diff options
| author | Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> | 2021-11-02 08:02:50 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2021-11-03 11:09:20 +0000 |
| commit | e7310c94024cdf099c0d29e6903dd6fe9205bb60 (patch) | |
| tree | 8340d44e4090a192e8ce269bcf7cfa759425501c /security | |
| parent | 7c2ef0240e6abfd3cc59511339517358350a8910 (diff) | |
security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux
Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the
secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(),
as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs.
Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this
asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer
secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do
peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in
one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for
its asoc.
v1->v2:
- call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code
duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej
suggested.
- when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually
gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse
SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that
secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side.
Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks")
Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 62d30c0a30c2..5e5215fe2e83 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -5502,7 +5502,8 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk); - newsksec->sid = asoc->secid; + if (asoc->secid != SECSID_WILD) + newsksec->sid = asoc->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid; newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk); @@ -5558,6 +5559,16 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); } +static void selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + + selinux_inet_conn_established(asoc->base.sk, skb); + asoc->peer_secid = sksec->peer_sid; + asoc->secid = SECSID_WILD; +} + static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) { const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; @@ -7228,6 +7239,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), |