diff options
author | Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> | 2023-12-19 23:28:55 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-12-29 11:58:38 -0800 |
commit | 0cc9fdbf4a5273310779bd4779fcdfb4705438a6 (patch) | |
tree | 92ac5667636858860244ea072c6d63b367ebd852 /mm/kasan | |
parent | ce37eec0ab62fb1f04509b83161845859815ee13 (diff) |
kasan: introduce poison_kmalloc_large_redzone
Split out a poison_kmalloc_large_redzone helper from __kasan_kmalloc_large
and use it in the caller's code.
This is a preparatory change for the following patches in this series.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93317097b668519d76097fb065201b2027436e22.1703024586.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@pm.me>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/kasan')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/kasan/common.c | 41 |
1 files changed, 23 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 1217b260abc3..962805bf5f62 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -363,23 +363,12 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc); -void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, +static inline void poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(const void *ptr, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { unsigned long redzone_start; unsigned long redzone_end; - if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) - kasan_quarantine_reduce(); - - if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) - return NULL; - - /* - * The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for - * alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc(). - */ - /* * The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode. * Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned @@ -389,12 +378,25 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size); /* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */ - redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), - KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); + redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size), KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE); redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr)); kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start, KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false); +} +void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size, + gfp_t flags) +{ + if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) + kasan_quarantine_reduce(); + + if (unlikely(ptr == NULL)) + return NULL; + + /* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages(). */ + poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(ptr, size, flags); + + /* Keep the tag that was set by alloc_pages(). */ return (void *)ptr; } @@ -402,6 +404,9 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag { struct slab *slab; + if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags)) + kasan_quarantine_reduce(); + if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR)) return (void *)object; @@ -419,11 +424,11 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flag /* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */ if (unlikely(!slab)) - return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags); - else { + poison_kmalloc_large_redzone(object, size, flags); + else poison_kmalloc_redzone(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags); - return (void *)object; - } + + return (void *)object; } bool __kasan_mempool_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, |