Merge branch 'x86-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull misc x86 updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Misc changes:

   - Enhance #GP fault printouts by distinguishing between canonical and
     non-canonical address faults, and also add KASAN fault decoding.

   - Fix/enhance the x86 NMI handler by putting the duration check into
     a direct function call instead of an irq_work which we know to be
     broken in some cases.

   - Clean up do_general_protection() a bit"

* 'x86-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/nmi: Remove irq_work from the long duration NMI handler
  x86/traps: Cleanup do_general_protection()
  x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP
  x86/dumpstack: Introduce die_addr() for die() with #GP fault address
  x86/traps: Print address on #GP
  x86/insn-eval: Add support for 64-bit kernel mode

1 files changed, 40 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 621782100eaa..5ef9f24f566b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -512,3 +512,43 @@ void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned lon
 
 	end_report(&flags);
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
+/*
+ * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high
+ * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads
+ * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the
+ * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds
+ * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space.
+ * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was.
+ */
+void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long orig_addr;
+	const char *bug_type;
+
+	if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+		return;
+
+	orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+	/*
+	 * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain
+	 * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access.
+	 * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we
+	 * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow
+	 * chunk of the non-canonical address space.
+	 * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a
+	 * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still
+	 * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not
+	 * necessarily what's actually going on.
+	 */
+	if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+	else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+		bug_type = "probably user-memory-access";
+	else
+		bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
+	pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
+		 orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
+}
+#endif