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author | Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> | 2016-08-11 18:44:50 +0100 |
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committer | Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> | 2016-08-25 18:00:29 +0100 |
commit | cab15ce604e550020bb7115b779013b91bcdbc21 (patch) | |
tree | 0ba025b8ad16505532aaa6e1b4cc665473f026fa /lib/cpu_rmap.c | |
parent | 7419333fa15ec958d12845fcc79b7bdd16de06ec (diff) |
arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions
The ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing
the PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU
implementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still
access such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect
against read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such
protection must enable features like SECCOMP.
This patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros
to the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that
pte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't
set. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the
pte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.
Reviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/cpu_rmap.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions