Merge tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next

Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2022-12-11

We've added 74 non-merge commits during the last 11 day(s) which contain
a total of 88 files changed, 3362 insertions(+), 789 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Decouple prune and jump points handling in the verifier, from Andrii.

2) Do not rely on ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION for fmod_ret, from Benjamin.
   Merged from hid tree.

3) Do not zero-extend kfunc return values. Necessary fix for 32-bit archs,
   from Björn.

4) Don't use rcu_users to refcount in task kfuncs, from David.

5) Three reg_state->id fixes in the verifier, from Eduard.

6) Optimize bpf_mem_alloc by reusing elements from free_by_rcu, from Hou.

7) Refactor dynptr handling in the verifier, from Kumar.

8) Remove the "/sys" mount and umount dance in {open,close}_netns
  in bpf selftests, from Martin.

9) Enable sleepable support for cgrp local storage, from Yonghong.

* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (74 commits)
  selftests/bpf: test case for relaxed prunning of active_lock.id
  selftests/bpf: Add pruning test case for bpf_spin_lock
  bpf: use check_ids() for active_lock comparison
  selftests/bpf: verify states_equal() maintains idmap across all frames
  bpf: states_equal() must build idmap for all function frames
  selftests/bpf: test cases for regsafe() bug skipping check_id()
  bpf: regsafe() must not skip check_ids()
  docs/bpf: Add documentation for BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE
  selftests/bpf: Add test for dynptr reinit in user_ringbuf callback
  bpf: Use memmove for bpf_dynptr_{read,write}
  bpf: Move PTR_TO_STACK alignment check to process_dynptr_func
  bpf: Rework check_func_arg_reg_off
  bpf: Rework process_dynptr_func
  bpf: Propagate errors from process_* checks in check_func_arg
  bpf: Refactor ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR checks into process_dynptr_func
  bpf: Skip rcu_barrier() if rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() is true
  bpf: Reuse freed element in free_by_rcu during allocation
  selftests/bpf: Bring test_offload.py back to life
  bpf: Fix comment error in fixup_kfunc_call function
  bpf: Do not zero-extend kfunc return values
  ...
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221212024701.73809-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

8 files changed, 605 insertions, 299 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_cgrp_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_cgrp_storage.c
index 309403800f82..6cdf6d9ed91d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_cgrp_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_cgrp_storage.c
@@ -211,7 +211,6 @@ BPF_CALL_2(bpf_cgrp_storage_delete, struct bpf_map *, map, struct cgroup *, cgro
 	return ret;
 }
 
-BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(cgroup_storage_map_btf_ids, struct, bpf_local_storage_map)
 const struct bpf_map_ops cgrp_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_meta_equal = bpf_map_meta_equal,
 	.map_alloc_check = bpf_local_storage_map_alloc_check,
@@ -222,7 +221,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops cgrp_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_update_elem = bpf_cgrp_storage_update_elem,
 	.map_delete_elem = bpf_cgrp_storage_delete_elem,
 	.map_check_btf = bpf_local_storage_map_check_btf,
-	.map_btf_id = &cgroup_storage_map_btf_ids[0],
+	.map_btf_id = &bpf_local_storage_map_btf_id[0],
 	.map_owner_storage_ptr = cgroup_storage_ptr,
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
index 6a1d4d22816a..05f4c66c9089 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_inode_storage.c
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ static void inode_storage_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	bpf_local_storage_map_free(map, &inode_cache, NULL);
 }
 
-BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(inode_storage_map_btf_ids, struct,
-		   bpf_local_storage_map)
 const struct bpf_map_ops inode_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_meta_equal = bpf_map_meta_equal,
 	.map_alloc_check = bpf_local_storage_map_alloc_check,
@@ -225,7 +223,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops inode_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_update_elem = bpf_fd_inode_storage_update_elem,
 	.map_delete_elem = bpf_fd_inode_storage_delete_elem,
 	.map_check_btf = bpf_local_storage_map_check_btf,
-	.map_btf_id = &inode_storage_map_btf_ids[0],
+	.map_btf_id = &bpf_local_storage_map_btf_id[0],
 	.map_owner_storage_ptr = inode_storage_ptr,
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index ae0267f150b5..9ea42a45da47 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -345,11 +345,27 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_to_inode)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_userns_create)
 BTF_SET_END(sleepable_lsm_hooks)
 
+BTF_SET_START(untrusted_lsm_hooks)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_alloc_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_free)
+BTF_SET_END(untrusted_lsm_hooks)
+
 bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id)
 {
 	return btf_id_set_contains(&sleepable_lsm_hooks, btf_id);
 }
 
+bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
+{
+	return !btf_id_set_contains(&untrusted_lsm_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id);
+}
+
 const struct bpf_prog_ops lsm_prog_ops = {
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
index 8e832db8151a..1e486055a523 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_task_storage.c
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static void task_storage_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	bpf_local_storage_map_free(map, &task_cache, &bpf_task_storage_busy);
 }
 
-BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(task_storage_map_btf_ids, struct, bpf_local_storage_map)
+BTF_ID_LIST_GLOBAL_SINGLE(bpf_local_storage_map_btf_id, struct, bpf_local_storage_map)
 const struct bpf_map_ops task_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_meta_equal = bpf_map_meta_equal,
 	.map_alloc_check = bpf_local_storage_map_alloc_check,
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ const struct bpf_map_ops task_storage_map_ops = {
 	.map_update_elem = bpf_pid_task_storage_update_elem,
 	.map_delete_elem = bpf_pid_task_storage_delete_elem,
 	.map_check_btf = bpf_local_storage_map_check_btf,
-	.map_btf_id = &task_storage_map_btf_ids[0],
+	.map_btf_id = &bpf_local_storage_map_btf_id[0],
 	.map_owner_storage_ptr = task_storage_ptr,
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
index d11cbf8cece7..f7dd8af06413 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
 #include <linux/btf.h>
 #include <linux/btf_ids.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
 #include <linux/skmsg.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
@@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ enum btf_kfunc_hook {
 	BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_STRUCT_OPS,
 	BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_TRACING,
 	BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_SYSCALL,
+	BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_FMODRET,
 	BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_MAX,
 };
 
@@ -5829,6 +5831,7 @@ static bool prog_args_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
 		return atype == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP || atype == BPF_TRACE_ITER;
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
+		return bpf_lsm_is_trusted(prog);
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
 		return true;
 	default:
@@ -7606,11 +7609,14 @@ u32 *btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(const struct btf *btf,
 	return __btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(btf, hook, kfunc_btf_id);
 }
 
-/* This function must be invoked only from initcalls/module init functions */
-int register_btf_kfunc_id_set(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
-			      const struct btf_kfunc_id_set *kset)
+u32 *btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(const struct btf *btf, u32 kfunc_btf_id)
+{
+	return __btf_kfunc_id_set_contains(btf, BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_FMODRET, kfunc_btf_id);
+}
+
+static int __register_btf_kfunc_id_set(enum btf_kfunc_hook hook,
+				       const struct btf_kfunc_id_set *kset)
 {
-	enum btf_kfunc_hook hook;
 	struct btf *btf;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -7629,13 +7635,29 @@ int register_btf_kfunc_id_set(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
 	if (IS_ERR(btf))
 		return PTR_ERR(btf);
 
-	hook = bpf_prog_type_to_kfunc_hook(prog_type);
 	ret = btf_populate_kfunc_set(btf, hook, kset->set);
 	btf_put(btf);
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/* This function must be invoked only from initcalls/module init functions */
+int register_btf_kfunc_id_set(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
+			      const struct btf_kfunc_id_set *kset)
+{
+	enum btf_kfunc_hook hook;
+
+	hook = bpf_prog_type_to_kfunc_hook(prog_type);
+	return __register_btf_kfunc_id_set(hook, kset);
+}
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_btf_kfunc_id_set);
 
+/* This function must be invoked only from initcalls/module init functions */
+int register_btf_fmodret_id_set(const struct btf_kfunc_id_set *kset)
+{
+	return __register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BTF_KFUNC_HOOK_FMODRET, kset);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_btf_fmodret_id_set);
+
 s32 btf_find_dtor_kfunc(struct btf *btf, u32 btf_id)
 {
 	struct btf_id_dtor_kfunc_tab *tab = btf->dtor_kfunc_tab;
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index a5a511430f2a..af30c6cbd65d 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -1404,7 +1404,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_kptr_xchg_proto = {
 #define DYNPTR_SIZE_MASK	0xFFFFFF
 #define DYNPTR_RDONLY_BIT	BIT(31)
 
-static bool bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr)
+static bool bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr)
 {
 	return ptr->size & DYNPTR_RDONLY_BIT;
 }
@@ -1414,7 +1414,7 @@ static void bpf_dynptr_set_type(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, enum bpf_dynptr_typ
 	ptr->size |= type << DYNPTR_TYPE_SHIFT;
 }
 
-u32 bpf_dynptr_get_size(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr)
+u32 bpf_dynptr_get_size(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr)
 {
 	return ptr->size & DYNPTR_SIZE_MASK;
 }
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ void bpf_dynptr_set_null(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr)
 	memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(*ptr));
 }
 
-static int bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 offset, u32 len)
+static int bpf_dynptr_check_off_len(const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr, u32 offset, u32 len)
 {
 	u32 size = bpf_dynptr_get_size(ptr);
 
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_from_mem_proto = {
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL | MEM_UNINIT,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_read, void *, dst, u32, len, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, src,
+BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_read, void *, dst, u32, len, const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, src,
 	   u32, offset, u64, flags)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -1495,7 +1495,11 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_read, void *, dst, u32, len, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, src
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	memcpy(dst, src->data + src->offset + offset, len);
+	/* Source and destination may possibly overlap, hence use memmove to
+	 * copy the data. E.g. bpf_dynptr_from_mem may create two dynptr
+	 * pointing to overlapping PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE regions.
+	 */
+	memmove(dst, src->data + src->offset + offset, len);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1506,12 +1510,12 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_read_proto = {
 	.ret_type	= RET_INTEGER,
 	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
-	.arg3_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
+	.arg3_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_write, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, dst, u32, offset, void *, src,
+BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_write, const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, dst, u32, offset, void *, src,
 	   u32, len, u64, flags)
 {
 	int err;
@@ -1523,7 +1527,11 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_dynptr_write, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, dst, u32, offset, void *,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	memcpy(dst->data + dst->offset + offset, src, len);
+	/* Source and destination may possibly overlap, hence use memmove to
+	 * copy the data. E.g. bpf_dynptr_from_mem may create two dynptr
+	 * pointing to overlapping PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE regions.
+	 */
+	memmove(dst->data + dst->offset + offset, src, len);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1532,14 +1540,14 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_write_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_dynptr_write,
 	.gpl_only	= false,
 	.ret_type	= RET_INTEGER,
-	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
+	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg4_type	= ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 	.arg5_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 };
 
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_dynptr_data, struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, ptr, u32, offset, u32, len)
+BPF_CALL_3(bpf_dynptr_data, const struct bpf_dynptr_kern *, ptr, u32, offset, u32, len)
 {
 	int err;
 
@@ -1560,7 +1568,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_dynptr_data_proto = {
 	.func		= bpf_dynptr_data,
 	.gpl_only	= false,
 	.ret_type	= RET_PTR_TO_DYNPTR_MEM_OR_NULL,
-	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
+	.arg1_type	= ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY,
 	.arg2_type	= ARG_ANYTHING,
 	.arg3_type	= ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
 };
@@ -1833,8 +1841,59 @@ struct bpf_list_node *bpf_list_pop_back(struct bpf_list_head *head)
  */
 struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	refcount_inc(&p->rcu_users);
-	return p;
+	return get_task_struct(p);
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_task_acquire_not_zero - Acquire a reference to a rcu task object. A task
+ * acquired by this kfunc which is not stored in a map as a kptr, must be
+ * released by calling bpf_task_release().
+ * @p: The task on which a reference is being acquired.
+ */
+struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire_not_zero(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	/* For the time being this function returns NULL, as it's not currently
+	 * possible to safely acquire a reference to a task with RCU protection
+	 * using get_task_struct() and put_task_struct(). This is due to the
+	 * slightly odd mechanics of p->rcu_users, and how task RCU protection
+	 * works.
+	 *
+	 * A struct task_struct is refcounted by two different refcount_t
+	 * fields:
+	 *
+	 * 1. p->usage:     The "true" refcount field which tracks a task's
+	 *		    lifetime. The task is freed as soon as this
+	 *		    refcount drops to 0.
+	 *
+	 * 2. p->rcu_users: An "RCU users" refcount field which is statically
+	 *		    initialized to 2, and is co-located in a union with
+	 *		    a struct rcu_head field (p->rcu). p->rcu_users
+	 *		    essentially encapsulates a single p->usage
+	 *		    refcount, and when p->rcu_users goes to 0, an RCU
+	 *		    callback is scheduled on the struct rcu_head which
+	 *		    decrements the p->usage refcount.
+	 *
+	 * There are two important implications to this task refcounting logic
+	 * described above. The first is that
+	 * refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->rcu_users) cannot be used anywhere, as
+	 * after the refcount goes to 0, the RCU callback being scheduled will
+	 * cause the memory backing the refcount to again be nonzero due to the
+	 * fields sharing a union. The other is that we can't rely on RCU to
+	 * guarantee that a task is valid in a BPF program. This is because a
+	 * task could have already transitioned to being in the TASK_DEAD
+	 * state, had its rcu_users refcount go to 0, and its rcu callback
+	 * invoked in which it drops its single p->usage reference. At this
+	 * point the task will be freed as soon as the last p->usage reference
+	 * goes to 0, without waiting for another RCU gp to elapse. The only
+	 * way that a BPF program can guarantee that a task is valid is in this
+	 * scenario is to hold a p->usage refcount itself.
+	 *
+	 * Until we're able to resolve this issue, either by pulling
+	 * p->rcu_users and p->rcu out of the union, or by getting rid of
+	 * p->usage and just using p->rcu_users for refcounting, we'll just
+	 * return NULL here.
+	 */
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1845,33 +1904,15 @@ struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 struct task_struct *bpf_task_kptr_get(struct task_struct **pp)
 {
-	struct task_struct *p;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	p = READ_ONCE(*pp);
-
-	/* Another context could remove the task from the map and release it at
-	 * any time, including after we've done the lookup above. This is safe
-	 * because we're in an RCU read region, so the task is guaranteed to
-	 * remain valid until at least the rcu_read_unlock() below.
+	/* We must return NULL here until we have clarity on how to properly
+	 * leverage RCU for ensuring a task's lifetime. See the comment above
+	 * in bpf_task_acquire_not_zero() for more details.
 	 */
-	if (p && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->rcu_users))
-		/* If the task had been removed from the map and freed as
-		 * described above, refcount_inc_not_zero() will return false.
-		 * The task will be freed at some point after the current RCU
-		 * gp has ended, so just return NULL to the user.
-		 */
-		p = NULL;
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-	return p;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /**
- * bpf_task_release - Release the reference acquired on a struct task_struct *.
- * If this kfunc is invoked in an RCU read region, the task_struct is
- * guaranteed to not be freed until the current grace period has ended, even if
- * its refcount drops to 0.
+ * bpf_task_release - Release the reference acquired on a task.
  * @p: The task on which a reference is being released.
  */
 void bpf_task_release(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -1879,7 +1920,7 @@ void bpf_task_release(struct task_struct *p)
 	if (!p)
 		return;
 
-	put_task_struct_rcu_user(p);
+	put_task_struct(p);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
@@ -1927,7 +1968,7 @@ struct cgroup *bpf_cgroup_kptr_get(struct cgroup **cgrpp)
 }
 
 /**
- * bpf_cgroup_release - Release the reference acquired on a struct cgroup *.
+ * bpf_cgroup_release - Release the reference acquired on a cgroup.
  * If this kfunc is invoked in an RCU read region, the cgroup is guaranteed to
  * not be freed until the current grace period has ended, even if its refcount
  * drops to 0.
@@ -2013,6 +2054,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_push_back)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_front, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_back, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire_not_zero, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RCU | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_kptr_get, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_KPTR_GET | KF_RET_NULL)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_release, KF_RELEASE)
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/memalloc.c b/kernel/bpf/memalloc.c
index 8f0d65f2474a..ebcc3dd0fa19 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/memalloc.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/memalloc.c
@@ -171,9 +171,24 @@ static void alloc_bulk(struct bpf_mem_cache *c, int cnt, int node)
 	memcg = get_memcg(c);
 	old_memcg = set_active_memcg(memcg);
 	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
-		obj = __alloc(c, node);
-		if (!obj)
-			break;
+		/*
+		 * free_by_rcu is only manipulated by irq work refill_work().
+		 * IRQ works on the same CPU are called sequentially, so it is
+		 * safe to use __llist_del_first() here. If alloc_bulk() is
+		 * invoked by the initial prefill, there will be no running
+		 * refill_work(), so __llist_del_first() is fine as well.
+		 *
+		 * In most cases, objects on free_by_rcu are from the same CPU.
+		 * If some objects come from other CPUs, it doesn't incur any
+		 * harm because NUMA_NO_NODE means the preference for current
+		 * numa node and it is not a guarantee.
+		 */
+		obj = __llist_del_first(&c->free_by_rcu);
+		if (!obj) {
+			obj = __alloc(c, node);
+			if (!obj)
+				break;
+		}
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
 			/* In RT irq_work runs in per-cpu kthread, so disable
 			 * interrupts to avoid preemption and interrupts and
@@ -449,9 +464,17 @@ static void free_mem_alloc(struct bpf_mem_alloc *ma)
 {
 	/* waiting_for_gp lists was drained, but __free_rcu might
 	 * still execute. Wait for it now before we freeing percpu caches.
+	 *
+	 * rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() doesn't imply synchronize_rcu_tasks_trace(),
+	 * but rcu_barrier_tasks_trace() and rcu_barrier() below are only used
+	 * to wait for the pending __free_rcu_tasks_trace() and __free_rcu(),
+	 * so if call_rcu(head, __free_rcu) is skipped due to
+	 * rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp(), it will be OK to skip rcu_barrier() by
+	 * using rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp() as well.
 	 */
 	rcu_barrier_tasks_trace();
-	rcu_barrier();
+	if (!rcu_trace_implies_rcu_gp())
+		rcu_barrier();
 	free_mem_alloc_no_barrier(ma);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 4e7f1d085e53..a5255a0dcbb6 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -451,6 +451,11 @@ static bool reg_type_not_null(enum bpf_reg_type type)
 		type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON;
 }
 
+static bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
+{
+	return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC;
+}
+
 static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	struct btf_record *rec = NULL;
@@ -458,7 +463,7 @@ static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 
 	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
 		rec = reg->map_ptr->record;
-	} else if (reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC)) {
+	} else if (type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type)) {
 		meta = btf_find_struct_meta(reg->btf, reg->btf_id);
 		if (meta)
 			rec = meta->record;
@@ -587,7 +592,7 @@ static const char *reg_type_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		[PTR_TO_BUF]		= "buf",
 		[PTR_TO_FUNC]		= "func",
 		[PTR_TO_MAP_KEY]	= "map_key",
-		[PTR_TO_DYNPTR]		= "dynptr_ptr",
+		[CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR]	= "dynptr_ptr",
 	};
 
 	if (type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) {
@@ -720,6 +725,28 @@ static bool dynptr_type_refcounted(enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
 	return type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF;
 }
 
+static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+			      enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
+			      bool first_slot);
+
+static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+				struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
+
+static void mark_dynptr_stack_regs(struct bpf_reg_state *sreg1,
+				   struct bpf_reg_state *sreg2,
+				   enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
+{
+	__mark_dynptr_reg(sreg1, type, true);
+	__mark_dynptr_reg(sreg2, type, false);
+}
+
+static void mark_dynptr_cb_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+			       enum bpf_dynptr_type type)
+{
+	__mark_dynptr_reg(reg, type, true);
+}
+
+
 static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 				   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, int insn_idx)
 {
@@ -741,9 +768,8 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_
 	if (type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = true;
-	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type;
-	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = type;
+	mark_dynptr_stack_regs(&state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr,
+			       &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr, type);
 
 	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(type)) {
 		/* The id is used to track proper releasing */
@@ -751,8 +777,8 @@ static int mark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_
 		if (id < 0)
 			return id;
 
-		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = id;
-		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = id;
+		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
+		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id = id;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -774,25 +800,23 @@ static int unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_re
 	}
 
 	/* Invalidate any slices associated with this dynptr */
-	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type)) {
-		release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id);
-		state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
-		state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.id = 0;
-	}
-
-	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot = false;
-	state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0;
-	state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type = 0;
+	if (dynptr_type_refcounted(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type))
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id));
 
+	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
+	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &state->stack[spi - 1].spilled_ptr);
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
-	int i;
+	int spi, i;
+
+	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
+		return false;
 
+	spi = get_spi(reg->off);
 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS))
 		return true;
 
@@ -805,13 +829,17 @@ static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_
 	return true;
 }
 
-bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-			      struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+static bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+	int spi;
 	int i;
 
+	/* This already represents first slot of initialized bpf_dynptr */
+	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
+		return true;
+
+	spi = get_spi(reg->off);
 	if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) ||
 	    !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.first_slot)
 		return false;
@@ -825,21 +853,24 @@ bool is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return true;
 }
 
-bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-			     struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
-			     enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
+static bool is_dynptr_type_expected(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+				    enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
 {
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
 	enum bpf_dynptr_type dynptr_type;
-	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+	int spi;
 
 	/* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR takes any type of dynptr */
 	if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
 		return true;
 
 	dynptr_type = arg_to_dynptr_type(arg_type);
-
-	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
+	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
+		return reg->dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
+	} else {
+		spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+		return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.dynptr.type == dynptr_type;
+	}
 }
 
 /* The reg state of a pointer or a bounded scalar was saved when
@@ -1351,9 +1382,6 @@ static const int caller_saved[CALLER_SAVED_REGS] = {
 	BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_5
 };
 
-static void __mark_reg_not_init(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
-				struct bpf_reg_state *reg);
-
 /* This helper doesn't clear reg->id */
 static void ___mark_reg_known(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u64 imm)
 {
@@ -1416,6 +1444,19 @@ static void mark_reg_known_zero(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	__mark_reg_known_zero(regs + regno);
 }
 
+static void __mark_dynptr_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, enum bpf_dynptr_type type,
+			      bool first_slot)
+{
+	/* reg->type has no meaning for STACK_DYNPTR, but when we set reg for
+	 * callback arguments, it does need to be CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, so simply
+	 * set it unconditionally as it is ignored for STACK_DYNPTR anyway.
+	 */
+	__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
+	reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;
+	reg->dynptr.type = type;
+	reg->dynptr.first_slot = first_slot;
+}
+
 static void mark_ptr_not_null_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) {
@@ -2525,6 +2566,16 @@ static int check_reg_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void mark_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+{
+	env->insn_aux_data[idx].jmp_point = true;
+}
+
+static bool is_jmp_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
+{
+	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jmp_point;
+}
+
 /* for any branch, call, exit record the history of jmps in the given state */
 static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			    struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
@@ -2533,6 +2584,9 @@ static int push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	struct bpf_idx_pair *p;
 	size_t alloc_size;
 
+	if (!is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx))
+		return 0;
+
 	cnt++;
 	alloc_size = kmalloc_size_roundup(size_mul(cnt, sizeof(*p)));
 	p = krealloc(cur->jmp_history, alloc_size, GFP_USER);
@@ -4275,7 +4329,7 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 		return true;
 
 	/* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
-	 * MEM_ALLOC, MEM_RCU or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the
+	 * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the
 	 * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in
 	 * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are
 	 * not.
@@ -4287,6 +4341,11 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	       !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type);
 }
 
+static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+{
+	return reg->type & MEM_RCU;
+}
+
 static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
 				   int off, int size, bool strict)
@@ -4703,6 +4762,18 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	u32 btf_id;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+		verbose(env,
+			"'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
+			tname);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+	if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
+		verbose(env,
+			"Cannot access kernel 'struct %s' from non-GPL compatible program\n",
+			tname);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (off < 0) {
 		verbose(env,
 			"R%d is ptr_%s invalid negative access: off=%d\n",
@@ -4773,14 +4844,16 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 
 	if (flag & MEM_RCU) {
 		/* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by
-		 * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is trusted. MEM_RCU
+		 * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU
 		 * itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu
-		 * read lock region. Also mark it as PTR_TRUSTED.
+		 * read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since
+		 * it could be null in some cases.
 		 */
-		if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !is_trusted_reg(reg))
+		if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock ||
+		    !(is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg)))
 			flag &= ~MEM_RCU;
 		else
-			flag |= PTR_TRUSTED;
+			flag |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL;
 	} else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
 		/* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged
 		 * with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively.
@@ -4823,9 +4896,9 @@ static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	t = btf_type_by_id(btf_vmlinux, *map->ops->map_btf_id);
 	tname = btf_name_by_offset(btf_vmlinux, t->name_off);
 
-	if (!env->allow_ptr_to_map_access) {
+	if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
 		verbose(env,
-			"%s access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
+			"'struct %s' access is allowed only to CAP_PERFMON and CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n",
 			tname);
 		return -EPERM;
 	}
@@ -5726,7 +5799,7 @@ static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 		cur->active_lock.ptr = NULL;
 		cur->active_lock.id = 0;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < fstate->acquired_refs; i++) {
+		for (i = fstate->acquired_refs - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
 			int err;
 
 			/* Complain on error because this reference state cannot
@@ -5822,6 +5895,119 @@ static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* There are two register types representing a bpf_dynptr, one is PTR_TO_STACK
+ * which points to a stack slot, and the other is CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR.
+ *
+ * In both cases we deal with the first 8 bytes, but need to mark the next 8
+ * bytes as STACK_DYNPTR in case of PTR_TO_STACK. In case of
+ * CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR, we are guaranteed to get the beginning of the object.
+ *
+ * Mutability of bpf_dynptr is at two levels, one is at the level of struct
+ * bpf_dynptr itself, i.e. whether the helper is receiving a pointer to struct
+ * bpf_dynptr or pointer to const struct bpf_dynptr. In the former case, it can
+ * mutate the view of the dynptr and also possibly destroy it. In the latter
+ * case, it cannot mutate the bpf_dynptr itself but it can still mutate the
+ * memory that dynptr points to.
+ *
+ * The verifier will keep track both levels of mutation (bpf_dynptr's in
+ * reg->type and the memory's in reg->dynptr.type), but there is no support for
+ * readonly dynptr view yet, hence only the first case is tracked and checked.
+ *
+ * This is consistent with how C applies the const modifier to a struct object,
+ * where the pointer itself inside bpf_dynptr becomes const but not what it
+ * points to.
+ *
+ * Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument
+ * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype.
+ */
+int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
+			enum bpf_arg_type arg_type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+	struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg = &regs[regno];
+
+	/* MEM_UNINIT and MEM_RDONLY are exclusive, when applied to an
+	 * ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (or ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_*):
+	 */
+	if ((arg_type & (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) == (MEM_UNINIT | MEM_RDONLY)) {
+		verbose(env, "verifier internal error: misconfigured dynptr helper type flags\n");
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+	/* CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR already has fixed and var_off as 0 due to
+	 * check_func_arg_reg_off's logic. We only need to check offset
+	 * alignment for PTR_TO_STACK.
+	 */
+	if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK && (reg->off % BPF_REG_SIZE)) {
+		verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset=%d\n", reg->off);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	/*  MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for
+	 *		 constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object.
+	 *
+	 *		 Currently, this is only possible with PTR_TO_STACK
+	 *		 pointing to a region of at least 16 bytes which doesn't
+	 *		 contain an existing bpf_dynptr.
+	 *
+	 *  MEM_RDONLY - Points to a initialized bpf_dynptr that will not be
+	 *		 mutated or destroyed. However, the memory it points to
+	 *		 may be mutated.
+	 *
+	 *  None       - Points to a initialized dynptr that can be mutated and
+	 *		 destroyed, including mutation of the memory it points
+	 *		 to.
+	 */
+	if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) {
+		if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
+			verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment,
+		 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
+		 */
+		if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) {
+			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n");
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
+
+		meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno;
+	} else /* MEM_RDONLY and None case from above */ {
+		/* For the reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK case, bpf_dynptr is never const */
+		if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR && !(arg_type & MEM_RDONLY)) {
+			verbose(env, "cannot pass pointer to const bpf_dynptr, the helper mutates it\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) {
+			verbose(env,
+				"Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n",
+				regno);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		/* Fold modifiers (in this case, MEM_RDONLY) when checking expected type */
+		if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type & ~MEM_RDONLY)) {
+			const char *err_extra = "";
+
+			switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
+			case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
+				err_extra = "local";
+				break;
+			case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
+				err_extra = "ringbuf";
+				break;
+			default:
+				err_extra = "<unknown>";
+				break;
+			}
+			verbose(env,
+				"Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n",
+				err_extra, regno);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static bool arg_type_is_mem_size(enum bpf_arg_type type)
 {
 	return type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
@@ -5945,7 +6131,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types = {
 	.types = {
 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
 		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED,
-		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED,
+		PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU,
 	},
 };
 static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types = {
@@ -5962,7 +6148,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types kptr_types = { .types = { PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE } }
 static const struct bpf_reg_types dynptr_types = {
 	.types = {
 		PTR_TO_STACK,
-		PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL,
+		CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR,
 	}
 };
 
@@ -6091,17 +6277,38 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			   const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
 			   enum bpf_arg_type arg_type)
 {
-	enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type;
-	bool fixed_off_ok = false;
+	u32 type = reg->type;
 
-	switch ((u32)type) {
-	/* Pointer types where reg offset is explicitly allowed: */
-	case PTR_TO_STACK:
-		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && reg->off % BPF_REG_SIZE) {
-			verbose(env, "cannot pass in dynptr at an offset\n");
+	/* When referenced register is passed to release function, its fixed
+	 * offset must be 0.
+	 *
+	 * We will check arg_type_is_release reg has ref_obj_id when storing
+	 * meta->release_regno.
+	 */
+	if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
+		/* ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR with OBJ_RELEASE is a bit special, as it
+		 * may not directly point to the object being released, but to
+		 * dynptr pointing to such object, which might be at some offset
+		 * on the stack. In that case, we simply to fallback to the
+		 * default handling.
+		 */
+		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type) && type == PTR_TO_STACK)
+			return 0;
+		/* Doing check_ptr_off_reg check for the offset will catch this
+		 * because fixed_off_ok is false, but checking here allows us
+		 * to give the user a better error message.
+		 */
+		if (reg->off) {
+			verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func or trusted arg to kfunc\n",
+				regno);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
-		fallthrough;
+		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
+	}
+
+	switch (type) {
+	/* Pointer types where both fixed and variable offset is explicitly allowed: */
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:
@@ -6112,47 +6319,38 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	case PTR_TO_BUF:
 	case PTR_TO_BUF | MEM_RDONLY:
 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
-		/* Some of the argument types nevertheless require a
-		 * zero register offset.
-		 */
-		if (base_type(arg_type) != ARG_PTR_TO_RINGBUF_MEM)
-			return 0;
-		break;
+		return 0;
 	/* All the rest must be rejected, except PTR_TO_BTF_ID which allows
 	 * fixed offset.
 	 */
 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC:
 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED:
-	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED:
+	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU:
 	case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED:
 		/* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function,
-		 * it's fixed offset must be 0.	In the other cases, fixed offset
-		 * can be non-zero.
+		 * its fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset
+		 * can be non-zero. This was already checked above. So pass
+		 * fixed_off_ok as true to allow fixed offset for all other
+		 * cases. var_off always must be 0 for PTR_TO_BTF_ID, hence we
+		 * still need to do checks instead of returning.
 		 */
-		if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type) && reg->off) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d must have zero offset when passed to release func\n",
-				regno);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
-		/* For arg is release pointer, fixed_off_ok must be false, but
-		 * we already checked and rejected reg->off != 0 above, so set
-		 * to true to allow fixed offset for all other cases.
-		 */
-		fixed_off_ok = true;
-		break;
+		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, true);
 	default:
-		break;
+		return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, false);
 	}
-	return __check_ptr_off_reg(env, reg, regno, fixed_off_ok);
 }
 
-static u32 stack_slot_get_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+static u32 dynptr_ref_obj_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
 	struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-	int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+	int spi;
 
-	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id;
+	if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
+		return reg->ref_obj_id;
+
+	spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+	return state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id;
 }
 
 static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
@@ -6217,11 +6415,22 @@ skip_type_check:
 	if (arg_type_is_release(arg_type)) {
 		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(arg_type)) {
 			struct bpf_func_state *state = func(env, reg);
-			int spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+			int spi;
 
-			if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) ||
-			    !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.id) {
-				verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno);
+			/* Only dynptr created on stack can be released, thus
+			 * the get_spi and stack state checks for spilled_ptr
+			 * should only be done before process_dynptr_func for
+			 * PTR_TO_STACK.
+			 */
+			if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
+				spi = get_spi(reg->off);
+				if (!is_spi_bounds_valid(state, spi, BPF_DYNPTR_NR_SLOTS) ||
+				    !state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.ref_obj_id) {
+					verbose(env, "arg %d is an unacquired reference\n", regno);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+			} else {
+				verbose(env, "cannot release unowned const bpf_dynptr\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 		} else if (!reg->ref_obj_id && !register_is_null(reg)) {
@@ -6318,19 +6527,22 @@ skip_type_check:
 		break;
 	case ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK:
 		if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) {
-			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, true))
-				return -EACCES;
+			err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, true);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 		} else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) {
-			if (process_spin_lock(env, regno, false))
-				return -EACCES;
+			err = process_spin_lock(env, regno, false);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 		} else {
 			verbose(env, "verifier internal error\n");
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 		break;
 	case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER:
-		if (process_timer_func(env, regno, meta))
-			return -EACCES;
+		err = process_timer_func(env, regno, meta);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		break;
 	case ARG_PTR_TO_FUNC:
 		meta->subprogno = reg->subprogno;
@@ -6353,52 +6565,9 @@ skip_type_check:
 		err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, true, meta);
 		break;
 	case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
-		/* We only need to check for initialized / uninitialized helper
-		 * dynptr args if the dynptr is not PTR_TO_DYNPTR, as the
-		 * assumption is that if it is, that a helper function
-		 * initialized the dynptr on behalf of the BPF program.
-		 */
-		if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
-			break;
-		if (arg_type & MEM_UNINIT) {
-			if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_uninit(env, reg)) {
-				verbose(env, "Dynptr has to be an uninitialized dynptr\n");
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-
-			/* We only support one dynptr being uninitialized at the moment,
-			 * which is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
-			 */
-			if (meta->uninit_dynptr_regno) {
-				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: multiple uninitialized dynptr args\n");
-				return -EFAULT;
-			}
-
-			meta->uninit_dynptr_regno = regno;
-		} else if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) {
-			verbose(env,
-				"Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #%d\n",
-				arg + 1);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		} else if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, arg_type)) {
-			const char *err_extra = "";
-
-			switch (arg_type & DYNPTR_TYPE_FLAG_MASK) {
-			case DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL:
-				err_extra = "local";
-				break;
-			case DYNPTR_TYPE_RINGBUF:
-				err_extra = "ringbuf";
-				break;
-			default:
-				err_extra = "<unknown>";
-				break;
-			}
-			verbose(env,
-				"Expected a dynptr of type %s as arg #%d\n",
-				err_extra, arg + 1);
-			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+		err = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, arg_type, meta);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		break;
 	case ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO:
 		if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
@@ -6465,8 +6634,9 @@ skip_type_check:
 		break;
 	}
 	case ARG_PTR_TO_KPTR:
-		if (process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta))
-			return -EACCES;
+		err = process_kptr_func(env, regno, meta);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -7234,11 +7404,10 @@ static int set_user_ringbuf_callback_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 {
 	/* bpf_user_ringbuf_drain(struct bpf_map *map, void *callback_fn, void
 	 *			  callback_ctx, u64 flags);
-	 * callback_fn(struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx);
+	 * callback_fn(const struct bpf_dynptr_t* dynptr, void *callback_ctx);
 	 */
 	__mark_reg_not_init(env, &callee->regs[BPF_REG_0]);
-	callee->regs[BPF_REG_1].type = PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL;
-	__mark_reg_known_zero(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1]);
+	mark_dynptr_cb_reg(&callee->regs[BPF_REG_1], BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL);
 	callee->regs[BPF_REG_2] = caller->regs[BPF_REG_3];
 
 	/* unused */
@@ -7632,7 +7801,15 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 
 	regs = cur_regs(env);
 
+	/* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot
+	 * be reinitialized by any dynptr helper. Hence, mark_stack_slots_dynptr
+	 * is safe to do directly.
+	 */
 	if (meta.uninit_dynptr_regno) {
+		if (regs[meta.uninit_dynptr_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
+			verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be initialized\n");
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
 		/* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */
 		for (i = 0; i < BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE; i += 8) {
 			err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, meta.uninit_dynptr_regno,
@@ -7650,15 +7827,24 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 
 	if (meta.release_regno) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
-		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1]))
+		/* This can only be set for PTR_TO_STACK, as CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot
+		 * be released by any dynptr helper. Hence, unmark_stack_slots_dynptr
+		 * is safe to do directly.
+		 */
+		if (arg_type_is_dynptr(fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno - BPF_REG_1])) {
+			if (regs[meta.release_regno].type == CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
+				verbose(env, "verifier internal error: CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR cannot be released\n");
+				return -EFAULT;
+			}
 			err = unmark_stack_slots_dynptr(env, &regs[meta.release_regno]);
-		else if (meta.ref_obj_id)
+		} else if (meta.ref_obj_id) {
 			err = release_reference(env, meta.ref_obj_id);
-		/* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
-		 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
-		 */
-		else if (register_is_null(&regs[meta.release_regno]))
+		} else if (register_is_null(&regs[meta.release_regno])) {
+			/* meta.ref_obj_id can only be 0 if register that is meant to be
+			 * released is NULL, which must be > R0.
+			 */
 			err = 0;
+		}
 		if (err) {
 			verbose(env, "func %s#%d reference has not been acquired before\n",
 				func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
@@ -7732,11 +7918,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 					return -EFAULT;
 				}
 
-				if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_DYNPTR)
-					/* Find the id of the dynptr we're
-					 * tracking the reference of
-					 */
-					meta.ref_obj_id = stack_slot_get_id(env, reg);
+				meta.ref_obj_id = dynptr_ref_obj_id(env, reg);
 				break;
 			}
 		}
@@ -8026,6 +8208,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
 	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE;
 }
 
+static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+	return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU;
+}
+
 static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg)
 {
 	return arg == 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET);
@@ -8710,13 +8897,20 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 		switch (kf_arg_type) {
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID:
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
-			if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta))
+			if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta))
 				break;
 
 			if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) {
-				verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno);
-				return -EINVAL;
+				if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) {
+					verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
+				if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) {
+					verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno);
+					return -EINVAL;
+				}
 			}
+
 			fallthrough;
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX:
 			/* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */
@@ -8780,22 +8974,15 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 				return ret;
 			break;
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:
-			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
-				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack\n", i);
+			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_STACK &&
+			    reg->type != CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR) {
+				verbose(env, "arg#%d expected pointer to stack or dynptr_ptr\n", i);
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 
-			if (!is_dynptr_reg_valid_init(env, reg)) {
-				verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s must be valid and initialized\n",
-					i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
-
-			if (!is_dynptr_type_expected(env, reg, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | DYNPTR_TYPE_LOCAL)) {
-				verbose(env, "arg#%d pointer type %s %s points to unsupported dynamic pointer type\n",
-					i, btf_type_str(ref_t), ref_tname);
-				return -EINVAL;
-			}
+			ret = process_dynptr_func(env, regno, ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | MEM_RDONLY, NULL);
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
 			break;
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_HEAD:
 			if (reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
@@ -8827,7 +9014,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 		case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
 			/* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */
 			if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID ||
-			     bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) &&
+			     (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) &&
 			    !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) {
 				verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));
 				verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n",
@@ -8942,7 +9129,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 		} else if (rcu_unlock) {
 			bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({
 				if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) {
-					reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED);
+					reg->type &= ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
 					reg->type |= PTR_UNTRUSTED;
 				}
 			}));
@@ -11282,7 +11469,7 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
 				 bool is_null)
 {
 	if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id &&
-	    !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) {
+	    (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) {
 		/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been
 		 * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on
 		 * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't
@@ -12104,11 +12291,16 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state_list **explored_state(
 	return &env->explored_states[(idx ^ state->callsite) % state_htab_size(env)];
 }
 
-static void init_explored_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+static void mark_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
 {
 	env->insn_aux_data[idx].prune_point = true;
 }
 
+static bool is_prune_point(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
+{
+	return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point;
+}
+
 enum {
 	DONE_EXPLORING = 0,
 	KEEP_EXPLORING = 1,
@@ -12137,9 +12329,11 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (e == BRANCH)
+	if (e == BRANCH) {
 		/* mark branch target for state pruning */
-		init_explored_state(env, w);
+		mark_prune_point(env, w);
+		mark_jmp_point(env, w);
+	}
 
 	if (insn_state[w] == 0) {
 		/* tree-edge */
@@ -12166,8 +12360,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	return DONE_EXPLORING;
 }
 
-static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt,
-				struct bpf_insn *insns,
+static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, struct bpf_insn *insns,
 				struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 				bool visit_callee)
 {
@@ -12177,10 +12370,12 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
-		init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
+	mark_prune_point(env, t + 1);
+	/* when we exit from subprog, we need to record non-linear history */
+	mark_jmp_point(env, t + 1);
+
 	if (visit_callee) {
-		init_explored_state(env, t);
+		mark_prune_point(env, t);
 		ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env,
 				/* It's ok to allow recursion from CFG point of
 				 * view. __check_func_call() will do the actual
@@ -12196,13 +12391,13 @@ static int visit_func_call_insn(int t, int insn_cnt,
  *  DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
  *  KEEP_EXPLORING - there is still work to be done before it is fully explored
  */
-static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 {
 	struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (bpf_pseudo_func(insns + t))
-		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env, true);
+		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, true);
 
 	/* All non-branch instructions have a single fall-through edge. */
 	if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) != BPF_JMP &&
@@ -12215,13 +12410,13 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 	case BPF_CALL:
 		if (insns[t].imm == BPF_FUNC_timer_set_callback)
-			/* Mark this call insn to trigger is_state_visited() check
-			 * before call itself is processed by __check_func_call().
-			 * Otherwise new async state will be pushed for further
-			 * exploration.
+			/* Mark this call insn as a prune point to trigger
+			 * is_state_visited() check before call itself is
+			 * processed by __check_func_call(). Otherwise new
+			 * async state will be pushed for further exploration.
 			 */
-			init_explored_state(env, t);
-		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insn_cnt, insns, env,
+			mark_prune_point(env, t);
+		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env,
 					    insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
 
 	case BPF_JA:
@@ -12234,22 +12429,15 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, int insn_cnt, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 
-		/* unconditional jmp is not a good pruning point,
-		 * but it's marked, since backtracking needs
-		 * to record jmp history in is_state_visited().
-		 */
-		init_explored_state(env, t + insns[t].off + 1);
-		/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
-		 * after every call and jump
-		 */
-		if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
-			init_explored_state(env, t + 1);
+		mark_prune_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1);
+		mark_jmp_point(env, t + insns[t].off + 1);
 
 		return ret;
 
 	default:
 		/* conditional jump with two edges */
-		init_explored_state(env, t);
+		mark_prune_point(env, t);
+
 		ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env, true);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
@@ -12285,7 +12473,7 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	while (env->cfg.cur_stack > 0) {
 		int t = insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack - 1];
 
-		ret = visit_insn(t, insn_cnt, env);
+		ret = visit_insn(t, env);
 		switch (ret) {
 		case DONE_EXPLORING:
 			insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
@@ -12876,15 +13064,6 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 
 	equal = memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, parent)) == 0;
 
-	if (rold->type == PTR_TO_STACK)
-		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
-		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
-		 */
-		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
-
-	if (equal)
-		return true;
-
 	if (rold->type == NOT_INIT)
 		/* explored state can't have used this */
 		return true;
@@ -12892,6 +13071,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		return false;
 	switch (base_type(rold->type)) {
 	case SCALAR_VALUE:
+		if (equal)
+			return true;
 		if (env->explore_alu_limits)
 			return false;
 		if (rcur->type == SCALAR_VALUE) {
@@ -12938,7 +13119,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		 */
 		return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 &&
 		       range_within(rold, rcur) &&
-		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
+		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) &&
+		       check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap);
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
 	case PTR_TO_PACKET:
 		if (rcur->type != rold->type)
@@ -12962,20 +13144,14 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
 		/* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */
 		return range_within(rold, rcur) &&
 		       tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off);
-	case PTR_TO_CTX:
-	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
-	case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
-	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
-	case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
-	case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
-	case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
-	case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
-		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above
-		 * would have accepted
+	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		/* two stack pointers are equal only if they're pointing to
+		 * the same stack frame, since fp-8 in foo != fp-8 in bar
 		 */
+		return equal && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
 	default:
-		/* Don't know what's going on, just say it's not safe */
-		return false;
+		/* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() */
+		return equal;
 	}
 
 	/* Shouldn't get here; if we do, say it's not safe */
@@ -13085,7 +13261,6 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat
 {
 	int i;
 
-	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++)
 		if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],
 			     env->idmap_scratch))
@@ -13109,14 +13284,25 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
 		return false;
 
+	memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch));
+
 	/* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
 	 * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
 	 */
 	if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
 		return false;
 
-	if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr ||
-	    old->active_lock.id != cur->active_lock.id)
+	if (old->active_lock.ptr != cur->active_lock.ptr)
+		return false;
+
+	/* Old and cur active_lock's have to be either both present
+	 * or both absent.
+	 */
+	if (!!old->active_lock.id != !!cur->active_lock.id)
+		return false;
+
+	if (old->active_lock.id &&
+	    !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch))
 		return false;
 
 	if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock)
@@ -13283,13 +13469,6 @@ static int is_state_visited(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx)
 	int i, j, err, states_cnt = 0;
 	bool add_new_state = env->test_state_freq ? true : false;
 
-	cur->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
-	if (!env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].prune_point)
-		/* this 'insn_idx' instruction wasn't marked, so we will not
-		 * be doing state search here
-		 */
-		return 0;
-
 	/* bpf progs typically have pruning point every 4 instructions
 	 * http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-1
 	 * Do not add new state for future pruning if the verifier hasn't seen
@@ -13424,10 +13603,10 @@ next:
 		env->max_states_per_insn = states_cnt;
 
 	if (!env->bpf_capable && states_cnt > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STATES)
-		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
+		return 0;
 
 	if (!add_new_state)
-		return push_jmp_history(env, cur);
+		return 0;
 
 	/* There were no equivalent states, remember the current one.
 	 * Technically the current state is not proven to be safe yet,
@@ -13567,21 +13746,31 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			return -E2BIG;
 		}
 
-		err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
-		if (err < 0)
-			return err;
-		if (err == 1) {
-			/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
-			if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
-				if (do_print_state)
-					verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
-						env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
-						env->cur_state->speculative ?
-						" (speculative execution)" : "");
-				else
-					verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
+		state->last_insn_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
+
+		if (is_prune_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
+			err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
+			if (err < 0)
+				return err;
+			if (err == 1) {
+				/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
+				if (env->log.level & BPF_LOG_LEVEL) {
+					if (do_print_state)
+						verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
+							env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
+							env->cur_state->speculative ?
+							" (speculative execution)" : "");
+					else
+						verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
+				}
+				goto process_bpf_exit;
 			}
-			goto process_bpf_exit;
+		}
+
+		if (is_jmp_point(env, env->insn_idx)) {
+			err = push_jmp_history(env, state);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
 		}
 
 		if (signal_pending(current))
@@ -14123,10 +14312,11 @@ static int check_map_prog_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE:
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE:
 		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_TASK_STORAGE:
+		case BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE:
 			break;
 		default:
 			verbose(env,
-				"Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, and ringbuf maps\n");
+				"Sleepable programs can only use array, hash, ringbuf and local storage maps\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
@@ -14782,6 +14972,10 @@ static int opt_subreg_zext_lo32_rnd_hi32(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (!bpf_jit_needs_zext() && !is_cmpxchg_insn(&insn))
 			continue;
 
+		/* Zero-extension is done by the caller. */
+		if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(&insn))
+			continue;
+
 		if (WARN_ON(load_reg == -1)) {
 			verbose(env, "verifier bug. zext_dst is set, but no reg is defined\n");
 			return -EFAULT;
@@ -15292,7 +15486,7 @@ static int fixup_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 	}
 
 	/* insn->imm has the btf func_id. Replace it with
-	 * an address (relative to __bpf_base_call).
+	 * an address (relative to __bpf_call_base).
 	 */
 	desc = find_kfunc_desc(env->prog, insn->imm, insn->off);
 	if (!desc) {
@@ -16464,12 +16658,22 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			switch (prog->type) {
 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
-				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable only if they are
+
+				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can be sleepable if they are
 				 * attached to ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION and are not in denylist.
 				 */
 				if (!check_non_sleepable_error_inject(btf_id) &&
 				    within_error_injection_list(addr))
 					ret = 0;
+				/* fentry/fexit/fmod_ret progs can also be sleepable if they are
+				 * in the fmodret id set with the KF_SLEEPABLE flag.
+				 */
+				else {
+					u32 *flags = btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id);
+
+					if (flags && (*flags & KF_SLEEPABLE))
+						ret = 0;
+				}
 				break;
 			case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
 				/* LSM progs check that they are attached to bpf_lsm_*() funcs.
@@ -16490,7 +16694,10 @@ int bpf_check_attach_target(struct bpf_verifier_log *log,
 				bpf_log(log, "can't modify return codes of BPF programs\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
-			ret = check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			if (btf_kfunc_is_modify_return(btf, btf_id) ||
+			    !check_attach_modify_return(addr, tname))
+				ret = 0;
 			if (ret) {
 				bpf_log(log, "%s() is not modifiable\n", tname);
 				return ret;
@@ -16679,7 +16886,6 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr)
 
 	env->allow_ptr_leaks = bpf_allow_ptr_leaks();
 	env->allow_uninit_stack = bpf_allow_uninit_stack();
-	env->allow_ptr_to_map_access = bpf_allow_ptr_to_map_access();
 	env->bypass_spec_v1 = bpf_bypass_spec_v1();
 	env->bypass_spec_v4 = bpf_bypass_spec_v4();
 	env->bpf_capable = bpf_capable();