diff options
author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-07-23 12:01:36 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-07-23 12:01:48 -0700 |
commit | 1a4f14bab1868b443f0dd3c55b689a478f82e72e (patch) | |
tree | 67c0e66dbb4895d1c03116df3a63896c67431680 /net | |
parent | 3dd1c9a1270736029ffca670e9bd0265f4120600 (diff) | |
parent | 58152ecbbcc6a0ce7fddd5bf5f6ee535834ece0c (diff) |
Merge branch 'tcp-robust-ooo'
Eric Dumazet says:
====================
Juha-Matti Tilli reported that malicious peers could inject tiny
packets in out_of_order_queue, forcing very expensive calls
to tcp_collapse_ofo_queue() and tcp_prune_ofo_queue() for
every incoming packet.
With tcp_rmem[2] default of 6MB, the ooo queue could
contain ~7000 nodes.
This patch series makes sure we cut cpu cycles enough to
render the attack not critical.
We might in the future go further, like disconnecting
or black-holing proven malicious flows.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 6bade06aaf72..3bcd30a2ba06 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4358,6 +4358,23 @@ static bool tcp_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk, return true; } +static bool tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *to, + struct sk_buff *from, + bool *fragstolen) +{ + bool res = tcp_try_coalesce(sk, to, from, fragstolen); + + /* In case tcp_drop() is called later, update to->gso_segs */ + if (res) { + u32 gso_segs = max_t(u16, 1, skb_shinfo(to)->gso_segs) + + max_t(u16, 1, skb_shinfo(from)->gso_segs); + + skb_shinfo(to)->gso_segs = min_t(u32, gso_segs, 0xFFFF); + } + return res; +} + static void tcp_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { sk_drops_add(sk, skb); @@ -4481,8 +4498,8 @@ static void tcp_data_queue_ofo(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) /* In the typical case, we are adding an skb to the end of the list. * Use of ooo_last_skb avoids the O(Log(N)) rbtree lookup. */ - if (tcp_try_coalesce(sk, tp->ooo_last_skb, - skb, &fragstolen)) { + if (tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(sk, tp->ooo_last_skb, + skb, &fragstolen)) { coalesce_done: tcp_grow_window(sk, skb); kfree_skb_partial(skb, fragstolen); @@ -4510,7 +4527,7 @@ coalesce_done: /* All the bits are present. Drop. */ NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPOFOMERGE); - __kfree_skb(skb); + tcp_drop(sk, skb); skb = NULL; tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq, end_seq); goto add_sack; @@ -4529,11 +4546,11 @@ coalesce_done: TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq); NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPOFOMERGE); - __kfree_skb(skb1); + tcp_drop(sk, skb1); goto merge_right; } - } else if (tcp_try_coalesce(sk, skb1, - skb, &fragstolen)) { + } else if (tcp_ooo_try_coalesce(sk, skb1, + skb, &fragstolen)) { goto coalesce_done; } p = &parent->rb_right; @@ -4902,6 +4919,7 @@ end: static void tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + u32 range_truesize, sum_tiny = 0; struct sk_buff *skb, *head; u32 start, end; @@ -4913,6 +4931,7 @@ new_range: } start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; end = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq; + range_truesize = skb->truesize; for (head = skb;;) { skb = skb_rb_next(skb); @@ -4923,11 +4942,20 @@ new_range: if (!skb || after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end) || before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, start)) { - tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue, - head, skb, start, end); + /* Do not attempt collapsing tiny skbs */ + if (range_truesize != head->truesize || + end - start >= SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(SK_MEM_QUANTUM)) { + tcp_collapse(sk, NULL, &tp->out_of_order_queue, + head, skb, start, end); + } else { + sum_tiny += range_truesize; + if (sum_tiny > sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3) + return; + } goto new_range; } + range_truesize += skb->truesize; if (unlikely(before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, start))) start = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; if (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, end)) @@ -4942,6 +4970,7 @@ new_range: * 2) not add too big latencies if thousands of packets sit there. * (But if application shrinks SO_RCVBUF, we could still end up * freeing whole queue here) + * 3) Drop at least 12.5 % of sk_rcvbuf to avoid malicious attacks. * * Return true if queue has shrunk. */ @@ -4949,20 +4978,26 @@ static bool tcp_prune_ofo_queue(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); struct rb_node *node, *prev; + int goal; if (RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) return false; NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_OFOPRUNED); + goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3; node = &tp->ooo_last_skb->rbnode; do { prev = rb_prev(node); rb_erase(node, &tp->out_of_order_queue); + goal -= rb_to_skb(node)->truesize; tcp_drop(sk, rb_to_skb(node)); - sk_mem_reclaim(sk); - if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf && - !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk)) - break; + if (!prev || goal <= 0) { + sk_mem_reclaim(sk); + if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf && + !tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk)) + break; + goal = sk->sk_rcvbuf >> 3; + } node = prev; } while (node); tp->ooo_last_skb = rb_to_skb(prev); @@ -4997,6 +5032,9 @@ static int tcp_prune_queue(struct sock *sk) else if (tcp_under_memory_pressure(sk)) tp->rcv_ssthresh = min(tp->rcv_ssthresh, 4U * tp->advmss); + if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) + return 0; + tcp_collapse_ofo_queue(sk); if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) tcp_collapse(sk, &sk->sk_receive_queue, NULL, |