab.h" -extern struct policydb policydb; +/* Mapping for a single class */ +struct selinux_mapping { + u16 value; /* policy value for class */ + unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */ + u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */ +}; + +/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */ +struct selinux_map { + struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */ + u16 size; /* array size of mapping */ +}; + +struct selinux_ss { + struct sidtab sidtab; + struct policydb policydb; + rwlock_t policy_rwlock; + u32 latest_granting; + struct selinux_map map; + struct page *status_page; + struct mutex status_lock; +}; void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms, struct avtab_node *node); @@ -19,4 +40,3 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd, struct avtab_node *node); #endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */ - diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c index d982365f9d1a..043efc59f8e4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/status.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c @@ -35,8 +35,6 @@ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not * changed without any system call invocations. */ -static struct page *selinux_status_page; -static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock); /* * selinux_kernel_status_page @@ -44,21 +42,21 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock); * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time. */ -struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void) +struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state) { struct selinux_kernel_status *status; struct page *result = NULL; - mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock); - if (!selinux_status_page) { - selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO); + mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock); + if (!state->ss->status_page) { + state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO); - if (selinux_status_page) { - status = page_address(selinux_status_page); + if (state->ss->status_page) { + status = page_address(state->ss->status_page); status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION; status->sequence = 0; - status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing; + status->enforcing = is_enforcing(state); /* * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set * a positive value on the status->policyload, @@ -66,11 +64,12 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void) * So, application can know it was updated. */ status->policyload = 0; - status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(); + status->deny_unknown = + !security_get_allow_unknown(state); } } - result = selinux_status_page; - mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock); + result = state->ss->status_page; + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock); return result; } @@ -80,13 +79,14 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void) * * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode. */ -void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) +void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state, + int enforcing) { struct selinux_kernel_status *status; - mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock); - if (selinux_status_page) { - status = page_address(selinux_status_page); + mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock); + if (state->ss->status_page) { + status = page_address(state->ss->status_page); status->sequence++; smp_wmb(); @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) smp_wmb(); status->sequence++; } - mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock); + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock); } /* @@ -105,22 +105,23 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing) * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current * setting of deny_unknown. */ -void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno) +void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state, + int seqno) { struct selinux_kernel_status *status; - mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock); - if (selinux_status_page) { - status = page_address(selinux_status_page); + mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock); + if (state->ss->status_page) { + status = page_address(state->ss->status_page); status->sequence++; smp_wmb(); status->policyload = seqno; - status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(); + status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(state); smp_wmb(); status->sequence++; } - mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock); + mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock); } diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 928188902901..a5ac27de571f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, ctx->ctx_len = str_len; memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len); ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0'; - rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp); + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len, + &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp); if (rc) goto err; @@ -352,7 +353,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, if (secid == 0) return -EINVAL; - rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len); + rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str, + &str_len); if (rc) return rc; |