diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2017-06-08 14:49:18 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> | 2017-06-09 13:29:48 +1000 |
commit | ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 (patch) | |
tree | 7a01f2a757a88fab95d9acf6353494a6e8e1a32e /security | |
parent | a9dd74b252e04b7e41ffe78d418b896b33b70a13 (diff) |
KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 50 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 2ae31c5a87de..435e86e13879 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, } ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, if (!ret) ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0); out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) ret = -EINVAL; out: - kfree(sdesc); + kzfree(sdesc); return ret; } @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, *bloblen = storedsize; } out: - kfree(td); + kzfree(td); return ret; } @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, if (ret < 0) pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; - kfree(tb); + kzfree(tb); return ret; } @@ -1037,12 +1037,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, if (!ret && options->pcrlock) ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(options); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(options); if (!ret) rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); else - kfree(payload); + kzfree(payload); return ret; } @@ -1051,8 +1051,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) struct trusted_key_payload *p; p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(p); + kzfree(p); } /* @@ -1094,13 +1093,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); if (ret != Opt_update) { ret = -EINVAL; - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } if (!new_o->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } @@ -1114,22 +1113,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } if (new_o->pcrlock) { ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree(new_p); + kzfree(new_p); goto out; } } rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); out: - kfree(datablob); - kfree(new_o); + kzfree(datablob); + kzfree(new_o); return ret; } @@ -1158,24 +1157,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { - kfree(ascii_buf); + kzfree(ascii_buf); return -EFAULT; } - kfree(ascii_buf); + kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } /* - * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload */ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0]; - - if (!p) - return; - memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len); - kfree(key->payload.data[0]); + kzfree(key->payload.data[0]); } struct key_type key_type_trusted = { |