diff options
author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2017-09-21 13:57:40 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2017-09-25 15:03:55 +0100 |
commit | 44d8143340a99b167c74365e844516b73523c087 (patch) | |
tree | a5f1901a9c6323577946f36885f2dc81ec807416 /security | |
parent | ebb2c2437d8008d46796902ff390653822af6cc4 (diff) |
KEYS: fix cred refcount leak in request_key_auth_new()
In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 68 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index afe9d22ab361..69d6b3b35470 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -120,6 +120,18 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) } } +static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) +{ + if (!rka) + return; + key_put(rka->target_key); + key_put(rka->dest_keyring); + if (rka->cred) + put_cred(rka->cred); + kfree(rka->callout_info); + kfree(rka); +} + /* * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key. */ @@ -129,15 +141,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) kenter("{%d}", key->serial); - if (rka->cred) { - put_cred(rka->cred); - rka->cred = NULL; - } - - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); + free_request_key_auth(rka); } /* @@ -151,22 +155,17 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, const struct cred *cred = current->cred; struct key *authkey = NULL; char desc[20]; - int ret; + int ret = -ENOMEM; kenter("%d,", target->serial); /* allocate a auth record */ - rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } + rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rka) + goto error; rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka->callout_info) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - kfree(rka); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } + if (!rka->callout_info) + goto error_free_rka; /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ @@ -176,8 +175,12 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're * servicing is already instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) - goto auth_key_revoked; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, + &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { + up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto error_free_rka; + } irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); @@ -205,32 +208,23 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); - goto error_alloc; + goto error_free_rka; } /* construct the auth key */ ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0) - goto error_inst; + goto error_put_authkey; kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage)); return authkey; -auth_key_revoked: - up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); - kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED"); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); - -error_inst: +error_put_authkey: key_revoke(authkey); key_put(authkey); -error_alloc: - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); +error_free_rka: + free_request_key_auth(rka); +error: kleave("= %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } |