diff options
| author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-07-09 01:19:05 -0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-07-16 21:53:55 -0400 |
| commit | eb624fe214a2e156ddafd9868377cf91499f789d (patch) | |
| tree | 590ece87004d5d95da553a1f51fe4ea11a09f13b /security/integrity | |
| parent | db2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1 (diff) | |
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
Fixes: 5808611cccb2 ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 1c64bd6f1728..81da02071d41 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1023,6 +1023,13 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_UID | IMA_PCR | + IMA_KEYRINGS)) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + break; default: return false; |